THE MALI MIGRATION CRISIS AT A GLANCE

March 2013

175,412
TOTAL MALIAN REFUGEES
IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

260,665
TOTAL IDPs
WITHIN MALI

1,300 Malian Refugees
as of Dec 2012 • registered with UNHCR

12,000 Mauritanian Refugees
as of 7 Feb 2013

26,545 IDPs
as of 7 Jan 2013

12,874 IDPs
as of 18 Dec 2012

2,739 IDPs
as of 18 Nov 2012

19,597 IDPs
as of 16 Feb 2013

69,221 Malian Refugees
as of 17 Feb 2013 • registered with UNHCR

53,841 Malian Refugees
as of 28 Feb 2013 • registered with UNHCR

9,137 Nigerian Returnees
as of 1 Feb 2013
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MIGRATION CRISIS

IOM uses the term “migration crisis” as a way to refer to and analyse the often large-scale and unpredictable migration flows and mobility patterns caused by conflict or natural disasters. IOM views the “migration crisis” concept as analytically useful for identifying all migration-related aspects of such conflicts or natural disasters, including patterns of human mobility before, during and after a crisis, internally and across borders. By capturing patterns of human mobility in their full complexity, a migration crisis analysis allows policymakers to develop an integrated response to the crisis, including humanitarian as well as migration management concerns.

The armed rebellion in northern Mali, and the ensuing military coup in January 2012, prompted a significant migration crisis. Large numbers have fled from the North of Mali internally to Mali’s southern regions as well as into neighbouring countries, with impacts evident within Mali, throughout the region and beyond. Though the North of Mali is sparsely populated, this massive outflow represents a significant proportion of the population. The recent military intervention of 11 January 2012 that was initiated at the request of the Malian authorities marks a new phase in the crisis, already impacting trends and patterns of population movements inside Mali and beyond. Still, it is important to recognize that the migratory consequences of the conflict will continue long after stability has returned.

With “The Mali Migration Crisis at a Glance,” IOM intends to provide policymakers with a snapshot of the migration crisis that continues to engulf Mali, a crisis which requires swift and effective action in the short-, medium- and longer-term, involving a broad variety of national and international actors. IOM encourages the use of a holistic and integrated approach to address the humanitarian, transitional and development aspects of the Malian migration crisis. While not exhaustive, the report aims to highlight the major mobility trends and patterns and to point out key measures that need to be taken to assist those caught in the crisis in finding durable solutions to their plight.

For this report, IOM has relied on data and analysis from a variety of sources, including data collected through the Commission on Population Movement led by IOM and composed of two national government entities, several UN agencies, and a number of NGOs. In terms of structure it looks at the Mali migration picture before January 2012 (Part I); the migration crisis as it evolved between January 2012 and the January 2013 international military intervention (Part II); and the situation since the military intervention (Part III). Finally, a number of recommendations to address the migration dimensions of the Mali crisis are put forth, emphasizing the need for a regional approach (Part IV).
Before the crisis, Mali was mainly a migrant sending country. The migration picture was characterized by a high floridity of population movements inside the country and across borders, and by a large diaspora population residing in the region and beyond. Mali had also become a relatively important transit country, both for migrants attempting to reach northern Africa or Europe and for trans-Saharan migration, and was host to a number of labour migrants and refugees.

Some key aspects of pre-crisis migration patterns include:

1. Important and Complex Circular Migration Flows including Pastoralist Movements

The high level of outward and inward movements between Mali and neighbouring western African countries, in particular Côte d’Ivoire, reflected the importance of circular migration for the Malian population. A third of the workforce in the rural delta region of Mali migrates each season to urban areas outside of Mali in order to look for work, filling labour shortages in neighbouring countries. Traditionally, seasonal labour migration from the arid parts of Mali, Mauritania and Niger has taken place to plantations and mines on the coast of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. Circular migration patterns also include pastoralist movements. Approximately 500,000 Tuaregs and other pastoralist groups in Mali, such as Sonike, Toucouleur, Moors and Peuls, have been moving along traditional routes from the North to the South of Mali, as well as towards coastal countries and western Africa. These processes have been facilitated by the ease of travel between ECOWAS countries due to the lack of a visa requirement for the citizens of ECOWAS member states.

