MIGRANT WELL-BEING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: A FOCUS ON GENDER IN CAIRO

WORKING PAPER FOR THE WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2013
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MIGRANT WELL-BEING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: A FOCUS ON GENDER IN CAIRO

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By Harry Cook and Jane Sail
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Introduction

This paper will complement the 2013 edition of IOM’s World Migration Report (WMR). In accordance with the WMR, it focuses on four dimensions of migrant well-being: career, financial, social and community. This paper has three main aims. The first is to provide an overview of the principal migration trends within and to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as a discussion of the well-being of principal categories of migrants associated with those trends and some of the specific determinant factors of the well-being of these particular migrants. This is achieved through a review of available literature and case data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The second is to examine gender as a particularly important cross-cutting issue in the region that impacts the well-being of migrants from a broad range of social backgrounds. A case study of migrants in central and greater Cairo forms the focus of this examination and includes an analysis of in-depth, primary data on well-being collected from 561 migrants. Significant gender discrepancies are found across nearly all of the migrant well-being indicators used. Arguments are advanced as to why similar results regarding gender-related inequalities may be expected to a lesser or larger extent across other parts of the MENA region. Addressing this second aim forms the focus of the paper and it is the analysis therein that ultimately serves the paper’s third aim: examining how the relationships between gender and migrant well-being in the MENA region are associated with development outcomes and providing policy recommendations on this basis.

Addressing migrant well-being in the MENA region is challenging, particularly given the paucity of existing data. The current study therefore focuses on the well-being of migrants in Cairo in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the various dimensions of well-being.

One of the challenges of undertaking research on migrant well-being in the region arises from trying to reconcile a lack of appropriate data with the need to give proper treatment to well-being as a rich, multifaceted concept. The empirical application of such a concept is designed to provide a more holistic measure of a migrant’s or community of migrants’ circumstances and yield insights that may otherwise be missed by more parsimonious sets of indicators. Remaining true to the intention of such a concept therefore requires a qualitatively broad range of data on any given migrant or migrant community. This is challenging in a region where data on even the most basic indicators of migrants’ circumstances are hard to come by.

The shortage of reliable data concerning migration in the MENA region exists in part because of the lack of institutionalized data collection points and integrated border management technology. It is also worth noting that the dynamic and varied nature of migration flows¹ in the region also makes migrant communities harder to track. Furthermore, the nature of migration flows can be extremely politically sensitive. This means that sometimes data are simply not collected. In states where more sophisticated border management systems and data collection points are in place, sensitive data are rarely published (such as those on human trafficking and the exploitation and abuse of guest workers and migrants). It is also difficult to carry out first-hand research in many countries in the region, as it must be permitted by government agencies. These considerations are relevant to all of the key labour importing States in the region as well as those states with the largest stocks of non-economic immigrants (Jordan and the Gulf States).

Another challenge of undertaking research on migrant well-being in the region is that where research has been carried out, it has usually focused solely on vulnerable communities in need of support and/or international protection. The continued selection of populations that are similar in this respect means that data do not present much variation in levels of well-being. This makes it difficult to explore the complex causal determinants of the well-being of migrants through comparative analysis since, for any sample, there effectively is no variation in the dependent variable to help us identify and estimate the power of various explanatory variables.

¹ These migration flows include but are not limited to the following: high- and low-skilled economic migrants, refugees, victims of trafficking, smuggled migrants, unaccompanied minors, stranded migrants and migrants moving for environmental reasons.
Part of the reason for the continued focus on vulnerable populations is the need to more efficiently direct aid and development initiatives, and also partly because, through the work of aid and development agencies, these are the kinds of communities that have more institutionalized and established points of access to them. This creates a kind of feedback loop where some communities become oversampled and others are left completely unrecorded. Apart from denoting a clear research bias, this focus on similar at-risk populations means that aggregating and analysing existing research in this field would yield few interesting insights. The risk would be that such an endeavour would represent a rehashing of existing work to restate what we already know—that these vulnerable communities have low levels of well-being.

