DIMENSIONS OF CRISIS ON MIGRATION IN SOMALIA

Working Paper February 2014

Department of Operations and Emergencies
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Geneva, Switzerland
This map is for illustration purpose only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

**General Flows:**
Influx of IDPs, high concentration of urban-based NGOs and transnational companies, increased access to services have favoured rural to urban migration. Integrated into camps and cities, many stayed in city centers.

**In South-Central Somalia:**
Migrate and camp near permanent water sites in dry season, and return to villages regularly.
Nomadic populations (Hawiye, Darood, Dir/Isaaq) - N and NE (congregate in villages/encampments near wells/permanent water sources). Nomadic populations (Hawiye, Darood, Dir/Isaaq) - Disperse with herds, live in some encampments in the Haud (large area that crosses into Ethiopia).

**In the US:***
*11,596* Legal permanent residents in 2013
*15,187* Unauthorized migrants

**GLOBALLY:**
USD 1 - 2.3 BILLION EST. 14% of total population of 10.2 million

**In Canada:**
*11,596* Permanent residents

**In Europe:**
*14,265* Legal permanent residents

**In Australia and New Zealand:**
*7,630* Permanent residents

**In South Africa:**
*26,190* Permanent residents

**In Egypt:**
*54,575* Unauthorized migrants

**In the US:**
*15,187* Unauthorized migrants

**In South-Central Somalia:**
Majority are Ethiopians in Somaliland and Puntland. Clan-based expulsions (dominant/non-indigenous clans expelling smaller clans) also the case in South-Central Somalia.

**In Somalia:**
From Mogadishu to three camps on the outskirts of the city. From Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Galkacyo to Baidoa, Afgooye, Wanla, Weyne, Balad and Jowhar districts in Southern Somalia. Massive internal displacement is also caused by localized violence over water and pasture resources.

**In Djibouti:**
*4,796* Somali refugees as of 2013.

**In Kenya:**
*54,000* Somali refugees registered as of 2013.
*235,316* Population as of 2013.

**In Tanzania:**
*5,796* Somali refugees as of 2013.

**In Yemen:**
*487,000* Somali refugees as of 2013.

**In Uganda:**
*270,000* Asylum seekers by the Government as of 2013.

**In Ethiopia:**
*198,451* Somali refugees registered in DOLLO ADDO as of 2013.

**Dadaab Camps:**
388,000

**Kambioos Camp:**
64,307

**Ifo 2 Camp:**
19,919

**Melkadida Camp:**
388,000

**Bokolmanyo Camp:**
64,307

**Buramino Camp:**
19,919

**Hilaweyn Camp:**
19,919

**Kobe Camp:**
19,919

**Ali-Addeh Camp:**
18,000 (under)

**Hol-hol Camp:**
1,100

**in the US:**
*11,596* Permanent residents

**in Canada:**
*11,596* Permanent residents
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IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

Publisher: International Organization for Migration
17 route des Morillons
1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland
Tel: +41.22.717 91 11
Fax: +41.22.798 61 50
E-mail: hq@iom.int
Internet: http://www.iom.int

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ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GECPD</td>
<td>Galkacyo Education Centre for Peace and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCOF</td>
<td>Migration Crisis Operational Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDA</td>
<td>Migration Development for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR-TB</td>
<td>Multi-drug resistant tuberculosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Return Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, sanitation and hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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</table>
INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND CONTEXT

This working paper considers the current multifaceted migration dimensions of crisis in Somalia, a country that is slowly re-emerging from over two decades of internal conflict. Since 1991, over a million Somalis have been forcibly displaced internationally and another 1.1 million displaced internally. Somalis make up one of the largest, most widespread diaspora around the globe. Apart from the fact that Somalia has a deep tradition of seasonal and pastoralist mobility and circular migration across borders, the years of lost development and a lack of livelihood opportunities has provoked widespread rural-urban as well as labour migration and fuelled human smuggling, human trafficking, gender-based violence (GBV) and/or labour and domestic servitude. The absence of government and rule of law during the crisis has also enabled the number of clan-based expulsions, particularly against minorities, to rise. Periods of drought, flooding, famine and environmental degradation have further compounded the problem.

The migration situation is changing rapidly. Many displaced Somalis are spontaneously returning while hosting countries of refugees are calling on the Somali government, its regional authorities as well as the international community to respond. The perceived increased stability has also led several other neighbouring and European countries to start discussing the forcible return of migrants with unsuccessful asylum claims, while other countries have already begun doing so.1 Most recently, in November 2013, the government of Kenya, who has been hosting the largest share of Somali refugees, the government of Somalia and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) signed a Tripartite Agreement governing the voluntary return of Somali refugees.2

Despite gains in stability, reports continue to warn of the fragility of the peace. The threat of violence, particularly in south-central Somalia and its capital Mogadishu remains high.3 Ethnic violence continues to flare up sporadically and the insurgent group Al-Shabaab still controls most rural areas in south-central Somalia as well as parts of southern Puntland. This means there are still often heavy security measures in place and restricted mobility. Further, demanding statebuilding challenges and institutional constraints compounded by a susceptibility to droughts, environmental degradation and high burden of disease make for a long and difficult road for recovery. The already fragile and limited resources in communities and urban centres will have to increasingly absorb the movement and return of millions of displaced persons and migrants.

Moreover, with its high unemployment, food insecurity, poverty, lack of health services, water scarcity and lack of improved sanitation among other challenges, Somalia ranks at the bottom levels of human development indicators. More than 870,000 Somalis (almost three-quarters of whom are internally displaced persons (IDPs)) living in urban or semi urban areas are deemed to be in emergency or in crisis situations and are in need of humanitarian assistance, while another 2.3 million Somalis are considered ‘stressed’ in the areas of food of nutrition.4 Given the current harvest results, acute malnutrition levels are likely to remain at ‘Serious to Critical’ levels across Somalia in the immediate period.5 The conditions that drive various forms of migration remain both widespread and rampant.

There is thus an urgent demand for information and data on the migration dimensions of the crisis in Somalia. Such information is critical to support policy and programme development across the spectrum from helping to determine the timing, phasing and safety considerations of return; to ensuring the continuity of care and well-being for those still in refugee or IDP settlements; managing and mitigating broader assistance to migrations and mobile populations in Somalia; and identifying and predicting new mobility trends and needs; to supporting dialogue that promotes early planning of migration into broader country recovery and development planning.

2. PURPOSE OF WORKING PAPER

Forming part of a broader series of profiles prepared by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in line with IOM’s Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF), the paper applies a “migration crisis” approach. It draws upon a range of existing research, published data and field interviews in order to form an overall synopsis of the migration dimensions of the crisis. The paper thus sets out the risks, challenges and opportunities associated with the spontaneous and planned movement of refugees, IDPs, irregular migrants and other vulnerable migrating groups in Somalia.

The focus of the paper is on Somalia broadly, which includes the semi-autonomous regions of Puntland, Somaliland and Jubaland, even though the situation and responses in each of the regions could benefit respectively from specific study and consideration and will have different structures and planning to address the displacement. Further, given the international community’s current prioritization of the issue of returns and returning populations, the paper gives disproportionate emphasis on the implications of such; however, migration in Somalia is complex and thus disproportionate assistance to other migrants and mobile populations are also priorities.

Given the rapidly changing environment for returns and other vulnerable migrant groups, the paper is expected to be updated, as needed. In a similar vein, due to certain limitations in data collection in parts of the country and the fact that this paper is the first of its kind to look holistically at the full crisis dimensions of migration in Somalia, this paper poses questions, in many ways more than it answers. The questions aim to help frame broader research requirements necessary for developing an informed, comprehensive and evidence-based knowledge base for all policy and programming considerations.
3. UNDERSTANDING SOMALIA’S MOBILITY THROUGH A MIGRATION CRISIS LENS

IOM uses the term “migration crisis” as a way to refer to and analyse the often large-scale and unpredictable migration flows and mobility patterns caused by conflict or natural disasters. These typically involve significant vulnerabilities for individuals and affected communities and generate acute and longer-term migration management challenges. A migration crisis may be slow in onset, can have natural or man-made causes and can take place internally or across borders. By capturing patterns of human mobility in their full complexity and revealing a more nuanced picture of the vulnerabilities and conditions that emerge in the context of different forms of involuntary movement, a migration crisis analysis allows policymakers to develop an integrated response to the crisis, including humanitarian, migration management, transition and recovery, peace and security, and development concerns. Key institutional documents include: ‘IOM migration crisis operational framework’ [IOM Council 101st session, 15 November 2012, MC/2355] and the ‘IOM’s migration crisis operational framework factsheet’ which can be found the IOM website [http://www.iom.int/cms/mcof].

Box 1: “MIGRATION CRISIS” APPROACH

Under the IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework, the migration crisis approach has been developed to highlight the migration dimensions of crises that are frequently overlooked in crisis response, such as:

a) The patterns of human mobility before, during and after a crisis;

b) The types of consequences that emerge from these patterns, from different perspectives including humanitarian perspectives (e.g. massive humanitarian needs in terms of food security and shelter), migration management perspectives (e.g. needs for large-scale transportation of populations to a safe haven) and peace and development perspectives;

c) The implications of these types of consequences for rapid, inclusive, predictable and accountable responses for the affected population;

d) The needs of vulnerable mobile populations not adequately covered by existing mechanisms, particularly international migrants caught in crises in their destination/transit countries.


The ‘migration crisis’ approach allows for recognition that not all patterns of mobility during crises and not all those on the move during crises are comprehensively covered by current international, regional and national frameworks. As such, given the mixed nature of mobility and the various dimensions that affect migration in Somalia, this approach allows for an inclusive focus on the vulnerabilities of a variety of people on the move and the affected communities as it is the dynamic of the whole picture, not only certain categories, that pose a challenge for Somalia.

4. CONTENT AND STRUCTURE

Part I - Migration context in Somalia

Part I of the paper begins by providing a brief snapshot of Somalia’s cultural, political and socio-economic context. This serves to better understand not only the unparalleled complexity of Somalia’s migration environment past and present; but also the conditions and context that will continue to drive migration and influence future mobility patterns in the country. It is important to understand the various crisis dimensions of migration in Somalia beyond forced displacement, and to help identify the broader need for assistance for migration and mobile populations.

Part II – Mixed mobility, host and return communities and evolving migratory patterns

Part II of the paper profiles the range of key target groups of Somalia’s migration crisis, including the location and distribution of refugees, IDPs, international labour, diaspora, rural-to-urban and irregular migrants. It also identifies key issues surrounding vulnerable groups such as women, minorities and victims of human trafficking; and explores Somalia’s vast and dispersed diaspora. It further outlines the current conditions of displaced populations, which serve as a push-pull to return, including those that may force premature self-repatriation. The section ends with a brief look at the impact of migration on hosting communities and on the potential consequences on communities in coping with the mass influx of returns.
Part III – Political and social considerations of return

Part III takes a closer look at the impact of the migration crisis on Somalia and the hosting countries of refugees. It summarizes the international and national response to migration and policies of return. This includes considering the significance of the recent Tripartite Agreement signed among the governments of Somalia, Kenya and UNHCR on the repatriation of Somali refugees in Kenya. This section also puts forward several social considerations of returning populations and refugee hosting communities.

Part IV – Conclusion and general recommendations

Part IV concludes the working paper by outlining a number of questions of consideration. It then puts forward recommendations related to data analysis and collection as well as information-sharing and coordination; interim measures and early preparations pre-return; strengthening government capacity; and early planning for sustainable return, recovery and reintegration.