2. Migration Routes through Mali: From smuggling to trafficking of people and goods

Over the last decade, Mali has become a transit country for migrants moving from countries in southern Africa towards northern African and Europe, with Gao serving as an important departure point. Mali has also been a transit country for trans-Saharan migration, including for Senegalese and Nigeriens. The absence of a visa requirement for ECOWAS citizens, the ease of travel for Malians throughout both the ECOWAS and Maghreb regions, the lack of reliable data collection and porous borders stretching for thousands of kilometres are all factors that have facilitated irregular transit migration.

Consequently, Mali has been increasingly characterized by a high level of human smuggling and trafficking of Malians and other nationalities for the purpose of sexual exploitation and forced labour, as well as cross-border trafficking of legal and illegal items, such as weapons, drugs, and cigarettes. As an example, consumer goods imported to Mauritania have been further traded through Timbuktu in Mali, often bypassing official customs regulation and inspection. Competition over the control of smuggling routes and the reported tolerance of Malian state officials’ towards criminal activity are seen as factors which have contributed toward the establishment of extremist groups in Mali.

3. Internal Migration Trends: Increased urbanization and food insecurity

Before the conflict, Malians migrated internally mainly in order to live closer to their family members and, to a lesser extent, to pursue professional and educational opportunities. Bamako and other urban areas were the major destination points for internal migrants, with an increasing trend towards urbanization in Mali in the years before the outbreak of the conflict in 2012, thus aggravating the pressures placed on insufficient infrastructure and basic services in urban areas. In 2010, 36% of the Malian population lived in urban areas. This proportion is expected to rise to over 60% of the total population by 2024.

Over the past few years, these mobility patterns took place within the larger context of severe food insecurity across the Sahel region, which by 2011 had developed into an acute crisis with pockets of famine. While difficult to fully assess in the current context, the food crisis has clearly influenced mobility patterns. Given their dependence on livestock, pastoralist groups have been disproportionately affected by the food crisis, which in turn further reduced their ability to cope with the 2012 crisis in northern Mali. Farmers in the Sahel region have also experienced the stark impact of the drought cycle on their livelihoods capacities and their resilience. The food crisis, as in other parts of the Sahel, is considered to have further fostered the permanent rural to urban migration trends already observed in the region. This underlying factor of vulnerability is an essential element to consider when looking at the current crisis and potential post-crisis and recovery options.

4. Foreign Population in Mali: Centered on regional migration

Historically, Mali has received relatively low numbers of labour migrants, mainly from the African region. Continued economic growth in Mali and the dynamics in certain economic sectors before the crisis, however, attracted an increasing number of foreign nationals from the ECOWAS region and beyond. In 2010, the foreign population in Mali was estimated at 162,677.
persons, including 77,549 nationals from Côte d’Ivoire, and 22,365 from Burkina Faso. In the past decades, Mali has also received various large waves of refugees from neighbouring countries, such as Mauritania (after the Mauritanian-Senegal war in 1989), Côte d’Ivoire (after the Civil War started in 2002) and Sierra Leone (following internal conflicts in the 1990s). While most of these refugees returned home, a residual case-load remained in Mali. Before the outbreak of the current conflict in January 2012, 15,624 refugees and 2,497 asylum seekers were registered with UNHCR in Mali.

5. Malians Abroad: A significant diaspora

As of 2010, 1,013,760 Malians were living abroad, mainly in neighbouring countries but also in France, Spain and other parts of the world. In 2009, Malians sent home remittances totalling USD 405 million. This sizeable diaspora originates mainly from the rural areas of Mali, where poverty, demographic pressures, unemployment and difficult climatic conditions act as the principal push factors. With such a large diaspora, return migration to Mali is also an important phenomenon, including Malians in an irregular immigration status and who are deported back to their country. Between 2002 and 2008, Malians who returned home (either voluntarily or through deportation) included 5,825 from various African countries, 4,781 from Europe, 434 from Asia and 35 from America.