Having surveyed much of the existing literature, it was with these concerns and the aforementioned contextual difficulties in mind that the Regional Office decided to collect directly comparable, primary data on well-being for a diverse sample of migrants, which could provide insight into some of the complex causal determinants of well-being in the region. Given constraints on time and resources, the challenge was to access a sample appropriate for a comparative analysis, the results of which could be relevant for the wider region. A decision was taken to survey migrants of different social backgrounds in central and greater Cairo who had come from States that had suffered recent periods of conflict. As detailed later in the paper, gender inequality is an important issue across the region. An examination of the impact of gender on the well-being of this sample of migrants was therefore taken as a line of analysis which could provide insights that could potentially be extrapolated to, or at least be relevant for, the wider MENA region.

The paper is divided into two main sections. The first section provides an overview of the principal migration trends to and within the region, as well as a discussion of migrant well-being and determinant factors of well-being within the region. The second section presents the focus of the paper: an analysis of the differences between male and female migrants’ levels of well-being in central and greater Cairo. The first part of this section provides an overview of Cairo’s position in the context of the wider region and a rationale for the choice of focus on gender inequality. The second part discusses the methodology of the study. The third part is a presentation and analysis of the data, followed by an examination of how trends in migrant well-being compare with those of the native-born population. Conclusions and recommendations are made in the final section.
Section I: A regional overview

The MENA region presents an intriguing combination of migration patterns, as it is at once a place of origin, transit and destination for significant international and intraregional flows, regular and irregular. One of the most remarkable trends in recent international migration has been the inflow of economically motivated migrants to MENA directed predominantly, although not exclusively, to the oil- and primary resource–exporting countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)) and Libya.

For many low-skilled South and South-East Asians of poor socioeconomic background and with few employment opportunities in their home countries, the oil-rich Gulf States are an attractive destination (Kapiszewski, 2009). Such flows are highly gendered, with men dominating the construction sector and women dominating the domestic sector – both vulnerable areas of work; estimates from national sources suggest that 50–76 per cent of documented international migrants from the Philippines and Sri Lanka, and 90 per cent of those from Indonesia are women (Sonmez et al., 2011).

Intraregional migrants from labour-exporting countries in the Mashreq and the Maghreb to the Gulf are still a significant category, although in the face of increased competition from South and South-East Asian workers, their presence in the Gulf countries has diminished dramatically, as shown in Figure 1 (Kapiszewski, 2009). That said, in recognition of their structural dependence on foreign workers (both Arab and Asian) and growing domestic unemployment rates, the GCC States have embarked upon policies of “indigenization” to increase the labour participation of their own national workforces (Kapiszewski, 2009).

Figure 1: Arabs as a share of foreigners in GCC countries, 1975, 1985, 1996, 2002–2004 (%)
Libya also has an oil economy, and although it has a larger domestic labour market than the GCC States, it still attracts foreign migrants from neighbouring Arab and sub-Saharan African countries as well as South Asia. Unlike the Gulf States, Libya is considered an easy destination for irregular migration, confirmed by 26 per cent of respondents in an IOM survey of Egyptian youth migration aspirations (2011). Along with other Maghreb countries, it serves as a transit zone for migrants on their way to Europe, North America and Australia. A spike in migrants destined for Malta and Lampedusa as a result of the recent Arab uprisings, combined with continuing high regional unemployment, has provoked renewed concern about flows of irregular migrants to Europe. This is coupled with continued accounts of abuse of migrants within Libya.

The MENA region is also host to millions of forced migrants fleeing recent armed conflicts, protracted sectarian violence, long-term internal conflict, and the effects of desertification and climate change. Of the recent Arab uprisings, the 2011 war in Libya and the ongoing Syrian civil war are remarkable for causing the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of nationals and foreign migrant workers, as shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 (UNHCR, 2012).

Table 1: Major countries of destination for migrants displaced from Libya (including third-country nationals)², March 2011–January 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination country</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt²</td>
<td>Egyptians</td>
<td>173,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>89,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>263,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia²</td>
<td>Tunisians</td>
<td>137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>208,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>345,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger²</td>
<td>Of the Niger</td>
<td>77,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>5,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria²</td>
<td>Algerians</td>
<td>1,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>12,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad²</td>
<td>Chadians</td>
<td>50,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total returnees</td>
<td></td>
<td>444,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total TCN</td>
<td></td>
<td>316,341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and UNHCR, January 2012.
Notes: ² IOM from Libya-Egypt border crossing, January 2012.
       ² Egyptian consulate in Tunisia, March 2011.
       ² IOM cross-border movements, October 2011.