1 For instance Saudi Arabia has been returning irregular migrants (see box 1).
3 The Copenhagen Post, Immigration Service ready to send Somali asylum seekers back (Copenhagen: 11 February 2013).
4 “Focus on Deyr Season Early Warning” Food Security and Nutrition, Food Security, Nutrition and Analysis Unit – Somalia, Quarterly Brief (November 15 2013).
5 Ibid.
### SOMALIA AT A GLANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borders</strong></td>
<td>Ethiopia (west), Djibouti (northwest), Gulf of Aden (north), Indian Ocean (east), Kenya (southwest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land area</strong></td>
<td>637,657 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable land (% of land area)</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural land (% of land area)</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent cropland (% of land area)</td>
<td>.05% (2011.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong></td>
<td>Somali, Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main ethnic groups</strong></td>
<td>Somalis (85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>Benadiris, Bantu, Gaboye, Banjuni and others (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>10,200,000 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>16.12 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>18 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age structure</td>
<td>70% under the age of 30 (2012a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown by years</td>
<td>0-14 years - 44.5%; 15-24 years - 18.8%; 25-54 years - 31%; 55-64 years - 3.3%; 65+ - 2.4% (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>1 million (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>1+ million (2007a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban population</strong></td>
<td>3,897,783 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total population</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% urban settings &gt; 1 million</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% annual urban population growth</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population in Mogadishu</strong></td>
<td>1,610,576 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of urban population</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total population</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural population</strong></td>
<td>6,297,351 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total population</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Literacy of age 15+</strong></td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female/male</td>
<td>25.8%/49.7% (2001c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life expectancy at birth</strong></td>
<td>50 years (2010b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5 mortality (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of Tuberculosis (per 100,000)</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physicians (per 1,000)</strong></td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses and midwives (per 1,000)</td>
<td>1.1 (200b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved water source</strong></td>
<td>29.5% (2010b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of rural access</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of urban access</td>
<td>66.4 (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved sanitation facilities</strong></td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of rural access</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of urban access</td>
<td>52% (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purchasing power parity</strong></td>
<td>USD 5.896 billion (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real growth rate</td>
<td>2.6% (2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**INTRODUCTION**

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<tr>
<th>Per capita</th>
<th>USD 284 (2012a)(^7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture/industry/services</td>
<td>59.3%/7.2%/33.5% (2011c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated remittances (total)</strong></td>
<td><strong>USD 1 billion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita/% of GDP</td>
<td>USD 110/35% of GDP (2012a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multidimensional poverty</strong></td>
<td><strong>81.2% of population</strong> (2012a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment to population ratio (15+years)</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male/female</td>
<td>73%/35% (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force participation (15-64 years)</td>
<td>58.7 (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male/female</td>
<td>79%/39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture/industry and services</td>
<td>71%/29% (1975c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines in use/mobile cellular</td>
<td>1 per 100 people /6.7 per 100 people (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users</td>
<td>1.3 per 100 people (2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: [no mark] World Bank Databank; a. UNDP Human Development Index, 2012; b. WHO Somalia Health Profile 2011 (figures 2010); c. CIA World Factbook. Note: Given the scarcity of data available in Somalia, the sources used for this table reflect the most recent figures available for Somalia. However, the sources themselves may have drawn from figures dating several years and projected the estimates to the time listed as publication. Therefore, the figures should be read as rough indications as opposed to evidence-based fact.

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\(^6\) Improved sanitation signifies use of any of the following facilities: flush or pour-flush to a piped sewer system, septic tank or pit latrine; ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrine; pit latrine with slab; or a composting toilet.

Dimensions of Crisis on Migration in Somalia

PART I - MIGRATION CONTEXT IN SOMALIA

This section explores the different cultural, environmental, political, economic, health and security factors that drive or motivate voluntary and crisis-induced mobility in Somalia. The years of political crisis, clan-based warfare and underdevelopment have affected the regular and irregular migration patterns of the country and forced the displacement of over one million across borders and another 1.1 million people internally. Many aspects of the country’s traditional mobility patterns may have been irrevocably altered in the aftermath of the crisis due to property loss, resource degradation, or from the socio-cultural impacts of generations having lived—even born and raised—in crowded settlements or urban environments. All of these factors intertwine and will influence opportunities and preferences of return and future migration trends.

In turn, the widespread migratory return of millions will add significant pressure to inter-clan relations as well as the country’s political, socio-economic and environmental landscape. The harsh socio-cultural conditions have given and will continue to give many little choice but to attempt movements to urban centers or abroad. Consequently, the lines between forced and voluntary migration—equally for returning populations—are blurred.

1. CULTURAL FACTORS OF MIGRATION

Somalia shares its borders with Ethiopia on the west, Djibouti to the northwest and Kenya to the southwest. Its long coastline connects it to the Gulf of Aden to the north and the Indian Ocean to the east. Somalia share a common ethnicity, language, and religion that also transcends across borders. Despite the homogeneity, clan affiliations are a deep and divisive component of cultural identity. The major clans are the Hawiye, Darood, Dir/Isaaq, and Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirlife) (see map 1). The Haarti (a subset of the Daarood) is located in the east (Puntland), and the Isaaq clan primarily in the northeast (Somaliland). Each of these are ‘super clans’ that consist of sub-clans and extended family networks that have a stronger influence on identity but that also join or split in a fluid process.\(^8\)

The Bantu, Benadir, Gaboye and Bajuni groups form part of Somalia’s ethnic minorities. Prior to the conflict they were largely isolated and immobile and had little interaction with major clans. However, these minority groups have traditionally experienced varying levels of discrimination by the major clans and have been generally socially and politically excluded based on traditional occupations.\(^9\) Given the impunity of absent rule of law during the conflict, the minority groups have faced increasing levels of clan-based expulsions and forced displacement. Moreover, as populations moved to escape the conflict or due to the expulsions, different ethnic groups increasingly mixed. Consequently marginalization reportedly increased, particularly in settlements of IDPs.\(^1\) Grievances of GBV against minority women committed by men from majority clans, for instance, have been anecdotally remarked. The incidents are often unreported and, as noted in Puntland, information on the incidents have been likely suppressed by majority groups.\(^1\)

Map 1: Geographic representation of major clans\(^1\)

In the central-south, urbanization, violence, and efforts to create a centralized state have weakened traditional structures but the groupings still hold immense influence over society.\(^1\) Traditional governance, known as xeer, sets up customary laws that varies according to the traditions and cultures of the clans. Over the years the various variations have incorporated elements of Islam and colonial systems. The xeer functions independently of modern structures and for the past decades has, with sharia laws, played a central societal role given the collapse of the formal governance and judicial system during the conflict.

2. CLIMATE

Somalia’s climate is arid in the northeastern and central regions to semi-arid in the northwest. There is little seasonal variation and unpredictable rainfall. Rainfall patterns include scarcity, poor distribution, seasonal variability in terms of the beginning and end of the wet seasons and annual irregularity in the amount of rainfall. Consequently, the country experiences droughts of different severity every 4-5 years. Somalia was the worst hit by regional droughts in
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2011, which in addition to the country’s insecurity and limited access of humanitarian agencies, caused the deaths of over a quarter of a million people (260,000), and added hundreds of thousands to the already war-torn displacement. Most recently in November 2013, a cyclone produced flashfloods in Puntland’s coastal areas, which may have killed three hundred residents while 400 nomadic households are estimated to have lost their livestock. Reglar flooding around the Juba and Shabelle rivers contributes to severe food scarcity and food insecurity. During the hot season in Puntland, heavy winds close down activities in the harbour including mobility across the sea to Yemen.

3. SEASONAL MOBILITY, PASTORALISM AND TRANSHUMANCE

Mobility in the form of nomadic rotation and transhumance is a traditional coping mechanism to the resource-scarce environment deeply embedded in Somali culture. The cyclical nature of migration tends to be deliberate, strategic, and “anticipatory”, determined by the region’s erratic rainfall patterns and resource-scarce environment. During the dry season, the north and northeastern nomadic populations overwhelmingly made up of the Hawiye, Darood and Dir/Isaaq, congregate in villages or large encampments at permanent wells or other reliable sources of water. During the wet seasons and for as long as the water and animal forage last, they disperse with their herds and live in small encampments throughout the Haud, a large area that crosses into Ethiopia.

Prior to Somalia’s protracted crisis, the vast majority (80%) of the population relied upon raising livestock while over half of the population (about 55%) engaged in nomadic pastoralism. Given that the rangeland is unsuited for other use, pastoralism has been the primary livelihood option available in these areas.

Given the relatively higher availability of water and farming land in the south, many south-central Somalis practice agro-pastoralism, involving less mobility because of the mix of farming and animal husbandry. They will, however, periodically migrate and “camp near permanent water sites” during the dry seasons and “return [to the villages] on a regular basis”.

Following the 1973-75 drought, the government pushed to move rural pastoralists to permanent, semi-urban permanent settlements, including fishing villages and range-grazing reserves. This was intended to help alleviate pastoralist vulnerabilities caused by drought and erratic rains. However, the settlement programme was not met with much success for several reasons such as the incompatibility of pastoralist and coastal culture, a lack of infrastructural support, little local demand and limited access to foreign markets. Consequently many returned to a nomadic life-style.

4. POLITICS

Somalia gained independence in 1960 and established a clan-driven multi-party system. Nine years later (1969), Major-General Mohammed Siad Barre led a military coup. In 1991, armed opposition groups ousted the autocratic military regime, plunging the country into clan-based civil warfare. Over the years that followed, various factions vied for control; however, for the most part the state was left without a central government. Critical developments during the war, the northern region declared its sovereignty from Somalia, forming the Republic of Somaliland (1991); the eastern region established the self-governing Puntland State of Somalia (1998); and the residents of Somalia’s
Juba region announced the regional administration of Jubaland in 2010. The latter was formalized in 2011 and recognized by the federal government in 2013. The regional administrations, which have varying degrees of independence, provided enclaves of relative stability and governance in the warring country. Internationally, the regions continue to be considered as part of the state of Somalia.

Among the most notable efforts to establish a central government, an interim Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in 2004. The TFG established the Transitional Federal Charter, as a temporary legal framework based on equal representation of the four major clans in the legislature and a half place allotted to minorities. Overall, the TFG held limited public support and managed little progress towards stabilization. In 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was installed and mandated to protect the TFG.

By 2009 Al-Shabaab, a group linked with the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, became Somalia’s most powerful insurgent group. A series of offensives led by the Somali military and AMISOM, bolstered by an intervention of the Kenyan army in 2011, succeeded in weakening Al-Shabaab. With growing stability in south-central Somalia and its capital Mogadishu, in 2012, the country held its first indirect election in 40 years, at which point the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) replaced the TFG. The FGS remains in power to present and has the broad support of the international community. The recent signing of the Somali Compact in September 2013 is a notable achievement. The Compact is based on the “New Deal Strategy for Engagement in Fragile States” agreed by states in Busan, South Korea in November 2011. It was agreed during the conference “A New Deal for Somalia” held in Brussels and co-hosted by the Somali Federal Government and the European Union. The Compact sets out five “Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals”, namely: building inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations, revenue collection and services. Under which, there are fifty-eight milestones to be implemented over three years (2014-2016). Development partners (donors) have pledged USD 2.42 billion to help implement the milestones.

The FGS aims to finalize a permanent constitution by 2015 and plans to hold national elections in 2016. However, consensus on a national vision, including power and wealth-sharing, has not yet been reached by the time of writing. Political disagreements between the President and Prime Minister led to the President calling for the latter’s resignation and for the vote of no-confidence from country’s parliament in December 2013. There are also several unresolved issues and points of contention between the government and regional administrations.

5. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Even before the state collapse and years of civil conflict, Somalia was already among the poorest countries in Africa; income and human poverty was widespread mainly among the nomadic and rural population and they had limited access to health and education services and clean drinking water. The conditions since 1991 have compounded the problem in both rural and urban areas, which have severely affected human development outcomes. Food insecurity, together with the high levels of population displacement and insecurity has led to a continuing humanitarian crisis. In 2012, Somalia overall ranked in the bottom five of the Human Development Index. Within the country, Somaliland typically ranked better in human development indicators followed by Puntland. South-central Somalia has endured the most challenging conditions.

Among the human development indicators, levels of education, income, health and gender equality received the lowest scores. The most recent figures on literacy date to 2001, in which only 37 per cent of the population over 15 years of age were considered literate and only a quarter of which were females (see Table 1). Poverty is widespread and persistent across the country. Using a poverty line of USD 2 per day, almost three quarters of the population (73%) are poor, which translates to sixty-one per cent of the urban population and 80 per cent of the rural population. Further, according to the 2012 Human Development report, “99 per cent of people in nomadic areas and 94 per cent in rural areas are multidimensionally poor in urban areas, three out of five people live in poor households, with an average intensity of deprivation of 50 percent. The proportion of people suffering multidimensional poverty is highest in south central Somalia at 89 per cent, followed by Puntland at 75 per cent and Somaliland at 72 per cent”. Over 73 per cent of the population is under the age of 30. The continuously high birthrates and low life expectancy of 50 years suggests that the patterns of “youth bulge” will persist, which raises particular potential risks and which begets specific livelihood and service demands. It also, however, brings with it the potential for innovative and productive opportunity. This is particularly relevant given the employment to population ratio in Somalia is estimated to be around only 40 per cent (see Table 1).

