A study on the Dynamics of Arab Expatriate Communities:

Promoting Positive Contributions to Socioeconomic Development and Political Transitions in their Homelands
One of the main objectives of the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States (Arab Expatriates Department) is to encourage the Arab Expatriates to participate in the development process in the Arab world, which requires studying the conditions and characteristics of Arab expatriates in countries of residence. This study is considered as an implementation of the mentioned objective and of the declaration of the first conference of Arab Expatriates, which was held in December 2012.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants. This collection of papers has been a cooperative endeavor between IOM and the Arab Expatriates Department of the League of Arab States (LAS).

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Foreword

In a region which includes countries that have some of the highest labour export and import rates in the world, migration and development have been ever more closely interlinked in recent decades. Financial remittances constitute a significant proportion of the GDP of export countries and an even greater proportion of their foreign currency earnings. Migration has served to alleviate the pressure on domestic labour markets, providing opportunities for work as well as training and education. It has also served as a mechanism for the transfer of ideas, knowledge and culture.

The region now has many vibrant expatriate communities around the world who contribute to their countries of origin in myriad ways. Some of these are obvious and well-documented, others have yet to be investigated or are entirely immeasurable. There are still more expatriates who desire to do more but lack the appropriate knowledge or infrastructure to become engaged.

The study was a joint project between the Arab Expatriates Department of League of Arab States (LAS) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). It followed on from the results of the First Arab Expatriates Conference, organized by the LAS General Secretariat in December 2010. The declaration of the conference included among its recommendations inviting the Arab League to carry out “in-depth studies on the social, cultural, economic, and political conditions of Arab expatriate communities in various countries of residence.” This collection represents a first step in meeting those objectives ahead of the Second Arab Expatriates Conference.

As well as the contribution that this collection makes to academia, the analyses and recommendations put forward serve as a foundation for future work which aims to realize the developmental potential of expatriate communities. Such communities, mobilized by the unique bonds they have with their home countries and their desire to see those countries enjoy socio-economic growth, may be one of the most important driving forces in development in the 21st century.

It is also our sincere hope that, amidst the positive social and economic transformations taking place in the Middle East and North Africa, the continued cooperation between the League of Arab States (LAS) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) will help to facilitate and encourage international efforts that allow the region to reap the developmental benefits of migration.

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Executive Summary

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is both an important region of origin and destination within the contemporary pattern of global migration. As a percentage of its population (5.3%), it has one of the highest stocks of expatriates in the world (World Bank, 2010). Many of these expatriates reside in comparatively more developed areas such as the EU and the US and have achieved significant professional and economic success.

Just as there are a great variety of push factors leading nationals from the MENA region to take up lives in expatriation, there are a great many different forces which motivate expatriates to contribute in different ways to their countries of origin. These contributions can be borne out of a desire to provide for their families; patriotism and national identity; a love of their own culture or language; a desire to see political change; a desire to make money through productive investment; or, merely a desire to ‘give something back’ and contribute to the socio-economic development of their home country.

These desires have manifested in a plethora of material, social and ideational transfers between expatriate communities and their countries of origin. These continue to have significant, positive developmental impacts on countries of origin in the MENA region. However, the potential contribution of many expatriates is limited by lack of appropriate knowledge or infrastructure to enable their contribution. There is certainly scope to improve this situation and encourage expatriate engagement.

Expatriates have complex, idiosyncratic relationships with their countries of origin. Particular situations may impact on their desire to engage with their countries of origin or on their ability to use the infrastructural resources available to them. For example, where state institutions are non-neutral, expatriates may not trust them, or may even fear them. These relationships can be managed and improved. The current political reforms occurring in many countries in the region represents an opportunity to recast these relationships as popular uprisings call for the democratization and long-term neutrality of state institutions. However, after many years of partisan domination, many states simply require better resources and information to start to repair relationships with their expatriated nationals. More research and outreach exercises are needed to guide this process and restore trust.

This collection of research papers focuses on specific aspects of the complex relationships that exist between expatriate communities and their home countries in the Middle East and North Africa, highlighting in particular the various kinds of social, political, and economic engagement that define these relationships. Analyses and recommendations are given with regard to encouraging this engagement and how best to harness its developmental impact.

In the first study of this collection, Moursi examines some of the characteristics of Egyptian expatriates in Germany. He argues that the success that many Egyptian expatriates enjoy in Germany pays dividends to Egypt in the form of direct investment, the provision of services for vulnerable populations and the transfer of knowledge and expertise. Transfers are facilitated and encouraged through cross-border networks and associations of expatriates.

Et-Tayeb explores historical trends in Maghrebi female migration to southern Europe, as well as their participation in destination country labour markets. She examines female motivations for migration and the related remittances they contribute to communities in the origin country. Although these migrants have a strong desire and commitment to transfer funds home, social mechanisms do not exist to facilitate finance being used for productive investment. Instead, much of it gets used for every-day consumption.

The processes of change involved in what has been termed the ‘Arab Spring’ is the focus of several research papers; these events are seen as factors with the potential to fundamentally alter the relationship between source countries and expatriate communities. Fawzy, and (Premazzi, Castagnone, and Cingolani) examine changes in expatriates’ desire to engage with their origin countries after the revolution.

Premazzi Castagnone, and Cingolani focus on second and third generation Italians of Egyptian origin in
Following the revolution, these migrant communities began to have a desire to reconnect with their Egyptian roots where previously they had grown significantly more distant from these roots than older generations. New social networking technologies provide novel avenues for them to pursue this desire and engage with communities in their source country.

Fawzy examines the characteristics of Egyptian migration to the UK. The individuals he focuses on, however, are of an older generation. They are still well connected with their origin country, well-versed with current events in Egypt, and engaged in the transfer of social and financial remittances. A principle change identified by the author and interviewees that will reshape the relationship between this migrant demographic and their origin country is the development of what may be loosely termed ‘good governance.’

The role that origin country states play in shaping the relationship with their expatriates is clearly significant. This is the subject of Jaulin’s study as he looks at the changing nature of Tunisian state institutions, through periods where they facilitate expatriate engagement and interconnectedness to periods where they effectively become an arm of the ruling autocracy, monitoring the activities of expatriates.

Bouhdiba also examines more macro-institutional factors but focuses on the type of provision and scope of coverage extended by domestic welfare apparatuses, both in origin countries and destination countries. Differences in the extent of a migrant’s right to coverage between countries constitute important factors shaping incentives for return, especially for older populations, for whom healthcare coverage becomes increasingly important.

Finally, Holman examines the complicated relationship that Iraqi expatriates had with their home country during the rule of Saddam Hussein. This informs her analysis of the motivations and results of the British Government engaging Iraqi expatriates in the decision to go to war in 2003. Significant lessons may be learned from this experience in the wake of the Arab Spring as the international community searches for legitimate interlocutors amongst expatriate communities to engage and help inform foreign policy moving forward.
Chapter One:

Egyptian Migrants in Germany and the Assistance of Development Efforts in Egypt

Moursi, Mostafa Abdel-Aziz

Introduction

Most studies relating to the role of migrants in the development sector emphasize the financial remittances that are transferred to the source country. Egypt ranks within the top ten remittance receiving countries in the world. These remittances usually have two main purposes; either to fund the needs of the expatriate’s family in the source country, or to be invested in different savings schemes or assets in source country. The importance of these remittances depends on the extent to which they are employed in socio-economic projects and contribute towards creating jobs for workers. This, in turn, depends on the capacity of the available investment mechanisms to attract such remittances and to employ those with scientific and technical expertise to establish the source country projects.

Human Development in Egypt (2008) highlights the fact that Egyptian migrant remittances in 2009, which were estimated to be 7.8 billion dollars and represent 5% of (GDP), have only contributed towards establishing 1.4% of small and medium-sized enterprises between 2003 and 2004 (Cairo-IOM).

Many studies have shown that the majority of the expatriates prefer to keep their savings as liquid cash or bank deposits. Only a small part of it is invested in housing and real estate, as guaranteed savings which may increase in value in the future or may be built upon at a later stage (UNRISD 2007).

The role of expatriates in source country development is now recognized as going beyond the remittance issue and their involvement in source country projects is also seen as a positive force for change. Given that most migrants and expatriates spend long time in destination countries where politics, science and technology are more advanced, they can contribute their expertise towards political economic development efforts.

In order to enlarge the role of expatriates as partners in development, it is necessary to develop mechanisms for receiving investment of all kinds and supporting income and jobs generating projects in source countries. These are some of the considerations that led me to examine two models for Egyptian expatriate contributions from Germany: the first one is a distinct productive project; the other displays the voluntary social efforts of Egyptian expatriates.

I do not here discuss the causes of the ‘brain and skills drain.’ However, it is possible to say that they are mostly economic, educational and technological. When contemplating these factors, the researcher sees that economic incentives may explain patterns of migration belonging to technicians and workers. However, perhaps in addition to this, social and political factors are needed to fully explain patterns relating to the ‘brain and skills drain.’ We say this with the caveat that the incentive to migrate usually arises from many factors coming together such that they push the individual into making the difficult decision to emigrate (Saleh 2003).

Naturally, like other migrant source countries, Egypt is trying to maximize the economic and scientific benefit that it can gain from its expatriates by recognizing them as extending and promoting the capacities of the country. Ibrahim Badran agreed with this sentiment during the Egyptian Conference (2000) when he said:
There is no escape for us from the viewing Egyptian expats in first world countries as being like capital for Egypt deposited in foreign banks. They embody a stock of knowledge and expertise. This stock may also increase in value and quality with time. It is a legitimate right for Egypt – which produced, made, and trained these expats, and is in part responsible for the riches that they own – that it employ some of this capital in serving some of its needs. Egypt has many needs at this time. Like many other countries it has tried desperately to keep up with the activity of its peers by means of science and technology.” (Fayez 1995)

In order to achieve this, many entities and mechanisms have been established to strengthen relations between Egyptian expatriate scientists and their home country, including the following:

First: The “Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals” (TOKTEN) Project:

This project represents one of the ways Egypt can benefit from the large stock of expertise and knowledge accumulated by its diaspora in the countries of the developed world. The project maximises those benefits and pursues methods which encourage and enable expatriates to provide services to their home country. These services are voluntary in the first instance. It also encourages those responsible for national economic utilities to accept and request these services.

In his book, Skilled Migration and its Transition to Positively Benefit Egypt through the TOKTEN Project, Mr. Mohamed Baha EI-Din says, “Making use of expatriates represents a closer compromise in addressing the problem and maximizes the benefit gained from Egyptian expatriate experts. The TOKTEN project aims to respond to the existing needs of all of the national economic utilities, related both to production and services.”

This project is undertaken on basis of the Egyptian Government and UNDP sharing the costs of using expatriate expertise equally. Project resources are used to cover the travel costs and the allowances of the expatriates serving in the project, in accordance with UNDP rates and depending on how many days they spend in Egypt.

By the end of 1994, 253 missions had been implemented using experts from around 10 destination countries in the developed world, serving productive activities in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The experts also served the health sector by contributing to oncology; radiotherapy; general and specialized surgery; psychotherapy; environmental protection relating to pollution and the re-use of waste water; the pharmaceutical industry and its regulation; and, the development of information systems relevant to all these fields.

Second: The Formation of the Association of Friends of Egyptian Scientists Abroad in 1971, which has the following objectives:

» Sponsor the issues of scientists abroad.
» Strengthen their links with their home country.
» Establish social, scientific, cultural and technological bridges between scientists abroad and their colleagues in Egypt.
» Participate in searching for means of socio-economic development in Egypt.
» To act as a civil body promoting flexibility in work, and help Egyptian expatriate scientists with official sensitivities and socio-political pressures in their new communities, both hidden and apparent.

The Association’s board set up its work strategy as follows:

1. Set up a general conference for Egyptian expatriate scientists every two years under the title “Egypt Year 2000.”
2. Set up subsidiary conferences when needed.

3. Work on using the professors amongst them as visiting professors in Egyptian universities or as experts in the Arab region via a UN agency, the Arab league, or the Organization for African Unity.

4. Inform Egyptian expatriate scientists about domestic conferences so that they are able to contribute to them.

5. Collaborate with other similar associations in the Arab world.

The association is mobile and can contact different state bodies directly without difficulty. It can also solve many administrative problems for expatriate scientists who live in fast moving societies, characterized by higher mobility of labour. Expatriate scientists are received by the association in a manner which has social and intellectual appeal. It calls on them to establish further links abroad and stay in direct contact with the parent association in Egypt.

Third: Some links for Egyptian expatriate scientists were established such as:

1. The Association of Egyptian Scientists Abroad in the United States of America.
2. The Association of the Egyptian Community in the United Kingdom.
3. The Association of Scientists in Switzerland.
4. The Egyptian Science Association (Germany).
5. The Union of Arab Scientific Researchers (Germany).
6. The Egyptian Club in Glasgow.
7. The Canadian- Egyptian Association for Scientific Progress.

This study will proceed with the following sections:

1. A preparatory introduction to migration and diaspora features in Egyptian society.
2. A discussion of some aspects of the community of Germans of Egyptian origin.
3. An examination of the ‘Sekum Group’ experiment as a model for bringing together expertise and financial capability.
4. An examination of the voluntary efforts of German physicians of Egyptian origin to support health services in their home country.
5. Conclusion

Migration and Diaspora Features in Egyptian Society

The Egyptian emigration is considered a relatively recent phenomenon, which has intensified in the last four decades. This is a relatively short time period in comparison with other peoples. For this reason the culture of emigration has not embedded itself within Egyptian society. For a long time Egypt remained an attractive country for many waves of foreign migration, both from countries in the immediate geographical area and from further afield. Throughout the ages, Egyptians continued to be unacquainted with the phenomena of emigration, to the extent that scholars said that the Egyptians were a farming people, and that they were closely linked to agriculture and their homeland, finding it difficult to move. This impression then changed to one of a people accepting emigration and able to expatriate for long periods of time. This was as a result of difficult living circumstances, the number of regional wars which Egypt participated in, decreasing work opportunities, and the short supply of agricultural land, among other reasons.

The character of Egyptian emigration is no longer limited to certain categories or sectors of the Egyptian
community but extends to all ages and professions. It includes innovators, intellectuals, scientists, craftsmen, and managing directors, both male and female.

After the October War in 1973, Egypt pursued a liberal policy to encourage emigration. This lead to increased emigration flows, especially towards the Gulf area. Moreover, in 1975, Egypt adopted a liberal law which allowed for Egyptians to have dual nationality, or even waive or retrieve their nationality when needed. Also, an Egyptian father’s ability to pass on his nationality to his children would not be limited by generation; regardless of whether or not children were born in Egypt or held another nationality. The law was also recently amended to give the same rights to children who have an Egyptian mother married to a non-Egyptian.

More policies relating to immigration were then passed in stages by the Egyptian government. As of the late 1960s, the government became more concerned for the children of expatriates, after an increase in their number. This concern was embodied in 1971 when the permanent Egyptian constitution added a specific section to regulate the rights of nationals to emigrate, and the processes and conditions involved in departure. For the first time in 1981, a minister of state was appointed specially for migration and the Egyptian diaspora. In 1983 Law No. 111 was passed which made provisions for the care of Egyptians living abroad and their participation in the fields of national development and production. Then, in 1996, Presidential Decree No. 165 was issued. Organized by the Ministry of Manpower and Migration, the decree aimed to link migration policy more closely with national interests and increase its contribution to socio-economic development.

The Egyptian presence outside Egypt – which is estimated at between 3.5 and 5 million permanent and temporary migrants – has become relatively important to Egypt. It represents a strong, human, Egyptian presence in different destination countries. This presence can enhance Egypt’s regional position and support its interests and development efforts if it is properly enabled and invested in. Financial and social returns from this presence have a special weight with regard to the Egyptian balance of payments, as well as a social yield. The remittances passing through banking channels were estimated at nine billion dollars between 2009 and 2010. We must also add to this the cash and goods which Egyptians bring back with them. The total cash transfers through banks alone, despite their relative decline, approach, if not exceed, the returns from the Suez Canal, the export of Egyptian goods, and tourism. All of this demands that this resource be maintained.

There are also many opportunities for Egyptian expatriates to gain expertise, skills and contacts from their work. This can have a positive impact on their productive efficiency and their respect for the value and organization of work. Finally, these opportunities ease the acute problem of unemployment in the Egyptian economy.

Of course, this positive impact is related to the investment of remittances in productive projects through channels which are able to absorb them at the appropriate rate. It also depends on the ability of appropriate authorities to undertake an active role in steering these remittances to sectors of productive investment, providing facilities and support in this process.

Despite facing difficulties, Egyptian migrants have been able to prove their ability, creativity and ingenuity by working in prestigious positions in destination countries. However, there are other Egyptians that have not been able to withstand the pressure and suffering involved in long expatriation and the struggle to adapt to the differences between their new community and their community of origin. Stories of success and failure should lead us to pause and reflect on the capacity of Egyptians to integrate into other societies.

We still lack a strategy for integrating the different components and dimensions of migration, clarifying its objectives, and linking it to policies for economic development. Also, at the organizational level, there is an absence of a comprehensive system providing care and protection to different migrants (there is a serious initiative to establish a ‘Care Committee for Egyptians Abroad,’ but it is still under discussion in the bureaucratic and legislative corridors).
At the basic level, there are some limited connections of association between the Egyptian expatriates and their fellow Egyptians in their home country. In other countries, however, there are no organizations or associations. Most of the links and associations of Egyptian expatriates are characterized by weakness and inactivity. A general framework of norms and principals is needed to organize and encourage them.

Observers of Egyptian migration face enormous difficulties due to the dearth of data and the absence of trustworthy statistics. The statistical mechanisms generally used for recording the number of Egyptian migrants around the world are primitive. There is no base year for the available statistics to enable a realistic estimation of the number of Egyptian migrants in Europe and other destinations. Also, a large number of them do not register themselves at Egyptian embassies and consulates, making it difficult to identify their numbers and distribution in different countries, as well as the details of their situation, social life, and political economic activity. Egyptian diplomatic missions concerning expatriates have increased in the last two decades, as the nation’s view of its expatriates developed substantially. Expatriates became seen as a resource for their home country and there are high hopes for their contribution to socio-economic development. Many of them took the initiative and demonstrated their expertise and effort in serving the needs of their home country in many fields, or helped overcome obstacles to development, either through the diaspora (such as the TOKTEN project, transferring knowledge and expertise) or by other means.

Relevant government organizations seek to conduct a comprehensive survey of the capacities Egyptian expatriates with the aim of identifying their number and positions, specializations, fields and circumstances of work, and their associations, and create a comprehensive database. This will form the primary core for the work of coordinating and connecting expatriate scientists with scientists in their home country. It will also work to find additional mechanisms to benefit from expatriate scientists while they are abroad. Expatriate contribution to the transfer of advanced technology from overseas to their home country will also be enhanced through the maintenance of constant contact with them.

Egypt works, as far as possible, towards the inclusion of their expatriates in care services. Citizenship involves an affiliation between citizens and their state and loyalty to its people and their best interests. It also involves the interaction of citizens with the events of their state and their enjoyment of political and civil rights. Each citizen has the right to freedom of movement and to select a place to live, whether that be inside or outside their country.

Article (40) from the permanent constitution issued 1971 decreed: “Citizens are equal before the law, equal in rights and duties, without discrimination based on sex, origin, language, religion or ethnicity”.

Article (62) said: “a citizen has the right to vote and run for election, and express his opinion in referendums, in accordance with the provisions of the law. His contribution to general life is a national duty”.

Recently, after the 25 January Revolution, the Egyptian legislature extended the domain of political rights for Egyptians abroad to equal that of domestic Egyptians. For the first time proper mechanisms have been established for this purpose to enable Egyptian expatriates to participate in the parliamentary elections in 2011/2012. This will increase expatriate feelings of affiliation with their home country whilst leaving their loyalty to their destination countries unaffected (Ghaleb 2009)

**German with Egyptian origin**

The total population of Germany is estimated to be 82.2 million. 7.3 million (9%) are foreigners. It is notable that the difference between the number of deaths and the number of births is 80,000 per year. This means that the German population is decreasing and that the proportion of people over 60 years old (23%) is increasing, while the proportion of those under 20 years old is decreasing (21%). According to the statistics, without increasing the rate of migration in the next ten years, those over 60 will make up 40% of the population. This will mean a decrease in productive power and an increase in consump-
There is therefore a need to bring in immigrants to work in order to realize demographic balance. Germany is among European Union states when it comes to taking in migrants (estimated to hold 60% of the EU’s migrants in 1998). Germany, does not accept the principle of dual nationality, even though some facilities relating to dual nationality have been adopted for those of the second or third generation born in Germany.

It is difficult to attain accurate census information for Egyptians staying in Germany. After reviewing Germany’s annual statistics records, we found that Egyptians were not mentioned. This is despite the fact that many statistics were recorded for migrants from Ethiopia, Algeria, and Lebanon and these migrants are a more recent presence than the Egyptians. A study prepared by the ‘Egyptian House for the General Federation of Egyptian Clubs’ estimated that the actual number of Egyptians is around 43,000, in addition to those staying illegally. Only 17,000 of these were registered in the consulate records.

### Number of Egyptians in Germany:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consular Department</th>
<th>Number of Egyptians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt (without referrals from Bonn)</td>
<td>6800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Consulate in Bonn (currently the function of the Frankfurt Consulate)</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Egyptian Consulates and The Egyptian House</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Federation of Egyptian Clubs in Germany - Dusseldorf)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some people have dated the Egyptian presence in Germany to before the Second World War period, which was followed by flows Egyptian migrants to Germany. In the beginning of the 50’s, after the revolution, large numbers came for study or work. Trade was active between Germany and Egypt as Britain contracted during that period. Thus, Germany contributed to the beginnings of Egyptian manufacturing programmes. Many Egyptian scientists and technicians came to Germany to receive training in its factories. Many of them married and stayed in Germany. The summer training programmes for Egyptian university students in Germany during the 60s and 70s had another crucial role in the residence of many Egyptians in Germany.

Since the beginning of the nineties, there has been an influx of Egyptian youth to Germany. However, most of them have stayed irregularly. Some of them have succeeded in settling their legal residence, while others still remain in the hope that new legislation will facilitate a solution for them. If their status is recognized this will double the number of Egyptians and Germans of Egyptian origin in Germany. Referencing the random sample of Egyptians, contained in the book Egyptians in Germany (1995) released by the Central Agency for General Filing and Statistics, we find that some of these Egyptian migrants are characterized by a high level of academic achievement and occupational status, occupying positions in the middle or upper classes. They are awarded more status than other communities, are characterized by a higher rate of integration and many of them marry Germans.

The first generation of the Egyptian migrants in Germany is an excellent model for Egyptian migration. Most of them have a high occupational status and are present in each big German city. Some of them run big companies and have established an association of businessmen in Germany which aims to strengthen commercial and economic relations between German businessmen and businessmen of Egyptian origin.

The German- Egyptian engineer, Ibrahim Samak from Luxor, lives in Stuttgart. He is the model of a positively integrated migrant, having stayed in Germany for around 30 years. He also preserves his ties to his home land. He has enormous projects in Germany and his company participated in the work of developing and renovating the historic building of the German parliament in Berlin, home of the ‘Bundestag.’ He also established the first village in his home country dependent on solar energy for its light, appliances,
and irrigation systems, Awlad Al-Sheikh in Wadi Natroun. There are many other Germans of Egyptian origin like Ibrahim Samak who participate in Egyptian development efforts.

For the first time, a German citizen of Egyptian origin, Ali Abed Al-Wahab, participated in the general elections (Sept 2005) as independent in Berlin, competing with a previous Mayor of Berlin for a seat in the Bundestag. He works primarily for an office providing services for foreigners in the municipality of Neukölln in the German capital. He represents Egyptian communities who have acquired other nationalities which is challenging for their home country. They are not included within the framework of the political organization of their home country, which is based on the spatial coincidence of the population and the area subject to this framework. How is it possible to strengthen the links between the source country and the emigrants, despite these geographical, political, and even legal separations? What is the form that their participation in national life could take? How will the nation deal with elements outside its national power? How do we reconcile multiple national loyalties which are often competing with each other?

Note that the majority of the European states recognize – if by varying degrees – the rights of the source country in building special relationships and associations with its diaspora in other countries where they are minorities, as long as this doesn’t contradict the sovereignty of the destination country. Also note that European states which adopt a flexible approach to migration or have a plurality of cultures, such as Britain, are those which especially allow immigrants to preserve social and cultural relations with the home nations. They can protect their cultural expressions within a framework spreading a culture of tolerance and combating discrimination. However, other states European states, such as France adopt a concept of the absorption or fusion of migrants in the ‘melting pot’ of the source country society. France prefer assimilation rather than welcoming these links with the migrant home country and they request that migrants abandon any social and cultural peculiarities, i.e. they don’t recognize what we might call “underlying loyalties.” It is worth pointing out that in 1996 the Central Agency for General Filing and Statistics limited the number of Egyptian associations in Germany to 24, including clubs, federations, fraternities, groups, mosques, and Christian and Islamic centres. It even included Egyptian-German friendship societies.

The “Sekem Group” experiment as a model for bringing together expertise and financial capability

In 1977 Dr Ibrahim Abouleish founded the “Sekem Initiative” in the Eastern desert of Egypt. This initiative was built by establishing economic entities in a variety fields, foremost amongst these were organic farming, herbal medicine, food products and cotton textiles. Social development institutions and not-for-profit organisations also emerged from this initiative. Thus the Sekem Holding Company was established to provide the finance required for long term investments. It also provided the information technology required to administer everything pertaining to the planning of these different activities, as well as their implementation. In 1984 the “Egyptian Organization for Green Development” was established as an NGO. In 2006 it changed its name to the “Sekem Institute for Development.” In 1985 a kindergarten was set up on the site of Sekem’s farmland. In 1986, the “Sekem Institute for Adult Training” was set up. Then, in 1994, the “Sekem Organisation for Organic Agriculture” was established as an independent NGO to provide agricultural training and investment services in Egypt.

1999 witnessed the opening of a new building, “The Sekem Academy for Science and Applied Arts,” which included the fields of medicine, pharmacology, agriculture, social research, and art. The name changed to the “Heleopolis Academy for Sustainable Development.” It aims to build the capacity of Egypt in preparing and publishing research relevant to the fields of medicine, pharmacology, organic agriculture, art and social science. It includes research programmes which run upon request so that it meets the needs of the community, businesses, and the state. It is dependent upon both domestic and international cooperation.
In addition to the research activities which the Heliopolis Academy undertakes it also organizes a number on academic, scientific and cultural activities. It includes a department for medical research that examines urgent medical needs in Egypt and carries out scientific surveys of popular prescriptions which merit further attention. After arriving at a new medicine it carries out laboratory testing before putting it forward to be registered by the Ministry of Health. A department for pharmacological research studies the active ingredients of medicines which use organic materials, enhancing methods for their detection and extraction. A department for agricultural research studies the best conditions for growing plants that are useful for medicines, their harvest times, standards for their selection, and ways to improve their variety through programmes for targeted plant strains and cultivation of a series of traditional herbs in cooperation with the rural community. In order to preserve Egypt’s wealth of genetic variety, the department set up a seed bank specifically for varieties of plant life threatened by extinction.

The department of social research has an agenda with multiple objectives. It includes: undertaking social research in multiple disciplines, through a variety of methods; organizing programmes of training; and, undertaking social development projects. The main aim of the “Sekem Institute” is to encourage farmers to use organic methods in growing their produce and their treatment of soil fertility and restoration. In practice, we find that the main difference between organic and traditional farming methods is the use of biological products and caring for the harmony of natural rhythms in agricultural activity. These biological products consist of plants, minerals, manure, natural fertilizer (compost), and the preparation of solutions to sprinkle the ground with. The use of these products provides healthy soil to grow strong and healthy plants. Many pesticides and chemical fertilizers result in pollution of the environment and products which damage the health of human beings.

Since its establishment, the Egyptian Organisation for Organic Agriculture has undertaken cycles of training for farmers, consumers, engineers, and planters in organic farming methods. As a direct result of the activity of the organization, the use of artificial pesticides has decreased by more than 90%, i.e. from 35,000 tons annually to around just 3,000 tons. At the same time, the productive yield of cotton rose by around 30%, i.e. 1,220 kilos for every feddan. The flexibility and character of the cotton also generally improved compared to the cotton farmed by traditional methods. There are currently 80,000 feddans in Egypt which are farmed with clean farming methods, based on organic agriculture, which avoid using chemical fertilizer. Organic agriculture follows a system specifically for the environment in combating disease and pests by avoiding the use of artificial pesticides, chemical fertilizers, growth hormones, antibiotics, and genetic modification. This project directly employs around 3,000 individuals, including experts, artists, administrative officials, workers, and scientists.

This project has earned a good reputation for itself abroad and there is an increasing arrival of its products in external markets. This led to the “Sekem” company earning the “Right Livelihood” award in 2003. This award is the equivalent of a Nobel Prize which is granted to entrepreneurs in the field of social and cultural development for a more educated world. The award panel saw that the Sekem Initiative demonstrates how modern business can mix profitability and international competitiveness with a humanitarian, cultural and spiritual approach to social development and respect for the natural environment. Also in appreciation of these efforts was the choice to recognise Doctor Ibrahim Abouleish, founder of the Egyptian Sekem Initiative, as a pioneer and friend of prominent social workers by the Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship.
The Voluntary efforts of German physicians of Egyptian origin to support health services in their country of origin

There are a number of voluntary initiatives in medicine and other fields which Egyptian expatriates contribute to. The following are examples of such initiatives:

» The opening of the Mubarak City for Scientific Research and the Application of Technology in December 1999. A number of Egyptian expatriates worth through the city to participate in transport and installation of advanced technology through cooperation with several national institutions. There have also been preparations for the establishment of a Science centre near 6th October City.

» The establishment of a global centre for heart surgery in the city of Aswan under the auspices of one the most famous heart surgeons in the world, Doctor Magdy Yacoub (British of Egyptian Origin), as part of the plan “Chain of Hope.” This plan helps poor countries adopt heart surgery procedures free of charge.

» Several Egyptian expatriate physicians have donated a number of machines and medicines to the trusts of several Egyptian hospitals. For the benefit of their home country, a doctor’s association endeavored to use the expertise of more than 20 thousand Egyptian doctors working abroad, especially in the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia, in an agreement with Egyptian embassies. The agreement linked these doctors to an association in Cairo so that they could contribute their rare specialisations and also train young Egyptian doctors (ministry of manpower and immigration).

In Germany there are a number of skilled workers of Egyptian origin in the fields of medical science, either specialized in human medicine, dentistry, pharmacology, or natural healing. Despite their limited number (less than a hundred) compared to the number found in other destination countries, the members of this group contribute to their home country through their initiatives, cooperation and voluntary activity. Their effectiveness is enhanced by the density of their associations, federations, and clubs established by Egyptian expatriates in most major German cities. These are not limited solely to Egyptians but some of them take the form of Egyptian-German friendship associations. This gives them an extra dimension of activity, as well as the presence of a network of support in their source country (the Association of Returning Expatriate Scientists or the association of Friends of Egyptian Scientists Abroad). Several members of these associations returned from Germany and preserved channels of active communication, either with Egyptian communities in Germany or relevant bodies.

The Association of Returning Expatriate Scientists was formed in 1995 as an NGO (*). It included a number of those with scientific expertise returning from Europe, the US, Canada, and especially Germany. Despite the fact that it is a small group (75 members with multiple fields of expertise), it nevertheless supports development efforts in the source country and is at the forefront of those inviting groups of German doctors and nurses, including those of Egyptian origin, to visit Egypt for voluntary work. In a number of Egyptian provinces, especially Luxor, Qena and Qaliubiya, doctors tied to members of this association treat the sick in poor communities and undertake surgical operations voluntarily.

To detail the quickest example, for the first time in Luxor international hospital, in January 2006, a team of German doctors, including some of Egyptian origin, completed 20 open-heart surgery operations free of charge for the sick in the South of Upper Egypt. The majority of these fixed valves, implanted arteries, and performed surgery on blood vessels. The medical team was led by two German doctors of Egyptian origin and included 10 others who had come from Germany specifically to undertake these operations free of charge in their first test in Egypt. Doctors from Luxor International Hospital, the Heart Institute, and the Medical College of Assiut also helped with the operations. The dean of the college was keen to send four doctors for training with the international team to aid it and gain valuable experience.

I obtained extra details about the procedure from Doctor Fikry Riyyadh, a doctor of Egyptian origin residing Germany. He said, “Doctor Magad Abdulmageed An-Nagar, is a professor and head of the Department of Central Care in the Northwest Rhine Centre. This centre is one of the biggest and most important centres for heart disease and heart surgery in Europe. The idea came in November 2005 when he met
with Doctor Saleh As-Sayeed, Professor of heart disease in Holland, and Doctor Mohammad Makawy, a specialist in physiotherapy and head of the Organisation of Dutch-Egyptian Friendship. We got to know about their experiment in which they would send a medical aid team to Egypt as a way of giving back to the country that we love and live in...” He added, “I finalized the idea when I displayed it to a friend, Dr. Omri Abdulatah Farag, professor and head of the Department of Heart Surgery in the Centre for Heart Surgery in Krefeld in Germany. I was able to obtain donations from the centre that I work in; supplies and medical devices equivalent to the value of 120,000 EGP. We displayed the idea to a group of colleagues in two centres to request support. They responded by offering to work free of charge, provided that the patients were those in need. We started preparing for a trip in coordination with the Egyptian Ministry of Health. The Luxor International Hospital was chosen for the surgical operations due to the fact that it has exceptional equipment... Indeed, the medical brigade of Mahmud Awadallah, general director of the hospital, announced the arrival of the team, chose a list of patients and diagnosed them with care. After we arrived we choose the neediest and those with the least potential for the operation.”

Besides the voluntary and social dimension of this model, it helped Egyptian doctors residing in the source country with new expertise through their participation with the visiting doctors. It provided the opportunity to train young Egyptian doctors in German hospitals and institutes. Note also that the German organization in Cairo took on an encouraging and supporting role in these efforts. However, some obstacles still stand in the way of expanding these sorts of efforts. These voluntary efforts, which proceeded under the title “The Initiative to Give Back,” encountered bureaucratic problems. For example, the incoming Egyptian doctors from Germany were not recognized as doctors in Egypt by the Supreme Council for Universities, despite the fact that most of them are professors in German universities. Each time they were also forced to get a temporary Egyptian work permit. Some of the Egyptian doctors were not welcoming towards the visiting doctors. There were also other problems including with nursing and sterilization.

The Association of Returning Expatriate Scientists has other activities besides these voluntary services in the field of health. These include inviting third and second generation children of migrants to spend two months in Egypt to learn Arabic, visit the sites of Egypt, and get to know their Egyptian peers. When we examine what motivates this group of Egyptian expatriates, we find that one of the main reasons is that they have strong feelings of association with their home country. This is despite the fact that they have been expatriated for long periods of time. The presence of organisations and associations linkages to gather expatriates together in the destination country is also important for a variety of reasons:

» They represent a civil body which can look after the interests of Egyptian communities abroad and fill the void where there is no official capacity to do so.