Countries with the highest numbers of Malian diaspora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>440,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>133,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>69,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>68,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>68,295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In February 2011, civil unrest in Libya led to one of the largest migration crises in modern history, with 790,000 migrants from more than 120 countries fleeing across Libyan borders from February to December 2011. Before this crisis, Libya was a country of destination and transit for emigrants from Mali seeking job opportunities, better living conditions or an escape from local clanship rivalries, including a large number of Tuareg nomads. Within this group of Malian migrants, it is important to distinguish between those who were mainly employed in construction or the service sector and those engaged in security for the former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

The conflict in Libya had various implications for the Malian population, in particular the loss of financial resources in the form of remittances and the investments that Libya had been making in Mali, an influx of weapons and the return of more than 11,395* Malians. These and other factors contributed to rising unemployment levels, an increase in the price of basic commodities, high transportation costs, and inadequate health and well-being services. Most Malians returning home were extremely poor and had lost all of their belongings, which placed additional stress on communities due to the need to feed and house increasing numbers of people. Desperation, anxiety and frustration have thus been common feelings among returnees, who were suddenly uprooted from their lives and deprived of the role of livelihood provider for their families and thrown into a situation of dependency and poverty, leading to the intention of many returnees to re-emigrate.

*The total number of Malian returnees remains undetermined in the North of Mali due to the rebels’ control of this area from early 2012 until recently. Around 92% of the returnees were males.
In January 2012, the start of the armed rebellion in the North of Mali and the subsequent military coup caused a migration crisis of significant scope and size, both within and outside of Mali. As of the international military intervention in January 2013, 376,828 people had been displaced, including 228,920 (61%) internally displaced and 147,908 (39%) displaced into neighbouring countries. Given that the North of Mali is sparsely populated, this massive outflow represents a significant number of the overall population in the North (23%), estimated at 1.3 million people (or 8.6% of the total population of Mali) that had to flee the conflict zones to escape violence.

The key characteristics of the current migration crisis are:

### I. Large Scale Internal Displacement to Southern Cities

**ORIGIN:** As of mid-January 2013, an estimated 228,920 persons had been internally displaced. There were equal numbers of men and women, half of the population was under 18 years old, and two-thirds were displaced from the North to the South. New displacements occurred mostly between March and July 2012 (62% of the total), and reached a peak in April after rebels gained control of the cities of Timbuktu and Gao. Most IDPs came directly from Timbuktu and Gao and, to a lesser extent, from Mopti and Kidal. While most displaced persons indicated conflict and violence as the primary cause of their displacement, one third also highlighted the food crisis as a secondary factor of displacement.

**DESTINATION:** Most of the IDPs who fled the North to the South have been living with host families or in rented housing in Bamako (22%), Mopti (18%), Segou (13%), Koulikoro (7%), Sikasso (6%) and Kayes (1%), which explains the absence of IDP camps. Another characteristic of the displacement over this period has been its degree of fluidity: due to the necessity to check on family members, livestock and property in the original places of settlement, 19% of the displaced engaged in back and forth movements from their place of displacement to their area of origin. Mobility-related obstacles (see Box 3) also reportedly forced some in the North of the country to flee into the areas surrounding their places of origin, including into the desert and bush, which resulted in severe humanitarian and security consequences. The Commission on Population Movement (Commission sur les Mouvements de Population, CMP) has reported that of the overall total of IDPs, 11% have been displaced within the Gao district, 13% within the Kidal district and 10% within the district of Timbuktu, including some people reportedly stranded at the closed border to Algeria.