The widespread conflict and political strife have crippled the health system and essential infrastructure, resulting in sub-standard and inadequate health services and water provision in Somalia. The capacity of health authorities is limited, and the country faces chronic shortages of qualified health personnel and equipment. Reportedly there are no trained nurses or midwives (traditionally trained are present, however) in the rural and nomadic areas and overall there is an estimated 1.1 nurses and 0.04 physicians per 1,000 people. Access to adequate and equitable prevention, continuity of health care and referral services are thus very limited particularly for those in hard-to-reach locations. As a result, the country bares the highest under-five mortality rate and the second highest maternal mortality ratio globally. Anecdotal reports indicate that some Somalis cross the border and seek treatment for multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) and/or other health care services in Kenya.
More than three quarters of the population lack access to proper sanitation safe drinking water (see Table 1). The severe water scarcity has been another driving factor for internal displacement. Existing water sources are inadequate in regards to accessibility, quantity and quality for human and livestock consumption. Less than 20 per cent of the populations in rural and pastoralist communities have access to improved drinking water, while 45 per cent of the urban population has access to improved water sources, which are mainly in the form of piped or potable water. For the past two years, the consecutive lack of rain coupled with poor water and available pasture in the rural areas has worsened the humanitarian situation. Along with consistently high temperatures, this has led to dried-up shallow wells and long water-trekking expeditions to reach existing boreholes. Access to and availability of safe water is critical, limited, and is a potential cause for both conflict and internal migration.

The country severely struggles to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) particularly in the areas of under-five mortality and maternal health, tuberculosis, illiteracy, gender disparity and malnutrition among many other indicators. According to TFG's MDG progress reports, it is unlikely to meet most of the MDG targets by 2015.

6. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The 2012 Human Development Report estimates Somalia’s GDP at USD 284 per capita, which is significantly lower than the sub-Saharan African per capita average of USD 1,300. During the conflict, Somalia maintained an informal economy, based mainly on livestock, remittance, and telecommunications. Livestock, hides, fish, charcoal and bananas are Somalia’s principal exports though livestock is the mainstay of the economy and is estimated to create about 60 per cent of Somalia’s job opportunities and represent 40 per cent of its GDP. The export of livestock and meat generates 80 per cent of foreign currency. External humanitarian and development aid has accounted for USD 75 per capita, which is more than double the per capita average for other fragile states (USD 36). Remittances are the highest worldwide and, in 2004 were estimated to be at around USD 1 billion (USD 110 per capita), representing 35 per cent of GDP. The estimates, however, could be as high as USD 2.3 billion. The private sector has been largely unregulated and is often “marred by elite capture of revenue sources, often by cartels linked to militias.”

The country has few natural resources, but the main ones are livestock, cash crops, charcoal, marine resources, and frankincense. Throughout Somalia, minerals, including uranium and likely deposits of petroleum and natural gas are found, but have not been exploited commercially. Telecommunications is among the most dynamic of the service industries. One person per 100 has a landline while 6.7 people per 100 have mobile cellular lines. The telecommunication companies provide the lowest international call rates on the African continent. Around 1.3 per 100 people use the internet and private firms provide wireless access in most major cities. The main growth in commercial activity has been in transit trade, with Somalia acting as a transfer point for goods travelling to markets in the Horn and East Africa.

The overall low economic performance, limited livelihood opportunities and environmental degradation have produced high levels of both rural to urban and international migration (see Part 2),

7. SECURITY

Following its independence, Somalia’s first war, the Ethiopia-Somali war, took place in 1977-78 over the disputed Ogaden region situated in present-day eastern Ethiopia. It is an area of ethnic and grazing significance for pastoralist Somalis. Consequent to the conflict, Somalia hosted an estimated 1.1 million Ethiopian refugees. Approximately 500,000 refugees were in camps and the remaining among the local population. UNHCR coordinated the return of 300,000 refugees under a rehabilitation programme, while 4-500,000 self-repatriated, many fleeing when Somalia’s first civil war broke out in 1987.

Internally, the first phase of Somalia’s protracted conflict began as a liberation movement (1987-1991) between the government and the Somali National Movement in northwestern Somalia (Somaliland). The war produced more than 500,000 Somali refugees distributed in eight refugee camps in Ethiopia and hundreds of thousands of IDPs. By 2005, after conditions in Somaliland had stabilized, the majority of the refugees self-repatriated from Ethiopia. Many of those who were refugees in Ethiopia, however, became IDPs upon their return to Somalia. They had lost...
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access to their land and were unable to resume their livelihood and compounded by the state collapse and migration crisis that had been happening around them since 1991.

Following the ousting of Somalia's long-standing military government (1991), the country plunged into clan-based civil warfare. Rivaling the TFG, which commanded little internal support and had made little progress, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a culmination of Sharia courts and warlords, took control of the southern parts of the country and restored a semblance of order. In 2006, the TFG engaged Ethiopia's military support to counter the ICU, a move that was generally considered to be unpopular among the public. Stripped of most of their territory, some of the hardline ICU members splintered into factions such as Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab tapped into the vulnerabilities, especially youth who supported the Islamic rule and who had felt disempowered by political processes and the economic decline around them. The group also used intimidation and force, along with jihadist indoctrination to recruit the youths.

The TFG and AMISOM, with Kenya's support have succeeded in weakening Al-Shabaab. However, the group has not been defeated and remains active in different areas of south-central Somalia, terrorizing Mogadishu among other areas. Daily reports of attacks surface from throughout the country and suspected Al-Shabaab infiltrators assassinate many leading individuals – judges, government officials, peacemakers – in 'unknown killings' that continues to breed deep fear among local populations.

Dissention and splitting within Al-Shabaab ranks and fighting between different insurgent groups are now occupying much of the recent insecurity. However Al-Shabaab has always maintained a certain empathy among the youth. Youthful frustration and idleness in a country plagued with high unemployment (60%) and limited access to basic services, where almost three-quarters of the population are under the age of 30, are fertile grounds for recruitment.

Moreover, the dissention and splitting in Al-Shabaab may produce unpredictable changes in its approach, posing a risk of new forms of insurgencies. Militant fighters attacked the UN compound in Mogadishu just outside the secure airport compound where all the U.N agencies are based, killing fifteen staff members and contractors and injuring thirteen civilians. An evolving Al-Shabaab could result in an increase of such asymmetric attacks and other guerrilla tactics that extend beyond south-central Somalia potentially into the more stable regions of Somaliland and Puntland and even into neighbouring countries. For instance, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for attacks in Nairobi, notably a high profile terrorist attack on a mall (September 2013) that lasted three days and resulted in 72 deaths.

In contrast, while attention is focused on Al-Shabaab, local militias and non-state actors are vying for control and influence in the newly accessible areas and old grievances among clans and communities over land and scarce resources could re-emerge that transform the conflict again. Localized violence over water and pasture resources have also led to massive internal displacement. Apart from the conflict, as noted above, there has been a high rate of expulsions of smaller clans by non-indigenous dominant clans, particularly in south-central Somalia. Criminal activities and banditry, private disputes and vendettas, coupled with weak governance, law enforcement capacity and judiciary services as well as organized crime further perpetuate localized insecurity. Indeed, the Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia covering the three month period between August and November 2013 noted an increase in criminal activities, “including the establishment of illegal checkpoints, robberies and extortion of drivers and owners of public transportation vehicles. In addition, abuses against civilians by undisciplined elements of the Somali national security forces were reported, mainly on the outskirts of Mogadishu and Kismaayo.”

Relative to south-central Somalia, the security situation in Somaliland and Puntland has been more stable. Nevertheless, tensions and civil unrest, some of which are violent surface over the disputed Sool, Sanaag and Caayn regions and there are clan tensions and periodic clashes between Somaliland and the self-proclaimed “Khatumo State”.

In Puntland, relatively low-level but intermittent Al-Shabaab activities persist, including clashes with Puntland security forces in the Galgala mountains area. Explosive devices near the residence of the President of Puntland, Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, in Garoowe, were discovered in August 2013. In November, Al-Shabaab insurgents are alleged to have conducted coordinated attacks on a Puntland government office, police station (Biyu Kulule) and central prison (Bosasso). As Puntland prepares for upcoming indirect elections, there are heightened security concerns in such key towns as Garowe, Bosasso and Galkacyo. Criminal activities, in particular relating to clan disputes, piracy and business continue to pose the biggest threat in Puntland and Galmudug. A security official in Galkacyo noted in 2013: “the local police are not enough to enhance the security of the town. They are overwhelmed with issues and understaffed with only a few officers manning police stations.”
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10 Barigababer, Assfaw. Crisis and crisis-induced migration in Somalia, Background study and field research conducted in 2013 (International Organization for Migration, n.d.).
12 Ibid.
13 Kaplan op. cit.
14 Barigababer, A. op. cit.
16 For instance 300 deep-water wells were drilled, however, many watering points were in private reserves and only open to those who could pay. Handulle and Gay write: "This has encouraged the intrusion of new pastoral groups into grazing areas which were previously under the defacto control of groups with tradition water rights in the area. These factors have led to the further breakdown of traditional grazing disciplines". Handulle, Abdullahi, and Gay, Charles W. Development and Traditional Pastoralism in Somalia, Commission on Nomadic Peoples, Number 19 (1987), p.39.
17 Ibid., p.39.
18 Ibid., p.37.
22 Handulle and Gay, op. cit., p.36.
25 Ibid., p. 656.
27 The appointed parliament elected the president, who selected the prime minister, who in turn selected the ministers.
28 Somali regions, Members of Parliament, civil society and international organizations also participated in the conference. The deal includes special provisions for Somaliland, though it will receive assistance as part several international organizations also participated in the conference. The deal includes special provisions for Somaliland, though it will receive assistance as part of the Somali Compact, press release (17 September 2013); "The Somali Compact," the Federal Republic of Somalia (16 September 2013); see also Uluso, Mohamed M. The Somali Compact: promising deal but with fatal flaws HIPRAA online (Somalia, 4 October 2013).
29 The Somali Compact, op. cit.
30 The Somali Compact", press release, op. cit.
32 Hamza, Mohamed, Somalia FM loses no-confidence vote, Aljazeera (2 December 2013).
33 Barigababer, A. op. cit.
34 World Bank, "Somalia overview" op. cit.
38 World Bank, "Somalia overview" op. cit.
40 WHO, Health Systems Profile, Somalia Regional Health Systems Observatory, Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO) (Cairo: 2011).
44 World Bank, "Somalia overview" op. cit.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Somalia Human Development Report, op. cit.
48 World Bank, "Somalia overview" op. cit.
49 Ibid.
54 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), 1979 World Refugee Survey, Annual Review (Washington, DC: 1980). Note: the number estimates have been subject to much debate and disagreement and are thus indicative only.
57 Between 3,000 and 4,000 refugees per day were crossing the border (USCRI 1989).
59 USCRI, 2006 World Refugee Survey, Annual Review (Washington, DC: 2006). For example, at the end of 1996, there were an estimated 290,000 Somali refugees in camps in eastern Ethiopia as compared to only 15,901 at the end of 2005, UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2005 (August 2007).
64 EEAS, op. cit., p.3.
65 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p.3.
70 Ibid., p.3.
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PART II – MIXED MOBILITY, HOST AND RETURN COMMUNITIES AND EVOLVING MIGRATORY PATTERNS

One family - a mother, father and their six children - left south Somalia unable to survive. Carrying everything you see in this photograph, they have been travelling for 25 days. Moving from Somalia to Kenya in brutal heat, they are in dire need of nutritional support and health care.

Consequent to the insecurity, low economic opportunity and natural calamities such as drought and flooding, about 14 per cent of the population – or more than one million Somalis live as part of the diaspora; about 1 million Somalis are refugees in mainly neighbouring countries; and no fewer than 1.1 million people have been displaced internally.

As returning refugees, IDPs, irregular migrants, unsuccessful asylum seekers, other vulnerable groups and members of the diaspora increasingly return (voluntarily or due to mounting pressures from their hosts), it could produce a massive migratory inflow that could create sudden shifts and burdens on resources, services, host communities and urban centres that if not well-managed, has the potential to de-stabilize Somalia’s fragile gains. As noted above, the Somali population already faces acute food insecurity, deteriorating health, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) conditions, high prevalence of GBV, livelihood crises and ranks among the lowest in human development in the world, including in access to basic services. Returning populations will not only encounter these conditions and suffer from them but they may also exacerbate them. The added pressures may spur ongoing flows of internal displacement and refugee flows as well as of irregular and urban-centered migrants both among current populations as well as among returning populations that migrate again outwards.