» They encourage a spirit of solidarity and harmony between Egyptian expatriates, giving those same associations and organisations greater strength and efficacy.

» They also protect expatriates if they are exposed to harm and allow them to face shared problems together through mutual support.

The Association of Returning Expatriate Scientists faced financial and administrative problems pertaining to their legal conformation in accordance with the law regarding NGOs. This forced it to join the Association of Friends of Egyptian Scientists as a transitional stage.
Conclusion

The wealth of Egypt does not merely consist of its land, the Nile, and its cultural heritage. Rather, the real wealth of Egypt is in her sons and daughters which have filled the world with their technical expertise and their great work in various branches of science and knowledge. They constitute an immense wealth by which Egypt has built its influence, honour and greatness. Thus, the workers, manufacturers, and scientists of Egypt are like a national treasure that has not yet been realized. As Zaki Naguib Mahmoud made clear in one of his works, “Minds are like all other living organisms, they seek for themselves a suitable place for their activity. If they are unable to do so, they will wither and die, and the different between intelligence and stupidity is lost. For the intelligent mind is not like a diamond that you put in a safe of solid steal, lock away, and return to at your convenience, checking that it is still sheltered from thieves so as to calm you heart. Rather, the intelligent mind is a beam of light that wants to find for itself darkness to illuminate. If we do not allow them to move then the light will be extinguished and cease to exist. Given that this is the case, who can blame the smart minds that migrate to where there are no thorns between them and their bearing fruit? The reality, which causes us both pride and sorrow, is that a large number of our bright sons and daughters who did not produce anything in the field of science when they were in our society were attracted by more favourable conditions to demonstrate their genius in other countries.

We should see our expatriate scientists from this perspective, as Farouk El-Baz does: “It is a mistake to imagine that the return of our migrant scientists will fix all our problems. When I look at why people migrate I have to look first to the political, social and economic situation. If I wanted to maintain the best available scientific expertise then I would have to widen opportunities, encourage researchers, and change the basic administrative procedures which are unsuitable for scientific research.” There is no doubt that many Egyptian expatriates support development efforts in their home country, either by establishing sophisticated projects there, or through voluntary work in various fields. Faced with the dilemma of final return, these efforts represent a compromise between the difficulties of the return process and the desire to give back to their home country:

» They lessen the negative impact of the migration of high-skilled Egyptians and partly contribute to transforming the ‘brain drain’ into a ‘brain gain.’

» On the one hand, it is possible to recognize such efforts as a form of circular migration. They open up opportunities for expatriates to undertake several activities in the source country (establishing projects, practicing business, voluntary activity etc.). On the other hand, they support the interests of the source country. They help expatriates to discover the opportunities for return to the source country in the future, whilst their residence and possibility to return to one of the EU countries is still maintained.
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Chapter Two:

The Participation of Female Migrants in the Socio-Economic Development Scene in Two Maghreb Countries: Social Reading of Status and Roles

Et-Tayeb, Aicha

Introduction

In recent years, global interest in migration and its different complexities has increased in pace with the increase in the number of migrants and the worsening of the legal and illegal routes that they take. This interest is associated with a number of initiatives to emphasize positive, active roles for migrants in different socio-economic fields in source and destination countries. In addition, there is growing talk that these international migration movements can produce civic and cultural contact between the migrant's original culture and their new culture.

However, analysis and research regarding the migration of women from developing to developed countries remains incomplete, despite the quantitative and qualitative progress. The status of Maghreb and Arab female migrants has generally remained more private, rarely receiving the interest it deserves from researchers and policy-makers specialised in the migration of these places of origin.

This paper attempts a qualitative examination of some of the aspects of the female migration from the Maghreb. In the first section, it attempts to put forward a statistical picture of its volume, characteristics, and context. This is despite the near absence of precise, comprehensive and official statistics regarding female migration from the area. The second section will deal with the path of female migration from the Maghreb while attempting to examine some of the characteristics of the migrants themselves. The third section will study the nature of the general relationships between women, migration, and development. It will explore the literature and research in this field, especially regarding the Maghreb. It will examine the contribution of Maghrebi female migrants to economic investment in their home country, through exposing myths and truths relating to their presence in this field.

Female Migration from the Maghreb: A Quantitative and Approach and Theory

In this section we develop a quantitative analysis of female Maghrebi migration. We also deal with the paucity of studies and theoretical approaches to female migration and its characteristics, as well the migration corridor from the Maghreb.

The Growing Volume of Female Migration

The dialogue about the extraordinary transformation of the phenomenon of migration is not new. For some time, the majority of international reports1 have emphasised the extent of this quantitative and qualitative transformation, both in its regional and international dimensions. The increasing presence of women within these international waves of human mobility remains one of the most prominent features of this transformation. The level of female migration, which now comprises nearly half of all migration, is around 94.5 million according to the UNFPA report for 2005. Most of them are unregistered and work in the fields of nursing, entertainment, and personal services. In the context of globalisation, 100 million

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1 Reports of from the IOM and UNFPA.
women migrate every year in search of partners or work, ensuring that they and their families will find means of subsistence. These are some of the factors which have turned the direction of the conversation towards the feminisation of international migration and the ‘silent’ transformation of its characteristics. The migration of Arab women has also witnessed a remarkable rise in the majority of Arab states. It now equals that of male migration in some of these states, such as Jordan and in 2005 surpassed that of male migration in other states, such as Lebanon.

There is a lack of precise statistics on the progress of female migration in the Maghreb. However, the available data point to a prominent increase in its trend during the last decade. In Morocco, for example, studies confirm that female migration made up a significant proportion of the number of general migrants in the year 1980 and has been progressing since that time. There numbers have increased rapidly, particularly since the first decade of the second millennium. In fact, the number doubled more than 6.6 times between the years 1992-2002. During this period, female migrants made up 78% of the total number of Moroccan migrants destined for Italy. In 2006, females accounted for 47% of the total Moroccan expatriates residing Canada. At the end of the 20th century they represented 32.9% of Moroccan migrants destined for Spain. Statistics also indicate that they accounted for 16.8% of the total number of migrant workers of Moroccan origin residing in Spain during this time.

Similarly, rates of female migration from Algeria became more pronounced within different sectors of Algerian emigration. For example, the number of female Algerian migrants moving to Quebec approached nearly half of all Algerian migrants destined for Quebec, numbering 1,008 from a total of 2,500 entering that region in 2000. Their number recorded in France is 42% of the total number of Algerian resident migrants. Their number increased to 10 times more than that of men entering France due to the extent of the policies for family reunification between 1975 and 1982.

It is also noteworthy that the number of Tunisian female migrants has registered a remarkable increase. Their proportion grew from 30.9% of the total number of emigrants to 38.2% in the year 1982, reaching 41.1% in 1990. This high overall trend is confirmed despite some of the numbers from the Foreign Ministry indicating that proportion of female migrants for the year 2008 was 36% (377,991) versus 64% male (679,806). Despite the obvious decline in the numbers between 1990 and 2008, it is not possible to talk about a decline in female migration from Tunis. This is not confirmed by objective evidence. Rather, evidence points to increasing cases of female migration from Tunis, either as individuals or within families, and either by regular or irregular means. This is confirmed by other indicators like the permits of residency for women arriving from the Maghrebi states in some of the destination states. The following matrix and chart also demonstrates this where the numbers of permits permitting residency for Tunisian females increased from 3,733 in 1992 to 12,814 in 2002. In the same period those for Moroccan females increased from 8,180 to 54,140 and those for Algerian females from 540 to 2039.

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4 Philippe Fargues (Dir), Migrations méditerranéennes rapport 2005, EuropeanUniversity, Institute European Commission, p 65.
6 Ibid. p164.
Table 1: Progression of the number of residency permits granted to Arab, Maghrebi females destined for Italy (1992-2002)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female Algerians</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Moroccans</td>
<td>8180</td>
<td>8844</td>
<td>12010</td>
<td>14641</td>
<td>17660</td>
<td>23722</td>
<td>27960</td>
<td>34349</td>
<td>54140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Tunisians</td>
<td>3733</td>
<td>3117</td>
<td>3783</td>
<td>4346</td>
<td>5193</td>
<td>6866</td>
<td>7829</td>
<td>8827</td>
<td>12814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12453</td>
<td>12445</td>
<td>16310</td>
<td>19599</td>
<td>23534</td>
<td>31504</td>
<td>36832</td>
<td>44387</td>
<td>68993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mohamed Khachani, L’émigration au féminin, Tendances récentes au Maroc, CARIM, notes d’analyse et de synthèse 2009/26, European University Institute

It is worth pointing out the disparity in monitoring the numbers of male and female migrants, from
source to destination, is due to the differences in processes of estimation and limited statistical mechanisms for recording migration. That disparity is clearly prominent in the estimation of the numbers of migrants from statistical sources in sending and receiving countries. These are issues that have provoked many international migration reports. Some of these have indicated that the interpretation of migration statistics will remain a complex and imprecise issue even in the case of states which strive to produce comprehensive and precise statistics. The figures for migrants differ according to how a migrant is counted and categorised, as well as the authority which undertakes that counting. This difference is not merely due to the lack of agreed upon definitions for characterising migrants but also because the same definition used in the source country and the destination country leads to different figures when it is operationalised.

The Absence of Studies and Theoretical Approaches for Female Migration

Movements of international migration from the Maghreb to Europe and other destinations are especially connected with historical and political causes. This is due to the colonial age and the policies that accompanied it which used basic labour from the colonies, both during and following imperial occupation. This historical association had a direct impact on the progression of the movement of female migration from the Maghreb, either in the form of accompanying migration or within the framework of family reunification policies in the destination country. Other forms of female migration then followed this, especially in the last two decades.

Despite the advance of the presence Maghrebi women on the scene of international migration, female migration has in general been almost absent from global studies in different fields of the human and social sciences, both in the West and in the Maghreb. Maghrebi female migration has not received attention from scholars and researchers. Migration studies and research have for a long time ignored the social and economic contributions and the different practices of female migration. Discussion of female migration has not been prominent in Europe except during the middle of the 1970s (the era associated with the European states suspending incoming immigration and family reunification for migrants). Studies began to discuss female migration in light of women joining their migrant spouses. In this way, the emergence of women in the scene of Maghrebi migration to Europe became associated with a stereotype which confined them to a scene of marriage and companionship for migrant men, and an inactive economic existence. The female migrant here is a domestic goddess and a social safety valve in the shadow of the culture of Western societies.

The male migrant is recognised as an economic being participating in the public domain whereas the female migrant is seen as a social being, confined to the private domain. Subsequently, the explanations for male migration have been given in terms of economic reasons, while those of female migration have been given in terms of social reasons. The first analytic approaches which tried to explain population movements within the classical schools of development (the schools of modernization and dependency) tended towards the same direction. They were affected by the stereotype of female migrants being economically inactive and caring for the family within the boundaries of the private domain. This has meant that female migrants are absent from initial studies of migration. Thus, despite a concentration of books about the subject specifically from the Maghrebi states, women remained a variable absent from the areas of intellectual and academic debate surrounding migration and its different dimensions.

However, with the increase of flows of individual female migration from the Maghreb, especially since the 1980s, attention to the problematic nature of the presence of women on the migration scene increased. Calls for increased attention to this kind of migration, independently of migration in its totality, became more pronounced. This was perhaps also accompanied by efforts from a group of parties and international frameworks which attempted to break those stereotypes prevailing in the European intellectual battlefield and to give women a socially prominent presence in the field of international migra-

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7 Philippe Fargues (Dir), Migrations méditerranéennes rapport 2005, Ibid, p34.
8 Verschuur Christine (Dir), Genre, nouvelle division internationale du travail et migrations, Cahiers genre et développement, n° 5 – 2005, p37
There is no escaping the fact that despite some of the intellectual progress in emerging approaches to the study of female migration, academic and epistemic production relating to this kind of migration is still small, globally and in the Arab world. Theoretical accumulation is still weak and the human and social sciences have not been able to develop theoretical models which are capable of advanced intellectual analysis of female migration, covering its circumstances and aspects, particularly apropos its economic cycles. A number of migration studies still treat migration as a phenomenon which is neutral with regard to the variable of gender. Consequently production sub-consciously returns to the male stereotype of migration.

It is important to note that along with this theoretical deficit in studies and approaches to female migration, there is still also (in the Maghreb region) a clear deficit in precise statistical observation of this phenomenon. The researcher confronts many difficulties in overcoming this statistical limitation which forces them to use sporadic and out-of-date data. The statistical assortment conceals migration according to gender in the Maghrebi states more generally. Rarely do the statistics allow close inspection of gender in the general distribution of data around migration movement. There is no escaping that the paucity of migration statistics categorised according to gender is almost a general case in the majority of the world, in both source and receiving countries. This is despite the acceleration and manner of the presence of women in international migration flows in recent decades, as has already been pointed out.

No doubt that the fragile status of many Maghrebi female migrants in the labour markets of foreign countries, without proper protection in unofficial and illegal work, contributes to a large extent to blocking efforts to statistically monitor them. This is true both in the source and destination country. Advocating the necessity of official statistical practice in dealing with migration from the perspective of gender will make Maghrebi females appear more prominently in international migration movements. They will become a clearer category for students, researchers and policy-makers to engage with. It would also highlight the prejudice against them and some of the extremes of the dual exploitation which they encounter, both as women and as migrants.

The Phases of Maghrebi Female Migration and the Characteristics of the Migrants

In this section we review the study of the historical development of categories of Maghrebi female migration, as well as the general characteristics of the migrants themselves.

The Historical Development of Maghrebi Female Migration

Movements of Maghrebi female migration developed from the second half of the 20th Century to the present day. During the last fifty years, categories of female migrants have been produced with multiple natures, sizes, and characteristics.

Maghrebi Females and the Migration of Companionship

Three Maghreb states (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria), directly after acquiring independence, witnessed a large wave of population movement across their borders. This movement was comprised not just of the French but also other nationals whose interests were directly linked to the presence of the French, such as the Italians and the Maltese. However, there were also a large number of Maghrebi nationals, such as wealthy Muslims and Jews who chose to leave voluntarily to Europe. In addition to these, broad swathes of the unemployed population and those who lay outside the formal economic sectors were forced to emigrate in search of a way to sustain themselves. For example, during 1956, the year of Tunisian independence, around 9,448 people emigrated. This continued as 6,626 more emigrants were recorded in 1961, followed by 8,946 in 1962. The number of Moroccans in France went from 40,000 in 1946 to 250,000 in 1954, then surpassing 600,000 in 1965. France continued to have an insatiable desire
for Maghrebi workers and worked to organise this exchange through concluding bilateral agreements for the export of labour.\(^9\) We must recognise that in light of the deteriorating socio-economic circumstances of the Maghrebian states, the departure of the colonialist, and the circumstances of setting up and building the newly independent states, the migration of low-skilled, male workers was seen as a magic solution. National governments would invest in it as far as possible to absorb the surplus in the labour market and the unemployed on the edges of the cities.

Alongside the official endorsement of labour migration to Europe (and especially France), family reunification policies for migrants became prominent in 1974. They were a socio-political solution by the European powers who wanted to mitigate some of the side-effects of migration. These policies aimed to reconfigure the existence of Maghrebian migrants and their families within the realms of Europe. It was in this context that the first Maghrebian females entered the migration corridor to Europe. The reunification of Maghrebian wives with their migrant husbands represented a golden opportunity for the nation and the family to further benefit from migration and advance their livelihoods. It also represented a European strategy to bring about more social stability for migrants and their receiving countries. Following these policies, the number of Moroccan female migrants in Europe rose. For example, in France, Moroccan female migrants as a proportion of the total number of Moroccans rose from 26.7% in 1975, to 39% in 1982. The numbers took the same trend in Belgium, Holland, and Germany. The statistics show that the number of Algerian female migrants which entered France during this period surpassed ten times the number of males. Tunisian female migrants as a proportion of the total number of Tunisians rose under the family reunification policy from 30.9% in 1975, to 38.2% in 1982, arriving at 41.1% in 1990.\(^{10}\) Bear in mind that the majority of those female migrants at the outset came from villages and the countryside, just as male migration had at the outset come from rural areas. Thus, the migration represented an extension of the rural exodus towards metropolises and cities; a product of the remnants for the colonial era. In summary, this category of migration remained associated with family and educational functions within the private domain.

Recent official French statistics indicate that the rates of family reunification continued to rise. During 2004, 5% of those in the programme were males, 40% females, and 55% children. This then changed in 2010 to 8% males, 58% females, and only 34% children.\(^{11}\) These figures reflect the continued increase in the rates of women as a proportion of the total beneficiaries of these policies. After this, they were registering the needs of their children. This confirms the trends of the raising level of female migration within the framework of family reunification and its continuation to the present day. It also confirms these policies as one of the forces ensuring the migration of women.

### The Maghrebian Woman and Movements of Individual Migration

Since the 1980s, movements of females migrating as individuals became prominent. They were comprised of women who chose to migrate to Europe independently, purely of their own volition, either for economic reasons or with the aim of continuing their education. These women represent an independent, self-sufficient economic unit and are different from the women accompanying their migrant husbands. If we delineate the different reasons for this category of migration, we see that there is convergence around the individual initiative to migrate and a shared desire for freedom from different pressures, situations of unemployment, and the lack of work in their country of origin. There is growing field evidence relating to individual Maghrebian female migration to Southern Europe specifically. This kind of migration includes unmarried women, widows, divorcees, and married women demanding a livelihood and means to contribute to improving the status of the family, leaving their husbands and children in the country of origin.

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It is useful to point out that this category of international female mobilisation for the sake of work does not merely consist of Maghrebi women but it draws in significant numbers of women in the world today. It is a strong global phenomenon associated with the context of globalisation which has made the labour market more attractive for women. Universal social assimilation, the reproduction of cultural residue, as well as the government policies of the receiving countries and the practices of employers, play a big role in encouraging female mobility, meeting the growing Western demand for them to perform specific work functions.

Young Women of Second or Third Generation Migrants

Young women of second or third generation migrants represent a primary component of the Maghrebi female migration scene which we cannot ignore. This component includes different descendants of Maghrebi migrant families who were born and raised in Europe or entered at an early age in the process of family reunification. Many of them hold dual nationality which makes it easy for them to join the receiving communities by virtue of their excellent language skills and early incorporation into the community where they are brought up and educated.

It is important to confirm the relevant context while attesting to the general characteristics of the Maghrabi groups residing in Europe during the transformations of recent decades. This context witnessed an increase in the ratio of business owners and the number of migrants who were taking over senior positions and high office in destination countries. The level of migrant education also rose which resulted in a decrease in the level of illiteracy (e.g. regarding Tunisian migrants, the rate improved from 60% in 1960 to 15% in 1990). The proportion of workers with basic skills also decreased (they represented three quarters of the Tunisian migrant workforce at the beginning of the 1980s but this had decreased to just one third during the 1990s). Maghrebi females descended from migrants were not immune to these transformations. Young, second and third generation females differed from those of the first generation in their level of schooling, professional integration, and the elevation of their economic participation, with some of them occupying prestigious positions in socio-economic life in the destination country. A prominent segment of their population became highly qualified in different fields which perpetuated their ability to actively integrate with western societies and positively interact through undertaking roles of social mediation between Western and Arabic and Islamic cultures. These generations recognise that they are an integral part of both cultures.

However, it should be noted that despite the stability of status that some of these females have in the destination country, many of them live – to different degrees – with many problems of cultural and social integration on the one hand, and difficulties of integrating into economic and professional life on the other hand. A number of studies carried out in France articulate the level of discrimination which youth of Maghrebi descent (male and female) face in the disparity of their rate of workforce penetration compared to that of youth of French origin. Youth of French origin are fortunate in that more than 80% of them acquire work, whereas this figure does not surpass 64% for those of Maghrebi origin. These different rates of labour market penetration are constituted by around 15 percentage points for males and 17 for females. The results of some other studies also indicated that the employment rate amongst categories of French youth of Maghrebi origin is less than around 20 percentage points behind children of the indigenous population. This is close to about 56% versus 74% for women and 65% versus 86% for men. These studies point to the fact that the differences in scientific expertise, academic qualifications, family situation, and neighbourhoods of residence between these two groups do not explain even a third of this discrepancy. The most important reasons elucidated are the difficulty of new migrant generations integrating into the economic cycle and the problem of ethnic discrimination which is present in the French labour market.

We have established that there is a dearth of precise statistics and personalised studies of the general

living situations and levels of integration of Maghrebi female migrants, particularly those of the second and third generation. Those that are available usually show that these migrants face growing social and professional discrimination against them and are exposed to different problems, first due to their being female, and second, due to their being Arab. This impression is becoming clearly confirmed in some official reports and documents in Europe. In recent years the dialogue about European governments ignoring the importance of female migrants has increased. Some of the official literature in France, for example, has started emphasising the necessity of the integration of female migrants and descendants of migrants. This could be the official key to the success of the process of integrating migrant populations. This dialogue spread following incidents in the Parisian suburbs which showed that particular importance should be given to the status of female migrants, particularly those from the Maghreb who live with real difficulties of effective integration in their destination societies.14

Some of France’s official reports15 point to the absence of Maghrebi female migrants from community areas and the leadership and management structures of organisations, parties, and trade unions. This is in spite of their demographic weight in France, where females represent more than 50.3% of total migrants. In January 2004, the total number residing in France reached around 4.5 million. This is in addition to those documents that confirm the fragility of Maghrebi female migrants’ status in the French labour market. Despite the fact that they constitute 41% of the total active migrant population, compared to just 35% in 1990, they are the most susceptible to exclusion from the labour market. Maghrebi female migrants succeed academically but this does not lead to certain or reliable professional integration compared to their French peers. The recorded rate of employment for young Maghrebi female migrants is 65.8%, whereas it is 79.5% for their French peers. Seven out of the eight main work roles that Maghrebi female migrants have cornered are unspecialised, compared to three out of eight pertaining to their French peers.

Building on this, it should be emphasised that categories of Maghrebi female migrants vary, as do the details of different migration experiences from one category to the next. It can be said that the categorisation of Maghrebi migrants according to gender, age, migration experiences, nature of economic activity, and social affiliation has become a procedural necessity which is indispensable for understanding the reality of female migration. Without this we cannot understand these migrants contribution to the economic development of their countries of origin. It is likely that some aspects of this contribution will be clarified after examining the general characteristics of Maghrebi female migration.

The General Characteristics of Maghrebi Female Migration

The general characteristics of Maghrebi female migrants have been through different structural transformations in recent decades. This change has consisted mainly of socio-demographic and socio-professional aspects. The general characteristics of these migrants have changed a lot in form and content from those in the 60s and 70s. If female migration from the Maghreb is liberated, just as it once advanced geographical movement for economically inactive, married women who were accompanying their husbands for purely familial and social reasons, the picture today would be very different.

Today the Maghrebi female migration overwhelmingly consists of females migrating individually. The evidence confirms the presence of married women within this mobilisation of individuals. Recent extraordinary demographic transformations within the Maghreb population are recognised as being one of the factors contributing to this emerging form of migration. Demographic indicators confirm the late age of marriage, especially among women, and the raising proportion of single women. For example the recorded rate of unmarried women between the ages of 25 and 29, was 55% in Tunisia is 2007. The number of young, unmarried women migrating towards the Arab Gulf through a Tunisian agency for technical cooperation has increased from 118 during 2000, to 597 in 2008. Southern Europe is today witnessing a

15 République française, Ministère de la parité et de l’égalité professionnelle, Femmes de l’émigration, 7 mars 2005.
significant influx of this class of migrants. It includes young students, divorcees, married and unmarried women looking for livelihoods and leaving their families in the Maghreb. 71.4% of Maghrebi females migrating to Italy do so on an individual basis and are either divorced or widowed.\textsuperscript{16} This is a phenomenon that has become most prominent since the end of the 90s. Significant rates of resident Maghrebis, especially in Italy and Spain, are no longer migrating as wives or mothers but as women looking for positions in the labour market, free mostly from family ties. The results of some studies confirm the decreasing rate of fertility of Maghrebinvests in Europe, as well as the late age of marriage of the second and third generations residing there. More than 60% of young women in the destination country are unmarried and live with their parents. For the most part, young Maghrebi women are not associated with married life until the age of 35.\textsuperscript{17} It will usually be a spouse of the same nationality or chosen by their family. The largest proportion of unmarried Maghrebi females is in Spain.

The majority of Maghrebi female migrants going to Spain come from urban areas. Some of the results show a decrease in the proportion of descendants from villages and rural areas. This proportion has not surpassed around 6% according to the results of some research\textsuperscript{18} whilst the remaining 94% came directly from the city, 65% of them are considered to be originally from that city, whilst the remaining 20% and from other cities, and 15% migrated from villages to cities before migrating to Spain. This refutes the idea that Maghrebi migration essentially comes from rural areas. This is an unconfirmed issue with regard to the situation of female Maghrebinvestment, unlike male migration. Female migration appears to be essentially an urban phenomenon. Maghrebi males are different in that they usually come from rural environments. The results of the same study indicated that the rate of male migration from rural areas reached 40% compared to just 6% for women.

As for the socio-professional characteristics of Maghrebi female migrants, they vary among different cycles of migration. The first migrants were distributed within the manufacturing sector, amongst essential industries like textiles. Females migrating on an individual and irregular basis essentially practiced agriculture and domestic services like care for children and the elderly. This is with the knowledge that Maghrebi female migrants became most prominent in the fields of entrepreneurship and private enterprise. This is an issue that began progressing more with the young women of the second and third generation. It also included, to a lesser degree, the women that entered Europe within the framework of the family reunification policies or seeking work. The statistics of the Office of Tunisians Abroad, such as those showing the proportion of women in high office, owners of institutions and the self-employed, recorded a rise reaching 9% from the total of qualified female Tunisians abroad in the US and Europe during 2006. Despite these high rates, when compared to the participation of Maghrebi female migrant in other sectors, they appear weak. However, in general, this sector is advancing. Female migrants of Maghrebi origin have a prominent presence in the socioeconomic scene in Spain and Italy. These women also make up a third of the active Moroccan residents in France (33.37%). This number is even higher for Tunisians (36.7%) and Algerians (36.6%). The recorded proportion of those involved in professional activity is generally rising remarkably in recent years, especially for those that have attained French nationality.

In general it appears that young female migrants are the best educated and most able to integrate in public socio-economic organisations in their receiving country. However, their appointment by employers of low-skilled workers is limited by specifications of a lack of skill and a lower level of education for occupations such as domestic service, employment in the service sector, and prostitution. These kinds of occupations are usually unstable and characterised by lower wages, a lack of social services and worse working conditions.

In the prevailing majority of cases, the first employment situations for migrant women and the daughters

\textsuperscript{16} Nouria Ouali, “Les marocaines en Europe: Diversification des profils migratoires” Hommeet migration, n° 1242, Mai- Avril 2003, p 73.


are characterised by instability (through a fixed-term contract, temporary work, or partial compensation). For example, the 40% of migrant women in France with higher skills break into the labour market through short-term work contracts. This approaches just 22% with regard to their French peers with the same training. If temporary contracts represent 63% of total work contracts for French youth who have graduated from university and are engages in work for the first time, then this figure will rise to 75% for those graduates with Maghrebi origin.\textsuperscript{19}

It is important to remember that progression of the migration of Maghrebi females in recent decades is tied to new directions of migration such as that towards the states of Southern Europe, like Italy and Spain. These women residing in Spain numbered around 498 in 2005. 170 of these women represent a third of the total of Moroccans residing in Spain, this approaches around 24.1% for Algerians, and 27.8% for Tunisians. These emerging destinations for women are associated with developing new specialisations connected to the phenomena of the internationalisation of care work and domestic service. These specialities are reciprocal to the growing demand of European families which covers the fields of female domestic activity. This led to an improvement in the general status of the family and rising rates of female enrolment in schools. It elevated the manner in which females entered the labour market and the areas of productive activity outside the private domain in the source country. In addition, the sum of demographic changes and the aging population in Southern Europe led to the activities of care and domestic service becoming pivotal in the equation of supply and the demand for workers in the labour markets of those countries. Maghrebi female migrant workers were one of the most important mechanisms mobilised to that end.

The number of workers in domestic services in Europe reached one million with the majority of them in illegal positions, according to the statistics. A considerable number of them are not practising this work in complete enjoyment of their entitlements under the law.\textsuperscript{20} Despite the efforts of some of the European states like Italy to ease the processes of legal entrance to domestic work and, since 1990, the urging of Italian families to adjust the law surrounding their employment, a large number of female domestic workers work in the shadows and practise their activities undeclared in parallel work sectors. This is with the knowledge that 90% of people undertaking domestic work in Italy in 2005 were female migrants. The circumstances of work in this sector are characterised by low wages, long working hours, little time off, and a lack of health coverage and social security. This is in addition to the possibility of facing psychological pressure because of loneliness and social isolation. They may also suffer racial abuse or sexual harassment by their employers. These same migrants are often forced to carry these injuries in silence because of their unstable and illegal work situations which deny them the possibility of complaint or litigation.

It is worth pointing to the widening of the parallel work sector to absorb Maghrebi female migrant workers in the states of Southern Europe. A number of these females are forced into organised crime networks. Those who have not been absorbed by the care and domestic service sectors can be subject to complete degradation in other work on the margins of society, such as work on the black market, the drugs trade, joining organised crime networks, or the sex trade. Despite the difficulty of having limited precise statistics to represent these phenomena, however, the bulk of the studies\textsuperscript{21} highlight the spreading of these phenomena in neighbourhoods known for the density of their Maghrebi expatriate presence.

**Migration and Development: Any Contribution from Women?**

In this section we present a study of the nature of the relationship between migration, women, and development. We also examine the importance of the transformation of Maghrebi migrants and the general participation of women in aspects of economic development.

\textsuperscript{19} Alain Frickey et Jean-Luc Primon, Insertion professionnelle et discriminations : l’accès à l’emploi des étudiants issus de l’immigration en région Provence - Alpes - Côte d’Azur, Cahier de l’URIMIS n° 10-11 dec 2006, p 65

\textsuperscript{20} Nouria Ouali, “Les marocaines en Europe: Diversification des profilismigratoires”, Ibid, p 70

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. 75
The nature of the relationship between migration, women, and development

Until recently, the relationship between migration and development was not prominent enough in research and studies of migration. This relationship did not merit analysis and theoretical study. At the same time, it wasn’t at the forefront of the concern of state policies, political agendas, and decision-making, either in the source or destination countries of these workers. The lack of interest in the nature of this general relationship and its social dimensions was due to many reasons. One of the most important of these is the problematic nature of the association between the two phenomena due to the perspective which sees migration as a socio-economic problem resulting in a decline and absence in development. This perspective sees geographical mobilisation of individuals seeking employment as emanating from the least developed states. Potential migrants searched for means of subsistence that were disappearing in the source country. Thus it was as a result of the weak developmental position and the inability of the source country to provide the necessities of life that they chose to emigrate.

However, in recent years, the duality of migration and development and the nature of the relationship between them began to occupy a different position in politics and research. A discourse emerged about the positive associations and the active roles that it is possible for migrants to undertake in the fields of socio-economic development, both in the source and the destination country. A global discussion emerged within the United Nations and other international structures. National and international reports relating to human development also emerged, as well as national and international conventions. It created a dualism around migration that was unique and paid special attention to the problematic nature of migration and development while focusing on its positive dimensions too. The cooperation, remittances, economic associations, and general contribution of migrants in reducing poverty and boosting developments initiatives in their home countries became included in the strategies of source and receiving countries.

There has been a development of intellectual approaches dealing with the problematic nature of the contribution of women in development in recent decades. Analytical frameworks have progressed from ‘women in development,” to ‘women and development,” then to ‘gender and development.” Despite the quantitative increase in women in the scene of international migration, discussions and studies of migration and development dealt with different issues from a neutral, holistic perspective and did not address the issue of gender. In this way, there was an absence of the contribution of female migrants to development and a blurring of the research of their roles in this context. It is known that the migrant woman, as well as the man, continually contributed, in different forms, to socio-economic development in both their source and destination countries. This was not only through financial and material remittances but also through launching economic enterprise, forming organisations, transferring expertise and technology, and other activities that a number of Maghrebi female migrants have been increasingly keen to undertake.

There is an increasing interest from the Maghreb states in the benefits of the migration of their citizens. These benefits and the contributions to development started to be relied upon in national plans for development. Migration was recognised in Morocco and Tunisia as an essential source of finance for the national economy which develops the welfare of the country, helps adjust the balance of payments, and contributes to efforts to fight poverty through motivating migrants to invest in their home regions. Despite all of this, female migrants remained a number absent from studies and statistics observing the volume of participation of female migrants, or which document their economic activity in their home country.

22 The approach ‘Gender and Development” treated contribution in the development process from a holistic perspective. It transforms the process of distributing the roles and responsibilities of men and women. This perspective recognised that analysis of the contribution of women in the developmental process must not ignore all of their different efforts and contributions, both inside and outside the home. This approach stressed the necessity of recognising non-commodity-based female production. This approach also refused division of labour between the private and public domains which were mostly used to blur the importance of the productive roles of women and their participation in developmental processes. See: Aicha At-Tayyad, Gender, Employment and Enterprise, The Arab Women Organisation, Cairo, 2011, Issue 150.
The Importance of the Remittances of Female Migrants

The volume of migrant remittances on an international scale increased in recent decades. On average they multiplied threefold, from $99 billion in 2002, reaching $308 billion in 2008. The issue attracted the interest of many actors on an international scale with the objective of researching means of optimally exploiting these terrific quantities of finance in source countries. According to total statistics from the World Bank for the year 2008, $28.5 billion was sent through official channels by migrant to their countries of origin in the Middle East and North Africa region, whereas this figure was around $12.9 billion. Using the example of the Arab states, Egypt benefitted from $5.9 billion in financial remittances in 2007, Morocco $5.7 billion, Lebanon $5.5 billion, Jordan $2.9 billion, Algeria $2.9 billion, Tunisia $1.7 billion, Yemen $1.3 billion, Syria $0.8 billion, and the West Bank and Gaza $0.6 billion. From a number of Mediterranean countries these remittances represent a primary and more stable source of outward capital flows. These financial resources, in some situations, surpassed foreign direct investment and official aid. With regard to the Maghreb in 2007, for example, migrant remittances were recorded to be around 63.7% of foreign direct investment and 45.2% of official development aid. In Egypt they represented 46.7% of foreign direct investment, and 22.5% of aid. The ten countries in 2006 whose GDP benefited most from remittances are Lebanon (22.8%), Jordan (20.3%), the West Bank and Gaza (14.7%), Morocco (9.5%), Yemen (6.7%), Tunisia (5%), Egypt (5%), Djibouti (3.8%), Syria (2.3%), and Algeria (2%).