The mass migration of around 790,000 people from Libya is considered, “one of the largest migration crises in modern history” (IOM, 2012a), although a refugee crisis was avoided as most Libyans migrated cyclically and did not apply for refugee status. IOM notes that of the 626,010 Libyans who fled to Tunisia, all had returned by 2012 (IOM, 2012a:11). Not only did the crisis lead many Libyans to flee, if many only temporarily, but it also

² Third-country nationals (TCNs) refer to people of different nationalities living within a host country. In this context, they refer to nationals fleeing Libya to neighbouring countries, who are neither Libyan nor from the host country.
resulted in the mass return-migration of regional foreign workers (Table 1). These returnees often travelled by truck in unacceptable conditions, although some thousands were left stranded within Libya or at camps along neighbouring borders and assisted by IOM. Thousands of Bangladeshi, Filipino, Pakistani and Vietnamese workers were also repatriated, assisted by their governments, IOM and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Due to difficulties reintegrating in their home communities and a return to relative stability in Libya, there are signs of growing numbers of returning Chadians, sub-Saharan Africans and some Asian migrants (IOM, 2012b).

As of this writing, the Syrian conflict is thought to have internally displaced around 2 million Syrian nationals and created over 300,000 refugees (Table 2). Official UNHCR and government figures likely underestimate the extent of the displacement as high numbers of migrants are estimated to be unregistered and living with relatives and host families in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (UNICEF, 2012). Iraqi and Palestinian refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic have been further displaced, returning to Iraq or other neighbouring countries.

Table 2: Key patterns of displacement from the Syrian conflict, as of October 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jordan*</th>
<th>Turkeyb</th>
<th>Lebanonc</th>
<th>Iraqd</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees</td>
<td>58,005</td>
<td>96,397</td>
<td>65,801</td>
<td>39,036</td>
<td>259,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrians awaiting UNHCR registration</td>
<td>30,758</td>
<td>29,734</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>88,763</td>
<td>96,397</td>
<td>95,535</td>
<td>39,036</td>
<td>319,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi returnees</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
* UNHCR, last updated 16 October 2012.  
*b Government of Turkey, last updated 8 October 2012.  
*c UNHCR, last updated 12 October 2012.  
*d UNHCR, last updated 15 October 2012.

Protracted effects of invasion and armed conflicts continue to be the source of millions of internally displaced people (IDP) in Iraq and Sudan that are considered some of the most serious cases of such displacement in the world. The unresolved Israeli-Palestinian dispute has left approximately 5 million stateless Palestinians scattered across the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and West Bank (UNWRA, 2012), and vulnerable yet again as a consequence of the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic. By nature, accurate calculations of forced migrant numbers are difficult to ascertain. There is also a growing tendency for displaced people in the region to bypass registration with the UNHCR or other official entities, thereby evading official statistics. The decision not to register is predicated on reasons such as mistrust and misunderstanding of the registration process, the unlikelihood of being resettled to a third country and the intent of further migration (Zaman, 2012). Nonetheless, UNHCR and UNRWA data show extremely high proportions of refugees and asylum-seekers in the region (Table 3). Distinctions should be made between refugees residing in formal camps (e.g. Somalis in Yemen) and those dispersed in urban settlements (e.g. Sudanese in Egypt), as these environmental surroundings have key impacts on well-being, for instance, in terms of living conditions and potential access to services. Refugees’ status – whether formally registered, awaiting registration, or unregistered – also informs the quality of their well-being, especially in urban settings.
Table 3: Regional distribution of refugees of protracted displacement, as of January 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>Iraqi</th>
<th>Palestinian</th>
<th>Sudanese</th>
<th>Somali</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>449,000</td>
<td>2,047,367</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>510,444</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>20,000–50,000</td>
<td>465,798</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>50,000*</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>6,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2,092,146</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>221,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UNRWA and UNHCR, January 2012.
Notes: * Estimate only.

The MENA region is considered one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change impacts, yet there are little data and few studies on the impact of climate change, including its impact on migration in the region (Elasha, 2010:13–27; AFED, 2008:127–136). Countries in the MENA region along existing migratory routes, such as Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Yemen, are also impacted by environmentally induced migration originating from sub-Saharan countries and the Horn of Africa, where pastoralist communities are particularly vulnerable to drought and the impact of climate change. Migration is expected to intensify in the different regions in sub-Saharan Africa, with projected increase in the number of environmentally induced migrants.