While a voluntary phased return is widely agreed to be the best approach to manage the returning population inflows (see Part 4), the conditions and pressures experienced particularly in refugee and IDP camps may lead many to feel they have little choice but to return prematurely. Premature returns risks leading to repeated displacement.

The largest outflow of refugees occurred during four specific time periods:

POST 1973-75 drought
- Majority of relocated rural pastoralists returned to nomadic lifestyle

POST GOVERNMENT SETTLEMENT PROGRAM 1973-75 drought response
- 1,000,000 est. Ethiopian refugees in Somalia
- 500,000 in camps

ETHIO-SOMALI WAR 1977-78 (over Ogaden region)
- 300,000 Ethiopian refugees

POST-CONFLICT 1987-87
- 500,000 Somali refugees
- 100,000 Somali IDPs

SOMALIA CIVIL WAR PHASE 1 1987-1991
- 500,000 Somali refugees

MILITARY GOVT OUSTED 1991-92 clan-based civil war ensued
- 200,000 Somali refugees

UN INTERVENTION 1992-1995 increased stability in Somalia
- 208,500 Somali refugees

CONDITIONS STABILIZED 2005
- 208,500 Somali refugees

ETHIOPIAN ARMY INVASION 2006-08 Occupies Mogadishu and large parts of SC Somalia
- 132,000 Somali refugees

ETHIOPIAN ARMY WITHDRAWAL 2009 Al Shabaab advance
- 297,000 Somali refugees

DROUGHT 2011 Kenya invades south-central Somalia

- 297,000 Somali refugees

The largest outflow of refugees occurred during four specific time periods:
or cyclical migration. In addition, some returnees, including some who may have lost official civil and other relevant documentation that attest to their qualifications, assets or entitlements will be returning often without any registered visibility. Consequently, they will have greater difficulty reintegrating and accessing services than those with facilitated returns. Moreover, many former pastoralists, having lived in urban or urban-like settings in camps, and faced with environmental degradation and possible loss of property may no longer see a pastoralist or nomadic livelihood as an option. Minority groups may fear returning to areas dominated by other clans. And community marginalization as a result of their “displacement/returning” status may also provoke tension. The impact of returning and evolving migratory flows thus poses complex humanitarian, security and development challenges not only for vulnerable groups and migrants but also host communities and urban centres.

1. PROFILE OF REFUGEES, IDPS AND MIGRANTS

REFUGEES

The current estimate of the number of Somali refugees is 1,023,722, located primarily in:

- Kenya – 474,483;73
- Ethiopia – 235,316;74
- Yemen – 231,064,75
- South Africa – 26,190;76
- Djibouti – 18,725;77 and
- Egypt, Eritrea, Tanzania, and Uganda also host.

KENYA: Kenya hosts the largest number (474,483) of Somali refugees and has done so for a longer than any other country in the region. Dadaab, the world’s largest refugee camp, was originally established in 1991 to host about 90,000 refugees. It now currently hosts 388,000 (November 2013).78 In 1992 the Kakuma camp was established to host refugees from South Sudan. At present about half (54,000) of the roughly 107,500 residents are Somalis. Two refugee camps were established in 2011, namely Kambioos and Ifo 2, which host about 64,907 and 19,919 refugees respectively.79 Approximately 32,000 refugees are officially registered in Nairobi;80 however, the total number of undocumented Somali migrants may be significantly higher, with some projections estimating up to 100,000.81 The Somali refugee population dominates a neighbourhood in Eastleigh in Kamakuji district of Nairobi, which has become known as ‘little Mogadishu’. Most are thought to be supported by their family members in the diaspora, while others are business owners.82

About three quarters (75%) of the refugees in Kenya have come from Mogadishu and its environs.83 Within Dadaab, about half came from Lower Juba and Middle Juba (Somalia), given its proximity. In 2011, 70 per cent of the arrivals to Dadaab were under 18 years of age, thousands of which were unaccompanied.84

ETHIOPIA: Ethiopia hosts over 243,960 Somali refugees in its five refugee camps.85 Dollo Ado opened in 2003 and is the largest of the country’s camps, hosting 198,451 refugees (43,131 households), including Melkadida (43,432, 8,884 households); Bokolmarnyo (41,539, 9,405 households); Buramino (39,974, 8,811 households); Hillaeyn (37,183, 7,996 households) and Kobe (36,313, 8,030 households). There are 40,714 (6,778 households) in the three camps in Jijiga. Addis Ababa hosts about 4,796 refugees.86 The city of Dire Dawa has a high Somali non-refugee population and thus is also a haven for many urban Somali refugees. About 80 per cent of the refugees in Dollo Ado came from Gedo (Somalia). More than 85 per cent of the daily arrivals of refugees in Dollo Ado were under the age of 18, thousands of which were unaccompanied.87

DJIBOUTI: Djibouti hosted Somali refugees, mainly from northwest region after the 1987 civil war began. However, most of the refugees repatriated after the return of stability in Somaliland. However, during the ongoing conflict in south-central Somalia, Djibouti received an estimated 20,000 Somali refugees. Just under 18,000 reside in Ali Addeh and approximately 1,100 in Holl-Holl camp.88 The majority of the refugees are from Mogadishu and its environs. Unlike the acute movement of Somali refugee flows to Kenya and Ethiopia, the movement to Djibouti has been noted to have likely involved more planning and resources as they travelled through Puntland and Somaliland to reach Djibouti.

YEMEN: In Yemen, Somalis receive prima facie refugee status. Although there has been annual Somali refugee flows from 1991 onwards to Yemen, the flows increased by about 62,000 when Ethiopia occupied parts of south-central Somalia during 2006-2009, and by about 100,000 during the 2011 drought.89 It has also hosted asylum-seekers, economic and other migrants. Mixed migration movements to Yemen have increased over the last three years. Sixty-three per cent (308,571) of the 487,000 Somalis that entered Yemen since 2006 did so in only the last 3.5 years.90 Yemen has, however, expressed it may
consider ending the prima facie status for Somalis as many are entering from the more stable Puntland as economic not conflict-induced migrants.\(^9\)

**OUTSIDE THE REGION:** Of the 42,000 Somalis that sought asylum in 2013, at least 20,600 Somalis filed asylum claims in 44 industrialized countries, compared to 18,701 claims in 2012.\(^2\) In 2012, about 14,265 Somalis applied for asylum in the European Union.\(^3\) Many Somalis continued to enter Europe through irregular channels in increasing numbers in 2012 despite the perception of growing security in Somalia and the end of the 2011 drought. Between 2008 and 2010 inclusive, the United States of America registered 11,596 Somali asylum-seekers, which represent about 4-6% of its total refugee admissions in that time period.\(^4\) The majority of Somali asylum seekers applying for asylum in Canada (1,731) between 2000 and 2010 were privately sponsored.\(^5\) In addition, in 2013, at least 15,393 Somalis were resettled or reunited with their families in 23 industrialized countries.\(^6\)

In addition to the requests for asylum in third countries, since the initial violence broke out in 1991, 168,043 Somalis have been resettled as part of resettlement assistance programmes,\(^7\) and another 27,994 Somalis resettled through their own means primarily through family reunification (see chart 1).\(^8\) Overall since 1991, the United States of America received the largest share of Somalis undergoing assisted resettlement and/or reunification (117,718 individuals) followed by Canada (15,187), Sweden (15,184), Norway (8,994), Denmark (7,997), Finland (5,724), Australia (5,583), United Kingdom (5,186), Italy (4,259), the Netherlands (4,228), New Zealand (2,047) and the across 40 other countries (3,930).\(^9\)

In 2012, about 14,265 Somalis sought asylum in 2013, at least 20,600 Somalis filed asylum claims in 44 industrialized countries, compared to 18,701 claims in 2012.\(^2\) In 2012, about 14,265 Somalis applied for asylum in the European Union.\(^3\) Many Somalis continued to enter Europe through irregular channels in increasing numbers in 2012 despite the perception of growing security in Somalia and the end of the 2011 drought. Between 2008 and 2010 inclusive, the United States of America registered 11,596 Somali asylum-seekers, which represent about 4-6% of its total refugee admissions in that time period.\(^4\) The majority of Somali asylum seekers applying for asylum in Canada (1,731) between 2000 and 2010 were privately sponsored.\(^5\) In addition, in 2013, at least 15,393 Somalis were resettled or reunited with their families in 23 industrialized countries.\(^6\)

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**Chart 1: Somali resettlement and reunification (1991-2013)**

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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>26,261</td>
<td>40,336</td>
<td>45,131</td>
<td>48,531</td>
<td>35,779</td>
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Source: IOM, Resettlement Assistance Programme (2014)

**REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN SOMALIA:** Somalia also hosts 2,318 refugees and another 8,427 registered asylum seekers. The refugees are primarily Ethiopians hosted in Somaliland and Puntland. However, about 60 refugees from Zanzibar, Tanzania, are living in Mogadishu. Neither the FGS nor the regional administrations have an asylum framework and thus their situation remains precarious. Refugees are not granted legal rights to work and their access to protection through law enforcement and justice mechanisms are limited. Highlighting the insecure conditions and weak protection context, UNHCR noted the “arbitrary detention of recognized refugees, as well as the hostility and discrimination towards “foreigners” which impedes access to the (limited) socio-economic opportunities available to the local population.”\(^10\)

**INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS)**

Most IDPs originate from south-central Somalia and have remained within the region, likely in close proximity to their places of residence. In Somaliland, some of the IDPs were originally refugees that had fled to Ethiopia during the 1987 civil war. They became IDPs upon their return after having lost access to their land and unable to restore their pastoral livelihood.\(^11\) As of February 2013, the estimates of IDPs in Somalia ranged between 1.1 million and 1.36 million.\(^12\) The geographic distribution of IDPs regionally is:

- South-central Somalia-920,000, of which 372,000 are in Mogadishu;
- Puntland-130,000; and
- Somaliland-84,000.\(^13\)

**RURAL TO URBAN MIGRANTS**

Urban centers, such as Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Bosasso have grown rapidly. Indeed, Mogadishu is among the fastest growing urban centers in Africa. Over the years, the influx of IDPs coupled with the high concentration of urban-based NGOs and transnational companies have favoured urban over rural development. The perception of higher socio-economic activity in urban centers and the increased development and access to services is likely to draw many returnees, including from the diaspora, increasing the pressures on urban settings. For instance, during the 1987 war, many pastoralists were integrated in populated camps or in cities and thus chose to return to or remain in populated centers. If development projects and awareness of local livelihood opportunities and access to services are not relatively balanced with rural areas and promoted, migration from underdeveloped rural areas to urban centers or irregular migration abroad is likely to become an increasing trend.

**LABOUR MIGRANTS**

Apart from individual country mappings conducted in the United Kingdom and United States of America respectively, there is no overall mapping of the Somali diaspora by country of residence.\(^14\) However, about one million Somalis are estimated to be concentrated mainly in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula but also Western Europe and North America.\(^15\) Particularly during the 1970s-1980s, Somalis migrated to the Arabian Peninsula in search of economic opportunity, drawn by geographic proximity as well as historic, cultural and religious similarity.
By 1981, their numbers had reached about 165,000. However, as a consequence, countries in the Arabian Peninsula began increasing restrictions on labour migrants in the 1980s; broadening Somali migration to other parts of the world.

**IRREGULAR MIGRANTS**

Data on the number of irregular migrants is unknown. While the diaspora is estimated to be over one million, it is difficult to know if and how many of this number represents irregular migrants. As an example, in 2011, 3,394 Somalis attempted to enter Europe via Malta or Italy and 263 attempted to enter via Turkey. Most were single, relatively educated, and left Somalia due to the general insecurity. Many irregular unaccompanied minors have been returned from Yemen while Saudi Arabia has begun returning Somali nationals (see box 5). Irregular migrants are highly vulnerable to falling victim to human trafficking or exploitative smugglers, dangerous crossings and risk-taking, and becoming stranded on route.