It seems that the concept of remittances is a somewhat vague concept. We are not diligent in making a unified definition which makes possible the extrapolation of all the channels which those remittances pass through. It is possible to briefly say that Maghrebi migrant’s remittances take a variety of forms, have multiple sources, and unequal volumes between both official and unofficial channels. Remittances which pass through official channels from the total financial remittances, sent from destination countries to families and relatives residing in the source country, can pass through postal centres or banking institutions. They can also be carried with migrants when they visit their home country.

As for remittances passing through unofficial channels, they can enter in the same manner that migrants do, either secretly upon their return (undeclared quantities of money that they bring back), or indirectly via relatives or friends who are studying, tourists, or medical patients. There are also other ways where migrants meet some of these visitors’ expenses abroad with hard currency and these people promise to repay this to the migrant’s family in the source country using domestic currency. This is a means which depends on countering the decreasing value of the domestic currency relative to the foreign currency. Also, indirect remittances consist of material transfers which migrants bring from abroad during temporary return. These are various commodities and material goods like cars, domestic electric utensils and machines, and furniture. These are items specified as being for the migrant’s and their family’s personal consumption and they exploit some of these other items through trade on the black market, or by what’s called ‘bag trading’ which represents an important resource for migrants during their vacations and visits, especially in Tunisia and Morocco.

In the space that remains, it is also worth remembering that financial remittances through official channels are able to be monitored and restricted whereas unofficial remittances and material transfers are not. However, despite this, they remain an important way for migrants’ families to overcome the difficulties of life, realise comfort, and acquire supplies and necessities in the context of rising prices in their home country. This is an issue that is directly observed where the standard of living usually differs from the ability of migrants’ families to acquire household supplies.

A study for the European Investment Bank estimated the rates of unofficial migrant remittances sent to the Arab countries in 2004, based on very limited survey data from those countries particularly associated with remittances from Europe. Those estimates were very expressive: 34% for Morocco; 20% for Tunisia; 57% for Algeria; 56% for Egypt; 7% for Lebanon; 53% for Jordan; and, 79% for Syria; 60% for

23 The European Commission, Female Migration between the Mediterranean States and the EU, EuroMed for Migration 2, undated, issue 257.
24 Ibid. Issue 258
32
In Morocco, the volume of official remittances multiplied more than 149.5 times between 1970 and 2006, starting at 320 million Dirhams and ending with 47,834 million Dirhams. These remittances constitute close to 8.9% of GDP. They cover 23.7% of imports and represent 18.4% of current revenue on the balance of payments, covering 47% of the trade deficit.

The Female Migrant: Remittances and Investment

Maghrebi female migrants contribute to their home country, according to their different socio-economic classes and positions, by sending financial remittances from the destination country. However, the totality of figures recorded for migrant remittances do not categorise them according to the variable of gender. Thus, researchers do not find accurate data for the contribution of women within the remittance process. Without the existence of sufficient data we cannot draw a picture of the behaviour of females sending remittances, the volume of those remittances, or the extent to which they differ from the behaviour of males sending remittances. However, despite this, available data suggest a hypothesis that the level of financial remittances for women is higher than that for men, even though they usually earn less. Some sources in the UK estimate that female migrants in the UK have monopolized 65% (around 1.5 billion Dirham) of the total migrant remittances (2.5 billion Dirham).

This theory is most supported by understanding the economic factors of poverty and unemployment and the subsequent desire to better the living conditions of the family, which in most cases lies behind the migration of Maghrebi female migrants, especially in recent years. We can see from this table covering the causes of Tunisian female emigration that migrating to look for work as well as to join a husband abroad are key causes. Work was the main reason for male emigration in 79.2% of cases.

Table 2: Distribution of Tunisian Migrants According to Gender and Reasons for Migration, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Migration</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reasons</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sum of studies in different regions of the developing world confirms the propensity of families to encourage young female migrants with the motivation to overcome poverty and the daily problems presented by life. This remains one of the main reasons motivating the female migrant to send a large part of their earnings for the benefit of their husband and children if they are married, or to their parents and family if not. Some studies completed in 2000 indicate that women from Bangladesh who work in the Arab Mashreq send more than 72% of their earnings to their home country. Other studies completed in Latin America in 2001 indicate that 87% of Nicaraguan migrant women in Costa Rica send finance to their families, versus 57% of men.

In general, we can say that the volume of remittances which female migrants send on an international scale is still not known to a sufficient extent and that relevant statistical data are still not provided, either by the source or destination countries. We must also point to the fact that women - probably more than men – turn to transfer through black market and unofficial channels to increase provision and avoid the excessive charges for sending through banks, postal centres, and international banks. However, despite


this, they remain keen on regular, continual, financial transfer to their families in their source country. That this behaviour is repeated by female migrants confirms their success and desire in providing for their families even in the context of expatriation.

Maghrebi female migrants’ behaviour and the amount they transfer is different from one category of migrant to the next. It is also connected to the nature of economic activity that they undertake and the significance of the resulting income. It also depends on their legal status and the status of their family. Some studies\(^{27}\) confirm the modesty of the value sent, which ranges, according to some limited studies, between 75 and 90 Euros, especially for women who migrated within the framework of family reunification or accompanying their partners. These are women without a stable source of livelihood. However, despite this, they still want to provide finance and aid for their families in the source country. The value of remittances is without any doubt associated with the value of their earning. Thus, the largest remittances are associated with those with high income in the destination country, and, subsequently, those with a higher level of education. We have seen through what has been put forward regarding the socio-professional characteristics of Maghrebi female migrants that there is a scarcity of entrepreneurs and those holding high office. This is opposed to the rising number for low-skilled workers in the service sector and agriculture, especially, in addition to the rising number of workers in unstable sectors and in irregular work with low remuneration.\(^{28}\)

At the same time, a large number of female and male Maghreb migrants suffer from the spectre of unemployment in receiving countries, as a result of various factors and the global economic crisis which in recent times has strongly affected a number of Western destination countries for migrant workers. Some recent studies from the OECD highlighted that the rate of unemployment among categories of migrants from different developing countries is estimated to exceed 20%. In other words, more than three times the average rate of unemployment of the indigenous populations.\(^{29}\) Arab migrant workers with certain characteristics encounter great difficulty in penetrating the labour market, resulting from a sharp decline in the demand for work. In addition, there is competition between migrants and workers from Eastern Europe. It is worth noting that the proportion of active Tunisian migrant workers compared to that of inactive workers has been recorded to be just 52%, whereas, the rate amongst the total workforce is 80%. The total proportions of self-employed and senior staff respectively are around just 11% and 9%.

As regards the rate of unemployment of Maghrebi female migrants, we find that in France it approaches 22% for those between 40 and 50 years old and 46% for 20 year olds. In Holland, the percentage of Maghrebi female migrants who are unemployed is 30%.\(^{30}\) According to some studies from the International Organisation for Migration, the number of Maghrebi female migrants who are housewives who practise some form of work in the destination country is estimated to be 75% of the total number in European states.

We have already covered the fact that there is a lack of official statistical reports which discriminate by the variable of gender or present a precise picture of the remittances of Maghrebi female migrants. The hypothesis that these remittances are of small volumes remains strong due to the force of witnessing the nature of activity and practise of Maghrebi female migrants in the destination country. This activity does not enable them to send high volumes of financial remittances by virtue of its instability, its weak returns, or its irregularities within the circumstances of the high cost of living in destination countries, considering the low pattern of savings.

\(^{27}\) European Commission, Female Migration between the Mediterranean States and the EU, Ibid No 259.


\(^{30}\) Abdelali Naciri Bensaghir Naima ABA, Les femmes migrantes dans les politiques de développement et de coopération au Maroc, ibid, p 10.
However, in light of this, do female migrants have a presence in the scene of economic investment in the source country and their homeland?

In general, most of the studies of migration and the use of migrant remittances converge on the similarity of migrants' investment behaviour amongst most of the countries that send migrant workers. We can see from these that remittances are basically used to meet the every-day consumer needs of the family residing in the home country. This use tends to cover much of the health and education spending, as well as the acquisition of necessary and luxury equipment. This behaviour is also accompanied by acquiring agricultural land, constructing housing, and some migrants undertake various economic enterprises to generate income in their homeland.

These investment activities are the same for Maghrebi migrants and Arab countries more generally. The partial results of some field studies31 highlight that the use of Maghrebi migrant remittances is distributed in different fields, such as: facing the daily costs of living (from 43% in Egypt to 74% in Jordan); school fees (from 12% in Egypt to 31% in Morocco); purchasing or improving accommodation (from 4% in some states to 34% in Tunisia); undertaking productive enterprise or investment (from 5% in Morocco to 18% in Tunisia); and, other fields of use (from 2% in Morocco to 25% in Tunisia). The most important use for migrants from Tunisia and Morocco is still essentially investment in housing which captures about 83.7% of their total investment.

Regarding expat Tunisians, some government structures, such as the Agency for the Promotion Industrial Investment and the Agency for the Promotion of Agricultural Investment, encourage the movement of investment and the general motivation of investors amongst the expatriate community. Statistics from the Agency for the Promotion of Industrial investment indicate that the number of Tunisian expatriate enterprises licensed between 1994 and 2008 does not represent even 10% of the enterprises confirmed by the agency. They don’t represent even 0.2% of the total value of investments, nor do they account for even 2% of the jobs.

The contribution of Tunisian expatriates remains weak according to the Agency for the Promotion of Agricultural investment as well. The volume of these investments increased from 2 million Dinar in 2004 and reached 9 million Dinar during 2008. However, this is limited to between 1 and 3% of the total number of enterprises (100 enterprises in 2007, and 118 in 2008). As for job creation, they did not surpass 100 on average in 1994, reaching around 164 in 2008. These enterprises are distributed in different sectors of economic activity, such as agriculture (9%), industry (27%), and services (64%).

However, the studies which have been collected by the Office of Tunisians Abroad during 200332 indicate that only 35.5% of these enterprises have actually been concluded (from 2,111 projects only 749 were realised). Quite a few of these enterprises were fake and migrant put forward requests for them only so that they can acquire some of the government concessions provided by the Agency for Investment. For example, much of the equipment supplied is exempted from customs. The results of these studies showed that the enterprises which are really completed are distributed differently according to sectors of activity; perhaps by a rate of 47.4% from the number of confirmed projects in the field of agriculture, 46.4% from industry, and only 24.6% from the service sector. The service therefore has the highest proportion of confirmed enterprises that are never truly actualised. This is considering the peripheral nature of these enterprises and their association with domains of activity characterised by instability and subject to fluctuations such as hotels, restaurants, and sports and luxury shops, amongst others.

The lack of official statistical evidence relating to the portion of investment belonging to Tunisian female migrants denies them a presence in this domain even if this were a modest presence.33 According to a

32 Philippe Fargues (Dir), Migrations méditerranéennes rapport 2005, Ibid, p 300
33 This is confirmed by assistants in the Agency for the Promotion of Agricultural Investment during field interviews
study prepared by the National Chamber of Female Entrepreneurs in 2010 on a sample of 96 economic institutions in Tunisia, 70% of the sample were not female migrants, whilst the remainder expressed that they travelled abroad only for study before returning to their home country.

We completed field studies with 15 Tunisian women living abroad. These showed that orientation towards investment amongst these women differed according to their destination (Europe of the Arab Gulf). It also differed according to their level of education. The results appeared to be that those with a higher level of education that had migrated to the gulf had less inclination to establish economic, revenue-generating enterprises after their period of migration. We said that the reason for migration was essentially within the context of experimentation, “breaking the routine” and “a change of climate.” Because of this, their ambition remains to construct and improve their families’ accommodation, to acquire a respectable model of car, to attain some jewellery and accessories for marriage if they are single, and to return to their home country. It is in this way that skilled Tunisian female migrants travel to the Gulf States for a limited period of around 5 years. Thus their migration plan stays within the bounds of these ambitions and does not usually stretch to specific income-generating enterprises, particularly if after migration they are considering work contracts in the public sector, such as health or education.

As for the status of Tunisian women migrating to Europe, their presence in economic investment differs and is embodied by two different forms of investment behaviour:

Shared Investment: This is that behaviour which prevails amongst migrant women with husbands, or who have accompanied their husbands in the context of family reunification policies. It consists of the migrant spouse in Tunisia establishing small or medium-sized investment enterprises with capital and a number of workers (commercial space, phone shops, petrol stations, restaurants, cafes). The female migrant will deal with the administration on behalf of their spouse, or cooperation in the management of it whilst their presence is required by the family in the homeland. The female migrant considers herself an equal partner in their enterprise and ensures its success as a family enterprise, especially in the absence of her spouse when she must demonstrate her shared responsibility. Some of the questions were reserved for confirming the nature of the division of returns with the spouse. Most of them confirmed that they directly, materially benefit from the returns of the enterprise.

Direct Investment: This is that behaviour where the female migrant establishes an enterprise with her own private capital which she transfers to the homeland. These migrants are ultimately those who visit the homeland regularly, from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, to follow the course of their enterprise. The man remains directly present in this enterprise, even if in different capacities from the first category. Perhaps it remains absurd to imagine a woman establishing unique, outstanding economic enterprises without the support and influence of her family, and subsequently without any men at all.34 The scene of female administration of enterprises and establishments is associated with the presence of men in different capacities, either as fathers, husbands, brothers, sons, and cousins, etc. The form of this presence differs, as does the strength of its impact on the establishment and on the personality of its owner, according to the nature of these associations and according to the role which these men play in the owner’s life.

It is important to state that in both situations the stage where women enter the world of income-generating, economic investment is only possible after the purchase of some land. This land is for the purpose of construction—sometimes in more than one place—and provision of suitable residence for herself and sometimes her family. Then after this stage there is the orientation to establishing small enterprise in the home country. However, this last stage is still advanced by a small proportion of women and migrants more generally. We explain that this is due to a recession in the permanent return of Tunisian migrants to their homeland, especially from Europe. This is particularly true of France which is the foremost re-

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36
receiving country for Tunisian migrant workers (54.6%), followed by Italy (13.4%), then Germany. This is bearing in mind that the total number of Tunisians residing abroad reached 1,057,797 in the same year\textsuperscript{35} and that the EU states took in 82.8% of those, followed by the Arab states (14.5%), with the rest being dispersed between America, Asia, and Australia.

Table 3: Distribution of Tunisian Migrants in Some Receiving States, According to Gender, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>360663</td>
<td>217335</td>
<td>577998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>96566</td>
<td>32346</td>
<td>128907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>50289</td>
<td>32439</td>
<td>82728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>65210</td>
<td>18423</td>
<td>83633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>8344</td>
<td>7554</td>
<td>15898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>3784</td>
<td>2142</td>
<td>5926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>8748</td>
<td>4629</td>
<td>13377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of Tunisians Abroad 2009

It is also important to say that a weak level of permanent return of migrants to the homeland is connected to the structural transformation of the nature of the relationship between migrants and their act of migration. The act of migration for those from the Maghreb was at the beginning like a temporary, limited movement to a destination to collect finance and then return, ultimately to the homeland. They would then invest what they had earned. As a result movements of migrant investment were more vital and active within the migration corridor. As for today, this old relationship has changed such that objective evidence shows that migrant’s plans have transformed from temporary to permanent migration. This is what lies behind the decrease in the tendency of migrants to channel investment to their homeland, as opposed to the raising nature of that investment in the destination country.\textsuperscript{36} During the national population census of 2004, the National Institute for Statistics in Tunisia showed that the numbers returning from abroad reached 17,766 between 1999-2004, with a yearly average of 3,553. Some other official bodies, like the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation and the National Fund for Social Solidarity, recorded 5,801 returns of Tunisians contracted abroad in the first part of 2006, and 5,618 in the second half. This is the problematic nature of supposed return for migrants by virtue of the finite work contracts, particularly in the situation of migrating through the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation. The mode of voluntary and permanent return from the European states has remained weak. It has also been indicated that the highest rate of permanent return was recorded (667) in 1985, more than 20 years ago. There have not been any recorded situations of return from France since 2006, according to the National Agency for the Reception Foreigners and Migrants.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Despite the significant value of financial remittances from a number of Maghrebi migrants, studies confirm in contrast a weak orientation towards productive investment for these migrants. The majority of Maghrebi migrant investments remained destined for every-day consumption and subsistence. The most important proportions of migrant financial remittances are orientated towards bettering the standard of living of families and individuals in the country of origin.

It is impossible to doubt the socio-economic value and direct benefit of this for the economy and development, both in macroeconomic and sociological dimensions. This is by virtue of contributing those reg-


\textsuperscript{36} This is growing according to numerous studies of the movement of Maghrebi migrant investment in destination countries, especially France. Space does not allow us to include this but it sufficient in this article to point to the rising presence of some statistics documenting the rise in the manner of socio-economic investment of Maghrebi female migrants, especially in France.
ular remittances to state revenues, the balance of payments, and to GNP. At the micro-sociological level, there is also a contribution to migrant’s domestic groups and their families which is clearly manifested in the use of migrant finance in the fight against poverty and bettering living standards. This has a direct impact on building capacity, helping to provide better education for children, improving their health situation, insulating them from poverty, hunger and disease, and providing more stability for them. This is especially true in areas where the state cannot provide, such as rural areas and poverty belts around cities. However, for all that, its importance should not hinder the calls for cooperation of different parties in the efforts to research the most effective ways to employ revenues from Maghrebi migrant remittances.

That same cooperation is required when studies examine the importance of the volume and quantity of these remittances (despite the limited wages of some female migrants) and the dominance of the pattern of dead and useless investment in constructing accommodation and acquiring land and equipment (amongst other things). This is merely a prominent trend employing the biggest proportion of migrant remittances.

Areas of non-productive investment and employment have remained buried and unexecuted. Domestic organisations for migrants in these fields direly need to encourage productive development projects which create jobs for workers. Greater logistic and material capacity does not need to be employed by migrants in constructing luxury accommodation or the acquisition of luxury cars, which are used only rarely during vacations.

The trend in productive investment by both sexes remains generally weak in the Maghreb, and most clearly in Tunisia. This is considerably less for migrant women which may make transfers in many situations of socio-cultural encumbrance which prevent her from engaging in adventurous, economic, productive enterprise in her home country despite her material capacity and the need for this kind of investment.

The propensity of Maghrebi female migrants, and other Arab female migrants, remains in dire need of development and support. In our view, this demands the introduction of efforts of different parties to activate and mobilise this propensity on the one hand, and work to provide suitable grounds to attract movements of female migrant investment in the source country on the other hand. This is not possible without attracting the attention of female migrants to the importance of their active contribution to development efforts, as well as motivating them to carry historical responsibility for this, both as a citizens and socio-economic actors on an equal footing with men.

In our view, the forgoing requires the following:

» Precise individuation of the volume and character of female migration from the Maghreb, observation of the status of these migrants, and the provision of precise statistical data relating to them so that students, researchers and decision-makers can draw a clear picture of their numbers, locations, legal status, age, and civil life.

» Work to highlight female migrant remittances publicly and separately from those of men. Orientate towards the adoption of more precise and transparent standards in the observation of remittances more generally, and female migrant remittances especially. Also, make this data available for all researchers and students.

» Development of a general research movement and approach, combining quantitative and qualitative methods, focusing on Maghrebi female migration. The aim would be to develop research efforts and understand the merits of female migration, as well as approximations of female migrants’ assimilation and aspirations. Through this, decision and policy-makers can avoid creating useless investment programmes and development plans that are unattractive to female migrants and don’t take account of their aspirations.

» Development of legislation to incentivise female migrant investment in their source countries. This legislation should consider specific characteristics of female migrants (civil life, level of education,
socio-professional specialisation, and level of earnings).

» Incentivising civil society organisations specifically for the source country to work on attracting migrant women and build networks of association between these migrants and the source country. Also, extending the potential for economic investment and break the boundaries of fear which discourage adventures in enterprise. At the same time, raise awareness about the importance of female migrants’ role and contribution in socio-economic development in their home country.

» Work to increase the openness of government, non-government and private bodies relevant to development to the opportunity of incentivising investment and migration through their socio-economic activity. This will invoke great possibilities for active contribution to development efforts through investment in expertise and experience in the source country, as well as remittances.

» Creation of new structures or activate existing national structures with the aim of incentivising economic investment and meeting global demand with required speed and transparency. Facilitation of complex administrative processes and ease financial transactions to stimulate economic enterprise proportional with the capacity of migrants.

» Exploiting the ongoing climate of democratic transition in Tunisian and other Magheb states more generally by fending off the fissures between migrants whose socio-economic links with their home country have been broken, and their trust shattered in recent years. Work to allay fears and rumours, and build a climate of faith in the future through evoking a sense of nationhood among migrants. Remind them of their vital roles in creating the path to democracy and national economic prosperity where growth rates in some states have become negative (Tunisia) after recent transformations.
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Chapter Three:

Egyptian Migrants in the UK: A Reading after the 25th of January Revolution

Sameh Fawzy

Introduction

This study aims to address the orientation of the Egyptian migrants in Britain towards development issues. It will also examine their role in Egyptian society after the 25th of January revolution, particularly after the escalation of calls stressing the importance of the participation of Egyptian expatriates in rebuilding Egyptian society democratically, developmentally and economically. The study, which was based on desk research and in-depth interviews, showed that there are basic pre-requirements to be met and different trends among migrants themselves when it comes to successful development in Egypt.

The objective of the study, as the title indicates, is to examine the role of the Egyptian migrants in Britain; particularly after the radical political shifts that took place in the Egyptian society after the downfall of Mubarak’s regime (1981-2011). One of the outcomes of this change was the inclination of Egyptians abroad towards seeking to participate in building the new political system and the project of economic, social and cultural renaissance; the dream of various sectors of the Egyptian people.

“Egyptians Abroad”, in modern developmental thinking on the relationship between migrants and their homelands, are not only a source of financial remittances, but they are also looked at as human minds contributing to economic and social progress, and human bridges that can transfer important experiences to peers who are concerned with the progress of their society. The Egyptian migrant is closely attached to the homeland; visiting and interacting with it, and often supporting its development.

This study has selected “Egyptians in Britain” for several reasons. Britain has one of the highest levels of direct investment in Egypt. It also has an Egyptian migrant community which includes important qualified professionals and a broad range of researchers and technically skilled labor. This makes it the perfect model of a professionally, generationally and religiously diversified migrants’ community.

1- Study Objectives

This study aims to achieve a number of objectives:

1. Examining the stance of a number of Egyptian migrants towards political developments and economic and social repercussions of the 25th of January revolution.
2. Understanding how Egyptian migrants in Britain think about development in Egyptian society, their view on developments of the political system, and their vision of their future role.
3. Defining the concepts of socio-political and economic engineering that ensure better participation of Egyptian migrants with respect to Egyptian political, economic and cultural affairs.
4. Preliminary monitoring of a number of factors influencing the attitudes of migrants to Egypt through the lens of what is termed the “Arab Spring” and its repercussions on Egyptians way of thinking.
2- Previous Studies

There are a number of previous studies with different perspectives on the issue of migration and its relationship with many other variables. The following section surveys some of the major studies to elucidate these multiple perspectives.

(2-1) Studies focusing on the relation between internal and external migration

Ayman Zahry’s study on the reciprocal relations between internal and external migration in Egypt (2005) is considered a pioneering study. Through conducting interviews in Upper Egypt, the study concluded a number of key findings. Firstly, pressures of poverty, marginalization and unemployment always constituted the motive behind rural-urban migration. Secondly, the remittances of those who travel to work in Jordan and Libya cannot be regarded a contribution to development efforts, but rather for meeting basic needs of migrants and their families1.

Within the framework of discussing internal migration, but from the prescriptive of “economic reform”, there is also an Egyptian case study, presented by Jacqueline Wahba and Mike Cormick, on social mobility and migration. It concluded that the nineties era, during the peak of the structural adjustment policies, witnessed social mobility at the level of internal migration as a result of the search for employment opportunities. It also examined the impact of the early retirement process in private sector companies on migration, as well as the change in the labor market and social mobility2.

(2-2) Studies focusing on labor migration to Europe

Ahmed Ghoneim’s study on labor migration to Europe mainly focused on mapping demography and professions of the Egyptian workers migrating to Europe, as well as the role of economic and social factors that motivate the decision to migrate. The most important of the results was that migration cannot be dealt with separately from the overall perspective of general socio-economic policy-making and associated problems related to the government’s foreign policy. The study ended by presenting a number of policy recommendations that the European Union should follow in its relationship with the Mediterranean countries in controlling irregular migration and presenting socio-economic aid packages3.

There is also a study presented by “Jacqueline Wahba” on labor markets performance and migration flows from Egypt. She saw labor migration through external markets as one of the aspects of globalization. She also discussed the policies of the Egyptian government with regard to legislation, training, re-training and educating workers for migration, explaining that such tools and means were limited4.

(2-3) Studies focusing on the Egyptians in Britain

Even though Ghada Karmi’s study on the Egyptians in Britain was in the mid nineties, it is one of the important studies mapping Egyptians in Britain. It also examined qualitative contrasts in the migrant community, their professional and religious background, and aspects of their integration in society, particularly in comparison with other Arab migrant communities5. However, naturally enough, the study does not include many of the shifts that occurred in the Egyptian migrant community in Britain during

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4 Jackline Wahba, Labor Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Egypt, European University Institute, National Background paper, November 2009.
the fifteen years since the study was first undertaken. Yet, it remains one of the fundamental studies in this field.

(2-4) Studies addressing the influence of the “Arab Spring” on migration to Europe

This research paper, by a group of researchers, addressed the relationship between Southern and Northern Mediterranean migration. It showed that the ‘Arab Spring’ had revealed a double failure of development in the South Mediterranean and the absence of a clear cooperation strategy of North Mediterranean countries in their relationship with South Mediterranean countries. The researcher revealed that European Union policies supporting tyrannical regimes in the South Mediterranean countries needed radical reconsideration to cope with the desire of the peoples of these countries for freedom and democracy and that this was part and parcel of development and migration.

One of the significant studies in this respect was developed by Dr. Ayman Zahri on the impact of Arab revolutions on migration. He addressed the history of migration, the volume of Egyptian external migration to Arab or foreign countries, with special focus on the Kafeel (custodian) system and its developments in the Arab Gulf countries, as well as efforts for protecting migrants’ rights.

(2-5) Studies addressing the relation between migration and development

Jacqueline Wahba and Yves Zenou examined the status of “returnees” working in the economic field and whether they were, when compared to those who had not been exposed to migration, willing and capable of owning and managing their own private enterprise. The study concluded that when migrants return to their country, they have the experience and willingness that would help them to own and manage private enterprise. However, they lack required social networks to do this. Hence, the study emphasized social capital as a key issue. Social capital is represented by confidence, solidarity and communication with others.

In another study with another researcher, Mike Cormick, Jackline Wahba concluded that there are important trends that should be monitored regarding returnees’ view of economic enterprise. These trends included an interest in working in the private sector although they preferred to work in the public sector before migration. It also included a desire to settle in the areas they were living in before migration, whether rural or urban, rather than a direct desire to settle in Cairo. It was also noted that their saving behavior was better than that of their companions who had not experienced migration.

The researcher benefitted from all these studies collectively in looking at migration from multiple perspectives and trying to link it to employment abroad, development, and migrants’ general political view of what is taking place in Egypt in the wake of the 25th January revolution, a major feature of the ‘Arab Spring’.

3- Study Methodology

The study methodology relies on surveying the development of mobility of Egyptian migrants in Britain through available literature. The descriptive survey identifies the characteristics of Egyptian migrants in Britain, their generational, occupational and religious diversity, and their views of their presence in the receiving country in a compared with communities of other migrants of Arab origin. The aim is to identify which of Egyptian migrant community’s distinguishing characteristics should be monitored.

6 Wai Mun Hong, Alejandro Lorca and Eva Medina, The Euro-Med Perspective on Migration: The Role of Economic and Social Reforms, a paper presented in the Workshop on Migration in the Arab Region: Determinants and Consequences, organized by Economic Research Forum and FEMISE, Istanbul, April 16-17, 2011
8 Barry McCormick & Jackline Wahba, Return Migration and Entrepreneurship in Egypt. A Paper prepared under the auspices of University of Southampton, United Kingdom.
In addition to the descriptive study, which depends on the latest available statistics, the researcher conducted a number of in-depth interviews with Egyptian migrants in Britain in January 2012; one year after the Egyptian revolution. It was ensured that the interviews included as much diversity as possible in variables such as: gender; age; religion; occupation; and, geographical difference in place of residence in the destination community, in the North and South, without limiting interviews to Egyptian expats in London. These field studies produced a number of points included in the researcher’s closing recommendations.

The researcher carried out in-depth interviews with interviewees on a number of themes that he considered significant and which were drawn from previous studies including: reasons for migration, communication with Egypt, communication mechanisms contributing to Egyptian development and economy and the vision for the future after the 25th January revolution. Interview questions included:

» Q1: What are the reasons that made you travel to and stay in the UK?
» Q2: How often do you visit Egypt?
» Q3: Have you visited Egypt after the 25th of January revolution?
» Q4: If yes, what are the reasons that made you do so? (Multiple options are allowed)
» Q5: Are you familiar with the changes that took place in Egypt after the 25th January revolution?
» Q6: If yes, what is the source of your information?
» Q7: Do you send or transfer money to Egypt?
» Q8: If yes, what is its purpose?
» Q9: If the purpose of the money you send is investment; what type of investment you invest your remittances in?
» Q10: Do you think your skills and expertise increased with your presence in Britain?
» Q11: Do you think of returning to Egypt and contributing to its development after the 25th January revolution so that it would benefit from your expertise?
» Q12: Do you think you can benefit society with the expertise you have gained?
» Q13: If you want to return to Egypt, what are the factors that would encourage you?
» Q14: If you do not wish to return, what are the reasons in your opinion?
» Q15: In your view, what does Egypt lack to become a developed country?
» Q16: Has Egyptian society been directed towards “progress” since 11 February 2011 till the present time?

The questions have been formulated, as it is clear in the wording, so that they are open ended questions that allow multiple options and points of view. They avoid typical preset answers and put interviewees in a position of thinking and contemplation before answering the questions. Moreover, questions require interviewees to contemplate issues which they may not think of in an organized manner.

**Egyptian Migrants**

According to latest statistics (2008), the volume of Egyptian migrants has reached about 6,500,000; about 8% of the total Egyptian population. Gulf countries, topped by Saudi Arabia, host the overwhelming majority of Egyptian migrants, while EU countries host more than 790,000 Egyptian migrants distributed in a number of countries headed by Britain, where 250,000 migrants live, representing 31.6% of the total Egyptian expats in Europe. Such figures represent a significant transition. In the past, Italy used to host the largest bulk of Egyptian expats due to its informal economic sector which absorbed irregular
migrant labor. However, it seems that the procedures followed in the past years to combat irregular
migration and tighten the requirements for obtaining visas to EU countries have contributed to declining
the number of Egyptian migrants to Italy.

Table No. (1): Estimated figures for the numbers of Egyptians abroad in 2008\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>No. of Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries</td>
<td>4,789,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African countries</td>
<td>2,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian countries</td>
<td>6,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>106,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European countries</td>
<td>790,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US and Canada</td>
<td>780,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,475,517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table No. (2): No. of Egyptian expats in the most hosting European countries\(^10\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No. in Europe</td>
<td>765,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons for the Migration of Egyptians

There are many reasons that explain the migration of Egyptians. Foremost amongst these are\(^11\):

1. Demand for Egyptian labor from oil-exporting countries, causing workers status to be affected by
   oil prices, political transitions and the position of the ruling regime in those countries as regards
   the Egyptian regime (e.g. this occurred recently due to the political developments in Libya).

2. Poor incentives within the socio-economic system, in addition to deterioration in the level of
   public services, especially in Education, generate demand for migration within some socially
   higher groups.

3. High supply versus low demand in the labor market which is accessed annually by 700,000 to
   800,000 new entrants. Existing productive capacities are unable to accommodate this large
   number of workers, particularly after the public institutions’ capacities have diminished, which
   used to absorb the surplus labor. This is in addition to the impact of political transitions and
   regional turbulences on the private sector, and the inability of human resources to compete. This
   leads to an acute surge in competition over jobs that do not require special qualifications or skills.

4. The savings ability of Egyptian migrants living in Europe represents, as Dr. Aymen Zohry observed,
   a permanent incentive for irregular migration as he noticed that remittances from Egyptians living

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\(^9\) Source: Emigration Sector based on MFA’s estimates

\(^10\) Source: Emigration Sector based on MFA’s estimates

\(^11\) Ahmed Farouk Ghoniem, Labor Migration for decent work, Economic Growth and Development in Egypt, Inter-
abroad as well as the ability to establish social networks always encouraged others to migrate to Europe.

5. Migration contributes to combating poverty and improving the standard of living. Researchers note that a large proportion of financial remittances made by Egyptians living abroad was used to improve the general living standard of poor families whose sons or breadwinners are migrants.

6. Absence of good governance, prevalence of corruption, poor transparency and accountability, as well as a deteriorated margin of freedom for over thirty years has formed a political environment that repelled those with expertise and created a lack of confidence in the future.

Migration Phases

Aymen Zohry reports several migration phases in the Egyptian context, taking the “ruling regime” as an independent variable, and migration as a dependent variable. He believes that, before the revolution of July 23, 1952, migration was for the purpose of study or tourism and was very limited. However, during president Gamal Abdel Nasser’s time (1954-1970), migration became a political instrument for assisting Arab countries economically, socially, and culturally. Egypt had sent many educational missions to assist the rising Arab countries in developing educational systems. Also, significant contributions were made by Egyptians in areas of engineering and construction. During President Sadat’s era (1970-1981), extensive migration of Egyptians to Arab Gulf states started after the October 1973 War, especially after the increase in petrol prices. Financial remittances of Egyptian migrants helped to boost the Egyptian economy; a trend that continued during Mubarak’s era (1981-2011). However, the percentage of unskilled labor increased and the protection given to Egyptians abroad decreased. The phenomenon of irregular migration grew due with the deteriorating economic, social and political situation as well as the marginalization of the role of youth and their resulting lack of hope.

Zohry argument focuses mainly on Egyptian migration to the Arab Gulf states. However, two points should be noted. Nasser’s period witnessed a massive labor migration to European countries and the United States. In addition, there was also group migration by some Coptic groups, who felt besieged due to economic nationalization policies, which recurred following the fall of Mubarak’s regime on February 11, 2011. Some press reports, that lacked reliable accurate statistics, indicated that there were waves of migration among Egyptians in general, and Copts in particular, out of fear of political turmoil, prevalence of violence, and rise of the Islamic current. This reveals the importance of conducting in-depth studies on the impact of the “Arab Spring” on migration, as regards its patterns, particularly as it might include segments that never considered migration as an option over the past years.

Egyptians Migrant Community in the UK

Egyptian migration to Europe started two hundred years ago, with the beginning of the nineteenth century at the time the French Campaign was waged against Egypt. When Mohamed Ali created the modern Egyptian renaissance, he sent the first mission to Italy in 1813 to study typography. In 1818, he sent another mission to France to study military sciences to build a powerful Egyptian army and study European standards. Throughout the twentieth century, Egyptians continued to migrate to Europe, in parallel with European migration to settle Egypt. However, migration has apparently increased since the sixties (Zohry 2006).