Well-being among migrants in the MENA region: An overview of existing literature

Perhaps because of the broad and rather vague nature of well-being, the concept is often broken down into components to allow for more organized and systematic review and greater accessibility. However, it is essential to recognize that the pathways to studying the dimensions of well-being are complex, interlinked and multidirectional, something which may be not be fully reflected through this study’s superficial separation of well-being dimensions. However, for accessibility and compatibility with WMR aims, as previously mentioned, the following dimensions of career, financial, community and social well-being will be addressed separately, using pertinent examples of specific migrant groups to highlight particular aspects of well-being. Given the region’s exceptionally high prevalence of conflict-induced migration and refugee camps, both highly associated with chronic and infectious disease, physical well-being – covering physiological and mental health – is a significant area of concern and will also be covered.

Career well-being

Accurate measurements of labour force participation among migrants are lacking; a combination of poor data collection and political sensibilities on presenting unemployment figures is partly to blame for this. Only Jordan, Iraq, the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Syrian Arab Republic conduct quarterly and annual labour force surveys, meaning that reliable and regularly updated employment data for the rest of the region is severely lacking (ILO, 2011a).

Employment depends highly on the nature of migrants, and their host countries’ economic climate and labour laws. Unemployment among formal contract migrant workers in the construction, domestic and
service sectors is low, partly because legal status is lost should they break their contracts. In 2008, two thirds of the GCC’s 16.5 million-strong labour force were foreign migrant workers (Baldwin-Edwards, 2011:12), and 87 per cent of Qatar’s 2010 workforce comprised foreign migrants (Shah, 2012:139). In Jordan, migrant workers make up 20 per cent of the country’s labour force, and while approximately 180,000 Jordanians were unemployed in 2008, by contrast, over 335,000 registered foreign workers had jobs (Ahamed et al., 2010). Such examples of high labour force participation characterize the situation of economically driven migrants in the region, although not without accounts of exploitation and abuse.

For forced migrants, multiple structural constraints prevent them from entering formal employment, which results in either un-/underemployment or employment in the precarious and unregulated informal sector. Unemployment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is extremely high at 23.7 per cent, while the overall labour force participation rate is extremely low, at 41.1 per cent (ILO, 2010). Four fifths of Gazans rely on humanitarian aid or the informal “tunnel economy” (ibid.). "There is some opportunity for those in the West Bank to work in Israel through strict quotas of permit holders, but an estimated 30,000 still work illegally in the Israeli labour market (ibid.). In 2010 Lebanese law was amended to allow work permits for Palestinians, but this has yet to be implemented; in 2011, 56 per cent of working-age Palestinians were unemployed, of whom 83.3 per cent were women (UNRWA, 2011). In Jordan, Palestinians are eligible for temporary passports, but this does not entitle them to full citizenship rights or government employment opportunities (UNRWA).

While the Palestinian example is of course unique, it is broadly indicative of common themes among other refugees in the region, namely low formal female economic participation, weak implementation of labour laws and high rates of unemployment and informal employment. Furthermore, the region has some of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world (ILO, 2012), therefore reducing host countries’ inclination to accept foreign migrants into their labour markets. In Egypt, high unemployment rates in the formal sector, particularly among the youth population where unemployment is estimated at almost 47 per cent (CAPMAS, 2012), mean that although it is technically possible for refugees to obtain a work permit, in reality it is extremely difficult, particularly without being highly skilled or educated (AMERA, 2012).

The situation of IDP is under-researched, but disaggregation of available information makes it clear that female-headed households (FHHs) of IDP are among the most vulnerable. Regional sociocultural norms mean that women are overwhelmingly less educated than men, translating into fewer opportunities to gain well-paid jobs (Roudi-Fahimi, 2003). Furthermore, a pervasive stigma against female employment exists, especially in rural areas. In Iraq, only 2 per cent of the 1–2 million FHHs of IDP had regular incomes, leaving 98 per cent either unemployed, engaged in informal odd jobs, or unable or unwilling to work (IOM, 2010).