Precise data on the level of smuggling of Somali migrants or on the level of human trafficking with Somalia as a source, transit or destination country is lacking. It is, however, considered to be widespread in all countries of the region. In particular, Somalia is reported to be among the top ten countries of origin for victims of trafficking. In 2012, the U.S. Department of State reported in 2012 that Somali men, women, and children were smuggled or trafficked from IDP camps in south-central Somalia to Somaliland and Puntland, and then to foreign destinations.

Female victims of trafficking are reported to face the denial of wages, long hours of work, lack of rest time, physical as well as sexual abuse, lack of freedom of movement and confiscation of documents. As a small example of a much broader problem, upon being smuggled or trafficked into Yemen, women may be subjected to kidnapping, physical and sexual abuse, and forced into prostitution or domestic servitude, especially before their eventual trafficking to other countries in the Arabian Peninsula. Reports of kidnappings of primarily Ethiopian but also Somali men arriving in Yemen have also emerged. The men were asked to pay between USD 200 and USD 400 for their release. In 2013, seven kidnapped children were rescued from possible trafficking to Yemen.

**WOMEN**

Women and children make up about 70-80 per cent of all refugees and IDPs. This imbalance has as much consequence for maintaining the safety and security of women and children in the camps as it does on their safety and economic and livelihood options for return. As noted above, Somalia places fourth to last in terms of indicators on gender inequality. The Human Development Index results reveal that women suffer more exclusion and inequality than men in the dimensions of health, empowerment and labour market participation. As the traditional ‘xeer’ and Sharia law increasingly replaced political and judicial systems during the conflict, women have been excluded from customary political and judicial structures. Customary law defines strict gender roles and they have unequal access to resources, power, and decision-making. Although Somalia’s established Family Law grants women equal inheritance rights, the customary practices and Sharia law inhibits this. In contrast, the regular protections that come with customary conventions to protect women have been lost.

Particularly in Somaliland and Puntland, irregular migrants from elsewhere in Africa, especially Ethiopia, become stranded in transit to Yemen and beyond. Bosasso has become known as a “smuggling boomtown.” The administration in Puntland frequently arrests irregular migrants and smugglers, but reportedly lacks jails to hold the numbers that reach “many thousands.” According to the Minister of Ports and Fisheries, Said Mohamed Rage, it is a humanitarian issue for the migrants who need help but the administration lacks the resources to feed let alone return them.

**SMUGGLED MIGRANTS AND VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING**

Within camps for internally displaced persons (IDP), IOM Somalia’s Migration Health Division (MHD) is reaching out to DP women representatives to train them on basic psycho-social support, peer education, gender-based violence (GBV) and its impact on survivors, coping mechanisms in the DP camps, and sensitization about places where GBV support services are offered.
GBV, including domestic violence and rape, against Somali women cuts across all social and economic strata; however traditional society is conditioned not to openly discuss these issues. The levels are reportedly among the highest in the world.\textsuperscript{117} The prevalence of such violence has been endemic not only to the conflict areas but also in areas of relative peace that lack protective mechanisms. In two separate incidents in 2013, in February and November, two alleged victims of rape were arrested and sent to prison as were the journalists that interviewed them. The former stood accused for “offending state institutions” and the latter defamation of character by the accused perpetrator. Another woman who reported being gang raped by AMISOM forces was also detained for questioning.\textsuperscript{118} Serious concerns have been raised about the handlings of GBV in Somalia.\textsuperscript{119}

In particular, rape, sexual violence against the displaced, especially against members of rival clans and minorities, are presumed to be severely underreported due to associated stigma and inaction. Women in the IDP camps of Bosasso, Puntland, have stated that they suffer sexual abuse and have no faith in the police and justice system to protect them. Likewise in the Buraha camp, east of Bosasso, displaced women and their leaders claim the cases do not go to court even if the police investigate the case.\textsuperscript{120} The chairman of the displaced people in Bosasso noted that “rape leads to such shame and social stigma” that it had forced several victims to migrate to Yemen and others to move to different towns to find anonymity.\textsuperscript{121}

**Box 2: Common human smuggling and/or trafficking routes**

Smugglers and traffickers starting or transiting through Ethiopia use four major routes:

- Dire Dawa (Ethiopia) ➔ Tadjoura (Djibouti) ➔ Obock (Djibouti) ➔ Yemen (USD 270 and USD 380);
- Jimma ➔ Sudan ➔ Libya ➔ Europe (USD 2,800 from Khartoum to Malta, paid to different smuggling groups along the route);\textsuperscript{122}
- Dessie ➔ Djibouti ➔ Yemen; and
- Awassa/Negele ➔ Kenya ➔ through Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique ➔ South Africa.

The route from Dire Dawa and Dessie to Djibouti has been a traditional trade route in the past, as were the Jimma to Sudan and Awassa/Negele routes to Kenya. Given stepped up surveillance along routes from Djibouti and Somaliland to Yemen, smugglers increasingly follow routes through Ethiopia, Sudan, and Libya onto Europe.


**SOMALI DIASPORA**

Many of the more than a million strong Somali diaspora have remained actively engaged in supporting their country, which has been noted to be in some regards a double-edged sword.\textsuperscript{123} Financial contributions have assisted clans during times of conflict and many states are weary of contributions that could support groups such as Al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{124} In contrast, diaspora support has been key for local reconciliation and state-building, notably in Somaliland and Puntland and increasingly in the south-central area. Highly visible in state institutions, they have also occupied top leadership positions in the state, political parties, cabinet, parliament and civil service.\textsuperscript{125}

The Somali diaspora plays a critical role in skills transfer and investment partnership and helping to shape and influence policies from their adoptive country. Many members of the Somali diaspora have technical know-how (and financial resources) and/or interest to contribute to the recovery effort. International programmes have tapped into this, sponsoring individuals through short consultancies and temporary placements to help build government, civic and private-sector capacity. For instance, in collaboration with US Agency for International Development (USAID) Mohamed Ali, a diaspora returnee, is working “on developing a peace incubator to connect young people with mentors to help them with the process of starting their businesses and then. Connecting them with investors who’ll give them money to launch their businesses”.\textsuperscript{126}

The IOM’s Migration Development for Africa (MIDA) programme also taps into diaspora expertise. Using a step-by-step approach to partnerships between FGS and the diaspora, members of the Somali diaspora community undertake a short consultancy period to build the technical capacity of civil servants through the transfer of knowledge. As part of this initiative, IOM has worked with 31 ministries and agencies throughout Somalia, including Somaliland and Puntland in such sectors as health, education, public finance management, and immigration, among others. The diaspora advisors that come through the MIDA programme not only provide training and transfer their skills to local colleagues, but in some cases they perform line functions that would not be done otherwise. Pointing to longer-term recovery IOM’s 3Es strategy to “enable, engage and empower” the diaspora in the recovery of post-conflict societies aims to engage the diaspora in investment, public-private partnerships and remittance transfer cost reduction as a sustainable recovery effort. The programme has thus “enabled more than 120 highly qualified Somali diaspora members to return and help build government, civic and private-sector capacity”.\textsuperscript{127}

The motivations for members of the Somali diaspora are many. While some wish to return on a temporary basis to learn about or to re-connect with the country and to feel a part of the recovery, others may look for opportunities for a more permanent resettlement while others look to profit through taking advantage of the weak regulations and enforcement. Regardless of the motivations, many return in a more empowered position than the rest of the returning
populations, bringing with it both advantages and potential source for tensions.

Box 3: Examples of engaging diaspora communities in China, India and Kenya

In order to better channel the opportunities related to diaspora, the FGS could draw upon the practices engaged by other countries with large diaspora communities. For instance:

- **In China**, there is a Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), which coordinates government-diaspora relations, including the provision of matching funds as incentives for investment in existing companies or to help create new companies. It has also local branches in every province in China and in some cities to allow the diaspora to connect closer to their home areas.

- **In India**, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs has been established to coordinate Indian diaspora outreach activities, including no fees policy for monetary transfers from abroad to banks in India.

- **Kenya** is in the process of developing a policy on its diaspora policy, which is expected to call for the creation of “appropriate structures including an office in the President’s office to coordinate diaspora issues on a regular basis”.

Source: Business Daily, 2013

To facilitate the implementation of the MIDA Rome Programme, IOM carried out an assessment of possible project that could be supported through MIDA Rome.

2. CURRENT ENVIRONMENT FOR REFUGEES AND IDPS

Given the protracted duration of the conflict, some Somalis have been displaced for over twenty-years. Children at the time of displacement have now grown and started families. Many have only known life in overcrowded camps or foreign cities. On the one hand, they may be considered fortunate to have received protection; even in refugee camps they are often living in better conditions than in their home country or even the local communities around them. The international community, including UNHCR, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and IOM, as well as local NGOs have provided immediate food, water and shelter, primary healthcare services, check-ups and health promotion and GBV protection; implemented numerous income-generating initiatives; convened skill-building workshops; financed the rehabilitation of schools, maternal and child health clinics, and community centers; and provided psycho-social support, particularly for victims of sexual and gender-based violence.

On the other hand, the absorption capacity of the camps against the number seeking assistance has posed significant challenges and led to dire circumstances and deprivation. In Dadaab, in Kenya, many refugees built their own shelters at the outskirts of the camps until resources were found. The refugees in Dadaab have limited mobility and are not permitted to enter into an employment contract, earn salaries or to access cultivatable land in the camps. For the most part, restrictive laws, high work-permit fees (compounded by expensive travel passes) prevent refugees from legally entering the labour market outside of the camps. The residents are thus dependent upon food assistance from WFP. Camp conditions, particularly the security within the camps, are also reportedly deteriorating. The camps in Dadaab have reported an increasing number of gang rapes and robberies. Ifo II is considered the most dangerous of the camps, where reports of abuse surface daily. The Kenyan police in the camp deny allegations that they are among the worst perpetrators of the abuse; instead they claim that “al-Shabaab sleeper cells and sympathizers” are the source of the growing insecurity.

Refugees in Melkadida, in Ethiopia are permitted to run small businesses and to raise goats and cattle in the camps and some have noted in interviews that they feel relatively safe. However, other interviewed refugees in Dollo Ado noted they experience decreased food rations, self-built poor quality shelters, lack of livelihood opportunities, and inadequate representation at the courts in Ethiopia due to lack of skilled lawyers. Only 30 per cent of the refugees in Dollo Ado live in the shelters provided by international organizations while the rest live in self-built, wind-susceptible shelters. There is no ambulance service and the nearest hospital is 360km away in Negele town. There have also been shortfalls in food supply, especially with sudden influxes of new arrivals. Those who have already been there had to share their food rations with the newly-arrived. Child malnourishment was a notable concern in the camps.

Citing national security concerns, in December 2012, Kenya’s Department of Refugee Affairs ordered Somali refugees in Nairobi and other cities to move to the camps and for all refugee services in the cities would stop. However, the order was not carried out and on 26 July 2013, the Kenyan High Court ruled that the “relocation would violate refugees’ dignity and free movement
dimensions of crisis on migration in somalia

rights. Nevertheless, the call for repatriation ignited an increase in institutional and public tension, violence and harassment towards the refugees. Members of the security forces have been accused of perpetrating beatings, rape and arbitrary detention as a way to push urban refugees to re-locate to the camps. Reports of heavy-handed treatment of Somali refugees in Nairobi frequently surface. Armed police are claimed to arrest Somali refugees and openly ask for money. Consequently, they say they must carry “ransom” cash with them at all times. Despite the increase in violence, the refugees and migrants based in Eastleigh reveal they feel considerably safer than those in Dadaab camps.

Similar to Nairobi, there have also been reports in South Africa of beatings, robbery, and killings of refugees. The Somali community has been especially targeted because they own shops in mostly poor, high crime areas. The South African authorities condemn the attacks, however, the fear it has evoked prevails and may, as in similar situations, contribute to self-repatriation.

The conditions in IDP camps are considered worse than in the refugee camps. The internal security situation in the country and restricted access to many areas has made it difficult to provide assistance to the IDPs. Also organizations often do not have significant presence in all of the areas where assistance is needed and local NGO implementation partners often lack the capacity needed to meet the breadth and demands of assistance. Generations have lacked access to effective health care, food security, education and a livelihood. Protection and security in the camps are less and women, children or minorities facing the brunt of abuse and violence (see Part 2, section 2.6). Moreover, displaced families living in Mogadishu camps have brought attention to aid diversion and other abuses by the ‘gatekeepers’ of the camps. The gatekeepers are typically self-appointed individuals or groups who control access of the camps. Many camp residents claim to live both in fear of the gatekeepers themselves but in worse fear that they will be evicted from the camps if they complain. A report from Hodon district highlighted that in addition to aid diversion, gatekeepers also forced the residents to pay a share of any cash donations they received.