Clearly, for Egyptians, the UK has a special place since it is the only colonial country that occupied Egypt for about 72 years (1882-1954). A few Egyptians travelled to the UK in the 1930s and 1940s for the purpose of study. Following the Free Officers Movement in 1952 and the announcement of Gamal Abdel

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Nasser as Egypt’s president, a number of Egyptians, especially the high-class segments and professionals, migrated to the UK. Notably, most of them were Muslims. In the 1970s, Coptic migrants followed suit, especially after the ascendance of the Islamic movement during the era of President Anwar el-Sadat. Although most Coptic migrants chose to go to Canada and Australia back then, some of them decided to settle in the UK in order to get a job or complete their post graduate studies. Migration increased in the 1970s due to the decision issued by President Sadat annulling the “exit visa” which was applicable during Abdel Nasser’s presidency, leading to a decrease in the number of migrants and Egyptians traveling abroad.

In that time, the British authorities allowed Egyptian migrants to get a residence permit and a job. Half of those migrants were low-paid manual labor working for restaurants or providing industrial services. The other half included professionals who wanted to build their professional capacities and continue their post-graduate studies in British universities. Since the 1980s, Egypt has turned into a migrant-exporting country. Recently, most of the migrants who moved to live in the UK have been professional workers with skills and technical training, at the expense of manual labor. This proves the hypothesis that in countries imposing restrictions on migration, a positive impact occurs with regard to the range of the vocationally and technically qualified people who move there.14

It is hard to tell the exact number of Egyptian migrants in the UK due to the lack of accurate statistics. Many Egyptian migrants do not record their data in the registration system used in the Egyptian consulate. Hence, the accurate number of Egyptians living in the UK is not known. Consequently, the characteristics, ideological trends, professions, interests, and relations...etc of such migrants cannot be determined either. In general, it is noted that Egyptian migrants have limited communication with the embassy. A senior figure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that this poor communication is attributed to the system followed during Mubarak’s regime (1981-2011), where diplomatic missions did not show much interest in communicating with all categories of Egyptian migrants there. Instead, they primarily focused on establishing Egyptian pro-regime groups to use against the Egyptian expatriates opposing or criticizing the regime policies when necessary.

Experience indicates that half of Egyptian expatriates live in London, while the rest are distributed over all other English cities. Wealthy migrants live in well-off neighborhoods in London like Hampstead, and St John’s Wood and Kensington, while those who belong to the middle class live in neighborhoods like Notting Hill and Earls Court. Some chose to inhabit London suburbs in search of the most affordable housing and a more affordable life style compared to that of central London. Egyptian migrants can also be found in Scotland, Brighton, Birmingham and other English cities. Therefore, Egyptians, unlike other expatriate communities are not concentrated in specific areas where they live in seclusion and settle for communicating with each other in what is known as a “Ghetto”, for despite the fact that the Edgware Road and Bayswater areas are located in the heart of London, clearly bearing Arabic features, and are the destinations for many Gulf tourists, the Egyptian presence in each of them isn’t strong. Thus, they cannot be considered as Ghettos exclusively limited to Egyptians. Many Egyptians who belong to the professional educated class prefer not to stay in communities formed in this area in the heart of London. The majority of Egyptian migrants demonstrate population variance when it comes to the religious belief dominant in Egypt. The vast majority of them are Muslims, with a Christian minority that is active, solid and united and has the capabilities of maintaining good internal communication. This minority usually frequents Coptic churches spread across various cities in Britain. There have been churches that have gained significance and fame like London churches, the most important and oldest being St. Mark’s Church in central London, St. George Cathedral in Stevenage, and another in Brighton in the south where a huge number of the Coptic Sudanese refugees coming from North of Sudan neighbor many Egyptian Coptic expatriates. In addition to churches in the South of Britain, there are those in Manchester, Birmingham, Wales and others. They also have a special college for theological studies named after St. Athanasius.15

Note that with successive religious tensions between Muslims and Christians in Egypt, Coptic expatriates managed through their connections with the churches to mobilize protests against Mubarak’s regime.

14 Assaf Razin and Jackline Wahba, Migration Policy and Welfare State in Europe, Unpublished paper
especially following El-Kedeseen (Saints) church incidents in 2011. The tensions that ensued that took place after Mubarak’s regime was toppled during the transition period that started from 11 February, this culminated in a mass demonstration outside the House of Lords following the Maspero events in 12 October 2011.\textsuperscript{16}

There has been an obvious disparity in the male to female ratio in Egyptian expatriates community in Britain. The ratio reached 2-to-1 respectively, thus having repercussions on the labour market, availability of job opportunities and marriage. Therefore, male Egyptian expatriates seek wives from outside the migration community. Usually they will bring wives from Egypt and bring them to Britain, given that a broad cross-section of Egyptian migrants do not wish to marry foreigners.

In a study that was conducted in 1997, on a sample of 56 Muslims and Christians who live in and outside of London, of both sexes, it turned out that Egyptian migrants have the capacity to fit into the multicultural environment in Britain due to their friendly nature and openness to others as well as their ability to take advantage of the opportunities offered to them. They also have a constant wish to settle down and to stay outside the political conflict cycle in the country that receives them. Some of them managed to achieve success in the society but others perceive that there has been discrimination against them. The majority of migrants, however, have agreed upon the fact that the British society provides them opportunities for contact, communication and maintaining their cultural identity. Despite this being the case, only 20% of the sample made a decision not to return and settle in Egypt, while about two-thirds of the sample would like to return to their children to live in Egypt again. This is, in part, due to the fact that Egyptians maintain a deep level of communication with their original community.\textsuperscript{17}

If we want to compare this community with the other Arab migrants communities in Britain, we will find that the Moroccans are connected to their country of origin in an obvious manner, to the extent that a large portion of them prefer to return to Morocco during the summer vacation to study, to renew ties with their home, to find marriage opportunities for their sons and daughters, or to invest in domestic projects. Moroccan identity is strongly present in Moroccan migrants, and they are concentrated in North Kensington, and live near each other. The case, however, is different for Egyptian migrants. While most of them prefer to be identified as having an Egyptian identity, they do not develop this identity, unlike Moroccans, in the form of residing in a Ghetto. They also did not develop a sense of mistrust and hostility towards the British society. The study has revealed that the Egyptian migrant community in Britain is not easy to categorize, as it comprises all forms of religious professional and social diversity, and it stands as a “microcosm” of the Egyptian diverse society. An Egyptian expatriate prefers to describe himself as merely an “Egyptian”, separate from any wider Arab or Islamic group, even though it is difficult to find a British community that can be called Arab or Islamic. Arab and Islamic nationalities are still communicating with each other based on the common ground of belonging to the country of origin.\textsuperscript{18}

The desire to return still has a place in the minds of Arabs living in Britain. Many of them become economically integrated into British society but cannot integrate on the political and cultural levels. In addition to Moroccans who prefer to connect to Moroccan society, if we look at the Arab nationalities living in Britain, we find Yemenis, who form a community with roots that can be traced back to the early nineteenth-century where a number of them settled in Britain, and married British women. They lived in neighborhoods where the working class is concentrated; in ports and in industrial areas. The first generation did not care about learning English, and learned very little of the language to help them find their way through life. The second and third generations are more integrated, but at the same time, they are more closely related to the shifts and developments that occur in Yemen. The same observation applies to Somalis who came to Britain to escape conflicts and wars that followed the toppling of President Siad Barre. However, since the majority of them are from the educated professional middle class, they feel that the working conditions in Britain do not suit them in terms of lack of incentives, and low salaries,

\textsuperscript{16} http://www.christian-dogma.com/vb/showthread.php?t=137481


and frustrating living conditions that they cannot get away from. They would like to return to their country once conditions become stable.\textsuperscript{19}

Egyptians become attached to their original community. However before the 25th of January revolution it was not clear whether they preferred to return or not. They present a middle way in the way Arab migrants deal with the British society, for on one hand, they are economically and professionally integrated, but at the same time they are living in a cultural context and social community associated with the Egyptian society. The British society offers the possibility of achieving the balance referred to, in terms of appreciation for cultural pluralism on the level of clothing, foods, and unique cultural self-expression. Perhaps for these reasons Indians always declare that they have settled in the British society, and that they do not prefer to return to their original country. ‘There are no cultural motivations to make them leave Britain, and it seems that this is the way in which many Arabs and Egyptians living in Britain think, as they see a way to reconcile reaping the fruits of stability, economic opportunities, career advancement and public freedoms present in a democratic society and committing to the cultural and social context in which they and their families wish to live. Such a context appeals to the Egyptian character. The case was no different after the 25th of January revolution, which we will be discussing in the field study. This does not contradict a basic hypothesis put forward by a number of researchers after analyzing some of the data gathered about Egyptian expatriates. This is that expatriates returning from abroad have the desire to establish economic enterprises and have the sense of adventure to start such enterprises, compared with people with no emigration experience. Despite the fact that an emigrant usually loses contact with the network of social relations while living abroad, his material savings, and his learned accumulated professional and scientific expertise compensate for the loss of social communication for a period of time. This hypothesis is tested on “returning expatriates” but it does not look into the issue of “return” itself, and the nature of factors related to it.\textsuperscript{20}

Field Study Results

In January 2012, the researcher carried out a number of interviews with a diverse sample of Egyptian migrants living in the UK. He interviewed some of them in person while other respondents answered the questions via e-mail. This sample does not only represent Egyptian expatriates living in London, but also others living across a number of English cities. In addition, it reflects all elements of social diversity in respect of professional, religious, and gender factors. The sample included both Muslims and Christians, males and females, with different professions. It comprised businessmen, academics, doctors... etc. However, out of the many interviews made, only 13 were selected since they were the most representative and honest ones. The selected set of interviews reflects the main general trends adopted by the interviewed migrants.

Dr. Sami A., 63 years, one of the most senior migrants in Birmingham, presents a good example of an educated businessman. He left Egypt and migrated to the UK due to “the lack of good job opportunities in Egypt and his desire to discover a new world”. Nevertheless, Dr. Sami visits Egypt many times every year. He, also, visited it following the January 25 Revolution to “see the changes taking place in Egypt and study the role which can be played in the post-revolution Egypt”. Moreover, he is “completely aware of the latest developments in Egypt” and follows the situation there closely via “newspapers, internet, TV, satellite channels, as well as the phone calls made with his relatives and friends”. Furthermore, he “makes money transfers to Egypt in order to invest in real estate and support social and charity projects”. Despite his strong connection with Egypt, taking into consideration his constant visits, rich knowledge, and the money transfers he makes, Sami is not planning to return to Egypt, even though “he has skills and experiences that can benefit his society”. Sami said that he believes he can serve his homeland better when he is abroad. He believes so because he has been running an engineering company engaged in


the field of technology for over thirty years. Also, he has conducted much research and maintains good relations with large universities, since he gives lectures in one of them as a visiting professor”. However, he thinks that the January 25 Revolution put Egypt back on the right track towards progress. According to him, “for Egypt to be a developed country, Egyptians must show a real desire for progress, work hard, and improve education and scientific research”.

Similarly, another retired 65-year-old migrant, who preferred to keep his identity concealed, left Egypt due to the inability to find an appropriate job there. He found a good opportunity in the UK, providing for better educational and professional development. He also visits “Egypt many times a year” and went there following the January 25 revolution to check up on his family and friends, see the changes taking place in Egypt, and “study the role which can be played in the post-revolution Egypt”. Moreover, he is “perfectly aware of the latest developments in Egypt” and follows the situation there closely via “newspapers, internet, TV, satellite channels, as well as the phone calls made with his relatives and friends”. Also, he “sends money transfers to Egypt to invest in real estate and supports charity projects”. However, he refuses to “return to Egypt” because he is committed to his “family and work in the UK”. Although he believes that Egypt has been doing better since the January 25 Revolution, it still lacks “organization”.

Two other migrants also follow this pattern, whereby they follow the situation in Egypt and invest there but are not planning to return to it. These 2 migrants are accountant Hanaa Sh., 58 years old, and Dr. Omar A., 60 years old, who works as a general practitioner in GP hospitals. They almost share the same reasons for leaving Egypt, which are corruption, injustice, better education and job opportunities in the UK and the desire to “discover a new different world”. They visit “Egypt once a year”. They visited it following the revolution in order to “know the actual developments of the situation there and explore a new role in the post-revolution phase”. Also, “They follow the situation there closely via internet, TV, and satellite channels” and send money transfers to Egypt to “invest in real estate and support charity projects”. They do not see any good reason for going back to Egypt. They also believe that they can serve Egypt better while living in the UK. While Hanaa Shorbagy says that Egypt’s progress depends on transparency, education development, integrity, and environment protection, Omar AL-Sheikh believes that fighting corruption, restoring security, and applying justice rules can help Egypt become a developed country. However, they believe that Egypt still needs to take more serious steps to pursue this path.

Adam, a 32-year old financial manager, shares their same reasons for leaving Egypt. He also maintains close connection with Egypt and visited it after the revolution. Adam follows the developments there on a daily basis via “newspapers, internet, TV, and satellite channels” and does not see a reason for going back there. Adam believes that Egypt’s real problem is the lack of organization and believes that this is why Egypt has not become a developed country yet.

Contrary to the above, Dr. Mohamed Sh., a 52- year old Consultant Otolaryngologist, has a different perception of the situation. He left because of the “corruption, injustice, and better education and job opportunities in the UK”. He visits “Egypt several times a year” and went there after the January 25 Revolution to “check after his family and friends and know the actual developments of the situation there”. Moreover, he is “perfectly aware of the latest developments in Egypt” and follows the situation there closely via “Internet, TV, satellite channels as well as the phone calls made with his relatives and friends”. He sends “remittances to Egypt to invest in real estate”. But in contrast to the previous respondents, Dr. Mohamed is considering going back to Egypt because he believes he can be of use there. Also, he thinks that democracy, justice, and absence of corruption can motivate him and other Egyptians residing abroad to invest back in Egypt’s development. Also, he believes that law must be applied in order for Egypt to be a developed country. In his opinion, Egypt has been on the right track since the January 25 Revolution.

Dr. Nehal A., a 40-year old doctor, adopts the same opinion, where she migrated to the UK because of the absence of democracy, corruption, injustice, religious fanaticism, the desire to discover a new world, and the availability of better education and job opportunities in the UK. She visits Egypt many times every year. She, also, visited it following the January 25 Revolution to “check up after her family and friends,
see the changes taking place in Egypt, and study the role which can be played to contribute to the reconstruction of Egypt and development of society”. Moreover, she is “perfectly aware of the latest developments in Egypt” and follows the situation there on a daily basis via “Internet, TV, satellite channels, as well as the phone calls made with her relatives and friends”. Furthermore, she “sends money transfers to Egypt in order to help her relatives, invest in real estate, and support charity projects”. She believes that she has acquired “useful skills and experiences from the British society that can benefit Egypt”. She wants to return to Egypt because she thinks that the situation there is encouraging since the “Muslim Brotherhood won the elections and Egypt’s future seems brighter now”. She believes that the adoption of a development system that follows Islamic principles and rules, adopts ethical and religious values, produces positive outcomes will lead to Egypt’s progress, since the Egyptian society lacks such values. She believes that Egypt is now going on the right track.

Opposite to the above, Mohamed E., a 47-year old IT Consultant, adopts a different opinion. He said that he left Egypt and migrated to the UK due to poverty, underdevelopment, corruption, injustice, and the availability of better education and job opportunities in the UK. Mohamed visits Egypt many times a year. He, also, visited it following the January 25 Revolution to “check up on his family and friends”. He follows the developments there on a daily basis via “Internet, TV, and satellite channels”. However he does not have any investments in Egypt and he is not sure either if he is going to return to Egypt. In his opinion, there are many repelling factors in Egypt such as the “absence of vision and high investment risks”. In order for Egypt to develop and progress, everyone who reached the age of 65 should be retired, Laws should be strictly enforced, fair payroll system should be adopted, and education should be improved. Hence, he believes that Egypt has “deviated from the right track since the January 25 Revolution”.

Dr. Hassan Nasser, a 39-year old Engineering Professor, adopts the same viewpoint, where he is not sure whether he is going to return to Egypt ever again. He migrated to the UK because of the “absence of democracy, the availability of better education and job opportunities in the UK, corruption, and injustice”. He visits Egypt “once a year” but he has not visited it yet since the revolution. However, “he is perfectly aware of the latest developments taking place in Egypt on a daily basis via internet”. Dr. Hassan does not send any money transfers to Egypt and believes that he has acquired “important skills and experiences from the British society that can benefit Egypt”. Dr. Nasser is “not sure” whether he is going to return to Egypt since his family receives its education in the UK. “For Egypt to be a developed country, it needs to achieve justice, adopt an appropriate vision for deploying the youth’s efforts, distribute population appropriately over the available area, encourage people to work, and promote productivity” Dr. Nasser said. In his opinion, “Egypt has been on the right track since the January 25 revolution.”

Each of “Suzan S.” pharmacist, 26 years old and “Eman A.” teacher, 29 years old, represent a model from the second generation of migrants. The reason behind living in the British society is “being born abroad”; however their links with the Egyptian society have persisted as they visit Egypt “many times a year” and the former “Suzan Sami” was in Egypt during 25th January Revolution. “Family visits and observing the change in reality” are the main two reasons for their frequent visits to Egypt whose news they always follow closely via “the internet, satellite channels, TV, phone calls with family and friends”. Both of them see no possibility to return to Egypt; they lead a stable life in the UK. Suzan Sami thinks that for Egypt to become among the developed countries needs “organization, justice, clean environment, good public transport network, education and training” while Eman Ahmed added other factors, like “good leadership, education and institutionalism” and both see that “Egypt is on the right track after 25th January Revolution”.

Ms “Refka B.” bachelor of law, 56 years old, has migrated to the UK owing to “poverty problems, absence of development and religious prejudice”. Hence, the influence of her religious affiliation is clear here which represents all her perceptions towards the developments taking place in Egypt since 25th January Revolution broke out until the present time. She “follows the incidents happening in Egypt” via “TV, satellite channels, phone calls with friends and relatives” and she “doesn’t think of returning to Egypt” because “nothing encourages returning to Egypt”. This is due to various reasons “citizenship gloomy future, no opportunities for living in dignity and freedom under the rule of Islamic trends, as well as the spread of corruption, favoritism and extreme religious obsession”. Based on this, Refka thinks that the
future of progress in Egypt depends on a number of procedures, including “spreading the culture of tolerance, coexistence that is based on the concept of citizenship, eradicating prejudice, religious obsession by applying law on all, reforming education by raising the level of teachers, following scientific research modern approach, purifying audio-visual, print media so that it becomes honest and neutral”. Moreover, she sees that “Egypt is not heading towards progress since 25th January revolution”.

Media expert “Ekladious I.” journalist and researcher, 61 years old, follows almost the same track where he thinks that “poverty problems, development absence, better opportunities in the UK for educational, occupational promotion, risk and the desire to explore a new world” are among the factors that pushed him to emigrate to Britain. Ekladious visits “Egypt once each two or three years”; and he hasn’t visited it since 25th January Revolution; however he is “fully aware of the developments taking place in Egypt every day via papers and internet”. He also sends money to Egypt to “support his relatives only, not to invest in any commercial projects”. Ekladious “doesn’t think there is any possibility to return to Egypt” because according to him “there is nothing encouraging him to return to Egypt”. The reasons for that are “the prevalence of chaos in most social institutions, the outbreak of bribery, favoritism and other discouraging issues, as well as the uncertain future under the rule of fanatic religious groups who don’t know the meaning of freedom or citizenship, deeming everything, even democracy and Copts, as infidel”. In his opinion, for Egypt to be a developed country, it needs to “separate religion from state, reform education, dismiss fanatic cadres, reform and purify media from hypocrites”. Moreover, he “isn’t sure whether Egypt is heading in the right track after 25th January Revolution”. Michael Sh. (48 years old) businessman, living at Brighton-South Britain for more than 15 years, has referred to the significance of “contributing to developing the Egyptian society; as an alternative for migration”. Concerning his contribution, he said that he “contributes to many projects in Egypt and he thinks that Egypt is on a better track”.

Conclusions and Recommendations

On reviewing the above mentioned interviews, we find a number of major trends that should be monitored:

1. Egyptian expats who have been interviewed tend to follow the incidents taking place in the Egyptian society, via many channels topped by “internet and satellite channels”. Many of Egyptian expats visit Egypt regularly; however 25th January Revolution was a major reason for visiting Egypt; not only to check on family and friends, but also to follow the developments taking place in society within the last period and considering contribution to developing Egyptian society. Interviews reveal the decline of the role of Egyptians’ unions abroad, embassies, consulates, or others in providing information and knowledge about the incidents taking place within the Egyptian society.

2. Most Egyptian expats who were interviewed stated that “Egypt is on the right track after 25th January Revolution” which expresses an optimistic view about the future and following the developments and transformations taking place within the Egyptian society. It’s noted that their optimism that Egypt is on the right track after 25th January Revolution; hasn’t created a spontaneous desire from their side to return and work in the Egyptian society; nevertheless a small number of them expressed the desire to return and many of them talked about their “economic” integration in Britain which makes it difficult to return to settle in Egypt again.

3. Tendency of Egyptian expats not to return and settle in Egypt is connected to the desire of some of them to invest in Egypt; where some of them do so. “Real estate market” is the place where they particularly invest their monies, besides the financial aids they present to humanitarian and social projects and assisting family and relatives. The reason why “real estate” is the main reason for Egyptian’s investment abroad is the steady increase in profits earned by investors in this field compared to investment in industrial projects or saving in Egyptian banks. Furthermore, there were many studies carried out to explore the relation between migration and real estate investment particularly in Morocco; where it was found that Moroccan migrants’ real estate
investment creates job opportunities and has positive results on economy in general, while other studies have noted the same thing for Egyptian expats.  

4. The so-called “good governance” in political development literature represented major concern among Egyptian expats when considering the factors that lead to the progress of the Egyptian society, as well as means of catching up with the developed countries such as accountability, transparency, combating corruption, organization and discipline. They also mostly focused on what we can call human capital such as education and training, besides the ethical, religious and humanitarian values in what we can call social capital. Such statements, which reveal awareness and experience, are a natural outcome for a significant category of interviewed expats, who most of them hold university, master’s or PhD degree from Britain and occupy major posts in social institutions. This made them more able to seize on the factors that contribute to societies’ advancement and development.

5. “Religious” obsession represents a major factor within the thought of a sector of Egyptians; including Christian Egyptian expats who fear “the rise of the Islamic trend after the parliamentary elections” and think that “religious fanaticism and extremism are among the obstacles to achieving progress in the Egyptian society”, while others think that “the rise of the Islamic trend is an assuring factor” as within the rule of the Islamic trend they’ll be “more committed to Islamic values and rules”.

Accordingly, there are a number of major recommendations that can be presented at the end of the study:

1. Egyptians have a serious desire to contribute to achieving progress in the Egyptian society after 25th January Revolution. Such desire has been, until now, more connected with investment than restoring stability in the Egyptian society. This means reviving a project that had achieved considerable progress earlier, “Investment Fund for Egyptian Expatriates,” which expats can contribute to. It employs those with technical and occupational expertise found among Egyptians abroad, finances major projects in the Egyptian society, sometimes in the area of “real estate”, most demanded by Egyptian expats for investment, so that it would generate revenue for the Egyptian expat and society. Such an idea was presented after 25th January Revolution; however it failed because of neglecting it.

2. Developing programs for what we can call “temporary return” which facilitate the return of Egyptian expats, particularly those of high-level scientific and technical expertise, to contribute to Egyptian society’s development. They could revive the concept of “visiting expat,” including university professors, doctors, businessmen, human resources experts, etc, who one can spend a fixed period transferring his experience to Egyptian society. There may be pre-existing initiatives in this field but they can be legalized, organized and put into regular forms to encourage Egyptian expats to adopt “temporary” return to contribute to development.

3. There is an obvious tendency reflected in all the interviews carried out with all Egyptian expats towards supporting “charity and humanitarian projects” in Egyptian society. This represents a major factor in the remittances transferred to Egypt. This field may be open for personal initiatives, nevertheless a wide charity project can be launched that may represent a major basis for attracting donations and contributions from Egyptian expats for major development goals in Egypt. Look, for instance, at the significant of the Aswan heart hospital project launched by Dr Magdy Yacoub. Other examples of projects that can be launched are “a hundred thousand schools,” “a health unit for each district,” and “clean water for a thousand villages”… etc. These are projects that the government may put on top of its priorities and find support and backing from Egyptian expats participating in them. This requires a new concept in the government’s communication with expats, including clear society development plans, stating priorities, determining the fields that they can contribute to, and contacting them through the media outlets that they get their

21 Wai Mun Hong, Alejandro Lorca & Eva Medina, the Euro-Med Perspective on Migration: The Role of Economic and Social Reforms, Workshop on Migration in the Arab Region: Determinants and Consequences, Istanbul, April 16-17, 2011.
information from; “satellite channels and internet”. This may represent a major initiative to overcome religious obsessions found among Egyptian expats, whether Christians or Muslims. When they see development projects serving all segments of Egyptian society and the efforts of all Egyptians coming together to reconstruct “the new Egypt”.

4. Egyptian expats in the UK insist on a major issue which is that the progress of the Egyptian society depends on the progress of concepts in political, social and cultural fields; such as: good governance, development, democracy, combating corruption and spreading tolerance. All these issues, when considered, represent indirect messages for the expat community on the importance of return and contributing to reconstructing “the new Egypt”. The feeling of Egyptian expats that there is “an obstacle” or “non-tendency” to build democratic governance systems based on accountability, transparency, rule of law, equity rules, leads them to abandon the serious thinking in contributing to Egypt’s development. This is a central issue: the Egyptian Revolution, which Egyptian expats have followed, and the impact of which most of them have traced through visiting Egyptian society, has raised expat expectations of seeing Egyptian society marching towards the level of progress of British society. Most of interviewees informed me of this. Accordingly, they wouldn’t be sympathetic, supportive or have a serious desire to contribute to development if they find the regime stumbling on path to democracy, re-producing political tyranny, or not complying with or applying standards of transparency, accountability and the rule of law.
Iraqi expatriate figures were a driving force in the Coalition campaign to remove Saddam Hussein in 2003, and assumed key roles in the governance of their country in the aftermath of the war. However, examination of the actual collaboration which took place between members of the Iraqi diaspora residing in the United Kingdom and British policymakers in the lead up to war, as well as diaspora contributions to reconstruction since the war, suggest that the scale of involvement has been more limited than previously supposed.

Although there was a high degree of Iraqi expatriate mobilization around the Coalition intervention, representing a range of political, religious and ethnic perspectives, research findings suggest that British policy makers engaged primarily with a narrow spectrum of pro-war diaspora voices, with a widely-held view amongst expatriate representatives that their input into policymaking around regime change was foreclosed by a pre-determined British and American programme for war which served ulterior foreign policy interests. The subsequent sense of exclusion from Coalition plans for war, combined with the violent outcomes of the campaign in Iraq, has deterred many British-Iraqis from further engagement with British policy. More significantly, the manner of selective diaspora involvement in regime change was seen by many as having direct implications for the post-war environment in Iraq by encouraging sectarian rivalry and political and economic corruption. The subsequent circumstances of insecurity and political repression reportedly inhibited expatriate attempts at civil society building and other forms of redevelopment in their country of origin. Expatriate contributions to British policymaking and reconstruction were further limited by internal conflict within the diaspora in the United Kingdom as well as questions around their ability to represent the Iraqi population in Iraq.

The recent wave of democratic protest in the Arab Middle East has afforded an opportunity to revise the approach to collaborating with expatriates that was adopted by Coalition representatives in Iraq in 2003. The case of the United Kingdom’s involvement in joint action in Libya is evidence of applied learning from the Iraq experience. In order to continue to evolve British policies to encourage broader diaspora involvement and thereby more effective political transitions in countries of origin, a number of recommendations have been developed.

Introduction

Two days before Coalition forces launched their first military attack on Iraq in March 2003, the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, opened a House of Commons parliamentary debate on the invasion with an anecdote about an interaction with an Iraqi exile living in the United Kingdom:

I recall saying to her that I understood how grim it must be under the lash of Saddam. ‘But you don’t,’ she replied ‘you cannot. You do not know what it is like to live in perpetual fear.’ And she is right. We take our freedom for granted. But imagine not to be able to speak or discuss or debate or even question the society you live in. To see friends and family taken away and never daring to complain. To suffer the humility of failing courage in face of pitiless terror. That is how the Iraqi people live. Leave Saddam in
place and that is how they will continue to live.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United Kingdom came to play host to the largest number of Iraqis seeking refuge from the Baathist regime of any country in the world. The Iraqi exile presence in the United Kingdom was pivotal to New Labour’s political case for the purported liberation of the country in 2003 and figures from the diaspora were at the forefront of post-war development and governance in the newly democratic Iraq. However, accounts of collaboration between policymakers and Iraqi communities in the United Kingdom suggest that the consultative effort made by British authorities in forging pre- and post-war policies was limited in both depth and ambit. Perspectives from a range of Iraqi expatriate groups document a lingering scepticism about the premises of the United Kingdom’s joint campaign to remove Saddam Hussein, and the reconstruction programmes implemented in its aftermath. Moreover, diaspora perceptions of bias or neglect on the part of British policymakers have frequently alienated Iraqi expatriates from the political institutions of their host country as well as efforts towards the socio-political development of Iraq.

Researchers in the field of migration have noted the potential of political, social or economic mobilization by diaspora communities to affect the course of conflicts, promote reconstruction, support armed struggle or hinder peace initiatives in their home countries. Such capacities are evidenced powerfully by the influence of prominent figures from the Iraqi diaspora in promoting the Coalition invasion and the subsequent sectarian reconstitution of Iraqi politics and society. As the British government contemplates the parameters of its involvement in rebuilding a post-Qaddafi Libya and responses to popular uprisings across the region, the experience of British-Iraqis is instructive in highlighting the causes and consequences of collaboration with diaspora communities in policy development relating to democratization, humanitarian intervention and regime change in the Arab Middle East (AME). Almost a decade after the United Kingdom’s campaign in Iraq was conceived, diaspora perspectives on policymaking offer avenues for the constructive reappraisal of expatriate contributions to future British interventions in the region.

Background

The history of emigration from Iraq is one of a continuum of economic incentives and forced migration that increased steadily over the course of the 20th century with the country’s myriad of political transitions and conflicts. The Iraqi diaspora, and specifically the population in the United Kingdom, is distinguished by communities of diverse ethnic background, religion and political affiliation, as well as by the socioeconomic means relating to the manner of arrival. Generalizations about social status, ideological outlook or politics are therefore difficult. This study does not attempt a survey of general community opinion, but rather seeks to document the specific perspectives of those who have been concerned with politics or development in Iraq, according to which they have sought to influence British policy. The research does, however, seek to account for a diversity of perspectives and experiences amongst Iraqi expatriates; a total of 16 Iraqi expatriates, including Shia and Sunni Muslims, Christians, Kurds, Turkomen and secular Muslims, were formally interviewed for this study, with participants representing asylum seeker, economic migrant and exile backgrounds as well as a range of political alignments. The history and demography of the Iraqi diaspora is examined below, including the background to political participation in the United Kingdom.

The British-Iraqi diaspora

Two distinct waves of expatriation are identifiable from Iraq with emigration increasing exponentially following the rise to power of Saddam Hussein in the late 1980s and again after the United States-led invasion of Iraq of 2003, reaching a peak in 2007. Concurrently, a number of specific dispersions or relocations of Iraq’s various ethnic and religious populations have taken place over the past century, notably

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1 For reasons of their public roles and the sensitivity of the subject matter, the participants in this study have not been identified by name. Further details of some interviewees may be provided by the researcher upon request.
with the exodus of Iraqi Jews following the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948 and the ongoing persecution of Assyrian Christians, Mandeans, Kurds and Turkomen (Sassoon, 2009). While the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Turkey, Israel and Iran all had sizeable expatriate Iraqi populations prior to 2003, Northern European states, including Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, currently host the largest number of post-2003 Iraqi refugees outside the region. As a result of the continuing post-2003 violence in Iraq, neighbours Syria and Jordan have received the majority of refugees, with recent population estimates of 1.5 million and 750,000 respectively (UNHCR, 2007).

Emigration from Iraq to the United Kingdom dates back to the 1940s and the population is amongst the largest of the Iraqi diaspora (UNHCR, 2007). Despite the long-establishment of some Iraqi emigrant communities, no specific census has been carried out on the population as a whole and gauging its size and demography is therefore difficult. The Iraqi Embassy in London suggests that there are between 400,000 and 450,000 Iraqis in the United Kingdom, while estimates from community organizations range from 200,000 to 350,000 (DCLG, 2009). The 2001 census in the United Kingdom recorded an Iraq-born population of some 32,000, a figure which was estimated to have least doubled by 2009 with the mass influx of asylum-applicants following the 2003 Iraq War (IOM, 2007). Iraqis in the United Kingdom represent a range of ethnic backgrounds and religious affiliations2, with ethnic Arabs and Kurds constituting the largest of these groups, although estimates of the respective size of the populations differ between community leaders and official studies. London is home to the largest number of Iraqis, with an estimated 50 to 60 per cent of the population, while other sizeable urban communities reside in Birmingham and Manchester (DCLG, 2009).

Administratively, the United Kingdom’s Iraqi population can be divided into three groups; settled residents, those who have been granted asylum or ‘exceptional leave to remain’ and those whose asylum cases have been refused by the Home Office. Iraqis from the first category have been arriving in the United Kingdom as migrants since the 1950s and 1960s for reasons of quality of life, including education, employment and civic rights, and now live as citizens or residents of the country. However, the vast majority of Iraqis have arrived as asylum seekers, many of them Kurds, in the 1980s and 1990s following the rise of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent Iran-Iraq and First Gulf wars (IOM, 2007). By the time the United Kingdom began contemplating a military campaign in Iraq in 2002, Iraqis were seeking refuge in the country at greater numbers than any other nationality, representing some 17 per cent of total claims made to the Home Office (Telegraph, 2004). Following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the United Kingdom’s concurrent suspension of assessing claims from Iraq, asylum applications dropped sharply, but increased again with the surge in sectarian violence from 2007. At the height of the exodus in 2008, Iraqis seeking asylum in Britain ranked fifth in number in the top ten nationalities, with 1,850 applications per annum to the Home Office documented. However, with an average recognition rate of 27 per cent during that year, the majority of these claims were rejected (ICAR, 2009). Although the rate of applications from Iraq has since decreased, the number of Iraqis who have either appealed their decisions, stayed irregularly or are on discretionary leave to remain, means that there is a sizeable community of Iraqi asylum seekers in Britain whose cases are still unresolved (Refugee Council, 2011).4

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2 Primary affiliations include Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Shi’ia and Sunni Muslims, Jews, Assyrian Christians, Armenians and Mandeans

3 Over the decade from 1992 to 2002, the number of Iraqi asylum claims received by the Home Office rose from 700 to more than 14,000 per year, with around 50 per cent of all applicants granted refugee status or exceptional leave to remain (UNHCR, 2007).