**COMPOSITION AND VULNERABILITY:** During this period, IDPs were composed of individuals and groups with a variety of ethnic and political backgrounds. For example, civil servants (along with family members) originating from the South but working and residing in the North, were displaced to the South according to the CMP, where reportedly they continued to work following their integration into the local civil service. In general, the situation of IDPs has been marked by security and humanitarian constraints, including a lack of access to and limited availability of basic services and supplies, such as food, clean water and health care. Special vulnerabilities among the displaced populations have also been identified, including more than 1,263 children separated from their parents across Mali according to UNICEF. As a result of their protracted situations, some IDPs started moving further away from urban areas to more remote neighbourhoods in search of more affordable housing. As confirmed by a survey carried out by IOM in Bamako in November 2012 the vast majority of IDPs (94%) expressed a wish to return to their places of origin, with 70% noting that improved security would be the primary condition for return, and 16% stating that improved economic conditions are needed before they would return home.

### 2. Refugee Flows to Neighbouring Countries

**ORIGIN AND DESTINATION:** Before the international military intervention of 11 January 2013, UNHCR had registered 147,908 refugees seeking shelter in neighbouring countries (for a detailed breakdown, see Table 3 below). The destination of Malian refugees in neighbouring countries was chosen based on a) the proximity and accessibility from their respective region of origin in Mali, b) similar ethnic background (for instance, Malian pastoralists who sought refuge in Hodh el Charghi, Mauritania share some ethnic roots with the Maurita-
nian pastoralists from that region), and c) presence of Malian diaspora communities in countries of the region (for instance, in Côte d’Ivoire or in Burkina Faso).

**SETTLEMENTS**: As was also the case for IDPs, the majority of refugees who fled between the beginning of March and the end of July 2012 settled in urban centers. This has led to considerable numbers of unregistered urban refugees, as for example in Mauritania, where an estimated 15,000 Malians reportedly settled in Nouakchott as of 9 January 2013. Initially, the high numbers of Malian refugees who did not find their way to urban centres were scattered in spontaneous sites close to the border with Mali. In order to decrease the risk of tensions at the border linked to waves of incoming refugees, they were relocated to official camps that were often further inland – for instance, in Niger from Banibangou to Mangaize camp, in Burkina Faso from Damba and Gandafabou settlements and spontaneous sites to official camps like Mentao or Goudébo and in Mauritania from Fassala transit centre to Mbéra refugee camp.

**MALIAN REFUGEES OUTSIDE THE REGION**: Very few Malians sought refuge outside the region. As an example, between January and December 2012, the EU countries received a mere total of 2,080 Malian asylum seekers. Further, there is no indication that the number of Malians in Europe has increased, while the overall number of asylum-seekers in absolute terms has remained small.

*Malian refugees as of 10 January 2013 (source: UNHCR)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Malian Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALGERIA</strong>:</td>
<td>1,500 Malian refugees; entering through the south</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NIGER</strong>:</td>
<td>49,748 Malian refugees from Menaka, Anderboukan, Inchinanan and Gao; entering through the western border with Mali; settling in 3 official camps (Abala, Tabareybarey, Mangaize) and 12 other settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BURKINA FASO</strong>:</td>
<td>38,776 Malian refugees from Gao, N’zillit, Timbuktu and Inthaka; entering through Inabao; settling in 14 refugee settlements and four official camps (2 permanent camps, Mentao and Goudébo, and 2 camps that are planned to close, Gandafabou and Damba)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CÔTE D’IVOIRE</strong>:</td>
<td>3,599 Malian refugees; entering through Pogo, Ouagolodougou, Man, Odienné and Tingrela; mostly settling in the West of the country (Issia, Guessabo/Mossidougou, Daloa, most in Vavoua) in host families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GUINEA</strong>:</td>
<td>26 Malian refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SENEGAL</strong>:</td>
<td>Unknown Number of Malian refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAURITANIA</strong>:</td>
<td>54,259 Malian refugees from Lere, Lamparao, Niafounké and Timbuktu; entering through the Fassala and Néré transit centres; settling in Fassala and Néré; mostly in Mbéra refugee camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong>:</td>
<td>147,908 Malian refugees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**3. Other Crisis-induced Mobility Patterns and Flows**

Due to the inaccessibility of certain routes within Mali (such as to Bamako), many Malians crossed into neighbouring countries in order to re-enter Mali at a different point, often through Burkina Faso and Niger.