Box 4: Testimonies of Somali refugees

In Ifo camp, “we have problems here that we did not have before. We are very scared at night. Every day we hear new stories. It has never been this bad or unsafe before. There are people who are trying very hard to make our lives much worse than it is. I don’t know if this is their way of making us leave the camp, but we have nowhere to go.” - Hasssan, resident at Ifo camp for 14 years

On leaving Dadaab for Eastleigh, Nairobi, “It was very difficult for me to stay in Dadaab. I found Eastleigh to be 100% better for me. I have my family to support and the rations in Dadaab were not enough for me to survive on. I am a very hard worker and since coming to Eastleigh, I have been able to work to support myself and my family. Dadaab is not safe or secure. There are a lot of things that happen there and many bandits take advantage of the refugees. In Eastleigh, I have found the police to be a big problem. When they see that you are Somali, it doesn’t matter what your legal status is, they will threaten to arrest you and detain you unless you pay a bribe.” -- Mohamed, a 47 year old living in Eastleigh


Reports from IDPs in Somaliland and Puntland have also highlighted their limited access to health services and education and consistently face the threat of evictions and sexual abuse and discrimination against minority groups. An unknown number but likely in the hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs have self-repatriated. Given the spontaneous and non-facilitated nature of the returns, the numbers and motivations are difficult to track. Since November 2012, which coincides with when the Kenyan government began pushing for repatriation, the Somali embassy in Nairobi recorded a significant increase in the number of requests for travel documentation to self-repatriate. Almost 20,000 are estimated to have voluntarily left Nairobi since that time. Many countries have considered the trend to be a positive sign of security gains in Somalia. The motivations for self-repatriation could be the increased perceived security in the areas of return, the desire to re-join family or an interest to (re-)gain land or set up opportunities before competition increases as the vast flows of populations return. Given the conditions noted above, for some (or many) the returns may be considered to be less voluntarily a response to the conditions they experience in the camps or places of displacement.
"We are scared to try and find water or use the latrine at night because of rape," says an anonymous mother residing in New Shabelle IDP camp.

According to estimates from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 3.9 million people have been displaced in Somalia—which means that one out of seven people is displaced, and in desperate need of humanitarian assistance.

The expected exodus of refugees from camps will have a significant impact on the local economy of the surrounding communities and areas. The international assistance that comes with community-based approaches will cease as will the dividends of international organizations and NGOs working and transiting in and around the area. Dollo Ado is located in one of the most remote, economically-depressed areas of the Ethiopia. International aid to the refugee camps has spilled into the local economy to the extent that there is some concern of what will happen to the region once the refugees are repatriated. In Kenya, the level of self-repatriation that has already occurred in Nairobi has been enough to see vacancy rates in apartments soar and thus rent rates plummet. Similarly dozens of shops have closed. Schools have reported the lowest enrolments in years. The remittance companies and the economy that grew from the activity of the thousands of Somali diaspora that travel to Nairobi to visit their family has already seen evidence of decline.

3. HOSTING COMMUNITIES

Locally within the hosting communities or surrounding areas, there have been cases of small-scale tensions, such as, for instance, disputes in the host community in Dollo Ado (Ethiopia) regarding grazing land for refugee-owned livestock. Similarly, the Dadaab District Peace Committee, which serves to resolve refugee-host community conflict, frequently intervenes on disputes over the scarce grazing land around Dadaab refugee camps. Nevertheless, community-based approaches to assistance have helped to ease refugee-local community relations. This includes community access to services in the refugee camps, including water, food, health care and employment; constructing water wells in localities such as Labsigale, close to Dadaab refugee camps; providing vaccinations and resilience training on protecting livestock to both Dadaab refugees and the host community; employed local businesses to transport some of the goods destined to refugee camps, giving income and employment opportunities to local inhabitants in Ethiopia.

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The following footnotes are found at the end of the document:

72 Somalia Human Development Report, op. cit.
74 Ibid.
77 OCHA, Issue #14, op. cit.
80 UNHCR, “New procedures”, op.cit.
81 Hasty Repatriation, Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (February 2013) p.11.
82 Hasty Repatriation, op. cit., p.10.
83 Barigaher, A. op. cit.
84 Save the Children, “Protecting Children in the Horn of Africa” in Goal & Save the Children’s Work with Somalia Refugees in Dollo Ado, Ethiopia (Connecticut: n.d.).
85 UNHCR, “Refugees in the Horn of Africa”, op. cit.
86 UNHCR, “Refugees in the Horn of Africa”, op. cit.
87 Save the Children, op. cit.
88 OCHA, Issue #14, op.cit.
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118 Hopkins, David. Somalilands police arrest alleged rape victim and reporter, Telegraph online (United Kingdom: 21 Nov 2013); and Somali woman who reported rape sentenced, Aljazeera (9 December 2013).


120 No Justice for rape victims in Bosaso, Radio Ergo, 6 November 2013.

121 Ibid.

122 The total amount was calculated from The Independent (2013), where the victims of smuggling paid money to four different smuggling groups along the way, starting from Khartoum (Sudan) until they board the boat that would take them from the Libyan coast to Malta.


124 Bariagaber, A. op. cit.


126 Javangua, Rohitia, Somali: Entrepreneurship as Tool for Peace, Africa (12 July 2013).


128 USCIR (2009) op. cit.; Hunter, Meredith, "The Failure of Self-Reliance in Refugee Settlements", POLIS Journal, vol. 2, Winter (University of Leeds, United Kingdom; 2009); Refugees may be hired "temporarily" by international organizations and NGOs and receive incentives but the incentives do not constitute salaries.

129 Hunter, Meredith, op. cit. p.15.


131 Hasty Repatriation, op. cit., p.9.

132 Focus group interviews in Melkadida on 27 June 2013 in Bariagaber, A. op. cit.

133 Bariagaber, A. op. cit.

134 Ibid.

135 Bariagaber, A. op. cit.

136 Doctors without Borders, Back to Square One, Dadaab Briefing Paper (16 February 2012).

137 Rhodes, Tom, Somalis in Kenya hounded by security forces, refugee policy, Committee to Protect Journalists, CPJ Blog (21 December 2012); and Refugees International, op. cit.


139 Hasty Repatriation, op. cit., p.3.

140 Rhodes, Tom, op. cit.; and Human Rights Watch, You Are All Terrorists (29 May 2013).


145 Somalia Human Development Report, op. cit.; and No Justice, op. cit.

146 Hasty Repatriation, op. cit., p.11.

147 Ibid., p.3.

148 Focus group interview in Dollo Alto, Ethiopia, 2013 in Bariagaber, A. op. cit.

149 IRIN, KENYA: Dadaab -- locals vs refugees (3 September 2013).


151 IOM, "IOM Trains host communities" op. cit.

152 Bariagaber, A. op. cit.

153 Ibid.

154 Hasty Repatriation, op. cit., p.12.
PART III - POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS OF RETURN

1. INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS

Relations between the governments of Somalia and hosting countries in the region regarding the refugee situation have remained for the most part positive, aided by the fact that: refugee camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti have received international assistance; local communities have received international assistance through community-based approaches; there is ethnic compatibility between the hosting area and the refugees; the camps are located in sparsely populated areas where competition for resources poses somewhat less of a threat; and the contact between the camps and local communities is limited.

Box 5: Return of Somali nationals from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recently (2013) changed its foreign workers legislation and has undertaken a crackdown on irregular migrants. This has led to a sudden increase in the number of Somalis being returned to Mogadishu. In December 2013 and 12 February 2014 alone 22,148 Somalis were returned and the number increases daily. Similar to the cases of previous returnees from Saudi Arabia, many of the returnees have been unable to trace their families due to the frequent displacements that have taken place over the years and that are still occurring and/or have been unable to afford the travel to where they believe their families are. Stranded in various districts of Mogadishu, the conditions they face and are a contributing factor to intensified effects of poverty, food insecurity and unemployment that already plague the city. Given the current conditions in Mogadishu, the international community has voiced concerns over the returns.

Source: Hosh, Abdikafar, Saudi Arabia Deports 100 Somalis to Mogadishu, Somalia Report (21 August 2013); Sabahi Online, 10,000 Somalis deported from Saudi Arabia since December (14 January 2014); IOM, Somalia Situational Report: Returnees from Saudi Arabia (16 February 2014).

With the actual/perceived stability of the country improving, including in Mogadishu and certain other locations of south-central Somalia such as Kismayo and Baido, the focus of the responses to displacement is shifting. Certain European countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway have tentatively assessed that the Somali capital was sufficiently safe to the point that failed asylum seekers would not face persecution if returned. Likewise, a few countries in the Arabian Peninsula have unilaterally sent home some Somali migrants. Given the burden of the camps in Yemen and Djibouti on limited natural resources, both governments have also voiced interest in seeing a prompt repatriation.

At the same time, however, the continued presence of Al-Shabaab in many areas of return continues to pose a risk. In particular, rural areas of south-central Somalia and southern Puntland are still controlled by Al-Shabaab. Ethnic violence also continues to displace thousands as witnessed in November 2013 with the displacement of 5,000 people from ethnic clashes. Premature return of displaced populations risks transferring the problem from refugees to IDPs and promulgating cycles of IDP re-displacement.

The recent Tripartite Agreement between the governments of Kenya and Somalia as well as UNHCR (November 2013) governing the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees in Kenya marks the first notable development on Somalia’s refugee situation. It is a legal framework that among its 30 articles includes provisions to facilitate and support the voluntary return of Somali refugees to locations of their choosing within Somalia. It calls for Kenya to continue protecting Somali refugees on its soil but also for Somalia to put in place the necessary administrative, security and judicial measures for the safe and voluntary return of the refugees. Specific activities include:

- issuing or validating official civil and professional documentation;
- facilitating “go and see” or “come and tell” visits to help refugees make informed decisions;
- ensuring safe transport, including for vulnerable groups;
- setting up mechanisms for fair and accessible procedures to settle land and property claims; and
- Strengthening and expanding Somalia’s national development, security and humanitarian assistance programmes to focus on local community development in key areas of return with a view to promoting sustainability.

A tripartite Commission will oversee the implementation of the Agreement’s provisions. The three-year duration of the agreement does not require that all repatriations be completed in that time; rather, it simply covers those who wish to be repatriated during this time and can be renewed and revised conditions permitting.

2. NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Apart from the protection and rehabilitation concerns of refugees and IDPs and the fact that Al-Shabaab remains present in most rural areas of south-central Somalia and southern Puntland, the challenges facing the FGS to handle the migration dimensions of the crisis are many. The federal structure is new and relatively untested in terms of key components of statebuilding. It is also still establishing its relations with the regional administrations, where many pending and contentious issues remain. Furthermore ministries face acute shortages in skilled staff, wherein
most ministries are run by fewer than a dozen staff. This is compounded by a lack of the infrastructure and resources required for the basic functioning of a country let alone to process and absorb millions of returnees.

The Tripartite Agreement, for instance, calls for the Somali government to set up Humanitarian border management and ensure the safety and security of return for Somali refugees currently in Kenya, including in transit; create conditions conducive to sustainable return and reintegration of returnees; and issue and manage all relevant documentation requirements. In the broader picture, the government cannot currently ensure the safety of, or provide the equivalent means to sustainable return (i.e. livelihood) for the majority of the residents already in Somalia. The former Somali Prime Minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, noted in early 2013: “While we view our returning people as an asset, not a liability, the fact is that my government does not have the capacity to provide housing and other needs for such a large number of people.”

Further, Article 25 of the Tripartite Agreement calls for Somalia to “establish fair and accessible procedures to settle any claims that the returnees may make for restitution.

Land ownership is a highly emotive and complex issue in Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu. The rush to access land across the city has sparked several disputes. Much of the premium land is contested as large portions of the land were appropriated during the 1991 civil war and the previous owners have returned to reclaim it. New occupants have resisted vacating the property and the Somali government has yet to create a legal body to handle the issue. Local courts in Mogadishu claim they are overwhelmed by the sheer size and complexity of the cases. Compounding the problem is the lack of reliable documentation that can be used and the mix of methods that have been used to verify and adjudicate rightful ownership of land given the years of absent central governance and the fact that there is a history of communal land ownership and no national cadaster and. For instance, according to xeer customary law, neighbours, relatives and former land commission officials act as witnesses to give verbal verification of land ownership. There are also a number of allegations against former officials with custody over land registry having sold verifications. Given the strong cultural influence and traditional power of clan associations, establishing such a system of transparent verification and dispute settlement mechanisms of land will be a large task that also calls upon effective rule of law to enforce the terms of settlement and prevent any potential clashes that ensue.