4 While the employment rate of settled Iraqi migrants remains relatively high at 78 per cent, amongst new migrants it is less than half, at 38 per cent (DCLG, 2009). Marked differences also exist in the respective education levels of the different groups, with the majority of the British-born community believed to go on the higher-education and professional jobs. By contrast, mental health problems resulting from the stress of war and migration, language barriers and a loss of socioeconomic status mean that many more recent migrants are unable to access education and other training and employment networks (IAUK, 1996).
Key characteristics

The Iraqi community in the United Kingdom is thus a multifaceted one. At its most extreme, its diversity is reflected in the disparity between settled communities with high levels of education, employment and social mobility, and more recent failed asylum applicants living transiently or sometimes irregularly on the margins of British society. For reasons of their relative integration and prominence in public and community roles, the contribution of settled Iraqi residents, will constitute the main subject of this study. The majority of those interviewed for the research migrated to Britain during the 1970s and 1980s, either as independent students or as young children with their parents, and their social profiles reflect the broad characteristics of a settled Iraqi population. By contrast to more recent waves of arrivals from Iraq, these individuals are predominantly from middle-class backgrounds with the economic resources to migrate as students or professionals without reliance on British welfare or protection mechanisms (IAUK, 1996). The majority of the Iraq-born participants were foreign educated, either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and worked as professionals in medicine, engineering or commerce - fields in which the British-Iraqi community has gained prominence. Although the participants came from a variety of distinct ethnic and religious backgrounds, most stressed the non-denominational nature of their relationship to the Iraqi community in Britain. Socializing and collaboration appeared to take place across cultural communities, with individuals describing themselves “first and foremost as Iraqis”.

Cultural and political ties

Iraqis have had a distinct presence in civic and cultural life in Britain, and since the growth of the community in the 1970s, have founded a variety of civil society organizations. Many of these developed in line with the various concerns related to their reasons for migration, for example, the ethnic rights of Turkomen and Kurdish groups, or have been associated with political groups or causes in Iraq, such as trade unionism or communism. A number of interviewees were involved in the vibrant student activist scene of the 1970s, and later took up roles in politics and community leadership in addition to professional employment. Involvement in campaigning enabled them to maintain strong ties to civic and political life in Iraq, and for many, their activism was premised on the belief that they would return to their home country after, what were perceived as, temporary political instabilities or threats subsided. However, following the rise of the evermore repressive Saddam Hussein regime from the late 1970s, political activism in Britain prohibited many from returning to Iraq. As one prominent journalist who came to Britain in 1976 explained, “some of us went back to Iraq and some were imprisoned or disappeared there. But a lot of people stayed in Britain for longer than anticipated by virtue of their political activities. We effectively became exiles.”

Many subsequently relinquished the idea of ever returning to Iraq, forging new roots in the United Kingdom and an attachment to British citizenship and institutions. However, others still owned property in Iraq and expressed a strong desire to return at a future date. This so-called “myth of return” to Iraq emerged as a strong theme amongst expatriates, and one long-standing resident explained: “Iraqis don’t like to stay away from their place and people (...). We always had a lot of communication with Iraq and once people finished their studies, they would always go back. Even when they graduated and had the opportunity to work here, most preferred to go home.”

Irrespective of intention or ability to return to Iraq, most interviewees expressed an ongoing attachment to their country and its future – a connection which was reflected in, and sustained through, their social or political involvement after arrival in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the magnitude of repression and suffering in Iraq seemed to have galvanised the commitment of many expatriates to Iraqi social or political causes, despite their having relinquished any desire to return. One campaigner explained how her exhaustive efforts to promote human rights in Iraq were inspired in large part by the price her exiled mother had paid for her activism. “I probably wouldn’t be that close to Iraq if it was not for my mother,” she says. “In her last weeks she told me, ‘I know you have grown up outside Iraq, but I am sure you have that flame inside you and you can do something for it.’ If she hadn’t said that, I probably wouldn’t be so eager to go there all the time trying to change things.”
Expatriate contributions to the United Kingdom

The combination of continuing personal ties to Iraq, cultural diversity and specific local factors have lead the British-Iraqi community to be described as the political and cultural centre of the Iraqi diaspora (Al-Ali, 2007). By contrast to other Iraqi communities, for example that in the United States, the spectrum of views and degree of mobilization in the United Kingdom is wide-ranging. A proliferation of non-sectarian alliances and organizations has been aided by the presence of secular political parties like the Iraqi Communist Party and Iraqi National Accord, with the geographical density of communities enabling more fluid affiliation and cooperation in campaigning. So too, the United Kingdom’s relatively generous social welfare provisions and open climate of political expression have facilitated the development of a vibrant diaspora culture with dynamic political potential and bridges between communities and across national borders to Iraq.

Political participation

The continuing links between the United Kingdom and its former colonial outpost have generated channels through which diaspora communities might influence political conditions in Iraq. This potential has been increasingly evident in expatriate activities since the 1970s, in campaigns directed at specific aspects of British foreign policy in Iraq and the wider region. Much early activism by Iraqis in the United Kingdom focused on issues of human and civic rights in Iraq, through raising awareness about ethnic minority abuses or political repression under the Ba’ath regime. Campaigns united activists from across the Iraqi political and cultural spectrum and founded enduring links between the diaspora and British civil society and parliamentary bodies. As the leader of an Iraqi community group explained,

Our activities put us very much in contact with different institutions, whether it was Westminster, the media, trade unions, local authorities or the women’s movement. We were received by Members of Parliament (sic), mainly liberals from the left and Labour parties, and together built up campaigns, like that against oppression of working class in Iraq. They showed solidarity with us, whether Kurds, Arabs, Islamists or Communists.

Political activism increased following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, with energies focusing on Western responses, namely United Nations economic sanctions and the United States-led invasion, both of which received British backing. The scale and diversity of the British-Iraqi diaspora had expanded vastly during the 1980s, however, opposition to the sanctions and military action prevailed across communities. Although objections to these campaigns were driven by concern about the welfare of Iraqi civilians, many described their difficulty in representing this view to British opponents of Saddam. “We knew the sanctions would hit every single Iraqi except Saddam and strengthen his grip over the population,” explained the head of a prominent lobbying organization. “People asked how we, who claimed to be victims of Saddam could support him by opposing the policies of the international community and I got blue in the face explaining that I was trying to protect my people.”

That the United Kingdom continued policies perceived as detrimental to Iraqi civilians in the face of diaspora opposition appears to have heightened expatriate scepticism about British foreign policy. For many, these doubts were confirmed by British and American responses to the wave of anti-government rebellions that swept through Southern and Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War from March 1991. The movement was portrayed by many interviewees as an opportunity to remove Saddam that was let slip by the American and British Governments, despite both countries having encouraged the uprisings. “It was just like the Arab Spring now,” explained on interviewee. “All the towns and villages fell into the power of the uprising, from Kurdistan to Basra. But Saddam still had the military advantage, and Britain did nothing, absolutely nothing, even though their armies were right there on the border.” The subsequent bloody suppression of the uprisings under the watch of American and British forces was therefore formative in shaping diaspora perspectives on British involvement in Iraq in the name of democratization or human rights. Lasting impressions of British policy as selective or insincere were characterized by one interviewee who described his reaction to the first suggestions of a Coalition campaign to liberate Iraq.
in 2002. “Britain did not have this policy of intervening in Iraq in 1991,” he said. “They were just an audience then. Britain needn’t have done even 50 per cent of what they were planning in 2003 to succeed, but instead, they allowed Saddam to return to power. Then suddenly 13 years later they wake up in the morning and want to bring democracy to Iraq?”

**Responses to the Coalition campaign**

Previous experiences of Western foreign policy, in Iraq or the AME more generally, were powerful in informing expatriate views of the 2003 campaign, whether supportive or opposed. Interviewees emphasised the long memory of the Iraqi community, shaped by a colonial past and decades of political involvement, and even those who had left Iraq at young age explained how they were affected by an Iraqi national and Arab regional consciousness. As one respondent summarized, “if you look at the history of dictatorship in the Middle East, all of them were backed at some stage by the West. So a lot of people in Iraq think that Western position in Middle East is a corrupt one and had little faith that the Coalition was coming over because they wanted the people to be free.”

However, many British Iraqis were not deterred by this sober view of policy from actively supporting the Coalition campaign. Backing for the United Kingdom’s participation in the American-led campaign therefore came from members of the diaspora with positive views of New Labour’s intentions as well as others who were willing to set aside their mistrust of foreign policy for the prospect of national liberation. Many of those from the latter group were Kurds or other political exiles who viewed the war as a, possibly final, opportunity to remove the entrenched Saddam regime. One Kurdish interviewee described his community’s support for Blair’s campaign as inspired by a sense of cumulative despair about the future of Iraq. “We are not fools but we were hopeless: we were shattered. Every family was touched by the regime, even here in England. We couldn’t do anything alone, so many of us seized this chance, suspiciously convincing ourselves that they wanted a democratic Iraq. Sometimes when the devil comes to help you, you will take his hand and say ‘let’s go’.”

The Iraqi diaspora in the United Kingdom was subsequently divided along lines of support for or opposition to the impending invasion, with each driven by an apparent concern for the future welfare of the Iraqi people and nation. For many of those who opposed the war, however, their stance became taboo amongst some diaspora and non-Iraqi advocates of war, and some preferred to remain silent. As one opponent of the war explained, “We became two big camps: for the war and against it. Those who opposed were often portrayed as supporters of Saddam which was a big problem for us and there was no rational voice that could distinguish between this camp and that one. It was very black and white, but really we were all just tired and wanted an end to the regime.” Others spoke of the challenges in forging a unified lobby or political front in such a heterogeneous and internally conflicted diaspora. One former member of the Iraqi Islamic Party in the United Kingdom described how his own campaign against the invasion was hampered by opposition from within his community, as well as policymakers’ preference for pro-war Iraqi voices. “We saw so many possible alternatives and submitted reports to Members of Parliament (sic) talking about change from inside Iraq,” he says, “but we could not build a campaign. If you talked about being against an attack on the Iraqi army, people would straight away say you were a Saddam supporter.”

**The opposition-in-exile**

A number of more established Iraqi opposition groups in exile had been engaged in long-standing campaigns for regime change and, whether because of their relative efficiency or due to parallel interests, were able to gain more traction amongst policymakers in the United Kingdom and the United States. During the year preceding the 2003 invasion, collaboration took place between Westminster and Washington representatives and exiled opposition politicians, notably those comprising the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella group of various opposition parties established in 1992 following the Gulf
Even prior to the adoption of regime change as official British policy, advisers from the Foreign Office stated the importance of maintaining ministerial contact with a number of Iraqi diaspora groups who had approached the Government to lobby for a Coalition intervention. In addition to the INC, amongst these parties were the Iraqi National Accord (INA), Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), all of whom had representation amongst the Iraqi diaspora in the United Kingdom. Reports note that talk of military action against Iraq in senior policymaking circles had named some of these groups as a focus of any attempt to overthrow Saddam, despite knowledge that some parties lacked credibility as an opposition force due to being outside Iraq for the major part of Ba’athist rule. In the year prior to the invasion, then Foreign Office Minister, Ben Bradshaw, and other Downing Street representatives agreed to meet with a number of key diaspora politicians, including Ahmed Chalabi (INC) and the British-based former Ba’athist Ayad Allawi (INA) and Kurdish Latif Rashid (PUK), all of whom pressed for British support for military regime change. They proposed that British forces could assist in training administration and justice in post-war Iraq, while stating the need to involve the Iraqi population in regime-change. In turn, British officials emphasized the role the opposition-in-exile could play in promoting the cause abroad by reminding the world of the repressive nature of Ba’athist rule and generating a clear vision for post-Saddam Iraq. These goals were partly facilitated by an opposition conference which took place in London in December 2002 and included over 300 participants from a spectrum of opposition groups. Government officials did not officially sponsor the meeting, however, two days after the conference, Downing Street received a visit from leaders of the KDP and PUK, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, and expressed support for the opposition’s role in a post-Saddam Iraq, including constitution-drafting and reconciliation.

**Diaspora views of the opposition**

Despite apparent support for a representative and unified Iraqi opposition amongst British policymakers, it appears that significant elements of the British Iraqi community viewed the Coalition alliance with exiled Iraqi figures as both narrow and selective. Many interviewees suggested that the official endorsement of the INC programme excluded the diversity of voices in the diaspora as well as inside Iraq. The characteristic view amongst interviewees who both supported the invasion and opposed it was that official dealings with exiled Iraqis were inspired by a drive to gain legitimacy for the Coalition campaign rather than an informed, nuanced picture of Iraqi opinion. A number of interviewees suggested that politically influential diaspora figures had more credibility in Western policy-making circles than amongst the Iraqi population they claimed to represent. “The 2002 London conference supports a thesis of coincidence, rather than cooperation between the diaspora and policymakers,” explained one interviewee. “The Coalition dealt primarily with the sort of opposition people who suited their agenda – they were capable politicians, but they were ultimately self-serving and did not have very deep roots on the ground.” Even those who were engaged in lobbying efforts in support of regime change were frank about the pragmatic nature of the opposition-in-exile relations with the British government. One former member of the KDP in the United Kingdom noted: “By the time we were having the discussion about the war, it was already a done deal. The discussion and conferences which took place in London were largely discussions for our own convenience. It was not a question of if, but how and when.”

Beyond these initiatives, it appears there was little effort by British officials to collaborate with diaspora views and politics on a more grass-roots or community level. As one prominent community representative explained, “They involved some influential individuals, but there was there was no broader consultation. I would not say that they involved the community at all and to whoever claims this, I would say, give me examples.” For those Iraqis who sought to lobby British officials against the invasion, the impression of exclusion from policymaking was all the more striking. “The decision to go to war was taken, not in consultation with Iraqis, but very high up in Washington and Westminster,” said another anti-war community leader. “After that, policymakers worked very actively to recruit Iraqis they had befriended over

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5 As noted in a memorandum to Mr Bradshaw’s office, 25 March 2002.
the years. They put up the smokescreen that they were listening to Iraqis but in fact were just listening
to the echo of their own voices.” The perceived disregard of British policymakers for grass-roots and
anti-war voices reinforced the view held by some that democratic institutions in the United Kingdom
were the realm of the elite. “There was a lot of opposition to the war amongst rank and file members of
parliament who supported us,” explained one prominent diaspora activist and journalist. “But they had
little influence. It is important that we did not stop the war – it shows what kind of democracy Britain is:
even when you have millions of people on the street, you find the rulers still do not listen to what their
people want.”

Outcomes of the war

The nature of Iraqi diaspora involvement in the 2003 regime change was widely perceived to have had
direct implications for the socio-political environment in post-war Iraq, and importantly, the capacity
of expatriates to engage with their country of origin. Most prominent amongst these associations, was
the perceived causal link between instability and sectarian violence and the political agenda of diaspora
depictions with whom the Coalition collaborated

Sectarian division

According to a number of interviewees, policymakers in both the United States and the United Kingdom
failed to recognise the broader political and cultural context in which the reconstruction of Iraq would
take place, and in reconstituting its political system along sectarian lines, opened the country up to for-
eign intervention and religious division. The narrow agendas of opposition figures selected for leadership
in the new administration, which focused on regaining the influence of hitherto marginalised ethnic or
religious groups rather than promoting national unity, was seen a key in this process. “From a geopoliti-
cal point of view, the US and UK should have known that there was a power vacuum in Iraq that would
be filled by regional powers,” said a former member of the British Iraqi Islamic Party. “The Coalition was
oblivious to the strength of emotional, historical and religious ties and was easily drawn in by diaspora
groups who said they’d be welcomed with open arms in Iraq. They failed to see that interests of these
groups were transient and not long term.”

Following the removal of the Ba’athist regime, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the official transitional
authority in Iraq, was led by a number of diaspora figures including Chalabi and Allawi. Seats in the IGC
were assigned along religious and ethnic lines based on the assumption that 60 per cent of the popula-
tion was Shia, 20 per cent Sunni, and 20 per cent Kurds (mostly Sunni), although no prior census of the
Iraqi population had been conducted. Not only was this division of leadership seen to have encouraged
cpolitical power struggles, but it was also viewed by many in the diaspora as having seeded sectarian
rivalries that were hitherto alien to Iraqi society. “The divide between Christians and Muslims was never
a factor in Iraq”, explained one Christian interviewee. “The majority of my friends in Iraq were Muslims
and to this day I do not know if they are Sunni or Shi’ia, we did not even think to ask” - a characterization
which stands in marked contrast to the deep religious fissures and persecution of minorities that char-
acterise present-day Iraq.

For those who had supported the Coalition invasion in the hope of securing greater recognition of minori-
ity rights, disappointment at the sectarian programme implemented in its aftermath was manifold. “We
were happy about the invasion because we knew nobody could topple [Saddam] unless the international
community assisted,” explained one Assyrian Christian representative. “But after the liberation, the Iraqi
opposition established a political process on the basis on sectarianism and ethnicity and now everyone
is loyal not to a unified Iraq, but to their narrow affiliation. Those like the Assyrians who have no political
power or militia to protect them are the weakest link in the society. There is nothing we can do.” Another
long-time campaigner from the Iraqi Turkomen Front (ITF) explained how her cause was eclipsed post-in-
vision by that of more influential minority groups vying to compensate for their subjugation under the
Saddam regime. “Turkomen involvement in the Iraqi opposition in London was strong before the war”, she says. “But afterwards, Turkomen did not get the rights or position they should have because the US and UK had no effective post-war plan and gave sectarian control to one of two groups, the Shi‘ia or Kurds, who were more successful in promoting their case around the world.” She explains that a number of current Members of Parliament have recognized and supported ITF’s campaigns, with 22 signing an Early Day Motion in the House of Commons, but expressed frustration at not being able to gain the same prominence or traction as Kurdish groups with greater political and economic resources. “visibility of one group should not mean that their situation is any better,” she says. “We have to remember that 98 per cent of Iraqis suffered under Saddam. We should not lose sight of the fact that we are all Iraqis and the rights of one minority should not come at the expense of another.”

Political corruption

Those from the Kurdish community in Britain characteristically viewed the outcomes of the Coalition removal of Saddam more positively: both in terms of minority rights and the material prospects it brought to Kurdistan. Despite this, many were aware that failures in the seminal phases of planning for regime change resulted in a divided and corrupt legacy that would be difficult to remedy. One former member of the PUK in Britain had supported British participation in the Iraq war and since returned to Kurdistan to take up as seat as an independent member of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). He continued to endorse the liberation of Iraq but was deeply critical of the foreign and sectarian influences that had tarnished Iraqi politics and society since the intervention.

Kurdish interests converged with those of the Coalition,” he explains, “and we had a lot of coordination with other groups before the war, but there was no consensus about how to solve the Iraqi problem or a cohesive approach politics. If we want a common idea of Iraq, we needed each component of Iraqi society to recognise the rights of the other. But this was not encouraged and instead Arabs were told to stick to Arabs, Sunni to Sunni and Kurd to Kurd.

Accordingly, sectarian allegiance and rivalry had bred a corrupt political culture that inhibited economic and democratic development and eroded efforts to create a binding vision of Iraqi government. “Sometimes I define Iraqi politics as the convergence of interests of big blocks with various foreign lobby groups and regional powers backing them. It is the convergence of interests, not people.” the KRG member admitted.

For some expatriate opponents of the war, the involvement of the diaspora and other foreign forces in regime change had produced a post-Saddam Iraq that was hostile to any positive efforts towards development. There was a common sense of pessimism about the immediate prospects of Iraqi society and expatriates’ ability to contribute to it, as was encapsulated by one veteran activist who stated that: “The Coalition set up a system which breeds division and any political group, even if it supports reform, will be incapable of change because of the rife conflict and corruption. This environment is not capable of producing anything positive with regard to basic services, Iraqi people’s needs or something more fundamental.”

After Iraq: Barriers to Positive Contribution

The violent trajectory of politics and everyday life in Iraq since 2003 and more recently, the American troop withdrawal, has generated a distinctly negative appraisal of both the Coalition campaign and the future prospects of the country amongst diaspora members in the United Kingdom. Despite this pessimism, most interviewees expressed ongoing investment in a British-Iraqi identity and a continuing desire to engage with the politics of both countries - whether directly through travel to Iraq or remotely via British institutions and organizations. As one interviewee explained, “Mistakes were committed on all sides and we should look to the future instead of backwards. Participating in political life means taking
part in our own destiny.”

However, the 2003 campaign has heightened awareness amongst Iraqi expatriates about the limitations and potential negative implications of political involvement and there remain a number factors inhibiting expatriate engagement with politics in both the United Kingdom and Iraq. Some of these obstacles relate specifically to expatriates from Iraq, while others confront AME diaspora groups in Britain more generally. The manifold barriers that participants identified as deterring their contribution related to two overarching factors: corruption and insecurity in Iraq, and a lack of inclusion in the plans of the Coalition partners.

**Corruption and insecurity in Iraq**

The physical and political environment in post-war Iraq was seen by many as limiting, or in some cases precluding, participation in civil society and economic redevelopment. A number of interviewees pointed to the recent wave of ‘Arab Spring’ protests in Iraq as evidence of the country’s flawed democracy. One long time trade unionist who returned to Iraq in 2003 to campaign for civil rights suggested that the short-sighted implementation of political structures after the fall of the Ba’athists had led to another repressive system with little scope for democratic activism. “Before the war, we were calling for internal unity, but we were not listened to and preference was given to other opposition figures whose agenda was simply to remove Saddam with little view to the future”, he says. “Now we have a corrupt system which arrests and murders people who are merely calling for reform. This is not a failure of democracy, but of the way it was organised – of planning and consultation.” The shortcomings of Iraqi democracy were emphasized by those who had attempted to participate at levels from party politics to election monitoring and grass-roots activism, but were expressed most powerfully by those engaged in human rights advocacy. One campaigner spoke of her thwarted attempt to establish a support network for victims of torture, which was obstructed by Iraqi officials. “We received direct threats from the Government, even people in the Ministry of Health.”, she says. “They came and intimidated workers with guns and violent threats, and eventually, I was completely devastated to have to give-up the plans.”

Efforts at promoting civil-society in Iraq have been rendered more difficult by the hostile attitudes towards women entailed by the rise of sectarianism and extremism since 2003. Recent reports have documented a rise in violations of women’s rights in Iraq, alongside indicators of prevailing conservative views on the status of women, such as increasing child marriage (HRW, 2011). Faced with corruption, official intimidation and specific gender-based antagonism, a number of female interviewees detailed the sometimes insurmountable challenge of confronting political institutions or social practices in Iraq. One woman expressed a sense of frustration and hopelessness such that she had decided to disengage from politics in the country of her birth after decades of activism. “Politics in Iraq is just a dirty war which is why I am retreating from it.” she says. “It is completely corrupt because of money and power. We have backward people in government. Nobody is thinking about real changes, except for a few who are powerless to do anything. For me, going to Iraq now is like going to a big prison.”

Professional or economic contributions to reconstruction were also described by expatriates as being hampered by institutional corruption. Some interviewees cited instances of friends or relations returning to Iraq to take up individual posts in training or services, especially in the fields of medicine and engineering, with positive outcomes, with many deciding to stay on in the country. However, the large-scale culture of corruption was characteristically seen to have permeated almost all facets of politics and industry, delimiting prospects of diaspora involvement. “In all of Iraq, including Kurdistan, outsiders have not been given the opportunity to contribute.” said one British-Iraqi member of the KRG, “Some expatriates went back, but most have lost out as a result of corruption and nepotism. There is no good business culture and if you make a good proposal to someone, they will say ‘we have our people to do that’. If you are honest in Iraq, you are in trouble, and after a while you realise it’s better to be dirty with them or leave the party.”
Exclusions in Coalition planning

Diaspora participation in civil society building efforts in Iraq were reportedly hindered by Coalition domination of post-war reconstruction programmes. Although British and American organizations have invested significant resources in developing a range of civil society organizations, some expatriate Iraqis felt that the ownership and implementation of projects was dictated by the political agenda of their sponsors, rather than by local or expatriate goals. “They wanted to manipulate the process of development by controlling institutions.” said one exiled writer and academic, “Anyone who wanted to do anything positive needed to cooperate with Coalition forces, who made attempts to control civil society rather than encourage it. Thousands of pounds were handed out to organisations in the name of feeding civil society: youth, women, public awareness and education, provided you talked about anything other than politics, war or occupation.”

Similar views were expressed by a British-Iraqi woman experienced in social and political development following her contact with Coalition democracy-education programmes. Although she had been approached by British political and non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives to recommend suitable trainers for a women’s political education course, she explained that qualified diaspora candidates were ultimately excluded in preference for non-Iraqi foreigners.

The US and UK Department for International Development made lots of campaigns for training on democracy, bringing in big foreign names employed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (sic), as if we Iraqis knew nothing at all. Baghdad was one of the first places in the world to institute democracy and all of a sudden we were being taught what it was by people with no knowledge of Iraq or our society’s problems. To me, it was completely wrong.

Conflicts in representation

The ability of expatriates to represent Iraqis inside Iraq, as well as conflicts within the British-Iraqi diaspora itself, were identified as significant obstructions to realizing positive diaspora contributions, despite a widely-held view of the need for greater, more coordinated involvement. It was commonly suggested that Iraqis who had endured Ba’athist rule, war and sectarian violence often questioned the credibility and authenticity of those now living outside the country. In her study of women’s activism in the Iraqi diaspora, Al-Ali observes a division between local voices and what are perceived foreign, expatriate influences with limited existing connection to Iraq. As she explains, “Many Iraqi women construct their differences with the mainly secular diaspora activists as a contestation between “authentic” culture and values on the one side and the imposition of foreign values and political agendas on the other” (Al-Ali, 2007). This divide appears to have been widened in the aftermath of the 2003 campaign, as foreign backing of sometimes unsuitable or corrupt expatriate political candidates broadly discredited the diaspora as a whole. So too, feelings of resentment or scepticism about those who had escaped the hardships of war and its aftermath had reportedly tarnished local views of expatriates. As one interviewee who has lived in London since the early 1990s explained: “If I am called upon to go back to Iraq, I will. But now there are sensitivities amongst those living in Iraq who say we from the outside did not suffer as they did – and they are right. Many Iraqis feel mistrust or anger at all those who went back just to take up political positions and called upon friends in Britain or US whenever a post opened up.”

Problems of representation and accountability were also apparent within the British-Iraqi diaspora, with questions raised about which facets of the heterogeneous and internally-divided population were authorized to speak on behalf communities. Previous studies by the British government have noted the religious, ethnic and political differences that characterize British-Iraqi communities. Research suggests that fear and mistrust within the community caused by repressive Ba’athist rule has led many Iraqis to disengage from diaspora affairs after their arrival in Britain (DGLC, 2009). Similarly, sectarian and politi-
cal conflict in post-Saddam Iraq had, in the view of some expatriates, created an environment in which issues of leadership and politicization had become taboo, generating a dearth of community leaders or spokespeople in the United Kingdom. Political schisms have been long-standing amongst the British-Iraqi diaspora, but divisions over the Coalition campaign appear to have amplified conflicts and proscribed collaboration of the kind that existed amongst activists in the 1980s and 1990s. As the leader of an established community organization explained: “It is very difficult now, unfortunately, because we are such a divided society, with everyone so strong in his or her views. I think it’s good to hear others’ views and try to overcome and change ideas, but I feel there is no real interest in finding common ground. Everyone is working for their own agendas, and I am exhausted to the point of giving up.”

Accessing British policy

Other community leaders spoke positively about the political learning-curve that has taken place amongst the Iraqi, and more broadly, Muslim diaspora in Britain as a result of the Coalition campaign in Iraq, suggesting that increased levels of unity and political awareness had led to more effective representation mechanisms. However, the receptiveness of British institutions to receive input from diaspora groups with divergent ideological, religious or political values was identified as a major obstacle in expatriate contributions to policymaking. This criticism was made in relation to the Blair Government’s neglect of anti-war diaspora voices, as well as a perceived hostility to Muslim influences in British politics. “Once you are in favour of a particular policy, you like what people who support that policy have to say and so you are not really interested in what the broader diaspora thinks.” said one representative of a Muslim lobbying organization, “The narrative that was created in 2003 that ‘you are either with us or against us’, alienated many Iraqis, especially Muslims.” This view was echoed by diaspora representatives of Muslim organisations from Iraq, as well as Libya and Syria, who suggested that political dialogue or collaboration in the United Kingdom was hindered by mistrust on the part of policymakers. “Britain’s position towards Islam has hardened since 2003.” said one British-Iraqi representative of an Islamist organization, “But the West must stop looking at Muslim communities through the exaggerated lens of the War on Terror. The British government needs to understand that we act on context and not ideology. There needs to be a pro-active relationship on both sides.”

Promoting Positive Contributions

Expatriate perspectives on the United Kingdom’s role in the Coalition campaign in Iraq suggest that the approach adopted by British policymakers in 2003 remains contested by large elements of the diaspora. The British Government’s response to the Arab Spring uprisings over the past year provides evidence of applied learning from its involvement in the Iraq campaign, as was noted by expatriates from Iraq, Libya and Syria. By contrast to the Coalition campaign of militarized, externally-enforced regime change with limited local or diaspora ownership, policymakers have more recently emphasized measured foreign intervention, cooperation rather than cooption and an autonomous, internally-generated process of democratization. Yet, despite this manifest political evolution, many of the perceived failings of the Iraq intervention, as emphasized by diaspora members, remain relevant. Policymakers have continued to engage selectively with local and diaspora opposition figures and, at times, let national interest or foreign-policy allegiances override their commitment to sponsoring democracy. Taking heed from the experience of Iraqi diaspora figures, it is hopeful that some of these approaches may be re-evaluated to obviate the most detrimental outcomes of the 2003 Coalition campaign while assisting the realization of democratic aspirations across the region.
Recommendations

Encouraging diaspora mobility and participation in the United Kingdom

The history of political participation by Iraqi expatriates in the United Kingdom testifies to a high level of awareness and agency in some elements of the diaspora, although government studies and interview findings highlight that engagement with public authorities amongst Iraqi communities in the United Kingdom is limited. Causal factors ranging from experiences of repressive politics in Iraq to mistrust resulting from the United Kingdom’s foreign policy have been aggravated by the perceived failure of public authorities to visit or consult communities on a range of policy matters. The array of autonomous Iraqi community organizations provide direct channels of access for communication and cooperation, which have remained under-utilized by authorities. This medium must be engaged more effectively to promote participation in electoral processes, stimulate dialogue between diaspora members and policymakers and evince a genuine attention to, and value for, community perspectives.

Avoiding partisanship/promoting unity in diaspora relations

The risks inherent in generalizing the views or interests of a fraction of the diaspora, namely those whose goals coincide with those of policymakers, as representative of the community as a whole has been made clear in the instance of Iraq. Political authorities must take a more rigorous approach to recognizing the diversity of political perspectives amongst expatriates and the nuanced contexts in which agendas have evolved. A more even-handed approach to relationships with expatriates, that emphasizes broad consultation and unity or consensus in political programmes, should be a guiding principal in collaboration with diaspora groups.

Recognizing the role of minorities

Religious and ethnic diversity such as that in the Iraqi diaspora can provide policymakers with an asset for understanding local contexts or equally, fuel for sectarian conflict as minority groups contend for restitution, rights or political visibility. The role of the Kurdish diaspora in the 2003 Coalition campaign suggests that groups whose claims are legitimized in the international arena are more likely to cooperate with, and not work against, policymakers, and that foreign governments are able to encourage positive interventions in conflict by giving diaspora leaders a direct stake in the war’s outcome (Natali, 2007). However, policymakers must also make realistic, contextual appraisals of the competing interests of minority groups and the future implications of supporting their agendas.

Emphasizing links between diaspora and country of origin

The disputed credibility of some exiled Iraqi figures supported by the Coalition underscores the need for host countries to prioritise links between expatriates and home countries in order to promote diaspora accountability and prevent perceptions of ‘parachuting in’ amongst local populations. Efforts on the part of policymakers to ensure that diaspora partners retain connections to, and credibility in, their country of origin are likely to minimize the chances of internal conflict and the interplay of ulterior or foreign interests. As one interviewee explained, “When groups are abroad in isolation for long periods they can lose touch with ordinary people, making them more vulnerable to accept foreign influences. You need to be in your own community in order to sing in tune.”

Sponsoring local movements

While expatriates may play an important role in development, the most effective and enduring campaigns for democratization and regime change are likely to be local in origin. This proposition was highlighted by the recurrent comparison made by diaspora figures between the potential inherent in the 1992 uprisings in Iraq and the arguably flawed, Western-led campaign to install democracy in 2003. Expatriate representatives may be pivotal in representing, articulating and gaining support for the de-
mands of local movements under repressive state rule, as has been highlighted by the recent revolution-
ary struggles in Libya and Syria. As one Kurdish Member of Parliament explained, “The good politics in
Iraq is in the street now – it is not in the corridors of parliament or the diaspora. The lessons should be
learnt by the West: the most important thing we can do to defend human rights and freedom of speech
is to listen to those on the streets.”

**Fostering a positive environment for return**

The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime was followed by public pressure from British authorities on Iraqis
in the United Kingdom to return to contribute to the rebuilding of their country. However, the diaspora
unaided does not possess the agency required to realize change in their countries of origin (Smith, 2007).
It is therefore key that foreign intervention, where welcomed, is followed by ongoing efforts to link ex-
patriate groups to local democratic forces and to monitor accountability and security in the post-conflict
or transitional environment. By promoting a freer, safer and more functional local setting in which to
engage in professional and civic-society building activities, countries can help realize the potential of
diaspora communities willing to return to the greatest benefit of home countries.

**Addressing issues in foreign policy**

As has been widely noted by scholars and commentators of the AME, the persistence of direct and
indirect outside support for authoritarianism abroad often betrays the democratic claims and practices
of governments like that of the United Kingdom. That “the West is no beacon of democracy” in the
eyes of many Arabs and expatriates (Sadiki, 2004) was echoed strikingly in interviews and may prove
one of the obstacles most difficult to redress, but most difficult to ignore in long-term efforts towards
collaboration. The recent intervention in Libya has redeemed British approaches to Arab democratization
in the eyes of some from the AME, however, others viewed the failure of British policymakers to
adopt uniform support for the protests, such as those in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Yemen, as further
evidence of hypocrisy in policymaking. The events now taking place in much of the Middle East repres-
ents an opportunity to re-evaluate British approaches to democratization in the region as a whole and
foster a more consistent and independent foreign policy response. The United Kingdom’s unique historic
relationship with, and subsequent expertise on, countries in the AME, cited by many diaspora members
as an asset over other governments, should be utilized towards this end of informed, autonomous and
collaborative policymaking.