A number of foreign nationals who were living in Mali before the crisis returned to their country of origin. For instance, 3,127 Nigeriens returned from the Gao area in Mali to Niger, often moving to the same settlement as Malian refugees. In addition, 8,000 of the 12,000 Mauritanian refugees residing in Mali had expressed their wish to return to Mauritania as of shortly before the international military intervention on 11 January 2013, according to UNHCR.

An anecdotal indicator of mobility is the number of tourists visiting Mali, which drastically declined from 200,000 in 2011 to only 10,000 in 2012, thus presenting a major loss of income for the Malian population and adding further to the stress on communities.

**OBSTACLES TO MOBILITY**

Internal population movements as well as movements to neighboring countries were hampered by several factors. In Mali, the movement by roads and waterways, including secondary roads from the northern regions and other conflict-affected areas to the South of Mali, were restricted by the major security concerns posed by insurgent groups in the North. Due to this and to the impact of heavy floods in the South, hundreds of Tuaregs from Gao and Timbuktu had remained stranded in the inner delta of Mali in the Mopti Region in August 2012, unable to follow their traditional transhumance routes.

Other displaced populations lacking financial resources or suffering from physical vulnerabilities (such as old age or illness) were not able to move easily.

Mobility from Mali to neighboring countries was hampered as well, for instance due to interrupted or unaffordable public transport, or to high numbers of insurgent groups at the borders, such as forces of the MUJAO (Mouvement pour l’unicité et le djihad en Afrique de l’Ouest) at the Malian border with Niger. Border closures and security enforcement measures by neighbouring countries prevented also prevented some populations from leaving Mali to seek refuge, and prevented others from following their traditional transhumance routes within the Sahel.
The international military intervention, which began on 11 January 2013 with the deployment of French troops at the request of the Malian authorities, marks a new phase in the Mali crisis. Many reports cite improved security and relative stability in the North of the country, although the situation in some places remains tense, including in Timbuktu and Kidal, in other places such as Gao the situation is completely unstable and highly precarious. Conditions in Bamako also remain volatile, with reported fighting within the Malian Army and continuing political uncertainty. However, it has neither resulted in significant shifts of pre-intervention mobility patterns nor caused massive movements. Since the military intervention, an additional 40,000 people have been displaced (a 13% increase), bringing the total to approximately 436,077 displaced persons. At the same time, some returns of IDPs have also been observed, although these are still sporadic due to the predominantly volatile security situation in the North of Mali.

1. Internal and Cross-Border Displacement since January 2013

Since the military intervention on 11 January, the total number of IDPs registered by the CMP has risen by around 30,000 to a new total of 260,665 IDPs as of 21 February 2013. This includes 15,715 Malians who moved from northern regions (Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu) towards the South of Mali between 12 January and 10 February, as identified at different flow monitoring points. Displacement in the North includes between 4,000 and 6,000 people that are still stranded at the closed border to Algeria at Tinzawaten. The number of newly registered refugees has increased by approximately 24,772 since 11 January 2013, bringing the overall number at 175,412.

2. Movements and Intention of Return of IDPs

FIGURES: The number of registered returns has remained low compared to the number of newly displaced people within Mali. Between 12 January and 10 February 2013, only 2,310 individuals were monitored moving back, mostly from Bamako (998), Mopti (507), Segou (308) and Sikasso (205) to their areas of origin in the north of the country (1,028 to Timbuktu, 962 to Mopti and 306 to Gao) although an increased movement of people towards the north of the country has been observed recently.