Moreover, the clan-based conflict has sharpened clan divisions, and parliamentary representation in the federal structure has been codified along clan affiliation. Some individuals belonging to one clan may be hesitant to return to an area where another clan is in the majority. Participatory and inclusive dialogue and planning on the return and recovery effort is essential.

Overcoming traditional inter-clan conflicts and establishing non-clan communal systems is essential for economic, political, and social recovery. In an effort to overcome clan divides, international organizations have undertaken programmes that brought a selected few individuals together from different clans to lead community development. Accordingly, representatives of all 16 districts in Mogadishu came together in April 2012 for the first time in 20 years to discuss issues of mutual interest. On similar issues, local NGOs such as GECPD in Galkacyo have been focusing on peace and reconciliation among clans and have succeeded in making the town free of segregation based on clan affiliation.

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL POLICIES ON IDPS

Given the lack of management of IDPs during the conflict, many have settled in privately-owned lands and have been subjected to evictions by landowners. Others in semi-rural areas are now settled on contested land. This has led to repeated displacement and corresponds to the broader challenges of land management and reparations.

The FGS has yet to adopt policy guidelines on IDPs, though UNHCR circulated a draft framework of possible guidelines as a potential starting point of discussion and policy elaboration. The government has also been collaborating with the Return Consortium (RC) -- an umbrella organization led by a steering group composed of the Danish Refugee Council, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), INTERSOS, IOM, Islamic Relief, Norwegian Refugee Council, UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP). The RC was established in 2012 to implement safe, dignified and sustainable return and reintegration of IDPs in Somalia. As of July 2013, RC has assisted 3,479 IDP households – 27 per cent of the total target for 2012 and 2013 –return mainly from Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Galkacyo and their environs to Baidoa, Afgooye, Wanla Weyne, Balad and Jowhar Districts in South Somalia. Post-return monitoring is presently underway. The results of the monitoring effort, which are expected to be finalized in the near future, are anticipated to provide lessons on implementation modalities for if and when large-scale IDPs (and refugees) returns take place.

Further, in March 2013 the FGS announced a draft plan to relocate approximately 270,000 IDPs from Mogadishu to three camps on the outskirts of the city. The FGS identified an area of land in Deynil District in Benadir region for the resettlement of 51,000 IDPs. UN agencies and international NGOs have been called upon to undertake the massive task, however delays have been expected as the land requires extensive preparation. Implicated IDPs as well as international agencies have expressed concerns at the safety, security, and livelihood opportunities in the proposed transitional campsites. An IDP in Mogadishu’s Darwish camp stated: “If we are provided with security and health services, we will obey the government plans. But if
In order to prevent the site from potentially turning into a slum, UN-Habitat has advocated that the site be developed as a mixed use district from its onset as opposed to a temporary settlement. Nevertheless, the FGS has limited resources to effectively manage and provide the necessary security in IDP camps comparable to refugee camps. Instead, there are “gatekeepers” who run the camps (see Part 2 section 2). It is important to note, however, the gatekeepers depend on the continuation of IDP camps as a part of their livelihood and thus may attempt delays on the options of return.

Apart from certain contexts such as in Somaliland, IDPs have typically been displaced for shorter periods of time than refugees or move repeatedly using their pastoralist or cyclical migratory patterns as coping mechanisms. And given that the proximity of the displacement is closer to their point of origin and ties with relatives, and the quality of IDP camp life and management is lower than that in refugee camps, it is possible that many IDPs, particularly among the 370,000 in Mogadishu, may be willing to return to their homes if there is a sense of security and opportunity for livelihood.

The FGS has been prioritizing IDP return over the comparatively more complex repatriation of refugees, though it is premature to know how the Tripartite Agreement on refugees in Kenya affects the national priorities, capacities and resources to address IDPs. As of February 2013, Puntland authorities adopted policy guidelines for handling the 130,000 IDPs in its territory. Its dissemination and implementation, however, remain limited to date. Apart from the development of a guiding document, in 2011 the Puntland authorities have undertaken a scheme to issue ID cards to IDPs from southern Somalia as a “security measure”. Puntland authorities have also granted land to some IDPs. Further, in cooperation with IOM-Somalia, IDP camps have received various skill-related training.

As of May 2013, there were 84,000 IDPs in Somaliland in camps in Hargeisa and its environs. As indicated earlier, most have been refugees and became IDPs upon return because they were unable to repossess their homes/land back. The authorities have not been able to resolve this issue. Consequently, there have been a few income-generating activities conducted for youth in some of the IDP camps, however, IDP assistance and protection has not been maintained continuously. The authorities have deported some irregular Ethiopian migrants back to their country in 2012.

3. SOCIAL FACTORS

Following the government-Somaliland crisis, which began in 1987 and lasted through the 1990s, the majority of Somali refugees in Ethiopia self-repatriated once the conditions in Somaliland improved. This suggests a strong cultural identity and desire to return, which Kunz defines as “majority identity”. Throughout the research of this report, focus groups emphasized the “temporary nature” of their displacement. Indeed, interviews in Djibouti refugee camp revealed that despite cultural compatibility of the refugees in the host communities, there is a preference to return; as one Somali refugee stated, “we did not choose [but were] forced to be here and do not want to die here”. Moreover, over the duration of the crisis, family and clan members have often moved back and forth to check and collect information on home, land, and relatives, suggesting there are still strong ties between the refugees their place of origin.

According to a sampling study conducted in Kenyan camps and in Nairobi in early 2013, the majority of refugees in Kenya (63%) indicated that they would be willing to return to Somalia but only once the security conditions have more notably improved. A handful of those interviewed (6%) said they would be willing to leave immediately while the remaining claimed they could not return until the conditions they fled are improving.

Many of the refugees and IDPs, however, have been living in urban areas or in city-sized refugee camps and may not want to return to rural areas and resume their nomadic or semi-nomadic life style. This may be especially the case for those born and raised in camps or with families who have adapted to the urban-like settings or who managed to make a good living in their present places of residence. Somali minority groups may fear they will face systemic “traditional” marginalization and persecution upon return by major clans, and may fear (perceived or actual) that they may be unable to reclaim their land and belongings. They may thus opt to wait for chances of resettlement elsewhere. Return to the area of origin may not be recommended in particular to areas where the risk of eviction, lack of security, and other human right violations is high.

Refugees and migrants in Europe, Canada, and the United States as well as throughout the Arabian Peninsula have faced a unique set of circumstances in their host countries, including varying degrees of support by the host government and/or extended family. Conditions that, even if poor, may be preferred than returning to the socio-economic and early statebuilding realities of their home country. Many may have established livelihoods and raised children abroad, who likely identify themselves more with their host country and have little interest, knowledge or know-how to live pastoralist lifestyles or other traditional livelihoods. Unsuccessful asylum claimants will be increasingly forced to return to Somalia, though they may have little interest in returning and aim to leave Somalia through irregular channels. In other contexts, irregular migrants abroad may find themselves stranded in the host country and be unable to return even if they wished to. In particular youths may have a difficult time adjusting to their return and may face their own set of discrimination upon return for “not fitting in”. They may have difficulty reconciling new and former cultural expectations. The marginalization of returned youths has been attributed to rise in gang violence in Somaliland as well as gang-rapes.
Dimensions of Crisis on Migration in Somalia

181 Human Rights Watch, The Netherlands: Half Plan to Deport Somalis (21 February 2013);
Copenhagen Post, op. cit.
182 The disagreement between the FGS and regional governments on who presides over the creation of federal states is tenuous. On 1 August 2013, the Puntland authorities communicated that it will “suspend all cooperation and relations” with FGS until the “genuine federal constitution is restored” (Garoweonline, 2013).
183 Interviews indicated that most of the ministries have fewer than a dozen employees. Baragiaber, A. op. cit.
184 The Tripartite Agreement, op.cit.
185 Quoted in Hasty Repatriation, op. cit., p.20.
186 Hasty Repatriation, op. cit.
187 Ibid.
188 Baragiaber, A. op. cit.
189 A participant in a focus group conducted as background research for this study made the following comment: “This process has taught us to move from clanism to neighbourhood.” Baragiaber, A. op. cit.
189 Baragiaber, A. op. cit.
190 Agencies including Mercy Corps, Agrosphere and Qatar Charity among others participate in the technical working group.
191 Ibid.
193 Somali government to relocate IDPs, welcome returning refugees, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), IRIN news (Mogadishu/Nairobi: 27 February 2013).
194 UN-Habitat, IDP Settlement planning and strategy presented in Mogadishu, Somalia (16 December 2013).
195 IRIN, "Somali government to relocate IDPs", op. cit.
196 UN-Habitat, "DP Settlement planning", op. cit.
198 Baragiaber, A. op. cit.
200 Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), SOMALIA: Puntland, Somalia act on migrants, IDPs, IRIN News (14 September 2011).
203 Human Rights Watch, Somaliland: Stop Deporting Ethiopian Refugees (4 September 2012).
204 For example, at the end of 1996, there were an estimated 290,000 Somali refugees in camps in eastern Ethiopia as compared to only 15,901 at the end of 2005 (UNHCR, 2007).
206 Similarly interviews with Somali refugee focus groups in Melkadida (Ethiopia) suggest that a majority of the population are willing to repatriate if the security situation is improved further and livelihood support is provided. Baragiaber, A. op. cit.
207 Ibid.
208 Hasty Repatriation, op. cit., p.19.
209 Ibid.

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154 Refugee Resettlement Watch, Denmark to send Somali asylum seekers back to Mogadishu (11 February 2013); DutchNews. Mogadishu declared safe for asylum seekers, says minister (24 May 2013).
155 Indeed, it is the poorest in the Arab World, with a GDP per capita income of USD 1,437 in 2010, and has been going through a long period of political instability, including years of insurgency in some parts of the
PART VI: CONCLUSION AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CONCLUSION

The past two years have brought about significant positive changes for Somalia. In addition to consolidating its power after successful albeit indirect elections, the government has earned the support of the international community and, with the support of AMISOM, has succeeded in stabilizing certain cities and towns, including most of Mogadishu. Achievements such as the Somali Compact as well as the Tripartite Agreement on repatriation of Somali refugees in Kenya reinforce the cautious optimism on Somalia’s stability gains and statebuilding.

Nevertheless, the country faces a long road of recovery and many questions remain with regard to the sustainability and advancement of security, including if, when and how AMISOM’s mandate may change and the impact this will have on security over the coming years. Ethnic and clan violence continues to surface and minorities face deeply embedded discrimination and expulsion. Law enforcement is understaffed and overwhelmed at best. The lack of judicial follow-up allows crime, extortion and banditry to persist often in impunity. Moreover, albeit weakened, Al-Shabaab is not defeated and continues to dominate certain areas, clashing almost daily with AMISOM and national forces as well as engaging in terrorism. On the one hand, the group is experiencing its own ruptures from within, with splintering, dissention and factional violence. On the other hand, this can spur unpredictability and shift the nature of the insurgency. The group has also always maintained a certain empathy with disenfranchised youth. A slow pace of social and economic recovery and human development, including lack of livelihoods for a country where almost three-quarters of the population is under 30 years of age, risks generating youthful support that fuels recruitment or that draws youth towards the ranks of piracy.

Further, the government has yet to reconcile regional and central administrative systems and differences; mitigate deep clan divisions (inside and outside of the political sphere); stamp out corruption; build trust in new laws, systems, and mechanisms (where informal practices have previously thrived); and enforce the rule of law. It must also build up basic services in both rural and urban areas and produce rapid and long-term dividends in sustainable development. Milestones such as the anticipated consolidation of the new constitution planned for 2015 and the national election set for 2016 could also bring with it renewed challenges and insecurities.