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6 The then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, stated in November 2004 that he wished to make repatriation
to Kurdish Northern Iraq compulsory. Describing the region as, “generally overwhelmingly safe”, the Minister
suggested that incentives such as the cessation of benefits and the removal of children may be used to encour-
age return. “[Iraqi asylum seekers] came here on the premise they were threatened with death and torture”, he
explained, “when you are no longer threatened... I think there is a moral obligation to return and assist in the
rebuilding of the country.”
Conclusion

Iraqi expatriate participation around the United Kingdom’s 2003 campaign in Iraq suggests that British policymakers had access to the necessary resources to forge a considered and progressive policy of regime-change in Iraq: both in terms of guidance on the cultural and political context, as well as access to democratic political forces in Iraq. However, in the case of Iraq, the scale of involvement has been more limited than previously supposed, directly or indirectly impacting change in Iraq as well as attitudes amongst the Iraqi diaspora in the United Kingdom. Greater openness to contribution from a range of alternative diaspora views and ideologies will enable political authorities to develop more constructive and enduring relations with expatriates in the future, thereby facilitating the formulation of more effective foreign policy in the region. However, British policymakers must also acknowledge that autonomy and cultural specificity exist at the core of democratic cultures and that models cannot always be imported wholesale from an external context. Arab expatriates who possess a strong knowledge of both local and Western cultures and the fluidity to move between them can prove a most valuable resource in making this translation.
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Chapter Five:

How do political changes in the country of origin affect transnational behaviours of migrants?

The case of Egyptians in Turin during and after the Arab Spring

Viviana Premazzi, Eleonora Castagnone and Pietro Cingolani

Abstract

This paper aims to explore the transnational behaviours of first and second generation Egyptians, with special attention to the relationship among the diaspora, strengthened as a result of the increasing use of new technologies, at a time of political change in Egypt following the events of January 2011.

The analysis in this paper is based on Egyptians residing in Turin, and will focus on two hypotheses; firstly that immigrants of Egyptian origin, as one of the largest and oldest groups settled in the city, show a clear tendency towards stabilization, and secondly, that the recent political developments in Egypt may represent important variables in the redefinition of present and future planning among first and second generation Egyptians.

Egyptians who first arrived in Turin in the 1970s, were members of the well-educated urban, middle class, however, more recent migrants include greater numbers of younger, less educated individuals from rural areas. Among second generation Egyptians, born and raised in Italy, values and meanings are often quite different from those of their parents. The community in Turin is not cohesive, despite several meeting places where first and second generation Egyptians can interact: the most important being the Arabic culture and language school Il Nilo and places of worship.

The ties that immigrants establish and maintain with their homeland are different for first and second generation Egyptians: transnational links are more pronounced amongst first generation Egyptians, although these also tend to weaken over time and with social and occupational integration in Turin. However, the events of January 2011 and the role of new media, notably social networks, have promoted transnational participation, especially among second generation migrants who, until recently, were not interested in their parents’ homeland. In some cases, involvement has developed from online action to engagement in specific activities, such as information dissemination and support in organizing polling procedures for the recent Egyptian political elections.

It is still too early to evaluate the impact of the changes in Egypt on the diaspora, however, it is evident that among many first and second generation Egyptians in Turin, a renewed sense of belonging has evolved.
Introduction

Immigrants from North Africa were among the first to arrive in Italy, and continue to constitute the largest group of migrants. Among them, Egyptians were, and still are, predominant, and, although less numerous than Moroccans and Tunisians, they have registered a higher growth rate over the last few years. Italy is one of the major destinations for Egyptians in Europe, with 110,171 Egyptians in Italy (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), 2011). The Egyptian community in Turin, with 5,051 people, is the third largest by number, following Milan and Rome (INSTAT, 2011). Egyptians are also one of the oldest groups settled in the city: their arrival dates back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is therefore a group which is now well established, with a high percentage of family units, due to a process of gradual consolidation of the community, which has led to the birth of a second generation.

This paper aims to explore the transnational behaviours of first and second generations of Egyptians, with special attention to the relationship among the diaspora, strengthened as a result of increasing use of new technologies, and the current dynamic political situation in Egypt following the events of January 2011.

The importance of social media in the recent popular protests that occurred in many North African countries, especially in Egypt, has clearly highlighted the novelty and importance of web-based technologies, which have burst onto the social and political scene. More generally, information and communication technologies (ICT) are deeply transforming the attitudes and transnational relationships of migrant communities. The use of ICT by diasporas for the creation and maintenance of transnational ties and as a mean of political participation in countries of origin and destination is an area of growing interest, although it is currently little developed.

The analysis in this paper is based on Egyptians residing in Turin, and will focus on two hypotheses; firstly that immigrants of Egyptian origin, as one of the largest and oldest groups settled in the city, show a clear tendency towards stabilization, and secondly, that the recent political developments in Egypt may represent important variables in the redefinition of present and future planning among first and second generation Egyptians. Further, the interconnectedness of local settlement, transnational political participation and return will be explored, comparing the perspectives of first and second generation Egyptians.

An overview of the Egyptian population in Italy, and specifically in Turin, will be provided, including sociodemographic features and characteristics of the socio-economic integration of Egyptians. The main features of the Egyptian community will be described, focusing on the sense of belonging and how this differs between first and second generations.

The role of new technologies in establishing links with Egypt and the use of social networks for political participation, with special attention to the second generation, will be explored. Efforts are made to understand how political changes in Egypt were perceived by and impacted Egyptians in Turin. Within the conclusions, some policy recommendations for the strengthening of social and cultural ties as well as strategies for a worthwhile use of the media are proposed.

This paper is based on 16 qualitative interviews with Egyptian migrants living in Turin. Sampling was carried out according to gender, age, place of birth and year of arrival in Italy. Accordingly the interviews were grouped as follows: old pioneers, men who arrived in Italy more than 20 years ago; first-generation, women who arrived for marriages or to rejoin husbands; new pioneers, men who recently arrived alone and second-generation, defined here as youths over 18 years old, born in Italy from Egyptian parents or who arrived in Italy as infants. A more detailed description of the sample is provided in the Annex. Interviews were conducted in Italian and lasted an average of 60 minutes. Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured outline that included various aspects of life: arrival, sense of community, intergenerational relationships, transnational ties with Egypt and new media use.

1 Here, the term “second generation” includes children of Egyptian immigrants, born in Italy or abroad but who have come to Italy before they were 13 years old (Ambrosini 2008).
The following aggregation centres for Egyptian immigrants were referred to for meeting the interviewed persons: Il Nilo, an Arabic culture and language school; Giovani Musulmani d'Italia (Young Muslims of Italy association); and ASAI (Associazione Animazione Interculturale) an association for intercultural activities. A few people were reached through other local networks in order to diversify the sample.

In addition to these information sources, this paper benefits from some of the initial results of a broader project entitled “Transmediterraneans. North African Communities in Piedmont, between continuity and change” that the Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull’Immigrazione (FIERI) is conducting with the support of the Compagnia di San Paolo foundation. The Transmediterraneans project, which began in September 2011, focuses on a systematic comparison of social and economic behaviours of the first and second generations of two North African groups settled in Turin since the 1980s: Egyptians and Moroccans.

**Egyptian migration to Italy**

Over the recent decades, two main destination areas have emerged for Egyptian migrants: Arab Gulf countries including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Jordan and more recently Lebanon and, since the early 1960s, the industrialized countries of the West, notably Australia, Canada, the United States, and European countries, among which mainly Italy, France and the United Kingdom (Zohry, 2010).

According to the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) data in 2001, 78.6 per cent of Egyptians residing in non-Arab countries were concentrated within five industrialized countries: the United States (318,000 - 38.6%), Canada (110,000 - 13.3%), Italy (90,000 - 10.9%), Australia (70,000 - 8.5%) and Greece (60,000 - 7.3%). The remaining Egyptian migrants were mainly in European countries including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Spain.

Italy became a destination for Egyptians in the 1970s. The first migrants from Egypt, so-called “pioneers”, were predominantly male, highly educated and middle-class individuals, originating from urban areas (notably Cairo and Alexandria), who left Egypt as a consequence of the high rate of unemployment. They sought new employment or study opportunities as well as new cultural experiences. While migrants seeking study abroad headed primarily to Rome, many did not conclude their studies and joined the labour market. Often Italy was not the first destination, but a step in a longer and more complex migration path.

Over time the composition of the Egyptians arriving in Italy has changed. From the mid-1980s the economic crisis in Egypt strained Egyptian families, driving new groups of men from rural areas with low levels of education to look for work abroad. The numbers of Egyptian migrants from these rural villages are increasing and rural youth compete to find a way to migrate to Italy, through regular or irregular channels. The choice of destination country in Europe is not a free choice; it is closely related to the existing migration networks and linkages between origin and destination. It is notable that among certain Egyptian villages in specific governorates, each village has its own destination; the two major destinations being Italy and France. Migration to these two destinations are operated, as Zohry states “in a close market where new entrants come from the same village or group of adjacent villages”. (2006, p.19)

Egyptian migration consolidated during the 1990s, as a result of networks of family members and acquaintances that attracted new compatriots and acted as a base during the settlement phase and in the search for a first job. Many of these migrants did not have economic obligations towards their families, being primarily interested in accumulating savings in order to return home after few years. However, during their stay, they changed their migratory plans as a result of the improvement of their economic and social conditions in Italy, and they opted for a long-term stay (CeSPI 2005a). Therefore the migration changed from temporary to permanent.
Although Egyptians are not among the most numerous migrants in Italy, representing just over three per cent of immigrants and ranking ninth in terms of the total number of immigrants in Italy, the evolution of this group has been steady, with a rapid acceleration in the last decade.

Table 1: First ten countries of origin of non-European Union citizens in Italy in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>% of total non-EU citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Morocco</td>
<td>501,610</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Albania</td>
<td>483,219</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 China</td>
<td>274,417</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Ukraine</td>
<td>218,099</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Moldova</td>
<td>142,583</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 India</td>
<td>142,565</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Philippines</td>
<td>136,597</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Tunisia</td>
<td>116,651</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Egypt</td>
<td>110,171</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Bangladesh</td>
<td>103,285</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,536,062</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISTAT

As the data show, the number of Egyptians in Italy has grown from over 33,000 individuals at the beginning of the 2000s to over 110,000 at the beginning of 2011, an increase of 226.9 per cent over the last nine years.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>33,701</td>
<td>65,667</td>
<td>71,117</td>
<td>82,843</td>
<td>90,365</td>
<td>110,171</td>
<td>226.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISTAT

Over the years, the number of women has also increased, largely due to family reunification (in 94% of cases, as shown in next graph) and the creation of families, resulting in an increasing number of births in Europe.

In this sample, the majority of the interviewees or interviewees’ fathers returned to Egypt to get married, subsequently bringing their wives to Italy. The first generation’s cultural space thus continues to be Egypt and their individual lives continue to be dictated by family ties and reproduction cycles, especially with regard to marriage choices (CeSPI 2005a).
With the establishment of families, there exists a second generation of young people who were born (or who arrived in their early years), raised and socialized in Italy. The population structure by age shows a substantial proportion of children (29%). According to data from the Ministry Education University and Research (MIUR), Egyptians enrolled in the school system during the academic year 2008–2009 included 2,732 in kindergarten, 3,915 in primary schools, 1,696 in secondary schools, 1,037 in high schools. (Dossier Caritas, 2011)

Figure 2: Distribution of the Egyptian population in Italy by age-group in 2011

Source: ISTAT
As such, the majority of Egyptians are of working age, between 25 and 45 years old (50%). According to ISTAT (2011) Egyptians are concentrated in the northwest (77.5%) and in the centre of the country (15.1%).

Figure 3: Distribution of Egyptian residents in Italy by area of the country in 2011

![Distribution of Egyptian residents in Italy by area of the country in 2011](source: ISTAT)

Table 3: First ten provinces of residence of Egyptians in Italy (%) - 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% women</th>
<th>% of total Egyptian residents in Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Milan</td>
<td>51,023</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Rome</td>
<td>12,636</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Brescia</td>
<td>7,833</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Turin</td>
<td>5,051</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Pavia</td>
<td>4,273</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Bergamo</td>
<td>3,668</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Lodi</td>
<td>3,342</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Cremona</td>
<td>2,913</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Florence</td>
<td>2,287</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Reggio Emilia</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: ISTAT)

Notable is the high concentration of Egyptians in the Lombardy region, primarily in the province of Milan (46.3%), and in the provinces of Brescia (7.1%), Pavia (3.9%), Bergamo (3.3%), Lodi (3.0%) and Cremona (2.6%). Egyptians are also highly concentrated in Rome (11.5%), the province with the second highest concentration of this group. With the fourth highest Egyptian population density is Turin, where 4.6 per cent of Egyptians in Italy reside.

Regarding economic integration, Egyptians are primarily engaged in the construction and the food service industries.
Table 4: Egyptian dependent workers in Italy by economic sector at 2001 census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC SECTORS</th>
<th>DEPENDENT WORKERS</th>
<th>% on total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absolute values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and fisheries</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>4,951</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>among which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>2,556</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>4,467</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>among which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>3,024</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sectors</td>
<td>3,003</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>among which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and warehousing</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic work in private households</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,971</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Istat in Cortese, 2010

For some workers with a high level of education\(^2\), the switch to self-employment represents an alternative route to blocked socio-professional mobility in the dependent labor market. Many have acquired through their employment the human resources (acquisition of skills and expertise) and social capital (building of networks and functional relationships) necessary for opening autonomous activities in particular in the construction and food service industries and commerce sectors. In addition, a number of Egyptians already have either direct business experience or previous experience within their families in Egypt, and can thus count on skills as well as economic resources from Egypt, beneficial for starting up a new business in Italy.

Regarding economic transnationalism, the experience of bankruptcy of many small and medium investors due to poor infrastructure, poor or lack of proper market research identifying the current Egyptian market needs/demands and trends, lack of information on investment opportunities and overall weak transparency and accountability in the Egyptian structure (Zohry 2010) seems to have created a strong distrust with respect to investment opportunities offered by Egypt. These conditions have slowed, until now, any kind of investment and financial and economic planning by interviewees. However there were some attempts to return in order to develop entrepreneurial projects. Two interviewees were successful in their investment endeavours, but are considered exceptions by the respondents. The majority failed, forcing the migrants to return to Italy (Ricucci 2010): “Here there are just a few people who came back to Egypt, very few. Those who did something there, it is because they have a lot of money, like Amin who has a transport company in Egypt. But that is an exception.” (Saleh)

**Egyptian transnationalism**

1- Return - between myth and reality

Generally, first generation migrants’ links with the extended family in Egypt remains strong. While they are economically and socially integrated, they continue to be strongly linked to their country of origin in

\(^2\) According to ISTAT in 2008 almost 30 per cent of Egyptians in Italy were University graduates.
cultural and social terms. With regard to the idea of returning, temporarily or permanently, however, a general ambivalence was noted among interviewees: many seemed to cultivate a myth of return, perhaps when retired or once children have reached a certain economic stability (Ricucci 2010); while for others, the birth of children is the factor that makes any idea of returning unlikely. But family issues are not the only ones that influence this decision. There are also associated considerations and decisions related to the constraints and opportunities that could arise in the two contexts of origin and destination. Viewed through the transnational lens, return migration is part of a system of ties and forms of mobility, which can be seen as a continuing circuit rather than a definitive act of resettlement (Cassarino 2004). The dichotomy permanent-temporary is beginning to be questioned by some scholars: Ronald Skeldon (2008) noted, for example, that “you never know if a migrant is permanent, not even when he’s dead, as many migrants want to get buried in their origin country!”. One interviewee noted, “My family lives there and, who knows, when I retire.... That is my country, my roots, even though I have Italian citizenship.” (Saleh). According to another, “My parents are in touch with their families. They are very attached, indeed even more so recently. They always think about going back, but it gets difficult since they are here and have a family here.... But contacts with their relatives an increasing more and more because they feel the need to go back to their country.” (Amro)

In interviews were also cases where the respondents’ moved back and forth for a year or a few years. According to one respondent, “I was born in Turin, then when I was four we came back to Egypt and we meant to remain there, but after four years, when I was eight, we came back.... In the four years we stayed there my father was a civil engineer and founded a construction company, but we didn’t make it and closed it.” (Dalia)

The interviews have shown another interesting phenomenon that should be investigated more thoroughly: some attempts to return are made by second generation migrants, often supported by their parents. A few, having started business activities in Egypt, have an opportunity to offer their children a future on both sides of the Mediterranean. One interviewee, Bahaa, shared the following,

» My elder son was born on August 1989, now he is 22. He is currently in Egypt, studying, and he will come back here at the end of January. After high school, in Turin, he attended an IT training course funded by the Piedmont Region, but he couldn’t enrol at the university. So he came back to Cairo where he is now attending his third year at the faculty of Information Technology. He comes here to Turin every summer to help me. When he finishes the university there he will come back here and have his degree recognised. I have another son and a daughter, the youngest. They will decide what to do, if they want they have a future here. They have a future at Cairo as well, because I have a business partner there with an import–export transportation company. They have a chance both here and in Egypt, it is up to them to decide what they want to do.

As Russel King and Anastasia Christou (2008) state “they are not ‘return migrants’ in the strict sense, but first-time emigrants to their parents’ country of origin”. Among Egyptians in Turin, the specific phenomenon of second-generation ‘return’ does seem to be gaining in significance.

2- The second generation as a transnationalism test

Second generation ties with Egypt are, in most cases, very different from those of their parents and almost none of those interviewed intended to return to live permanently in Egypt. It seems that ethnic ties and the intensity of border-crossing are reduced in through the generations. However, recently Ambrosini (2008) invited consideration of the second generation as a “transnationalism test”. Studies from as far afield as Boston, Massachusetts and Senegal (Leichtman 2005; Levitt 2001; 2002), found that immigrant transnationalism is not a phenomenon confined to the first generation, but one that can extend to the second and subsequent generations. Moreover, a rapid and successful integration/assimilation does not preclude the second generation from engaging in a range of transnational/diasporic activities linking them back to their ‘home’ country (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). According to Queirolo Palmas (2010), the second generation can live “transnational lives” (Smith 2005) and discover new identities and forms of belonging, and also launch independent attempts to return. As one interviewee experienced, “I
attended junior high school in Chieri and high school for one year. Then I wanted to come back to Egypt again, because high school there lasts three years and university is one year less. I wanted to try and I lived there for one year. But I couldn’t adapt to it and I came back to Italy.” (Amro)

Hopes and good intentions, however, are often disappointed because these returnees are plunged into a school system with which, in many cases, they are unfamiliar, which is unprepared for them and in which their educational progress may be slowed (King 1977; King and Christou 2008). However, the inability to adapt to their community of origin and failure to adhere to the values of identity and community (Ricucci 2010), may result in a realization of how ‘Italian’ the second generation are, and convince them that their parents’ home country can never become their home (Kasinitz et al. 2002; Kibria 2002). One interviewee noted, “Recently I feel a bit more Italian and I am growing away from my relatives. I hope this isn’t so strong (the detachment), because they are still my parents anyway.” (Amro). Another said, “I came to Italy to stay here forever; I will go to Egypt on holiday at the most. What do I care about the Egyptian government? My dream is to stay in Italy.… I would just like to have a regular work contract in Italy. And buy a house here, stay here.” (Abdelrahman).

However, in Italy many second generation immigrants feel torn. On one hand the young people who have grown up in Italy know very little of their parents’ country of origin, which is, in many cases, just the country where they go on holiday. Interviewee Shrin described her experience of visits to Egypt, “First, I’ll go to Cairo to see everybody. I have a small house there overlooking the sea and we go there on holiday. My son’s friends came with us once. It was a group of Italians and Egyptians on holiday.” Abdelrahman described his visit, “When I went there I visited the Pyramids; I went to Sharm El Sheik; I had a wonderful time with my friends!” On the other hand, they sometimes return to their roots out of an “exotic curiosity”, particularly in the light of current political change. Interviewee Shrin explained the situation of her children, “My children follow what happens in Egypt because their teachers always ask them about what happens there.”

Further, among the second generation immigrants interviewed, the discrimination of which they are often victim in Italy, the solicitations of classmates and above all, in the last year, the curiosity and attention towards their country of origin are all factors that have stimulated new reflections on their personal identity and have brought them to involve themselves in the development of online and offline social and political spaces where they can play their hyphenated senses of belonging (Andall 2002).

**The Egyptian community in Turin**

1- Division between groups within the community – so-called “non-community”

Based on available evidence, the Egyptian community in Turin seems quite fragmented, confirming results of previous research (Ambrosini and Abbatecola 2002) which defined it a “non-community” because of the limited cohesion among migrants. After September 11, 2001, and as a reaction to perceived Islamophobia, many Egyptians in the Western countries also started to sacrifice their Egyptian identity for broader and supranational identities such as being an Arab and a Muslim (Zohry 2010). The stated solidarity of interview respondents often depended on the place of origin: rural or urban, as Saleh states,

“» In Turin there is no solidarity among us, because there are only about 20 of us who come from Cairo, others come from Suez, but the majority come from the countryside, not from the city. From Afghor, a village near the city of Kalubia, or from Saleh, near Mitom. I can easily recognise those who come from the countryside by their face... Those who come from little towns are close to each other, they see each other frequently.

Egyptian migrants themselves say they are individualistic, family-focused and not prone to engage in community activities. During the early stages of migration in Italy, this was also evident among other migrant communities (CNEL 2000), but for the Egyptian community) this has continued into the settlement phase. The same interviewees highlighted the existence of this condition, which favours forms of social
relationships based on family allegiance, both in Italy and in Egypt.

In Turin there are no important labor or trade unions, hometown associations nor any other organization networks to strengthen links with the villages and cities of origin. The existing associations are weak, with little representation, disconnected at the national level and dependent on the character of the association’s president. Egyptian associations are interested principally in sustaining the local integration of migrants and the preservation of Arabic culture and language as demonstrated in Turin by the engagement of the Egyptian school, Il Nilo, which is considered one of the few important meeting places of the Egyptian community. Iman also confirms the importance of the school in her experience, as a source of social cohesion based on family, “The community depends on the family; this is the case for mine, as we have attended the Egyptian school and have many family friends there. They have also created an association which is called ‘Egyptian families’”. The school has in fact become a meeting place and a bridge between the first and second generations: first generation migrants are involved as teachers while the second generation learn their parents’ language and culture and maintain important ties with their community.

In addition to Arabic language and culture schools, other key meeting places include places of worship. Allasino and Ricucci (2004) showed how religion occupies a prominent place in the lives of Muslims living in Turin, who identify themselves with the faith in which they were educated, considering it a point of reference for their lifestyle. However, there was little consistency among interviewees who presented different styles of living: some are believers and practitioners, while others are believers, but in a discontinued manner and still others live religion in a more intimate way or are indifferent.

For some, the place of worship is a place to meet the whole Muslim community, a place of appropriation of identity, for themselves and their children, especially during traditional religious festivals such as Ramadan or the ceremony for the Sacrifice of the Ram. These are important occasions were young people, together with their families, meet with relatives who live in Italy and the entire Muslim community; here they feel a sense of belonging to a common faith and a common culture. The place of worship is not only a place for prayer, but also an important center for information, such as the circulation of instructions on the polling procedures for the recent Egyptian elections- One interviewee explained, “My father is one of the people responsible for the mosque and he has managed to arrange some events in order to explain to people how to vote.” (Asab)

Christian Egyptians in Turin meet in the Coptic Church based in the Orthodox Coptic Parish of Holy Mary. Many visit the church every Sunday to attend Mass and there they communicate with other Egyptians, speak Arabic and eat Egyptian food. During the week, catechism lessons and other activities are organized.

2- Online spaces— the impact of the Internet on the community

There are a growing number of virtual Egyptian organizations, some of which are more active than physical organizations. The wide accessibility of the Internet has made it possible for Egyptians to communicate and create virtual organizations regardless of their current place of residence. Virtual groups utilize the Internet and other communication technologies to keep in touch with members. Many Egyptian diaspora established groups with Yahoo, MSN and Facebook. As the Study on the Dynamics of the Egyptian Diaspora: Strengthening Development Linkages (Zohry 2010) shows, there are more than 200 Facebook groups created by Egyptians abroad. The number of members in each of these groups varies according to location. Members of such virtual organizations are usually young, aged between 18 and 39 years old, and computer literate. During the interview with Rania, creator and administrator of the Facebook group “Egyptians in Turin”, she explained how this idea came to her,

> The thing that encouraged me to become the leader of a group was an Egyptian TV programme called Wesal which acted as a link between Egypt and all the Egyptians abroad. The anchorwoman, Abir Said Abo Taleb, is very good because she travels around countries and interviews Egyptian people to know how long they have been living there, then she interviews the second genera-
tion,… and then this programme decided to arrange winter or summer tours for Egyptian guys from 15 to 30 who live abroad, to allow them to discover Egypt because the majority of them do not know its history, historical and religious monuments…. And when I watched this programme showing guys who were all happy and enthusiastic, I was a bit jealous and I said “lucky them, lucky them!”

For Rania, Egypt is a country that she has seen above all through her parents’ stories, “I have information about Egypt only from my father and my mother. We go there on holiday every two to three years but from ages 5 to 11 years we were never there. And when I went there, at 11, it was a surprise.”

Following the example of other young people of Egyptian origin living outside of Egypt and given the opportunities provided by the social networks (as mentioned, Zohry 2010), she decided to set up on Facebook the group “Egyptians in Turin”. Facebook for her is an important tool for creating a sense of belonging for Egyptians living in Turin, but also to maintain contact with relatives or friends in Egypt. She continues,

I think Facebook is very important because it is a communication network which is essential not much for friends who see each other frequently, but especially for my cousins who live in Egypt… it is easier to communicate with relatives in Egypt. You feel closer making comments on Facebook statuses, and thanks to the pages on Egypt, on its news, politics, sports, films, Egyptian society, or thanks to other news in general, you understand what is happening between you and the world...

The interactive and participatory Internet makes aggregation and definition of new identities easier, and leads to the emergence of new social and political actors. Furthermore, such online communities can be effectively translated into forms of off-line political mobilization. Meeting offline, organizing trips for group members, inviting group members to convene in public places and organizing Egyptian dinner parties and lectures was Rania’s objective when she created the group.

The group allows members to communicate about Egyptian news, rumors, commercials and jokes, and to organize activities to promote Egyptian culture and national solidarity, to share experiences and emotions, to exchange advice and opinions, and to present proposals and claims lobbying for the current political issues and debates in Egypt. New forms of civic participation via the social network seem to meet the needs of contemporary individuals to connect individualism and collectivism, to affirm their own subjective identity, and to pursue their personal interests, but at the same time, the need to share feelings and a sense of solidarity with a group, thus creating a community dimension.

How the Media has linked the Egyptian community in Turin to events and participation in Egypt

In the current climate, the role of mass media (conceived as technologies as well as content), is becoming more and more instrumental in defining the formative experiences of a generation, not only because they are so deeply embedded in everyday practices as to become a “natural” element of its social landscape, but also because historical events, as well as cultural values and their symbolic forms, are often mediated by them. This is what has happened, for example, with the revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests which occurred in Egypt and elsewhere and became known as the “Arab Spring”3.

Among Egyptians in Italy, four types of media were used to keep in contact with happenings in Egypt. These media flow across and between local, national and international boundaries: Egyptian online newspapers, Egyptian TV channels broadcasted by satellite or Internet and online social networks. The Egyptian protests brought to the fore the inextricable connection between networked media (such as Facebook and Twitter) and mass and interpersonal media (such as radio, newspapers and mobile

3 “Arab Spring” refers to the democratic uprisings that arose in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread across the Arab world (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain…) in 2011.
phones) (Chatora 2012). Here, the focus will remain on the use of the social network Facebook.

It is evident that social media tools have become a norm in the everyday lives of many people, included migrants, merging their online and offline experiences, and becoming one of the primary methods of social connection and interaction around the world. The Internet facilitates contacts with diaspora groups that often “act as bridges or as mediators between their home and host societies” (Shain and Barth 2003). One interviewee explained, “The first time I surfed the Internet was to know about life in Egypt, to watch the Egyptian news... Now I use it to get informed, to know, to talk and get in touch both with Italian and Egyptian people.” (Sherin)

The contacts between Egypt and diaspora groups allow them to share values like pluralism and democracy, called “social remittances” by Levitt (1998): ideas, behaviours and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country communities. The transfer of social remittances is made easier by the development of new technologies, as Rania states, “Egyptians and Tunisians who live abroad have been educated for democracy, they know they can talk and you can talk about freedom, justice ... and through social networks they share ideas and experiences with their peers who live in Egypt.”

Given the widespread use of Facebook among young, second generation migrants, these young people are more and more like their native counterparts, “prosumers” (Tapscott and Williams 2006)—active producers/consumers of digital content—and “netizens” (Brettel 2008)—digital citizens, who find in the web a public space, a citizenship place (Mazzoli 2009). In particular, on the debate over the importance of online services in relation to the mobilization during the Arab Spring, it is interesting to focus on their use. During the revolution what and with whom did Egyptian bloggers, and Facebook and Twitter users communicate? And what happened after that?

During revolution in January 2011, communication was two-pronged: the Internet was used for the practical organization of protests and to keep in touch with the diaspora, without censorship imposed by regimes. Among Egyptians living in Egypt and the diaspora, new forms of collaboration as well as sharing of new political ideas, values and norms were realized, allowing diaspora communities to get involved in social- political processes back home (Chatora 2012).

Interview respondents were very active in their use of Facebook during the revolution, and over the following months they stayed in touch with those who were in Egypt, sharing information and making comments about political news with relatives and friends, but also updating the pages of the official Egyptian and Italian groups with news, videos and posts. One interviewee explained, “We talk about politics, I write something on Facebook. There is a page called Egyptians in Turin and I always write there what’s happening in Egypt, in order to report here what is happening there.” (Alima). Another said, “I use Facebook, Twitter and the press as sources of information and to keep in touch with the guys who live there and tell me about politics.” (Sanah)

This global data and information exchange can influence the formation of public opinion. As people across the Mediterranean demonstrated during the revolution, and continue to demonstrate today, the Internet can increasingly be a place of citizenship, where people can put up their own identity and their own profile and interact with other people as if they were in a “modern agorà” (Mazzoli 2009).

**Political change in Egypt: how it is perceived and how it has impacted the Egyptian community in Turin**

1- First generation

First generation migrants have perceived some differences between themselves and the second generation in relationships and empathy with respect to the January 2011 revolution in Egypt, as respondent
Bahaa notes:

» Not all the young born here are interested in what has happened in Egypt. My generation has followed the events more closely because we suffered when we were young. Those born here didn’t feel the lack of democracy and freedom. They don’t care. It isn’t the same as for young people who stay there, that have experienced the dictatorship. Those born here, they go to Egypt only for holiday, for having fun, for going on the beach, for visiting relatives. Those more involved were young people in Egypt and we, migrants of my generation, abroad. We want to see, to participate in this change. I have always followed politics.

During the revolution, a sharing of a combination of enthusiasm and frustration, pride and guilt, was evident among first generation immigrants. Migrants are often likely to feel a “genuine sympathy” for their relatives who remain in conflict-ridden areas (Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009). Migrants may also feel guilty at the thought of being safe while their relatives are suffering (Byman et al. 2001). Such feelings may motivate first generation diaspora to engage in “virtual conflicts” or even participate in or mobilize forces for the “real conflict” (Demmers 2002), as happened with Bahaa,

» All of us went from Turin to Egypt, my family, then there in that square we met other Egyptians from Turin... Egyptians in Turin followed the events a lot. It was really important. We had to help, give a hand, feel side to side. In the last 10 years things got worse and from here we see them better. It is like your son. If you are side by side daily you can’t see he is growing, but if you see him once a year you realize immediately that he has grown.

First generation migrants’ commitment was not limited to physical or emotional participation during the revolution. They also saw concrete opportunities for action for their country, and some plan to engage in specific activities, such as information dissemination and support in organizing polling procedures. Bahaa continues, “In Egypt in January everything changed. We have to be more linked with our country because now it needs us. Before we didn’t have freedom and we weren’t able to do much. Now we can do more for helping the elections, following the polling procedures.”

2- Second generation

Despite the opinion of first generation migrants, according to second generation migrants, the Egyptian revolution has also caused a rediscovery of their pride in being Egyptian and made some reconsider the migratory networks and ties with their parents’ country of origin as a resource. The parents have often sacrificed family ties to a more generalized emotional link to the ‘homeland’. But on special circumstances, such as the revolution, new ties were created, or old ties rediscovered and reactivated, by both first and second generation migrants, partly as a result of the use of new technologies which provided the opportunity to be always connected with what was happening both at home and abroad.

» What has happened is tragic and beautiful, even for we who are here. We wrote on our wall or on the movements’ walls “Go on!” But sometimes those who directly participated in the protests, those who really took to the streets, discouraged us saying “Well, thank you very much, but you’re not here.” But it was my way of showing support and adherence to the cause. So during those weeks I felt even more frustrated because it was they who took to the streets and I could only follow things from a distance and write my support. I wanted to be there, they were momentous changes, and even now I want to be there because during these days Al Tahrir Square is a laboratory of ideas. (Rania Ibrahim, journalist for the Magazine Yalla Italia)

Similarly, on the wall of the Facebook group Egyptians in Turin, Rania explains, “The group was really useful during the revolution, because we posted everything there: patriotic songs, songs for the country, songs for the young men and women who died in the square, songs that make us cry, make us dream to be in Egypt, we posted news and everybody did it.”

The combined dynamic of the rediscovery of their roots, the birth of a new pride in being Egyptian and being masters of their destiny able to overcome dictators and to create real democracies, is changing
space/time links and could transform the concept of the parents’ country of origin from not only the past, but also a new future in which they can be involved not only as an audience but as participant actors. Rania continues,

> I thank my mother who gave me this love for the country. And this love has increased after the revolution, because before I didn’t know anything about Egypt, nothing about politics: I only knew the name of the President, but I didn’t know how was the country, how they lived there. When my dad watched the news on the TV I ran in my room. Now I watch the news everyday to see what is happening there. I follow pages that I never imaged, I know all the parties, the parliament, the ministries; even my mum is surprised and says “you look really interested”. It is strange for me to be so interested in Egypt. With what is happening I might be there; during the revolution I cried when I saw the people in Tahrir Square and I could have been one of them but I was and I still am here.

Asab goes on, “After the revolution I would like to see the new Egypt. Perhaps you are more proud to be Egyptian than before because around you people are more proud. You are more curious and more proud, yes.”

Further study is necessary to understand how many of these processes and ideas are born and die online, activating only an affective/emotional dimension, and how many have effects in offline realities of the countries of origin and in Italy.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, the main characteristics of Egyptian immigrant community in Turin are described. The paper also illustrates the impact on their lives of the recent political changes in their country of origin and describes old and new transnational practices, activated by first and second generation migrants and facilitated by the use of new media.