INTENTIONS: An intention survey conducted by IOM on displaced populations in Mali at the beginning of February showed that 93% of IDPs intend to return to their region of origin, even though 40% do not know when they wish to return. 89% of respondents were expecting that security conditions would quickly become adequate in northern Mali, which suggests that rapid returns to the North are likely to occur as soon as security conditions allow it. However, households also indicated that their return date would depend not only on the security situation in the North (62%), but also on the school calendar (37%), the agricultural calendar (5%) and the availability of transport (5%). The main priority needs identified in return areas were food, transportation and shelter. Regarding the last point, 30% of respondents indicated that their habitat had been damaged or destroyed. An additional condition, considered by respondents as a prerequisite for safe return, is the relocation of the currently displaced civil servants and the resumption of government services.

Displaced Malians within Mali and in Neighbouring Countries since 11 January 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Mallans who fled within Mali and to neighbouring countries since 11 Jan 2013</th>
<th>Total number of displaced persons in Mali and in neighbouring countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bamako</td>
<td>7,216</td>
<td>62,414 (13.02.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>25,977 (06.12.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayes</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>2,739 (19.02.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidal</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>28,645 (31.10.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koulikoro</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>19,597 (13.02.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mopti</td>
<td>4,504</td>
<td>40,056 (05.02.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segou</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>46,599 (18.02.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikasso</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>12,874 (19.02.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timbuktu</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>21,764 (01.10.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total IDPs</td>
<td>15,715</td>
<td>260,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>5,578</td>
<td>53,841 (20.02.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>5,835</td>
<td>47,205 (20.02.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3,599 (19.01.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>26 (11.01.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>13,359</td>
<td>69,221 (17.02.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>20 (20.07.2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Refugees</td>
<td>24,772</td>
<td>175,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>40,487</td>
<td>436,077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CURRENT OBSTACLES TO MIGRATION MOVEMENTS

Despite the progressive reopening of roads, population movements, especially return movements, continue to be obstructed because of the prevailing security situation in the North, particularly in Gao. Movements have been hindered by a lack of available transportation to the northern areas and by depleted financial resources, as well as by the threat of landmines and improvised explosive devices.\textsuperscript{69} Pastoralists and seasonal labor migrant movements are still interrupted and trade activities inhibited, due to depleted livestock and continuing border closures, for example with Algeria.\textsuperscript{50} Tensions on the basis of ethnic grounds have been rising, mainly affecting Tuaregs, Arabs and Peuls, which has reportedly resulted in lootings and other reprisal attacks.\textsuperscript{51}
IV

ADDRESSING THE MALI MIGRATION CRISIS THROUGH A HOLISTIC APPROACH

The migration dimensions of the crisis in Mali present important challenges to be addressed. While the international military intervention did not lead to massive waves of internal and cross-border displacement, it has led to new flows of displacement in line with figures observed throughout the crisis.52

This section of the report presents a set of initial recommendations aimed at improving conditions for sustainable return, providing viable and durable solutions to resolve current displacement, and preventing or mitigating potential future displacement. The recommendations have been developed using IOM’s Migration Crisis Operational Framework,53 a tool developed to provide a comprehensive analysis of gaps and needs related to mobility in crisis situations. This approach aims at providing a holistic set of recommendations for the different actors involved in the current response, from national counterparts, to local and international humanitarian partners, as well as the international community at large.

1. Strengthening information collection and management

In order to better plan activities for addressing forced migration related issues, it is essential to further invest in tracking the movements of the population and monitoring the needs of IDPs and returnees, with a focus on identifying way points, displacement sites and protection concerns, profiling of IDPs and return intentions, as well as assessments in areas of return. Expanding the monitoring of cross-border and internal way points is further recommended to capture any spontaneous returns of refugees and IDPs (for example, as they are moving from south to north through Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, or from west to east through Mauritania).