Parallel to all of this, government systems, borders, local infrastructure and the economies in communities and cities must absorb the potential return of over two million people. The returnees would be arriving into an environment that currently ranks among the lowest of human development and that regularly experiences debilitating droughts, flooding and environmental degradation. As populations return or concentrate in urban settings, disputes over property and assets, the sudden burden on already over-extended infrastructure in communities and urban settings and competition over resources contains its own destabilizing potential. Security, cultural, and such social factors as health, economic and slow onset climate change, natural disasters and environmental degradation will continue to be drivers of displacement, labour as well as rural to urban migration apart from, during and after the returning phases. Moreover, border management is basically non-existent in the country and thus migration flows, and especially non-facilitated self-repatriation of refugees and return of migrants will be very difficult to monitor, control and register.

Despite the security restrictions that remain in many parts of Somalia, there have been many assessments and mappings conducted across a range of issues. However, for the most part migration related data has focused narrowly on the refugee and IDP contexts and not on the crisis dimensions of and on migration more holistically. This includes other vulnerable groups, the role of the diaspora, socio-economic and livelihood implications of the crisis on traditional and cultural mobility patterns and the continued potential drivers of (re-)displacement that extend beyond the security context.

Understanding migration in Somalia includes the need to understand clan and sub-clan dynamics, nomadic and minority composition of migrants, including but not exclusive to displaced populations; as well as understanding the social and economic landscape (including livelihood and access to health, education and WASH) that underscores the conditions that not only await returnees but that also will continue to produce outmigration and repeated displacement. Therefore, in addition to understanding the continuous drivers of migration, an ethnographic profiling is also essential in helping to identify preferences of return, the communities that will receive them, protection concerns and the livelihood options available for their reintegration. This will additionally facilitate the identification of locations to focus on assessing absorption capacity and market requirements of communities of return. Questions of relevance to assess include:

- What are the push and pull factors that are motivating many to self-repatriate but not others?
- What is the likelihood that returnees will be drawn to urban settings after they have returned to rural areas with or without the support of some form of rehabilitation packages?
- What may be some of the unpredictable consequences of these rehabilitation packages?
- What are the controllable and non-controllable factors that can positively or negatively influence return?
What is the likelihood of the returns causing new waves and manifestations of migration?

As stated in the Tripartite Agreement and true for all displaced populations, individuals are free to return to any place of their choosing within Somalia, which may not be their point of origin. This, however, risks facilitating urban congestion and overcrowding. For instance, there are no figures discerning if and how much of the camp populations were/are traditionally nomadic. After having lived years in the camp or urban settings, they may have little connection or desire to return to such a livelihood. Given the once high number of nomadic pastoralists in the country, it is difficult to know if and how the returning populations will affect this traditional mobility. Alternatively, their nomadic coping mechanisms may have managed to allow many to continue to lead a relatively nomadic livelihood.

Moreover, the return of one million refugees as well as inflows of migrants including irregular migrants and the Somali diaspora may have varying expectations on the political environment to which they are returning and thus have different levels of trust in the government. Some groups may feel disempowered or disenfranchised by the statebuilding processes that have emerged in their absence such as dialogue on the constitution and preparations for the next elections. Particularly in preparation of the national elections, information, civic education and opportunities that help displaced populations to participate in consultations and to feel to some degree engaged in part of the statebuilding is critical. This will facilitate their trust and buy-in to the state and peacebuilding processes and help be a part of their reintegration.

In a similar vein, the populations in Somalia have relied upon traditional governance systems, and thus an important question within any profiling is the role of xeer specifically among the refugee population. Unless there are reliable, enforced, effective and agreed dispute settlement systems in place, returning populations will fall under the traditional systems, which they may or may not have been respecting while displaced. It also may or may not be compatible with the beliefs and practices of the returning populations, particularly those having lived abroad. Women and minorities could face exclusion as a result of the traditional decision-making and judiciary processes. Migrants may also have difficulty reconciling traditional practices with expectations of similar state-based structures in existence where they were based.

The Tripartite Agreement has ensured that at least one facet of the broader migration crisis is going to be addressed. However, the capacity of the government of Somalia to fulfill the security, judicial, administrative and logistical tasks of the agreement requires a careful needs assessment. The Somali populations in Kenya’s camps and cities must also receive extensive outreach on the Agreement, especially regarding their protection and rights. However, the Tripartite Agreement, by the fact that it is the first of any national or international measures to address returns, risks prioritizing returns from Kenya over any other group.

The existence of the Agreement could also set the precedence for negotiated returns from other host countries. Such devised frameworks with other countries would have to be compatible in terms of incentives, protection and packages for the beneficiaries. Unequal packages risks provoking movements to sites where packages are deemed to be better. They could also produce tensions, whereby one group is perceived to be ‘favoured’ over another. Therefore, while the Tripartite Agreement is the first of its kind, it is important that the planning, preparations and implementation be done in a manner that is compatible and conducive to the development and implementation of all policies and frameworks related to returns, regardless of location and status. Likewise, it also essential that new policies and frameworks factor in and form part of the broader timing and phasing of returns in order to avoid mass movements that exceed the Somali government and local authorities’ capacities to manage it. Return movements should be also managed in a manner that matches and does not overwhelm progress made in statebuilding, peacebuilding and development.

A phased and sequenced approach is widely agreed to be the best approach for returns. However, as noted in the Tripartite Agreement but applicable more broadly, in order to prevent destabilizing premature self-repatriation, it is essential for the international community and hosting countries to continue to maintain the humanitarian assistance and protection available to displaced populations until the time is ripe for their respective repatriation.

Moreover, the new existence of the Agreement could also spur new movements of previously non-displaced persons hoping to benefit from the packages available to returnees. There could also be waves of self-repatriation due to perceived signs of security and protection, misinformation, or exploitive scams claiming to facilitate returns. It would hence seem advisable to eventually consider developing systems for irregular migrants to register for assistance and facilitated return, comparable to the one established for refugees and IDPs. Similarly, creating systems to monitor and track continuous mobility and cyclical migration would also be useful to consider.

2. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Given that the capacity of the Somali government is still limited and the high volume of displaced persons and the socio-economic and environmental conditions in the country— that continue to compel populations to migration outwards and to which returnees will confront—a phased and sequenced approach to returns is not only favourable but necessary. All returns should be balanced against the capacity of the urban and rural communities to absorb the inflows. While it is difficult to set out specific benchmarks on the necessary preconditions that should be in place
PART VI: CONCLUSION AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

within the receiving communities for populations to return, safety and security, access to basic services and a level of assurance that the returns will not provoke further displacement are critical considerations. In this vein, further assessments and data collection are necessary.

Many of the recommendations below can each be considered to be, or to have, immediate, mid-term and long-term requirements and/or ramifications. The timing for certain interventions will depend on the phasing and sequencing of interventions. Many of the recommendations should also be considered to be undertaken in a phased and/or pilot approach in order to be manageable or to minimize overwhelming capacity burdens, to continually learn and improve lessons or to prepare for nation-wide coverage.

1. Strengthen Data Collection and Analysis and Information Sharing and Coordination

- In order to get an informed, evidenced-based understanding of the full impact of the crisis dimensions of migration, including on the impact of the return movement on populations and communities as well as on Somalia’s broader mobility patterns and continuous drivers of migration, a number of assessments, mapping and data collection are necessary covering:
  - Needs assessment of government capacities (security, judicial, administrative and logistical, including at borders) to manage return movements, including cyclical migration and the return of rejected asylum-seekers abroad. The needs assessment should correspond but not be limited to the requirements of the Tripartite Agreement. The results of the assessment should inform an overall development strategy, action plan and resource mobilization strategy for both the Agreement as well as broader national strategy. It would cover such as elements as border capacities and migrant processing capability among other administrative, judicial and security measures.
  - Security situation that factors in the capacity of security sector to maintain public order and security and that identifies potential risks in different geographic areas throughout the country, with geographical rankings and warnings according to risk; as well as continued monitoring and updating of safe return route and transportation modalities.
  - Continued monitoring of new refugee and IDP movements.
  - Broader-based ethnographic mapping and profiling of potential returnees in refugee camps, urban settings and IDP settlements, taking into account their clan; family situation; location they are planning to return to; the duration of their displacement; their socio-economic profile, including education and literacy; their specific vulnerabilities and other healthcare and protection needs, including inter-clan relations.
  - An environmental assessment of rangelands and cultivatable land and impact assessment of return on the environment and local resources.
  - Possible livelihood opportunities, gaps in regulatory frameworks that may prevent the promotion of investment and trade
  - Once conditions for return are met, conduct a profiling of existing Somali rejected asylum seekers in third countries, enabling identification of pilot areas of return and reintegration in Somalia.

2. Support Interim Measures and Early Preparations for Return

- To prevent sudden waves of premature returns, continue to ensure that camps and existing assistance programmes remain able to guarantee the safety, protection and resources, including dependable shelters, adequate healthcare and WASH services in refugee camps. Likewise, support the FGS and respective regional authorities to maintain adequate standards, protection and oversight at IDP camps.
- Engage host communities on topics and raise awareness on the key issues of return to help communities, towns and cities be prepared for the changes that they could expect from populations returning such as impacts on local economies,
resources as well as potential social repercussions, conflict mediation techniques and mechanisms they can approach.

- Promote and support awareness-raising and sensitization programmes across the country and in the displacement camps and communities on the dangers of irregular migration and other campaigns that send positive, reconciliatory messages for communities of return.

- Engage displaced populations in civic education and participatory consultations related to statebuilding.

3. Strengthen Government Capacity to Manage the Different and Multifarious Dimensions of Migration

- Based on the results of the needs assessment, support the government in preparing a policy and legal framework that covers all dimensions of migration and mobility in Somalia in a balanced and gender-sensitive manner, including on border management, refugee and IDP returns as well as regular, irregular and cyclical migration, trafficking and smuggling; stranded migrants and third-country nationals. Operational modalities of return, action plan and resource mobilization scheme should accompany all policies and frameworks. Focus should include but not be limited to the specific implementation requirements of the Tripartite Agreement and other refugee and IDP returns.

- Support the government to address border management and border security and assist in enhancing cross border security cooperation between governments in the region. This could also include establishing a joint task force involving all three regional administrations in border management.

- Strengthen policies, capacities and parable assistance related to managing both regular and irregular migration, including training personnel; once the situation on the ground allows and in line with agreed international policies, arrange for immediate transfer of those who would like to voluntarily return back to their respective countries regardless of their status; and facilitate the return of stranded migrants through inter-governmental cooperation.

- Establish a national ministry or department responsible for coordinating and overseeing returns and managing repatriation and returnee affairs in collaboration with ministries of labour; internal affairs; population; reconciliation, compensation and restitution; and transitional justice among others. Provide intense training on returnee issues, such as managing and processing claims and disputes.

- Assist in setting up transitional bureaus or committees in each region to facilitate the registration, administration of returnees and to receive dispute and settlement claims for processing and dispute mitigation/settlement.

- Promote the establishment of “Overseas Affairs”, such as those found in India and China, to help promote positive oversight and engagement to bridge the diaspora and Somalia (see box 3).

- Assist in strengthening existing primary health care, referral and continuity of health care services particularly in trans-border areas and hard-to-reach IDP and migrant communities.

- Support preparedness and early warning to prevent secondary migration and to build resilience against such factors as drought and renewed violence.

- Focus on preparedness and resilience, including on natural disasters such as drought, flooding and environmental degradation, particularly regarding rangeland and marine pollution, in particular by investing in disaster risk reduction.

4. Early Planning for Sustainable Return, Recovery and Reintegration

- Negotiate community-based rehabilitation and reintegration programmes and support packages in collaboration with international organizations and the government that could engage the diaspora and involve communities in providing technical support in trading skills and financial literacy as well as setting up cooperatives and small scale industries.

- Ensure that all groups of returnees and vulnerable migrants are factored into early planning and that they are tracked and registered in order to ensure that they receive appropriate assistance, including for rejected asylum seekers and returning irregular migrants.

- Encourage the FGS to visit the camps and settlements to discuss pertinent issues, hear voiced concerns and, when appropriate, to formally invite them to come back home.

- Engage leaders in the diaspora communities or associations in a forum that channels assistance opportunities throughout the country.

- Engage, consult with and provide technical expertise to recovery, development, peacebuilding, environment, governance, transitional justice and judicial administration, rule of law, security, human rights and health and WASH sectors on different aspects of migration relevant to these sectors and ensure that planning and coordination engage the sectors as required. Particular attention should focus on helping the
different sectors prepare and accommodate for the high volume of return of potentially idle youths, educating the sectors on key psychosocial issues of return.
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