Migrant job satisfaction is strongly determined by immediate working conditions and can be broadly split by formal and informal sector. The formal Kafala sponsorship system of migrant employment operates in the GCC countries, Jordan and Lebanon, and works through the legal contraction of migrants to a private employer or sponsor. These often exert a great deal of control over migrant workers (HRW; ILO; IOM internal case data). While current conditions still provide serious cause for concern, such as the routine confiscation of workers’ passports and travel documents and restrictions on leaving or changing employers, reforms imposed in Bahrain in 2009 and recently proposed by Kuwait (2010), Qatar (2012), and Saudi Arabia (2012) are hoped to ameliorate this. In Bahrain, legislation now allows workers to change employers without employer consent, and in Qatar, plans to create a labour union to protect the rights of foreign workers have been discussed (Hyslop, May 2012). Reports from Saudi Arabia suggest that a mandatory insurance scheme might be introduced for foreign workers (Arab News, May 2012). While these changes are clearly welcome, it should be noted that no country has made definitive moves to abolish the system and the situation requires further monitoring to encourage full implementation of and adherence to proposed legislation changes.

3 Tunnel economy refers to the system of smuggling fuel, food and other commodities through underground tunnels between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. They are the result of Israel’s suffocating blockade on Gaza’s land and sea borders after Hamas’ election in 2007.
Within the region, only Jordan’s labour laws recognize domestic work, but abuse cases in this country are high nonetheless (ILO; IOM case data). This means the sector is unregulated and as migrant domestic workers (MDWs) typically live with their employers, they are highly susceptible to abuse. The prevalence of poor conditions, including excessive employer control, inferior living conditions, and verbal, psychological and sexual abuse make job dissatisfaction the norm, and civil society organizations and embassies of labour-sending countries register thousands of complaints regarding the ill treatment of domestic workers each year (HRW, 2012a).

Workers commonly complain of disappointment resulting from the divergence between the promises of recruiters and the realities of their working conditions upon arrival in their destinations (IOM case data; MENA programming). In 2011, IOM discovered a number of stranded Ukrainian and Bulgarian workers in Iraq; their contractors had not fulfilled their financial and contractual obligations, thereby leaving the workers stranded and deprived of basic needs and expected salaries (Smith, 2012:3). Despite the prevalence of similar poor employer practices region-wide, workers are often scared to complain for fear of repercussions, while a general perception of migrants as “replaceable” creates a strong sense of job insecurity among migrants (Migrant Forum in Asia).

In the face of such abuses, it should be noted that international cooperation on migrant rights is improving, and bi- and multilateral communication between major sending countries and Arab receiving countries has been established – for example, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue between the Colombo Process countries and the GCC States, plus Yemen and two Asian destination countries, namely Singapore and Malaysia. The effectiveness of such partnerships remains to be seen, but they represent a valuable step towards protecting workers’ rights. Recognition of MDW vulnerability has also been recognized in the ILO Convention (No. 189) and Recommendation (No. 201) on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, which came into force in August 2012. This marks an important milestone for domestic worker rights and many eyes are now on Jordan, perceived as the region’s leading labour reformer, to ratify the convention.

Financial well-being

Being employed is generally a positive indicator of financial well-being as it is associated with a steady income, which in the case of migrants, may be remitted to families and communities at their place of origin. However, for millions of economic migrants in the region, structural conditions at pre-departure and destination stages mean employment itself is an obstructive determinant of financial well-being.

During the pre-departure stage, migrant workers often pay recruitment agencies to guarantee employment in the MENA region. While a recent report by IOM and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) recognizes the necessary role of recruiters in matching prospective migrants to employers, serious concerns regarding the unscrupulous behaviour of recruiters and exploitation of migrant workers remain (Agunias, 2012:3).

Investigations in GCC countries show high proportions of workers paying recruitment fees and travel costs (up to 77% in the UAE), even in countries like Qatar, where there are memorandums of understanding that place such financial responsibilities on employers (Sonmez et al., 2011; Agunias, 2012:3). Recruitment fees may be as high as USD 4,000, forcing migrants to borrow large sums of money at interest rates of 3–10 per cent per month or 100 per cent per year (Sonmez et al., 2011; HRW, 2012b; Agunias, 2012:4).