2. Continuing responding to the most pressing humanitarian needs of displaced persons and hosting communities

As displacements are likely to be protracted by the on-going conflict and returns are may take place over an extended period of time, it will be important to maintain humanitarian profiling of displaced populations and their host communities, in particular for the most vulnerable for whom return is not an immediate or recommended option. Protection concerns for ethnic discrimination and raising conflicts within the hosting communities will have to be taken into account and closely monitored.

Therefore, humanitarian assistance to alleviate food insecurity, to ensure the availability of health care services, safe water, hygiene promotion, psychosocial support and to address other needs of vulnerable populations in areas of displacement (Non -Food Items, Shelter, WASH, etc.) will be required as well as support to the hosting communities, with an increased focus on livelihood support linking displacement and returns with the resilience strategy for the Sahel. It will be essential in the conduct of any livelihood intervention to pay due consideration to the risk of tensions in vulnerable host communities that have been unduly impacted by the crisis while they are also in need of assistance. Livelihood support should also be tailored in such a way that it does not impact on the return intentions of IDPs.

3. Carefully supporting return, reintegration and stabilization

Although the volume, pace and nature of returns will continue to be contingent primarily upon the security situation, longer-term stability will depend on three key variables: the availability of basic services in communities in the North, livelihood opportunities and increased confidence in government.

In the immediate term, efforts should be made to preposition support to spontaneous returns, providing en route humanitarian assistance through a system of fixed and mobile way stations. This activity is conditional, depending on the security situation along the route and in destinations, in order to avoid creating pull factors and exposing returnees and humanitarian operators to risks.

The second urgent effort should be supporting the returnees’ reintegration process by providing initial family-level reintegration support that addresses material reinsertion needs, followed by livelihood programmes.

It is further recommended to ensure that the post-crisis strategy of the international community includes community-based stabilization initiatives, aimed at improving the sustainability of return and mitigating as well as preventing the root causes of conflict at the community and local governance levels (for instance, through community dialogues, peace dividends distribution, etc).

In this context, it is vital that relationships and trust are built between locals and community authorities in the North, where change is achieved slowly and resources often take a long time to secure. One way to further support the resilience agenda would be to rapidly support the rehabilitation of community infrastructure and the re-establishment of basic services and government presence in the North.

4. Integrating a cross-border and regional approach

Due to the large number of people displaced across the re-
gion, the porous nature of borders throughout the Sahel, the important trade routes that support the regional economy (including illegal trade) and cross-border activities, migration routes (including trafficking) and transhumance routes, it is therefore essential to establish a regional approach to the migration crisis affecting Mali. In particular, this implies the development of complementary and consistent approaches to address the issues of refugees and IDPs.

Since cross-border illegal activities flourish in the context of weak governance, it is also important to invest in alternative livelihoods and income-generating opportunities for marginalized border communities whose members are now engaged in illegal cross-border activities, such as the trafficking of weapons and people.

Beyond the migration crisis, the looming food security crisis affects the entire Sahel region and requires a better integration of a humanitarian and a transition approach in order to deal with the specific issues in Mali within the broader context of the regional resilience agenda.

5. Investing in building resilience and peace

Underlying region-wide issues comprised of food insecurity, high food prices, insecurity, criminal activities and high unemployment rates present significant push-factors for regional migration and have been increased by the crisis in Mali. Food insecurity alone affected over 18 million households across the Sahel in 2012, and is likely to continue in 2013. Therefore, efforts to develop and support longer-term resilience should consider underlying food insecurity through targeted sustainable livelihoods programs focusing on unemployed and vulnerable youth.

In this context, and in line with the IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework, it will be essential to also facilitate the peace-building, conflict mitigation and confidence-building process between different ethnic communities as well as between the general population and government institutions and their partners.

In the context of consolidation of the democratic process, an urgent effort is recommended to enable disenfranchised, displaced populations to register and vote. IDPs and refugees should participate in the parliamentary elections for their regions of origin, in order to ensure that they are duly represented in the next legislature and that the government pays attention to their needs and concerns.