Egyptian immigrants who first arrived in Turin in the 1970s, were members of urban and middle class groups with high levels of education. During more recent years, the composition of the Egyptian migrant community has been changing with the arrival of younger, less educated individuals originating from rural areas. Further, the presence of a second generation has introduced elements of diversification because values and meanings systems of persons born in Italy are quite often different from those of their Egyptian-born parents. The community in Turin is not cohesive, is characterized by a plurality of individuals and of small groups mainly interlinked by family relationships. Key meeting places where first and second generation Egyptians can interact include the Arabic culture and language school, Il Nilo, and a few places of worship.

The ties that immigrants establish and maintain with their homeland are different for first and second generation migrants: transnational bonds are more pronounced among first-generation migrants, although these linkages tend to weaken over time and with social and occupational integration in Turin. Attempts to return to Egypt have been made with transnational business initiatives, but only few have been successful. Although there have been some independent attempts to return to Egypt by second generation Egyptians, generally ties with Egypt among second generation Egyptians who have been raised in Turin are weaker. During the January 2011 revolution in Egypt, the instant and widely available access to new media, notably social networks, played an important role in promoting forms of transnational participation, especially among second generation migrants, many of whom had shown little previous interest in their parents’ homeland. Such is the case, for example, of the Facebook group “Egyptians in Turin” described in this paper where information and opinion was widely shared among Egyptians, both in Turin and in Egypt. Young Egyptians living in Turin were able to, and were interested in, following what their peers where doing during the revolution and became increasingly involved and supportive through the medium of the Internet. Since January 2011, for some migrants involvement has changed from online action to engagement in specific initiatives, such as dissemination of information.
and support in organizing the polling procedures for the recent Egyptian political elections.

It is too early to evaluate the impact of the changes in Egypt on the diaspora because the political situation is still evolving. However, it is evident that recent changes in Egyptian politics have awakened what was a waning sense of belonging among both first and second generation migrants, with some young migrants discovering a new sense of pride in being Egyptian. Indeed, a few Egyptians have returned to Egypt to participate in the protest movements and to be closer to their families; however, most remain sceptical about the possibilities of return to Egypt and the potential to develop businesses back home. How these sentiments and initiatives will evolve will depend on both the diaspora’s commitment to Egypt as well as institutional initiatives promoted by the Egyptian government to involve Egyptians abroad.

Policy recommendations

These research findings allow for some tentative policy recommendations that may be useful to strengthen transnational bonds and to promote the Egyptian diaspora’s contribution to political and social process in Egypt.

1- Sustain remittances through co-financing measures

First generation immigrants have the knowledge and professional experience as well as the economic resources that can be invested in Egypt. Some migrants are interested in directing individual and collective remittances toward social development initiatives, such as education, healthcare, sanitation and small irrigation systems, in their villages and cities of origin. One incentive to promote the investment of individual and collective remittances may be through co-financing measures with Italian cooperation and/or Egyptian local and state authorities. The organization of these pilot projects may be promoted and supported by local NGOs in the villages of origin and by Italian NGOs working with migrants.

2- Promote educational and cultural activities at local level

A second important policy recommendation refers to educational and cultural exchanges. In Italy, selected schools could organize study and discussion on current developments in Arab countries, in this case Egypt, by engaging with the Arabic culture and language teachers now working in the cultural centre Il Nilo. In Egypt, selected schools could promote information meetings on migration and the potential social and cultural contributions migrants can make to Egypt. These meetings may involve the participation of first generation migrants and could utilise new technologies, for example video conferencing and screening of video-documentaries made in Italy.

3- Promote exchanges among young second generation migrants

A further pilot initiative could be the organization of exchanges among second generation migrants and their peers living in Egypt, similar to the activity coordinated by the journalist Abir Said Abo Taleb. Such exchanges would be promoted in Italy as well as in Egypt. Groups and bonds established on the Internet could be strengthened by direct contact and personal exchange.

4- Create an Internet portal for circulation of human resources

Another activity is the creation of an Internet portal where human and cultural resources and capital can be interlinked across the Mediterranean. There is currently a lack of tools dedicated to this geographical area, with the only attempt being the creation of the website of the Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS) project, financed by the Italian government and implemented by the Emigration Sector of the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration with the International Organization for Migration. The website aimed to connect job seekers to employers abroad through a database and an information portal for
Egyptian migrants abroad. However, of the 170,000 applications, only 178 individuals were selected to work in Italy. Such a system could be enhanced based on the model of the professional networking website, LinkedIn. The purpose of this website is to allow registered users to maintain a list of contact details of those with whom they have some level of relationship, or to find other people potentially interested in their skills. On this Internet portal, migrants living Italy, for example, could offer their job expertise to companies based in Egypt, and skilled individuals in Egypt could offer their skills to companies based in Italy.

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Annex

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List and profile of interviewees
Chapter Six:

The Tunisian State and the Tunisian abroad

Thibaut Jaulin

Abstract

The Tunisian case is of particular interest when considering Arab expatriates’ potential to contribute positively to economic development and political change in their homelands, because the Tunisian State has developed an active migration policy since the 1960s, and because Tunisians abroad played an active role during the Tunisian Revolution in January 2011 and participated in the election of the Constituent Assembly on 23 October, 2011.

This paper does not intend to discuss the arguments for and against the impacts of migration on the countries of origin, but rather consists of a synthetic and critical analysis of out-migration patterns and policies in Tunisia. The first part examines trends and patterns of Tunisian migration, and points out various problems with regard to existing data. It insists that greater efforts should be made to produce updated data on migration flows and stocks, including more details regarding migrant profiles.

The second part assesses the Tunisian State’s management of labour migration and relations with Tunisians abroad. It shows that state-organized labour migration currently represents a small part of migration flows from Tunisia, and that relations with Tunisians abroad were characterized by defiance prior to the Revolution. It concludes that more attention should be paid to the demands of Tunisians abroad, and that establishing trusting relations with them is a prerequisite to fostering their contribution to socioeconomic development and democratization in Tunisia.

Introduction

The Tunisian case is of particular interest when considering Arab expatriates’ potential to contribute positively to economic development and political change in their homelands. Indeed, the Tunisian State has developed an active migration policy since the 1960s, with the aim of promoting labour migration, and strengthening the relations with Tunisian migrants. Moreover, Tunisians abroad played an active role during the Tunisian Revolution in January 2011 through the Internet, and since then as supporters of the democratization process, including participation in the election of the Constituent Assembly on 23 October 2011.

Academic literature addressing the migration and development nexus, including diasporas’ contribution to economic development and political change in general, is extremely broad. This paper does not aim at discussing the arguments for and against the impacts of migration on countries of origin, but rather consists of a synthetic and critical analysis of out-migration patterns and policies in Tunisia. It reviews the relevant academic literature, in French and English, and relies on selected press articles and interviews with Tunisian experts and practitioners.

The first part examines trends and patterns of Tunisian migration, and highlights various problems with regard to the data available. Tunisia has experienced several waves of migration following independence in 1956, including an upsurge of regular and irregular migration since the late 1990s due to structural unemployment. The greatest numbers of Tunisian communities abroad are based in the European Union (EU), primarily in France, Italy, and Germany, and, to a lesser extent, in the Arab oil-producing countries,
notably Libya and in North America. Most Tunisian labour migrants are young males with low qualifications, but recent flows include increasing numbers of university graduates and female workers. The first part concludes that the current trends and patterns of Tunisian migration are complex, and that producing updated and more detailed data is necessary to fully analyse such complexity and the consequences for policy making.

The second part assesses the Tunisian State’s management of labour migration and relations with Tunisians abroad. The State historically contributed to organize labour migration to France in the 1960s and 1970s, but currently state-organized labour migration represents a small portion of migration flows from Tunisia. Moreover, prior to the Revolution, the relations between the State and Tunisians abroad were characterized by defiance, due to the authoritarian nature of the Tunisian regime and monitoring of Tunisian migrants’ activities. The paper concludes that more attention should be paid to the demands of Tunisians abroad, particularly those who actively participated in the Revolution. The recent participation of Tunisians abroad in the election of the Constituent Assembly represents a positive step. However, more could be done to establish trusting relations with the Tunisian community abroad, which appears as a prerequisite to foster the latter’s contribution to socioeconomic development and democratization in Tunisia.

Trends and patterns of Tunisian out-migration

A. Overview of past and recent flows

Migration from Tunisia began before World War II, on a limited scale, while the country was still a French protectorate. Migration flows became significant in the early 1960s, a decade later than in Algeria and Morocco. The main push factor was unemployment, and international migration often represented a second step after internal movement from rural areas to major urban centres, in particular Tunis. Tunisian migrants primarily migrated to France, and to a lesser extent, to Germany and Belgium, where demands for unskilled workers was high.

Until the late 1960s, most migrants arrived in France with a tourist visa and obtained a long-term residence permit after being recruited. However, controlled labour migration gradually became the main trend in the early 1970s (see part two). The official number of Tunisian migrants registered in France grew from 52,159 in 1965 to 149,274 in 1973, but these figures do not include tens of thousands of temporary and seasonal migrants, or those who obtained French nationality during this period (estimated at 17,000). According to Gildas Simon’s work on Tunisian labour migrants, the number of Tunisians who migrated during this period is estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000 (Simon, 1979: 81).

Between 1973 and 1974, Western European states halted labour migration because of the economic impact of the oil-crisis. This decision had a great impact on the patterns of Tunisian migration to Europe. Although labour migration was perceived as temporary, few migrants actually returned to Tunisia and most settled in host countries with their families, benefiting from family reunification schemes. Consequently, the demographic and social characteristics of Tunisian migrant communities in Europe gradually changed to include more women and children. In parallel, labour migration to Arab oil-producing countries increased, due to the growing demand for labour, despite serious political and economic constraints. In Libya, in particular, Tunisian workers suffered from massive expulsions in the 1980s, as a consequence of diplomatic tensions between Tunisia and Colonel Ghaddafi’s regime in Libya. In Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, migration has usually been limited to specific categories of professionals, such as teachers, doctors and nurses.

Since the late 1990s, Tunisia has witnessed an upsurge in migration, which can be explained by structural demographic and socioeconomic causes. All Arab countries, including Tunisia, witnessed high level of fertility and rapid population growth until the 1980s, before the annual number of births stabilized, and sometime shrank, as a result of family planning programs. Consequently, the largest generation born
in the 1980s reached working age at the beginning of this century, thus exerting great pressure on the labour market. Such pressure was aggravated by two other factors: the growing economic participation of women and the development of formal education. As Philippe Fargues points out: “Arab population in 2011 have an overall annual growth rate between 1% and 2%, while the active age population is rising by 3% per year, the demand for employment by 4% or 5%, and the amount of human capital by 6 to 8 percent” (Fargues, 2011).

Consequently, the lack of employment opportunities is significant in relation to the demand for labour, in particular in the marginalized region of the Tunisian hinterland. Since 2008, 140,000 young adults are estimated to enter the labour market every year, while the number of jobs created is 65,000, mostly located in the more developed regions of the greater Tunis area and along the coast. Moreover, unemployment is particularly high among the highly skilled because significant investments to improve the educational system did not coincide with an appropriate employment policy. From 2001 until 2008, while the official rate of unemployment remained stable at 14.2 per cent; educational expenditure rose from 4.0 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 5.7 per cent, and unemployment among the highly skilled rose from 14.8 per cent to 21.6 per cent.

B. Problems in measuring flows and stocks

Firstly, it is important to consider a few basic methodological issues related to migration statistics. Migrants are difficult to count for several reasons, among which the hidden nature of irregular migration flows and the diverse definitions of who is a migrant. Indeed, figures may vary significantly depending on who counts, whether country of origin or country of destination, which criteria are used to define a migrant, such as whether a foreigner, born abroad or born of foreign parents.

In the Tunisian case, the number of Tunisians abroad, according to Tunisian consular records, is higher, sometime twice as high, as the number of Tunisian migrants recorded by host countries (see Annex 1). Indeed, host country statistics usually consider foreigners and/or foreign-born citizens as migrants, in contrast to consular records that include all categories of citizens abroad, including migrants, citizens with dual nationality and descendants of migrants. However, consular records may be inaccurate because not all migrants register their children at the consulate or because some migrants have returned or died without being removed from consular records. Finally, estimating the population of people of Tunisian origin abroad raises complex issues, besides statistical problems, such as the status of Tunisian Jews who migrated on the eve of Tunisian independence in 1956, many of whom migrated to France, and, to a lesser extent, to Israel.

Further, estimating irregular migration flows from Tunisia is complex and requires utilising different sources. Habib Fourati (2008) uses the results of the Tunisian census and of various migration surveys to estimate irregular migration for the period April 2003 to April 2004 by country of destination (see Annex 2). He shows that irregular migration flows are mostly directed to France and Italy, where they represent respectively 38% and 56% of the total migration flows from Tunisia. However, such figures may be out-dated since irregular migration from Tunisia reached a peak a few years later, before routes of irregular migration changed due to greater control of Italian shores.

Bearing these methodological limitations in mind, the number of Tunisians abroad can be estimated to be 1,058,600 in 2008, according to the Tunisian consulate records, distributed as followed: 54.6 per cent in France, 13.4 per cent in Italy, 7.8 per cent in Germany, 7.9 per cent in Libya, and the remainder in Arab countries and North America. Note that the number of Tunisians registered in the consular records was 600,000 in 1995, thus confirming the increase of migration flows from Tunisia in the early 2000s. During the period 1995 to 2008, the annual growth rate amongst Tunisians abroad was 5.5 per cent, in contrast to an annual growth rate of one per cent among the Tunisian population (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2010).

Note that 22 per cent of Tunisians abroad have dual citizenship (Boubakri, 2011)

This new wave of migration has been directed toward several countries, contrary to the first wave in the 1960s, which was primarily directed to France. Currently, France remains the primary destination of Tunisian migrants, but other European and non-European countries are gaining importance. For example, the percentage of Tunisians residing in France, as a percentage of the total expatriate population, decreased from 58 per cent in 1995 to 54.5 per cent in 2008. In contrast, the highest growth rates of Tunisian expatriates were observed in Germany and Italy, respectively 12.4 per cent and 11.5 per cent per year from 2001 until 2008. In Italy, the number of Tunisian migrants have increased from 40,000 in 1995 to more than 140,000 in 2007, representing 14 per cent of the total Tunisia population abroad (Di Bartolomeo et al, 2010; Mahjoub, 2009).

The number of Tunisian migrants in Arab oil-producing countries also increased during this timeframe, from 102,725 in 2001 to 153,200 in 2008. However, the Libyan political crisis in 2011 had a dramatic impact on Tunisian migration flows. Libya hosted more than half of the total number of Tunisian migrants in Arab oil-producing countries, 83,600 in 2008, most of whom fled when the conflict erupted, along with hundreds of thousands of stranded migrants of various nationalities. At the time of writing, it is still too early to know when and to what extent labour migration to Libya will resume.

Finally, it is notable that Tunisian migrants in North America represent only 2.6 per cent of the total numbers abroad, although the percentage of highly qualified migrants, in particular women (Sliman and Khlife, 2010), is much higher in the United States and Canada, due to the selective migration policies.

C. Problems in assessing migrant profiles and relations with Tunisia

Limited, and often out-dated, data are available regarding the socioeconomic background of Tunisians abroad, in particular in Arab oil-producing countries, and their situation in their country of residence and relations with their country of origin. According to statistics of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)3 and the Tunisian National Institute for Statistics, the typical profile of a Tunisian migrant is that of a man (82% of all Tunisian migrants), aged 15 to 44 years old (89%), single (75.6%), having migrated to France or Italy (75%), in search of a job (66.3%), with a low level of education (56%). Note, however, that the proportion of highly skilled migrants (i.e. with tertiary level education) have risen significantly during the last decade, from 19.6 per cent of the total registered outflows in 2001 to 30 per cent in 2008. In addition, the proportion of those employed in highly skilled occupations, such as professionals and managers, is quite significant (12.8%) (Di Bartolomeo et al, 2010; Mahjoub, 2009).

Consular records show slightly different figures, in particular the proportion of men among Tunisians abroad is estimated at 64.7 per cent, which can be explained by the presence in the records of the children of migrants, contrary to OECD statistics. Interestingly, consular records show that the socio-professional breakdown of Tunisians abroad differs significantly according to destination country. For example, the proportion of workers is much higher in Italy (59%) than in France (41%); the proportion of professionals, managers and students is lower in Italy (respectively 2%, 1% and less than 1%) than in France (respectively, 5%, 4% and 4%); the rate of unemployment is higher in France (18%)4 than in Italy (8%) (see Annex 3).

Remittances are a key issue when considering migrant relations with their country of origin, and the impact on development. Remittances sent by Tunisian migrants have increased steadily since the 1990s. According to the Tunisian Central Bank (BCT), remittances totalled 2,653 million Tunisian dinars in 2009, which represents five per cent of the Tunisian GDP. However, the World Bank estimates that Tunisian remittances are much higher, up to 4,397 million Tunisian dinars in 2009. The reason for this may be that the BCT estimation does not take into account informal money exchanges or manufactured goods

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3 Primarily consisting of countries of destination
4 On the socio-economic integration of the children of the migrants from the Maghreb in France, in particular inequalities in accessing the labour market see Meurs et al. (2006), Borell and Lhommeau (2010), Aeberhardt et al. (2010).
brought back by migrants. Note that remittances have severely dropped in 2011 (possibly by 12.5%), as a result of the Libyan crisis (Boubakri, 2011). Renewed research should be conducted to estimate the amount of remittances, and to understand how migrant’s families use these back home (e.g. daily consumption, to buy manufactured goods, to access education or health, to acquire real estate). Although remittances represent a crucial contribution to poverty reduction and to improved living standards, their impact may be heterogeneous, because some regions or groups are favoured, and because they are rarely invested in productive economic projects (e.g. Ma Mung, 1996; Ma Mung et al, 1999; de Haas, 2008 and 2009).

To conclude, Tunisians abroad relate to their country of origin through, amongst others, visiting or returning permanently to Tunisia; communicating with relatives by telephone or Internet; watching Tunisian news and programmes via satellite TV and Internet; participating in community activities abroad and assisting relatives who are willing to migrate. Further, Tunisians abroad have a significant influence on their country of origin through so-called ideational remittances, which include social and political remittances in terms of practices, demands, ideas and values. Understanding the impact of such ideational remittances raises a wide range of issues, from demographic transition to social and political change, which are still to be researched.

The Tunisian State and the Tunisians abroad: from defiance to participation

The following section focuses on the Tunisian State’s achievements and shortcomings in implementing policies with the aim of promoting labour migration and fostering relations with Tunisians abroad.

A. Managing labour migration

After independence in 1956, the Desturian Socialist Party (PSD), which ruled Tunisia until 1987 within a single party system, initially opposed out-migration, fearing the loss of human and financial capital. However, labour migration soon emerged as a key feature of Tunisian employment policy in the early 1960s, in the face of growing unemployment, and the Government developed a set of public institutions responsible for managing labour migration, although such measures were considered temporary.

The Office of Professional Training and Employment (OFPE) was created in 1967. Regarding labour migration, its tasks were the following: determine labour shortage and needs in receiving countries, select workers to go abroad and monitor labour migrants abroad and prepare their return. In 1969, the OFPE began to collaborate with the French National Office for Migration (ONI) and created, in Carthage near Tunis, a large centre to regroup and prepare workers prior to departure. By 1972, controlled migration represented three-quarters of Tunisian worker placements in France, as opposed to one-fourth in 1969; and the number of Tunisian workers in France tripled from 1965 until 1973, officially reaching 149,274 today, but in reality numbers are certainly higher (Simon, 1979: 89).

During the same period, Tunisia gradually developed one of the most extensive consular networks. Consulates were perceived as important social spaces for migrants, playing a double role of intermediary and mediator with both the Tunisian and the host country institutions. In addition, the Tunisian State supported the creation of associations of migrants, so-called the Amicales des Travailleurs Tunisiens en France, with a sociocultural role among migrants, and were used by the Tunisian regime to monitor political activity among migrants.

In 1974, France officially closed its doors to labour migration. Only few Tunisian migrants returned to Tunisia, despite the French Government offering financial incentives to do so, and the majority settled permanently when their families joined them under family reunification schemes. In parallel, the demand

5 See http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/one-year-after-revolution-tunisian-economy-red

6 Sections II.a and II.b are based on Laurie Brand’s analysis of the Tunisian migration policy from the 1950s to the 2000s (Brand, 2006: 92-132).
for labour in Arab oil-producing countries increased, thus attracting more and more Tunisian migrants, in particular to Libya.

From the 1970s until the 1990s, the Tunisian State reorganized the institutional framework dedicated to the management of labour migration on several occasions, in order to solve the country’s unemployment problem. The Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation (ATCP) was created in 1972 for the training and placement of skilled workers. It gradually specialized in labour migration to Gulf countries. In 2008, the ATCP achieved 2,058 placements of qualified migrants. In parallel, the OFPE was reorganized several times in the 1980s. Eventually, the National Agency for Employment and Independent Labour (ANETI) was created in 1993 with the aim of implementing the Government’s employment policy. In 2008, the ANETI realized 2,193 placements, half of which were seasonal jobs, mainly in France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (Mahjoub, 2009).

Although the number of persons who benefited from ATCP and ANETI employment programs abroad is noteworthy, state-organized labour migration represents a small percentage of the total number of migrants, regular and irregular. Therefore, the Tunisian State should aim to enable and promote labour migration among the Tunisian youth, in particular through education and professional training; as well as (re)negotiating agreements with receiving countries, including visa facilitation and protection of the migrant social and human rights.

B. Reaching Tunisians abroad

As early as the late 1950s, following independence, the Tunisian State aimed at connecting with Tunisian labourers in France. It developed a large consular network and created associations, so-called Amicales des Travailleurs Tunisiens en France, which offered a space for political, social and cultural activities, under the control of the consular administration and PSD members. Consequently, those who were not sympathetic to the PSD viewed warily the Amicales. In addition, the regime monitored very closely dissenting political activities among Tunisian migrants, in particular participation in social protests in the 1970s, and Islamist parties in the 1980s.

The management of relations with Tunisians abroad became a key policy issue after the 1987 coup, when Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali came to power. Firstly, Tunisians abroad were granted the right to participate in the 1988 presidential election. Then, new policy programs insisted on maintaining strong identity and social and cultural ties with Tunisians abroad and encouraged their socioeconomic integration in the host society. It is noteworthy that the acronym Tunisian Workers Abroad (TTE) was abandoned for Tunisian Residing Abroad (TRE) at that time. Furthermore, the TREs started to been seen as potential contributors to the development of their country of origin, and facilities were provided to those returning to Tunisia, such as free customs privileges and value added tax (VAT) suppression for investment projects; benefit of resident status; children’s enrolment in the public education system and free Arabic classes; credit facilities and access to real-estate.

To implement such policies, the Office of the Tunisians Abroad (OTE) was created in 1988 within the Department of Migration at the Ministry of Social Affairs. Gradually, the OTE developed policies and programs aiming at responding to various challenges, such as the role of women in transmitting Tunisian cultural values; the contribution of businessmen and highly skilled migrants to the development of 7

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7 The OFPE’s name was changed in 1973 to the Office for Tunisian Workers Abroad and for Employment and Professional Training (OTTEEF). In 1984, the OTTEEF was divided into two entities: the Office for the Promotion of Employment and the Tunisian Workers Abroad (OPETTE) in charge of the placement of migrant workers, and the Office for Professional Training (OPF) in charge of training.

8 On EU Mobility Partnership, see Westh Olsen (2011).

9 The OTE actually traces its origins to the OPETTE (see note n°6)

10 Other economic and commercial organizations in Tunisia began to be active among the TREs in the 1990s, for example, the Tunisian Banking Society opened offices abroad to facilitate financial transfers and the Tunisian Agency for External Communication supported Tunisian media broadcasting abroad.
their country of origin and the relationships of the children of the migrants with both the host country and their country of origin. Among various initiatives, the OTE organized the Annual Conference of the Tunisian Migrants, which was usually held on the National Day for Tunisians abroad, and the Day for Development Support to foster contacts between Tunisian businessmen and their region of origin, and created a repository of Tunisian associations abroad. Further, the OTE recruited social attachés in charge of assisting the TREs in the Tunisian consulates, and created dedicated quarters for women (espace femme) to strengthen community cohesion. It expanded and developed Arabic teaching among the children of migrants, as well as the organization of study trips and vacation camps in Tunisia. Finally, it contributed to the facilitation of the return of the TREs to Tunisia during summer break.

The Tunisian Government further established the Council of the Tunisian Communities in France (CTCF), in which all Tunisian associations and parties were represented shortly after the coup, but which was soon dominated by members of Ben Ali’s party, the Constitutional and Democratic Gathering (RCD). As early as 1989, the regime resumed past practices of controlling social and cultural activities among Tunisians abroad, as well as monitoring political dissidents, in particular Islamist parties. RCD cells and associations linked to the regime carried out activities abroad, such as organizing annual conferences for the party’s executives, businessmen, artists, students and women; mobilizing the vote of the TREs during the presidential elections and supporting the OTE in organizing Arabic teaching classes. However, the lack of democracy hindered the participation of Tunisians abroad in such activities, and their contributions to the development of their country of origin.

C. Tunisians abroad since the Revolution

The Internet played a crucial role during the Revolution, by offering an alternative media for political contest, while official media, such as radio, TV and newspaper, were strictly controlled by the regime. In-depth research and analyses of the Revolution are still to be conducted, but several research studies offer evidence of the role played by Tunisians abroad, via the Internet. For example, the map of the Tunisian blogosphere during the Revolution, locating and numbering the websites linked with the main blogs of Tunisian opponents, shows that most flows of information outside of Tunisia were concentrated in Europe. Moreover, Romain Lecomte’s paper traces the story of the first Tunisian cyber-dissidents, based in Tunisia and abroad, who developed several websites criticizing the regime in the early 2000’s. He explains how more and more Internet users, in Tunisia and abroad, gradually took part in discussions on the socioeconomic and political situation in Tunisia, on their own blogs and, later, on Facebook (Lecomte, 2006).

After Ben Ali’s departure, numerous initiatives from Tunisians residing abroad vowed to support democracy and economic development in Tunisia. In addition, some actually decided to return to Tunisia, such as ministers of the Transition Government led by Mohammed Ghannouchi, and later by Beji Caid el Sebsi: Jalloul Ayed (Finance), Mehdi Houas (Trade and Tourism), Yassine Brahimi (Transport and Equipment), Eyes Jouini (Economic and Social Reform).

In March 2011, several Tunisian associations abroad launched the Assises de l’Immigration Tunisienne (Foundations of the Tunisian Migration) with the aim of drafting a Cahier de doléances (Register of grievances) to be presented to the Government. Following the gathering of 300 representatives of Tunisian associations from five European countries and Canada in Paris in May 2011, the Cahier de doléances was presented to the Tunisian Government in June 2011. The Cahier first insists on the right for all the TREs (including irregular migrants) to participate in the Tunisian general presidential and legislative elections and to be eligible for election (including citizens with dual nationality), and to guarantee fair

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12 see http://pactetunisien.org
14 This issue was later debated within the Constituent Assembly, when representatives eventually adopted the draft law for the organisation of the state, which specifies that the President of the Republic should be born of a
representation of the TREs within parliament. Further, the Cahier notes that the Tunisian State should not exert any form of control over the Tunisian associations abroad, but should simply recognize them, develop collaboration on migration issues and regroup them into an independent and democratic federation. The Cahier further condemns prior intervention between the State and the RCD, and demands in-depth reform of the OTE, the creation of a Ministry for Emigrants and the establishment of a representative institution of the TREs.

Further, other demands presented by the Assises de l’Immigration Tunisienne include the definition of a new migration policy respectful of migrant rights (both Tunisian migrants and foreign migrants in Tunisia); the promotion of Tunisian culture and Arabic language among the TREs; the improvement of the consular network and the facilitation of the return of the TREs to Tunisia, both for holidays or permanently. The Cahier demands that readmission agreements with EU countries and quotas on the number of migrants admitted to EU countries are denounced; to offer assistance to Tunisian irregular migrants abroad, in particular legal advice; and to reform the 2004 Tunisian law on the entry and stay of foreigners and adopt the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants. The Cahier further suggests to reform and enhance Arabic teaching among the children of Tunisian migrants, including greater cooperation with educational institutions in the countries of residence (such as including Arabic in the curriculum and recruitment of Tunisian professors); support scientific and cultural exchanges (such as university grants and degree equivalency) and to promote Tunisian tourism and cultural heritage among the TRE. Last, but not least, the Cahier criticizes the numerous problems faced by the TRE when dealing with the Tunisian administration, both at the consulates and when returning to Tunisia, and the lack of initiatives to promote investments in Tunisia.

In June 2011, the Tunisian Higher Independent Instance for the Election (ISIE) announced that the TREs would be able to participate in the election of the Constituent Assembly and that they would be represented by 18 specific representatives, to be elected in six extraterritorial constituencies. Out of eighteen seats for the TRE, the Islamist party An-Nahda won nine seats; but it is noteworthy that the voting behaviour of Tunisians abroad differs significantly from one country to another. For example, An-Nahda obtained 49.4 per cent, 45.8 per cent, and 42.9 per cent of the votes in Italy, Arab countries and Germany, but 35 per cent, 34.3 per cent, 33.7 per cent in the United States, Paris, and Marseille. Such differences raise the question of the relationship between the voting behaviour of the TREs and their socioeconomic profile and situation in the countries of destination. Further research is necessary to analyse the political representation and participation of the TREs, including the role of the TREs representative within the Constituent Assembly; consider for example do they defend the TREs’ rights and interests? Do they foster their relations with Tunisia? Do they contribute to the design of a new migration policy?

During the electoral campaign, most Tunisian political parties unanimously supported the TRE’s participation in the election of the Constituent Assembly, but the definition of a new policy to manage labour migration and to foster relations with Tunisians abroad appeared as secondary. Political parties’ programs mainly focused on the creation of a new institutional framework for the management of migration; the promotion of investment by the TREs in Tunisia and the revitalization of Tunisian culture and language among the TREs. For example, several parties proposed to create a Secretary of State for Tunisians Abroad and/or a Representative Council for Tunisians Abroad. Moreover, it was suggested, amongst others, to create an Economic and Social Agency in charge of fostering investment, to offer financial incentives to highly skilled migrants returning to Tunisia and to lower the costs of money transfers. Few parties, however, tackled the issues of the migrant rights, assistance to irregular migrants or...
negotiation of new and balanced agreements with destination countries.

Conclusion and recommendations

To conclude, the drafting of a new constitution is a crucial step for Tunisia, and the country faces tremendous challenges, in particular a very high unemployment rate and economic slowdown (Cassarino, 2011). In such a context, political parties often consider defining and implementing a new migration policy as secondary. Therefore, international and regional organizations and partner countries should further support the Tunisian State in conducting qualitative and quantitative research on migration; debating what should be the main goals of such policy and reorganizing the institutional framework when necessary.

In this paper, in analysing the Tunisian migration trends and patterns, it was explained that available statistics are contradictory and incomplete. There is a need to update statistics regularly and to put more emphasis on those categories of migrants that are often disregarded (or watered down), such as irregular migrants, circular migrants, return migrants, descendants of migrants born abroad and migrants in Arab oil-producing countries. In addition, detailed information should be provided on the migrants’ socioeconomic background and their situation in the receiving countries. To fulfil these goals, it is crucial to better systematize data on migration produced by Tunisian institutions and to further support quantitative and qualitative research on migration.

Moreover, the analysis of the management of labour migration by the Tunisian State shows that state-organized labour migration currently represents a small percentage of all migration flows. Therefore, the Tunisian State should further engage in enabling the Tunisian youth to migrate, within State programmes or independently. To this aim, the Tunisian State should resume its efforts to promote labour migration through bilateral schemes and to negotiate larger visa facilitation agreements with receiving countries. Promoting and adopting common stances with other labour migration sending countries in the Mediterranean and in Africa would contribute to strengthen Tunisia’s position when negotiating agreements with receiving countries, including the EU and EU member states, as well as Arab oil-producing countries. In addition, such agreements should systematically include provisions for professional training programs and the protection of migrant social and human rights, in particular that of irregular migrants.

Further, until the Revolution, the Tunisian policy toward Tunisians abroad has been characterized by a close monitoring of political opponents to the regime and extensive control of social and cultural activities abroad. In this context, Tunisians abroad viewed Tunisian consulates and associations related to the regime warily. Therefore, establishing trusting relations with Tunisians abroad appears as a prerequisite to fully mobilise their skills and assets for the development of Tunisia. In addition, more attention should be paid to the demands of Tunisians abroad, in particular guaranteeing their representation within State institutions and participation into policy making; promoting a stronger sense of community and belonging abroad; protecting the migrant rights and providing assistance to the most fragile, in particular irregular migrants, and creating an enabling environment to facilitate the efforts of those who are willing to contribute to Tunisia’s development, including fertile return programs. Granting the right to vote to Tunisians abroad for the last election was a positive step, but further attention should be now paid to the role of the representatives of Tunisians abroad within the Constituent Assembly in promoting their demands, defending their interests and contributing to the design of a new migration policy. Moreover, reorganising the institutional framework concerned with migration appears to be highly desirable, in particular the OTE which is negatively perceived by Tunisians abroad. A crucial aspect of such reorganisation is the coordination between the various governmental institutions in charge of migration issues, including the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Education and Employment, and the participation of non-governmental stakeholders in the process of decision-making, including Tunisian associations.
abroad. Indeed, migration is typically a crosscutting policy issue and more emphasis should be placed on promoting global approaches to migration, rather than focusing on one aspect alone.
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Annex 1: The number of Tunisian migrants according to origin of data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of destination</th>
<th>Destination country</th>
<th>Origin country</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3 079</td>
<td>5 896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10 480</td>
<td>18 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>222 000</td>
<td>555 347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>23 142</td>
<td>80 336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>93 601</td>
<td>142 972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>14 124</td>
<td>77 877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4 098</td>
<td>8 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2 384</td>
<td>2 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3 695</td>
<td>7 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3 070</td>
<td>5 621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>5 716</td>
<td>11 533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>387 225</td>
<td>919 090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>99 083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 018 173</td>
</tr>
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*Source: www.carim.org, 2009*


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Individual migration</th>
<th>Family migration</th>
<th>Irregular migration</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6 200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4 500</td>
<td>11 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>4 600</td>
<td>8 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European countries</td>
<td>2 200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2 500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>3 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Arab countries</td>
<td>1 600</td>
<td>1 300</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16 300</td>
<td>3 400</td>
<td>10 800</td>
<td>30 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Fourati, 2008*
Annex 3: The Tunisian Diaspora in France and Italy

source: www.fhimt.com
Annex 4: The election of the representatives of the Tunisians abroad at the Constituent Assembly

source: www.fhimt.com
Chapter Seven:

THE PENSION OF THE RETURNING RETIRED MIGRANT IN THE MAGHREB: A DEVELOPMENT FACTOR?