In the UAE, average salaries for construction workers in 2004 were USD 8–10 for 10-hour shifts, including overtime, resulting in an average annual salary of USD 2,575 (HRW, 2006). If construction worker salaries in other countries in the region are of a similarly low rate, this suggests that only negligible amounts of income will be available for personal expenditure or remittances after debt repayments have been made; such pressures also serve to keep migrants under a bondage of debt and dependency (UNDP, 2009).
Recurrent complaints among migrant workers are underpayment, withheld salaries and deduction of wages for reasons that were not agreed on, for example, deductions for shelter, travel and medical expenses (Sonmez et al., 2011). This prevents migrants from remitting or repaying outstanding debts. Wage discrimination by gender and race is also prevalent and among MDWs, and a hierarchy of nationalities has emerged. Customarily, Filipinas are regarded the most “prized” and earn the most, followed by Indonesian, Sri Lankan and African workers (ILO, 2010:5; de Regt, 2008). Yet, as a recent IOM migrant protection operation in Jordan has revealed, all nationalities are equally at risk of exploitation and abuse.

At the departure stage, exit visa requirements from most migrant-receiving countries (except Kuwait and the UAE) can pose further financial burdens. While the visas themselves are not necessarily a financial issue, the fines imposed for those who overstay their contracts are. In Sudan, a common complaint is that employers or agents withhold migrants’ passports and therefore expose them to fines, that at USD 5 for each day overstayed, quickly become prohibitive in terms of repayment and onward movement (IOM case data, 2012). As mentioned, migrants often have significant outstanding debts to recruiters, and the additional burden of exit fines leaves migrants extremely vulnerable to exploitation. In cases of emergent conflict, such as those in Lebanon in 2006 and the Syrian Arab Republic at present, many migrants remain stranded unless external interventions are made. For instance, this was the recent case for 225 Filipino workers in the Syrian Arab Republic, who were stranded until the Philippine foreign affairs secretary negotiated an exit visa waiver with the Syrian Arab Republic Government (Reyes, 2012); not all migrants are so lucky.

For unemployed forced migrants, there is little financial security from social services, and they tend to be highly dependent on humanitarian aid. While migrant workers face poor socioeconomic well-being in terms of working conditions, job satisfaction, and income irregularities, forced migrants face problems of accessing the formal labour market at all. This is a greater concern for long-term refugees and asylum-seekers as host countries are generally resistant to refugee integration, given weak domestic economies and services, which make it difficult to provide for their own citizens, let alone refugees and other migrants. This has obviously negative consequences for migrant poverty and migrants’ capability to afford adequate food and shelter.

As outlined earlier, unemployment among IDP, especially FHHs, is high. Results of IOM research in Iraq showed that only 42 per cent of FHHs generate income, leaving 58 per cent dependent on alternative sources, 39 per cent of which is provided by relatives and friends (IOM, 2011). These cases indicate high levels of poverty with many households unable to afford adequate shelter. The results also report families living without basic electricity or water services, and unable to afford food. Many IDP regionally are in similar positions of dependency, and are left with little bargaining power and are vulnerable to exploitation.

**Community well-being**

In general terms, pervasive societal discrimination and racism, exclusionary policies and heightened feelings of insecurity since recent regional uprisings negatively affect the well-being of regular and irregular, economic and forced migrants alike. Within the region, only Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, leaving high proportions of asylum-seekers and refugees unprotected by international law or the rules of non-refoulement. The absence of this framework underlies much of the negative well-being outcomes for migrants in the region and even signatory countries struggle to fulfil their obligations. Some, such as Egypt, have placed reservations on convention articles, thus preventing refugees and asylum-seekers from accessing employment and the education and health services crucial for their community well-being (Al-Sharmani, 2010).

All countries in the region have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which should, in theory, allow refugee children the right to free primary education. However, the documentation needed to attend schools is
difficult to obtain, meaning that in reality, few refugee children are enrolled in schools (AHDR, 2009). In addition to bureaucratic obstacles, many migrants face household financial pressures that require children to earn an income and forgo their place in formal education (AHDR, 2009). For irregular and undocumented migrants, access to state education is not possible, although in the case of Egypt, they may attend “refugee schools” provided by humanitarian agencies (e.g. the Africa and Middle East Refugee Assistance (AMERA)).