Other important elements that will need to be addressed and supported in the future include:

- A national peace-building process and security sector reform through governance, reintegration and targeted livelihood support for disaffected and/or vulnerable youth and ex-combatants.
- Capacity-building of the Government in the area of integrated border management programs.
- Long-term stability, governance and economic development needs by supporting resilience-building, the resolution of land- and other resource-related disputes, and the engagement of diaspora for peace and development, as well as building the country’s migration management capacities.

KEY ISSUES AND TRENDS TO MONITOR

While these recommendations are aimed at ensuring that urgent humanitarian needs and post-crisis return and stabilization for the displaced are met, there are a number of underlying factors that will need to be closely monitored since they can influence the post-crisis strategy. IOM is planning to produce a more in-depth analysis of migration patterns and trends in relation to the Mali crisis, within a broader regional approach to mobility and resilience, for which the following issues have been pre-identified:

Perception of displacement among host communities in places of origin and of displacement: New waves of displacement can change the dynamic and the perception among host communities, which have tolerated the displaced based on the perception that they are mainly victims of the rebellion. Protracted displacement related to security concerns or expectations of retaliation upon return can lead to politicization. The way that displacement is perceived can also impact the reinsertion of different groups as they return, including a potential association along ethnic or political lines that can exacerbate community tensions.

Rapid urbanization induced by urban displaced: A volatile security situation can reinforce on-going urbanization trends, in Bamako as well as in other cities, which is often unplanned and unmanaged. The issue of urban settlements represents an important challenge for the displaced populations given that they usually settle in impoverished areas with limited access. It also poses a challenge for host communities, since it can impact on the repartition of populations along ethnic and cultural lines in urban settlements.

Regional security and peace-building dimension: Given the interconnections between different terrorist groups operating in Western Africa, security sector and peace-building efforts in Mali must be looked at through a broader regional lens, including when it comes to the return and reintegration of displaced populations that can be associated with those groups.
REFERENCES


5. Malian citizens are one of the most privileged Sub-Saharan nationalities in terms of ease of entry into Maghreb countries. See: Di Bartolomeo, A. et al (2010).


17. IOM (2009).

18. IOM (2013). Outward Migration from Mali. IOM, 18 January 2013, http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/world-migration/index_big.html (accessed 7 February 2013). This is based on data from the World Bank as of 2010, which is compiled from information provided by consulates. Since this data does not take into account the number of Malians residing abroad in an irregular status, the actual figures are likely much higher. For a discussion of this issue, see: IOM (2009), Migration au Mali: Profil National, p. 51.

19. Unless otherwise specified, the information in this box is based on: IOM (2012), Returnees from Libya: The Bittersweet Experience of Coming Home, Summary Report and IOM (2012), Migrants Caught in Crisis: The IOM Experience in Libya.

20. This section is mostly based on the reports of the Commission on Population Movement (CPM) led by IOM and com posed of two national government entities, several UN agencies, and a number of NGOs. Unless otherwise specified, references are from the CPM report of 24 January 2013, covering the period before the international military intervention on 11 January 2013.


29 Unless otherwise specified, the information presented in this section is from UNHCR and mostly concerns Malian refugees in Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Mauritania. See: UNHCR (2013), Mali Operation Information Sharing Portal, Regional Overview. Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/MaliSituation/.


32 IOM internal documents.

33 IOM internal documents.


35 Official number provided by Service d’Aide et d’Assistance aux Réfugiés et Apatrides (SAARA), containing current figures and numbers as of May 2012.


45 Official number provided by Service d’Aide et d’Assistance aux Réfugiés et Apatrides (SAARA) containing current figures and numbers as of May 2012.

46 The information is from IOM internal documents. There has not yet been a survey conducted on the return intentions of Malian refugees.


50 IOM internal information; OCHA, Mali Complex Emergency Situation Report No. 21, 16 January 2013.


56 Refers comprehensively to the influx of former militia and young migrants in the aftermath of the Qaddafi regime in Libya, which has had a particular impact in the North of Mali.