Sofiane Bouhdiba

Abstract

Migration from the Maghreb to Europe began in the 1960’s, following independence. Since the turn of the century, thousands of these migrants, who have since reached retirement age, have returned to their countries of origin. This sociodemographic study examines the situation of these returning retired migrants, the extent of their pensions and the way these are utilized in terms of consumption and investment.

It also discusses the strategies developed by Maghrebian governments to attract the pensions of retired returning migrants and promote local investment. Finally, the study proposes a series of recommendations in the framework of best practices in the circulation of pension flows from retired returning migrants in Maghrebian economies.

Introduction

Migration from the Maghreb1 to Europe started in the 1960’s, following independence. Since the turn of the century, thousands of these migrants, who have since reached retirement age, have returned, to their countries of origin. This study examines how the pensions of the returning retired migrants are used. Globally, two primary avenues are evident: pensions can be used entirely for consumption purposes, including purchasing of houses, or can be partially invested in local economies. Considering that there exists a consistent differential between wages and pensions between home and host employment markets, a retired returnee could constitute a factor of economic development in the Maghreb.

The data used originates from a field survey conducted in 2006 within the framework of the “Migrants de retour au Magreb, réintégration et enjeux de développement” (MIREM² project based at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RCAS) (Cassarino, 2007), with financial support of both European Union and European University Institute. The data of this survey was stratified into the three countries of the Maghreb, with a total sample of 992 migrants disaggregated as follows: 330 individuals in Morocco, 332 in Algeria and 330 in Tunisia. Only data concerning those returning migrants who freely decided to return home were considered in this study, thus excluding those deported.

What is the proportion of pensions invested by retired returning migrants? Is it possible to consider returning migrant pensions as an element of sustainable development in the Maghreb? What are the strategies developed by the Maghrebian governments to attract these pensions in the investment process? These are some of the questions to which this study will try to find answers.

The research is organised into three sections; the first briefly outlines the framework of the research, the second examines the situation of returning retired migrants in the Maghreb, including profile and entrepreneurial behaviour and the final section of the study proposes a series of recommendations in

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1 Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia
2 Collective Action to Support the Reintegration of Return Migrants in their Country of Origin
order to attract the pensions of retired expatriates and support their investment in local businesses.

Framework of the study

Before examining the role of the pension of the retired returning migrant, here follows a brief overview of the current situation and the methodology of the study.

A. The first generation of migrants

The process of economic transition that followed independence in the Maghreb during the 1960's led to a migration of young men, primarily to France, a former colonial country, and Italy, considered the nearest country with employment opportunities. Since that time, the Maghrebian governments considered emigration as a means of curbing unemployment and reducing poverty. It was also a way of importing wealth through remittances.

Today, migration is still a critical issue in the Maghreb, and migrants are considered as key actors contributing to local economic development. In Morocco for example, remittances represent more than eight per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and enables the government to cover around 50 per cent of the balance of payment deficit. However, little attention has been paid to the changes occurring since the departure of the first generation of migrants, the perspective of their return and its possible effects on investment and sustainable development.

Today, the expatriate Maghrebian community includes a second and even a third generation, however, it is notable that the first generation of migrants is composed of individuals who have just reached retirement age. Many of these retired migrants have returned home, or are considering returning to their home land.

The MIREM survey showed that retirement is the primary motivation for returning home, familial problems in the home country, such as inheritance issues or caring for family members being the second reason, with respectively 14.4 per cent and 8.9 per cent of the responses. In fact, those aged over 65 years represent 18 per cent of Maghrebian return migrants, while 21.9 per cent are officially retirees (Cassarino, 2007).

The concept of spending the final days of life in the homeland, and to be buried near the father, is common in Muslim culture. Moreover, being buried in a non-Muslim cemetery is an expressed fear among Muslim expatriates in Europe and the United States.

Although pensioners represent only a small proportion of the total number of returning migrants, they constitute a group to seriously consider, as an increasing number of Maghrebian expatriates return home once retired. During the past 10 years, more than 90,000 Algerians left France to take advantage of their pension in Algeria. The number of Moroccan pensioners leaving France numbers around 1,400 per year. As such, the savings and pensions of retired returnees is now becoming an economic factor of some importance.

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3 Bank Al Maghrib, 2004
4 65 years in most host countries
5 Around 9,100 migrants per year
B. Methodological approaches

Existing literature distinguishes two opposite approaches for the analysis of the use of pensions of retired returnees, depending on their vision of their economic capital.

1. The endogenous migration model

The endogenous migration model considers that a migrant’s behaviour is based on altruism and the satisfaction of persons relying on him, in particular the family at home (Brown, 1997 and Poirine, 1997). In the framework of this model, it is assumed that the pensioner may utilize his entire pension for consumption purposes, either for himself or his family. Immediate welfare is paramount as the utility of the migrant is directly linked to the utility of the family in the home country (Chami, 2005). This model of remittances does not consider the migrant’s transfers, savings or pensions as an engine of local employment and economic growth.

2. The portfolio model

The portfolio theory states that remittances aim at guaranteeing a reward when returning to the home country (Chami, 2005). In the case of the returning retired migrant, this model considers that at least a portion of the pension is invested in local business. Based on this model, remittances, savings and pensions can be considered as a major source of capital for economic growth in the country of origin, as they may create productive assets and employment.

3. The optimal duration of migration

Many studies have shown that there is a close relationship between the period of time spent abroad and the returnee’s willingness to invest in the economy of the country of origin. If this duration is too short, a couple of years for example, the migrant may not have the time to acquire the necessary experience to create and manage an investment in the country of origin. Conversely, if the period spent abroad is too long, the migrant may lose contacts in the country of origin, and may become so disconnected that he will no more have the sufficient knowledge about behaviours, markets and economic mechanisms to be able to invest profitably (King, 1986, see also Carletto, 2007). In addition, if the returnee is too aged, his health may not permit him to manage an investment efficiently. As such, there exists a theoretical, optimal period of time spent abroad that influences the probability of investing at home.

The entrepreneurial behaviour of the Maghrebian retired returnee

This section examines the behaviour of the retired migrant when he reaches the point of decision-making, whether to return to his country of origin or remain in the host country.

A. Profile of the Maghrebian retired returnee

Based on the findings of the MIREM survey (Cassarino, 2007), here follows a profile of an Algerian retired returnee, who is representative of the Maghrebian migrant.

He was 25 years old when he left Algeria in 1960 and travelled by boat to Southern France (95%). He holds regular documents (99%), including a working permit (63%). Today, he is aged 65 and decides to return home after having spent an average of 40 years abroad. He is poorly educated (95%) and was living in a rural area (59%) before migrating abroad.

Although he was employed before migrating (62%), his financial situation was precarious (87%) and he did not benefit from any help from his family (66%). He left Algeria single (70%) and had no family ties.

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6 Where purchasing land or houses is considered consumption
7 Median age at return is 71 years
in France (96%).

Once in France, he did not benefit from any help from family or friends (75%), but he found a job within three months (82%), and did not find difficulties in integrating into the local society. Although he did not improve his educational level (95%) and had no access to professional training (90%), he improved his financial situation during his career (97%).

He maintained links with Algeria and sent EUR 1,000 to Algeria once a year (80%) to help the family (in particular for school expenses), build a house and contribute to social projects, such as the building of mosques. He would also bring household items and appliances, such as refrigerators or cars to Algeria (88%). While abroad, he maintained regular contacts with his consular representation.

On return to Algeria, he is now the owner of his house (98%) and lives in an urban area (73%). Although he thinks about staying indefinitely in Algeria (75%), he has kept his documents in order to maintain the possibility to return to France (84%).

He felt poorly assisted by the Algerian government on his return, and despite problems of reintegration of the Algerian society, he thinks that life in Algeria is better that in France (68%). Those who stayed in host countries transfer EUR500 monthly to their bank accounts in Algeria (55%), using it for family expenses and to build a house. Interesting features also emerge from the entrepreneurship behaviour of the Algerian retired returnee. In fact, he does not seem keen on investing at home (90%). If he did, he invested in small and medium projects, employing less than 10 employees, in the tourism and commercial sectors, with amounts varying from EUR 3,000 to EUR90,000. He has the capacity to invest amounts that are considered relatively high relative to the local economy and level of development. His main source of financing includes pension and savings, with no assistance from local banks.

The characteristics of the Algerian retired returnee are very similar to those of Moroccan and Tunisian retired returnees.

B. Return vs. stay, social protection as a key factor

When a migrant reaches 65 years old, which is the retirement age in most host countries, he must make a major decision in the last phase of his migration cycle: stay in the host country or return home.

1. Stay in the host country

The degree of access to good medical services and the quality of the health system are key elements for the retired migrant. Indeed, he is by definition over 65 years old, and may have specific health needs. As is the case in many developing countries, the Maghreb is characterised by a two-speed health system. The medical services offered by the public sector are limited, and often characterized by a disorganized reception, a lack of hygiene, delays in treatments and overcrowded rooms. However, the private sector provides a better quality of health services, but at a very high cost. This is particularly true in Tunisia, where private clinics are now exporting their services8. In addition, the Maghrebian health systems still do not provide specific services such as geriatrics or psychological assistance for the elderly. The only Maghrebian country where some progress has been made in this regard is Tunisia.

Further, the migrant will likely have benefitted from a social protection system that reimburses a consistent part of medical expenses, especially if he was residing in Europe or in the Gulf region, where there are high quality social systems in place. The migrant knows that in his country of origin, the social protection system is still poor, and he will likely spend significant amounts of money to cover health expenses, with no likelihood of reimbursement. As such, the retired returnee is aware that, if settling in his home country, he must attribute a portion of his pension to health

---8 Many British patients have surgical operations in Tunisia, because it is cheaper compared to the United Kingdom, and there are no waiting lists.
care, which he could freely benefit from in the host country. Finally, the migrant may be aware that if he decides to return home, he may need to travel regularly to his previous host country to benefit from high quality medical services.

For these reasons, the Maghrebian retired migrant may be reluctant to return home indefinitely. This may be a reason why, as evidenced in the results of the MIREM’s survey, most retired returnees maintain updated documents related to their host countries, and may not hesitate to travel to their host country every six months maintain their social protection benefits.

2. Return home

Paradoxically, the primary factor encouraging the retired Maghrebian migrant to return home is also related to the social system. There is a huge difference in salary levels between host and home employment markets. As pension calculations are based on last salaries, pensions are also relatively higher in host countries. As an example, the pension of a retired Tunisian operator returning from Germany is equivalent to the salary of a General Manager in the private sector in Tunisia.

In addition to the differentials in gross salary levels, the exchange rates between the Maghrebian currencies and the Euro or the United States Dollar are favourable to the return migrant. In addition, the fluctuation in the exchange rates regularly pushes the value of pensions up, compensating inflation rates in the home country. For all these reasons, the possible economic effect of the migrant pension is multiplied and affords him to live comfortably in his home country. There is a common Arabic expression used by retired returnees to describe this situation: “to live like a bey in one’s home country”.

The retired returnee is thus confronted with a dilemma: should he return home to enjoy his pension, benefitting from its multiplied value? Or should he remain in the host country, benefitting from a high standard of social protection? In both cases, the social protection mechanism appears as a key element in making this decision. However, should the migrant decide to return home, there follows a further decision: how to use the pension?

3. Retired returnees and entrepreneurship

The MIREM survey findings demonstrate that Maghrebian retired returnees use their pensions to fulfil basic needs, such as food and clothing, as well as leisure. As noted, a portion of the pension also finances health care. Pensions are also used to reimburse bank loans to buy land and build houses. This may have a multiplier effect, particularly by creating some employment opportunities. However, this may also create inflationary pressure on the local property market, rising house purchase and rental costs. In addition, when pensions are utilized for purchasing imported goods, such as refrigerators or cars, this will not stimulate the local economy, and will not contribute to reduce the deficit of the national balance of payments.

The MIREM survey shows that only a small proportion of pensions are used in productive investments, mainly small and medium businesses. However, in total, millions of Euros are invested in local economies, which certainly contributes to the economic growth of the Maghreb.

The returnee entrepreneur rarely contracts a bank loan when investing. The savings accumulated in the host country constitute the main source of financing investments when returning home. Indeed, 76 per cent of returned Maghrebian migrants finance their investments with their own savings and pensions. Only 13.9 per cent contract bank loans; 15.3 per cent in Morocco and Tunisia and 9.5 per cent in Algeria (Cassarino, 2007). There are many reasons explaining this autonomous-behaviour: The first is that the migrant has saved sufficiently during his career to finance his investments himself, more so since these are generally small and medium sized businesses. Secondly, returning Maghrebian migrants may distrust local banks, indeed some have a low perception of local banking systems. However, this lack of confidence is also expressed by the local banks who consider the retired returnee’s activities as low-return and risky investments, arguing that returned migrants, having spent time outside of the country, have poor or incorrect knowledge of the local market, and will thus have difficulties managing human and financial assets at home. Second, Maghrebian banks are more likely to issue loans to young entrepreneurs than to retirees.
The question of age is also related to the theory of the optimal period of time spent abroad (see section one). In the case of the Maghreb, the MIREM survey showed the following:

This graph shows that the optimal period of time spent abroad is between four and 13 years, and it is clear that when this duration exceeds 32 years, the probability of investing at home becomes very low.

More detailed results show the same conclusion concerning the three countries of the Maghreb, as seen in the following graphs:
A comparison between the three countries shows that the Tunisian retired returnee is more likely to invest when returning home, even after a long time spent abroad. This may be because Tunisia is more open to the outside world, Europe in particular, than Morocco and Algeria, and that there are more opportunities of creating small and medium sized projects in sectors such as services, tourism and industry.

Following this overview of retired returnee behaviour, the next section will discuss a series of recommendations in order to improve the return experience of pensioners and support their contribution to local economic development.

**Recommendations**

In Mediterranean countries, migration has been used as a sustainable development strategy for many years (Nzberg, 2004). In particular, the three Maghrebian governments are systematically developing strategies to attract the remittances of their expatriates. Since the first generation of migrants reached retirement age, the savings and pensions of these returnees has become of interest for the Maghrebian economy. But the situation is not easy to manage and further action is necessary.

**A. Database**

Decision makers in the three countries of the Maghreb suffer from the lack of both quantitative and qualitative data concerning the behaviour of returning migrants. This is particularly true concerning the retired returnee, as the phenomenon is relatively new. There is a need to enhance the knowledge base on the motivations of retired returning migrants, their investments, their needs and the potential they can offer to their home country. As such it is necessary to conduct surveys and studies in the field of migration of pensioners. As Maghrebian countries do not have the capacity to finance such complex studies, partnerships with European and American academic institutions, such as the European University Institute, should be considered. Partnerships with non-governmental organisations and intergovernmental organisations, such as the International Organization for Migration, may also offer possibilities to collect data.

**B. Restore faith in home country administrations**

A psychological factor is behind the reluctance of retired returnees to invest in their countries of origin. Some may be afraid of wasting their life away from home (ghorba9) and their savings in a bad business investment. This fear is reinforced by the lack of knowledge of the society and culture in their country of origin. Indeed, the return migrant may be afraid of being confronted with corruption, bureaucracy and misunderstanding.

The diplomatic representations in the main European cities should make greater efforts in communication in order to offer a more positive vision of the return home and the potential for investment in productive projects in the country of origin. There is a real challenge in communication and information sharing. The message must be convincing, because the image presented by Embassy officers may contrast with what the migrant hears about his country from other sources such as European media (including TV, newspapers and the Internet) and unofficial channels such as family and friends. The fear of the migrant may be reinforced should he already have experienced problems with local administration, such as customs or border police, on other occasions, such as when visiting home for holidays.

**C. Support the return migrant**

It is time to abandon the simplistic, externalised vision of migration in the Maghreb where emigration has, for decades, been considered as a major solution to economic growth. From this perspective, the
return of the retired migrant has not been seriously considered as a means to promote development. As such, it is highly recommended to create government agencies with the specific role of helping the retired expatriate who wants to invest at home. These agencies should provide the migrant with accurate information concerning investment procedures.

Indeed, migrants know little about the mechanisms and procedures to invest their savings. For example, most ignore the latest banking reforms, such as the possibility to hold current accounts in currencies other than local currency. The only information they have is that provided by relatives during their holidays. Efforts have been made in Tunisia, where there are some incentives to invest, including tax exemptions and off shore areas where investors can establish export initiatives. However, only a few expatriates have access to such information.

These specialised agencies should also help retired migrants in conducting marketing studies, playing a mediation role to help migrants to obtain local bank loans or supporting negotiations with the local administrations.

D. Improve the institutional environment

The three Maghrebian countries are characterised by poor infrastructure, in particular roads, electricity networks, industrial estates, Internet and telephone networks and public equipment. In addition, the populations of Morocco (30 million habitants), Algeria (30 million habitants) and especially Tunisia (10 million habitants) constitute small markets. There is no possibility to count on a sufficiently large demand for goods and services, and competition is fierce. Thus, efforts must be made to attract new money flows from outside the Maghreb.

The government should also offer specific incentives to the retired migrants to create investment projects when returning home. The MIREM’s survey showed that 88.8 per cent of the Maghrebian return migrants did not benefit from any assistance from the administration during the return process or investment procedures (Cassarino, 2007). Data show marked differences between the three countries, as 80.8 per cent of the Tunisian returnees said they had not been assisted by their own government, while this proportion is 90.9 per cent among Moroccan returnees and 95.1 per cent among Algerian returnees (Cassarino, 2007). Most problems are related to the lack of customs and tax incentives, the low education level of the local human capital and the reluctance of the local banks to issue loans.

E. Improve social protection

As noted in section two, the key factor that influences the behaviour of the retired migrant is the social mechanism in the home country. Indeed, the decision to return home or to remain in the host country depends on the quality of life the migrant expects for himself, as well as his spouse. As such, efforts should be made to improve social protection mechanisms in both host and home countries.

1. In host countries

The Maghrebian Governments should help retired returnees in regulating their situation regarding their social rights, in terms of pension and the health coverage, in liaison with host country administrations.

In order to benefit from social protection in the host country, the pensioner must keep all his documents updated. The residence permit is one of the most difficult documents to obtain and maintain for a retired returnee. In fact, it is not a systematically renewable document and the migrant is thus obliged to provide evidence of his presence in the host country territory. As he must stay no more than six months outside the host country, he is obliged to travel regularly and cover these additional costs. The statute of a retired migrant may be changed by recent decisions taken in many European countries that are closing the doors of immigration. The so-called “Sarkozy
law”\textsuperscript{10}, for example, may make it more difficult for a retired returnee and his family members to benefit from social protection.

To address these issues, the Maghrebian authorities should create specific taskforces in charge of following new legislations in the host countries, and, if necessary, advocate in order to make it easier for the returnee to benefit from his social rights. However, Maghrebian governments should also address some of the difficulties related to social protection in home countries.

2. In home countries

The Maghrebian Health Ministries should act in order to improve the quality of the medical services offered to returning migrants. In particular, private clinics should offer special rates to retired returnees, who can pay in a stronger currency. In Tunisia, off shore clinics have been already created to admit non-resident patients, and return migrants should also have access to these. If the retired migrant knows that he can have access to an acceptable level of health services in his home country, this will likely encourage him to settle at home and then to invest locally.

Finally, specific assistance should also be provided to return migrants to enable benefit from the social protection in their country of origin. Such assistance should also be provided to widows and dependent children who returned home and wish to benefit from their social rights, such as receiving the pension of the spouse in their home country. In particular, they may need legal assistance to address the legal barriers with social security administrations.

Conclusion

This brief overview of the economic behaviour of retired return migrants demonstrates that the social mechanism is a key issue in the migration process in the Maghreb. Investments from the pensions and savings of retired returnees may be an engine of economic development for Morocco, Algeria and, more particularly, Tunisia. As such, there is a clear necessity for the Maghrebian Governments to develop strategies in order to attract these pensions and encourage investment in local economies in the form of micro-projects. There is a need to conduct deeper research to understand the social and anthropological factors that are behind the economic behaviour of the retired returnee. This is a complex issue, but one that can provide a wealth of information. In particular, the knowledge of the motivations behind the return of the retired return migrant and the utilization of his pension is without contest the key to positive migration policies.

Finally, it would be interesting to evaluate the effects of the Arab spring on the behaviours of Maghrebian migrants. In particular, it could be interesting to understand if it has resulted in a change in the decision among retired migrants as to whether they return home or remain abroad.

\textsuperscript{10} Referring to the law n°2003-1119, issued by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, on 26th November 2003, restricting immigration, visas procedures, staying of foreigners and nationality
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Conclusion

This collection of studies has built on the rich array of research that has evolved around expatriate communities’ contributions to the socio-economic development of their countries of origin, through its exploration of many of the facets of this contribution to the Middle East and North Africa region. Within this research field, focus was initially given to financial remittances sent by emigrants and their role as a pivotal counterweight to the outflow of capital from many developing countries (discussed in Jaulin; At-Tayeb; Moursi; Fawzy; [this collection]). Indeed these remittances have dwarfed international aid (Gol-din, Cameron and Balarajan: 2011). Attention was also given to the foreign direct investment in origin countries that has been organised by expatriate communities, as well as the positive effects those communities could have on capital markets. This in turn leads to new productive enterprise and job creation (At-Tayeb; Moursi; Fawzy; Bouhdiba [this collection]).

The research field surrounding expatriate communities’ contributions to the socio-economic development of their countries of origin then evolved and expanded to incorporate the broad range of ‘social remittances’ which countries of origin receive from their expatriate communities. These have also been examined within this collection of essays. These include the transfer of knowledge, skills, expertise, ideas and culture which positively impact human capital in countries of origin (Moursi; Fawzy; Jaulin; Premazzi, Castagnone, and Cingolani [ibid]). Expatriates also form formal and quotidian organisations and associations, in both countries of origin and destination. Many of these organisations and associations create networks between countries of origin and destination and help facilitate various types of remittances in addition to promoting a range of civic activity and a sense of national identity. All these activities help to raise the stock of social capital in countries of both origin and destination (Moursi; Fawzy; Holman; Premazzi, Castagnone, and Cingolani [ibid]). Finally, these dynamics can lead expatriates to have a heightened sense of civic engagement with their home country as they follow developments at home from the outside (Fawzy Holman; Premazzi, Castagnone, and Cingolani [ibid]). Countries of origin can benefit substantially from the participation of expatriate communities in the political process.11

This collection of studies has examined some of the factors that motivate expatriate communities to participate in these socio-economic transfers and to civically engage with their countries of origin. At-Tayeb (ibid) contends that Maghrebi females often migrate based on a desire to better the living conditions of their families and that their families encourage them to migrate on this basis. There is a relatively new demographic of Maghrebi female labour migrants who have children and partners in their country of origin to support. Persistent feelings of national identity and an altruistic desire to help the home country are also strong motivating factors and are evident, for example, in the case of German physicians of Egyptian origin voluntarily carrying out heart surgery (Moursi [ibid]). Others continue to entertain the possibility that they will one day return (the ‘myth of return’) and make investments and transfers on this basis (Premazzi, Castagnone, and Cingolani [ibid]). Still others, motivated by the desire to grow old or ‘live like a Bey’12 in their home country, really do make concrete plans for return and carry them to completion. They invest in real estate and enterprise accordingly (Bouhdiba [ibid]). The prospect of real political change can be a great motivating force, especially where migrants may have migrated for political reasons and whose communities have been persecuted or are under threat of persecution (Holman [ibid]). The events of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011 have also renewed interest and engagement with country of origin amongst the long-term expatriated and second/third generation migrants (Fawzy; Premazzi, Castagnone, and Cingolani [ibid]).

These studies also make important contributions to our understanding of the kinds of institutional mechanisms which enable and facilitate expatriate transfers and engagement for the MENA region. Meso-lev-

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11 In what follows the word “remittances” is used to refer to this variety of socio-economic transfers unless otherwise made explicit.

12 Originally an Ottoman word that can be considered equivalent to ‘Lord’ in English.
el networks of association and more formalised organisations stand out as being particularly important (At-Tayeb; Holman; Moursi; Premazzi, Castagnone, and Cingolani [ibid]). Denser networks of association carry information effectively and create an environment conducive to relationships based on trust. They also provide a platform for reputation to play a more important role in transactions, making it more worthwhile for an actor to invest in and maintain their reputation. In these circumstances transactions become characterised by reciprocity and cooperation. More trust is built and a positive feedback loop emerges (Ostrom: 1998). These networks of association are often social in nature and practise, rather than purely economic (Granovetter: 1985). Family and friendship ties are incredibly important resources for migrants (Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan: 2011). Furthermore, the fact that migrant networks of association are often characterised by a sense of shared identity also engenders trust and collaborative attitudes (Moursi [ibid]).

When these networks encompass communities in countries of both origin and destination they make migrant transfers possible where otherwise transaction costs would be too high. This is clear, for instance, in the case of remittances being transferred through informal channels. Migrants use their social networks to send money and goods home with a member of their community when they travel between destination and country of origin. They will also cover the expenses of visiting members of their community in the destination country in exchange for that member covering the expenses of their family in their home country using the domestic currency. Such measures avoid transfer costs and costs involved in currency exchange (At-Tayeb [ibid]). They are not managed by any legal system or contract but malfeasance rarely occurs because of the nature of the migrant’s network. Informal remittances could represent as much as 80% of total remittances for some countries in the Arab world (such as Sudan and Syria) (European Investment Bank 2004 estimates, in ibid).

Meso-level networks and organisations also stand out as important in Premazzi, Castagnone, and Cingolani’s paper (ibid). They examine the differences between first and second/third generation Egyptian migrants in Turin. They find that second/third generation migrants are less well connected to Egypt and other members of the Egyptian community. First generation migrants tended to move back and forth between Egypt and Italy over their lifetimes and maintain strong family and social connections with their home country. Many of them still maintain the ‘myth of return’ that they will one day move back to Egypt permanently once they have retired or their children have grown up. Second/third generation migrants, on the other hand, do not travel to Egypt with such frequency and tend not to see themselves living there permanently but only visiting for a holiday. Their networks of association with the Egyptian expatriate community are weaker. One of the problems is that there is a lack of more formal organisations for expatriates in Turin to develop and maintain a shared sense of identity or purpose, or to facilitate and encourage regular meetings and exchange of information.

Although second/third generation migrants in Turin are less well connected to Egypt and members of the Egyptian expatriate community, Premazzi, Castagnone, and Cingolani demonstrate how new social networking technologies are helping them to become more connected and rediscover their Egyptian identities in the wake of the political changes unfolding in Egypt. They not only interact with each other through these networks but also with their peers in Egypt. Nevertheless it is clear that the absence of more formal meso-level organisations and associations limits the expatriate community’s engagement with the origin country. An informative comparison can be made with the more formal organisations and associations founded by German’s of Egyptian origin in Moursi’s study (ibid).

One demographic covered in Moursi’s study is that of skilled workers of Egyptian origin in Germany in the field of medicine. He notes that despite their limited number in comparison to other destination countries, their efficacy is enhanced by the ‘density of their associations, federations, and clubs which have been established by Egyptian expatriates in most major German cities’ (ibid). Many of these are Egyptian-German friendship organisations which gives them another dimension of activity. When members of these more formal organisations return to Egypt, they maintain active channels of communication with Egyptian communities in Germany. This demographic, by virtue of belonging to these more formal organisations, is part of a dense meso-level expatriate network.
Perhaps the most important step in cultivating this demographic’s engagement with their country of origin, however, was the establishment of a formal organisation in the country of origin which could harness their expertise and desire to contribute to their home country and channel it by giving them a shared sense of purpose. The Association of Returning Expatriate Scientists was set up in Egypt to facilitate a broad range of remittances to Egypt which continue to have a significant developmental impact in the health sector. The Association was able to build networks with the vibrant Egyptian expatriate civil society in Germany and engage expatriates in development initiatives.

One of the principle lessons of this study is therefore that those wanting to maximise the developmental potential of expatriates from the Middle East and North Africa would do well to look at ways to encourage and support the growth of these kinds of meso-level networks and organisations. Efforts should also be made to link these organisations across borders, between origin and destination countries, as this can facilitate the greatest flow of well-targeted remittances.

Although the picture is complicated by the mixed motives of the UK and US governments, Holman’s paper (ibid) is also indicative of the heightened efficacy and expediency of more formal organisations based on shared objectives and allegiances. The prospect of going to war for regime change in Iraq was enough to mobilise Iraqi expatriates en masse, both in opposition and support. However, long-term, formal organisations, mostly comprised of particular ethnic groups, were more effective at mobilising resources quickly and making their voices heard. The absence of neutral, overarching institutions to represent the views of the expatriates meant that those who were not organised would not have their voices heard. In this context, it is natural for an unorganised expatriate to support an organised group which they believe will best promote their interests and perspective. Shared interests, experiences, perspectives and overlapping networks of association are often more likely to be created along ethnic lines. This means that expatriates may be more likely to support formal organisations comprised of members of their own ethnic group.

Holman argues that the war coalition’s selective consulting of expatriate groups contributed to a sectarianisation of Iraqi politics in the lead up to toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime which continues to plague post-war Iraqi politics. The lesson is an important one given recent events in Libya and Syria. Where states are seen to have lost legitimacy and other states in the international community seek to consult expatriate groups for understanding and guidance, they must look to avoid partisanship and promote an inclusive voice. Minority rights must be ensured and groups must be given an equal voice. If broad consensus cannot be reached, third parties should be incredibly wary of taking any action. When their home country state is losing legitimacy or entering a transition period, despite the fact that expatriates have a great deal of value to contribute, finding neutral ways to give those contributions a platform is extremely difficult for third parties.

On the other hand, legitimate, democratic states can help shape the macro-institutional environment to facilitate migration, various remittances and expatriate engagement. The macro-institutional environment constitutes an important determining factor for such processes (Bouhdiba; Jaulin [ibid]). It shapes incentives and the development of meso-level organisations and networks. It provides resources that migrants and organisations can use to achieve their ends. It can also provide migrants and organisations with the ability to participate in shaping the institutional environment itself.

Through an examination of the Tunisian state’s historical involvement in this field, Jaulin’s paper (ibid) shows the potential role that states can play in engaging expatriate communities and harnessing their socio-economic development potential. In this case, the state set up an extensive consular network, negotiated agreements for the placement of workers abroad, established associations of migrants abroad to promote cultural activities, granted rights to expatriates to participate in elections, and launched projects to encourage return and investment. A special office was established to engage expatriates in development and encourage remittances.

Such a framework could have provided an excellent base for a coordinated and multi-faceted approach to expatriate engagement to further expand upon. However, as Jaulin documents, successive regimes
have used this institutional framework to push forward and protect their own agenda, thereby eroding the trust and confidence of the expatriate community. Institutions established in destination countries were used to monitor emigrants, dissidents and any opposition groups which might form abroad. This unofficial political function prevented the proper functioning of these institutions with regard to expatriate engagement and remittance transfer. Many expatriates did not trust these institutions and found ways to circumvent them rather than engage with them at any level (ibid). This emphasises the importance of neutrality in the way state institutions engage expatriates.

Tunisian expatriates harboured a desire to engage with their home country, invest in its economy, and contribute to its development; however, they lacked the institutional resources to enable their ambitions and the political context limited their means of engagement. This is evident in Tunisian expatriates’ actions following the revolution; putting forward their list of demands for political reform after the start of the revolution. These demands included expatriates’ rights as Tunisian citizens to participate in elections and be represented within the parliament, the immediate cessation of state manipulation and control over Tunisian associations abroad and a desire for a collaborative approach with these associations on migration-related issues. The expatriate community evidently wanted to retake control of their institutions and use them to contribute to the socio-economic development of their source country. It is very likely that they share this sentiment with other expatriate communities from the MENA region. The opportunity for states to recast their relationships with their expatriates in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’ must be seized.

Another element of the macro-institutional environment which has an impact on investment and remittances sent to the origin country is inclusivity and the quality of the source country’s welfare system. Bouhdiba (ibid) focuses on the retiree expatriate worker demographic, arguing that pensioners must factor in the discrepancy between healthcare and other welfare costs in the origin and destination country. Over a period of time working in the destination country, the migrant will typically have acquired rights to a certain degree of coverage within that country’s welfare system. The quality of this coverage will typically be much better than the available equivalent in the country of origin. The retiree may not even enjoy the same rights to coverage in the country of origin, should they chose to return. These kinds of calculations play a significant role when retirees come to weigh up the costs and benefits of returning home. They must be confident that the risks and needs associated with old age will be sufficiently provided for.

Bouhdiba suggests that country of origin governments should create taskforces to track relevant destination country legislation and, where necessary, lobby and form bilateral agreements with destination country governments to ensure returnees have access to their social rights. Countries of origin should also be sure to make provisions and extend coverage, both to the returnees and their families. States should pay attention, the retiree demographic is important for the socio-economic development of countries of origin because it includes many who wish to use their savings, accumulated over a lifetime of work, to return to and live comfortably in their home country. For many, this may include starting their own small and medium-sized enterprises and engaging in economic activities.

There is a consensus around a more general set of policy recommendations in this collection of studies. One of the most pressing issues to be addressed is the dearth of comprehensive and reliable data on migration related issues in the MENA region. Statistics should be updated regularly and more emphasis should be put on categories of migrants that are often disregarded (or included within broader groups), such as irregular migrants, circular migrants, return migrants, descendants of migrants born abroad, and migrants in Arab oil-producing countries. Detailed information should be provided on migrants’ socio-economic background and their situation in the receiving countries (Jaulin (ibid). This kind of information is essential for feeding research and effective policy-making.

Trust in origin country institutions has been severely eroded over the years in cases where institutions have been governed by regimes trying to ensure their continued dominance over those same institutions. The need to circumvent state institutions has posed a massive obstacle for expatriates who want to engage with and send remittances to their country of origin. This situation can be rectified, however.
The events following the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011 have presented opportunities for reform and rebuilding relationships between citizens and institutions that should not be missed. The recasting of this relationship should be based on the extension of rights to expatriates, including the right to be represented in state institutions, as well as making institutions accountable to those they serve.

Once trust is restored, countries of origin should promote a stronger sense of community and belonging among their expatriates abroad. They should foster the creation of organisations and associations of expatriates and make efforts to protect expatriate rights and provide assistance to the most vulnerable. They should also foster expatriate engagement by providing more exchange programmes and temporary return to facilitate the transfer of social remittances. An enabling environment should be created to facilitate the efforts of those who are willing to contribute to the socio-economic development of their country of origin. This should include special measures to guide and encourage financial remittances and direct investment.

States clearly have a central role to play in orchestrating these changes, particularly in rebuilding the relationship between the people and their institutions. Regional organisations, such as the League of Arab States, have a role to play in developing an integrated strategy to tackle issues of migration. These organisations of states also have more bargaining power on the international stage compared to individual states. This leverage may be used to secure the best rights for their expatriate citizens. International organisations like the International Organization for Migration also have an important role to play in providing assistance and expertise in managing migration and organising migration-related development programmes. Ultimately, the development of a strong civil society will be incredibly important both in the rebuilding of national institutions and in facilitating remittances through the proliferation of meso-level networks, organisations, and associations.
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