Widespread antipathy to migrant integration, even towards fellow Arab migrants, has characterized the region’s immigration policies. The Kafala system has been used as a mechanism to control temporary migration since the 1950s and emphasizes the segregation of migrant workers and national citizens. In consequence, construction workers confined to labour camps and construction sites, and domestic workers confined to their households face insurmountable barriers to community integration.

On a societal level, xenophobia and discrimination against all types of migrants are significant barriers to community well-being. Racist attitudes towards sub-Saharan Africans are particularly prevalent across the region, particularly in Libya and Israel. There are suggestions that the recent civil uprisings in the region have put African migrants at further risk of xenophobic attacks and exclusion, due to heightened feelings of nationalism and increased economic hardships (IRIN, 2011). Since the revolution in Egypt, African migrant women in the country report increased sexual harassment (IRIN, 2011), while in Libya, existing discrimination against Chadians, Nigeriens and other black Africans has heightened since the conflict because of their perceived role as Gaddafi’s mercenaries (Kirkpatrick, 2011). Meanwhile, African migrants in Israel, notably from Eritrea and South Sudan, and including asylum-seekers, are pejoratively labelled “infiltrators” in legal and public discourse and have recently faced severe public aggression, including destruction of property and anti-African rallies (Jerusalem Post, 2012; Al Jazeera, 2012). Israel’s racist and xenophobic behaviour towards African asylum-seekers was singled out as a concern in the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2012 report (CERD, 2012:6).

The recent uprisings also appear to have altered migrants’ already low confidence in national institutions and reduced feelings of personal safety. Sudanese migrants in Cairo complain of less security and help from authorities since the revolution (IRIN, 2011); and in Libya, sub-Saharan African migrants are still being persecuted by Katiba rebel groups (EU, 2012) and detained in inhumane detention centres. For migrant workers in the GCC States, Jordan and Lebanon, the judicial system remains broadly unresponsive to abuse cases, and criminal charges are rarely, if ever, brought against employers (HRW, 2012a). There is widespread disillusionment regarding the legal system among workers, as even where grievances are allowed to be filed, employers take little notice and further action is not pursued by the authorities (HRW, 2012c).

For many migrants in the Gulf, the pressure to earn money and remit to families overcomes dissatisfaction with their community environment and forces them to remain and even encourage relatives to work there (HRW, 2012c). Yet, for many displaced people, dissatisfaction with their host communities and the perception of better opportunities elsewhere is driving them in continuous onward migration; this is evident through the increasing flows of irregular sub-Saharan Africans through the Sinai to Israel, and through the continuous flow of African migrants crossing the Gulf of Aden to Yemen and onward to richer Gulf countries (UNHCR, 2012).

Social well-being

For female refugees or asylum-seekers, especially in urban areas, cultural and social constraints on female mobility make forming friendships and social connections beyond the household extremely difficult; for MDWs, meeting people and forming support networks is nearly impossible (HRW, 2012a). The absence of social restraints on men makes it far easier for them to make and meet friends. Shared knowledge of Arabic is an important inclusive social factor for intraregional migrants, but for Asians and sub-Saharan Africans, language barriers inhibit social well-being and the ability to seek assistance when needed.
For teenagers and adults in refugee camps, there are often few recreational activities or communal social spaces available. The absence of significant cultural elements, such as cafes and smoking areas, makes it harder for camp residents to engage in “normal” recreational activities and adds a further psychological dimension to their displacement. A lack of access to telephones, top-up cards, or the Internet in camps means that refugees have little opportunity to keep in touch with relatives or friends elsewhere. In the absence of up-to-date information on their home communities, this lack of contact is a highly distressing factor for displaced people.

Physical well-being

Healthcare expenditure is not a top priority in the region, and the provision and level of healthcare available to migrants is highly variable (Maziak, 2009). From this unpromising base, poor migrant health is expected but cannot be confirmed due to the dearth of research in the area. In theory, documented migrants (including refugees and asylum-seekers) should be eligible for government services, but this is rarely the case. Existing research indicates that health insurance provision for migrant workers is inadequate and most cannot afford private coverage (ILO, 2007). Irregular migrants have little official opportunity to access health services but may be treated by humanitarian agencies, such as IOM and local Red Crescent clinics. Access to quality care or emergency treatment is dependent on migrants’ financial status (AHDR, 2009).

Gender inequality and cultural taboos on reproductive health issues in Arab countries have resulted in women carrying a disproportionate burden of the region’s ill health, reflected most clearly among migrant women (Butler, 2006, in McMichael et al., 2012). For female refugees, camp conditions increase reproductive health risks and women in camps tend to have higher rates of maternal mortality and gender-based violence (McMichael et al., 2012).

Despite common associations of forced migrants with infectious diseases, chronic diseases including mental health disorders have equal, if not greater, long-term importance. The high levels of conflict-induced displacement within MENA make mental health disorders a particular area of concern, especially for children and adolescents still in the formative stages of their physical, emotional and social development (Reed, 2012:250). Many of the region’s displaced people have experienced violence at close quarters, which is strongly associated with high incidences of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety and depression (Reed, 2012:254). Adults with poor mental health are also likely to negatively influence their children’s long-term development, creating a cycle of poor well-being.

Substantial evidence suggests that location of resettlement heavily impacts mental health, and a study of Palestinian school children in the West Bank and Gaza found that children living in refugee camps were more likely to suffer from PTSD than displaced children in other settings (Khamis et al., 2005; Reed et al., 2012:256). While humanitarian agencies (e.g. UNICEF, UNHCR and AMERA) are increasingly providing psychosocial care in refugee camps and in urban settings, the underlying social stigma of mental health disorders in the region prevents many from utilizing these services (Sadik et al., 2010).

The particular working and living conditions of MDWs also make them especially vulnerable to mental health disorders. The consequences of absent regulation on this labour sector are confined mobility, excessive working hours, restricted breaks, and persistent threats, control and abuse – all conditions associated with disorders such as chronic fatigue, depression and psychological stress (Sonmez, 2011). Live-in working conditions and underlying gender norms that disfavour women have led to several reports of sexual abuse of MDWs at the hands of male household members (HRW; IOM programmatic case data). The lack of access to psychosocial support and oppressive environment of mental and physical abuse can lead to drastic consequences, highlighted by relatively common cases of suicide among MDWs in Lebanon (HRW, 2012a).
Conclusion

Despite technical distinctions between regular and irregular migrants, within the MENA region, such differences are largely superficial as in reality; neither group of migrants receives adequate protection or access to services, and both suffer from human rights abuses. There is little appetite within the region to reduce migrant marginalization or improve their livelihoods and, as a result, migrant confidence in national institutions (and humanitarian agencies) tends to be weak. It is clear that national and societal factors produce an overwhelmingly negative environment for the well-being of migrants of all categories, with particular discrimination against women and sub-Saharan Africans.

There are increasing attempts to show how, despite deep structural barriers, migrants are using creative and alternative means of securing livelihoods and contributing to their host communities (Grabska, 2006; Zaman, 2012). While migrant agency is an important consideration and deserves a more prominent role in the discourse, the extent of migrant vulnerability and marginalization in the region clearly indicates a pressing need to address current policies and attitudes, and instigate further reforms. By undertaking an in-depth study of the migrant population in Cairo, it is hoped that a clearer idea of migrant needs will emerge in counterpoint to the generally vague and interpretive measurements currently available for the region.
Section II: Migrant well-being in Cairo: A gendered analysis

As set out in the introduction, given the contextual difficulties of undertaking research on migrant well-being in the region, the MENA Regional Office decided to undertake a case study of migrant well-being in central and greater Cairo.

With a population approaching 20 million, Cairo is by far the largest city in the region and epitomizes the rapid process of urbanization that has been taking place in the region. For centuries, Cairo has been one of the principal centres of the Arab world. In addition, Egypt has one of the most porous borders in the region. This makes Cairo both a destination for many in the region and a transit hub. It also faced its own revolution during the Arab uprisings with ramifications for migrants and refugees within Egypt.

To maximize the relevance of the sample for the region as a whole, focus was placed on migrant communities from countries in the region that had experienced relatively recent periods of conflict. Forced, intraregional migration is a key dynamic in the region, and in many ways, these migrant communities in Cairo represent a microcosm of migrants in the region as a whole. The added benefit to examining these groups is that they share the Arabic language, which minimized interpretation errors. Respondents who did not speak Arabic spoke English. Thus, within our sample, the main groups were Iraqi, Syrian, Sudanese, South Sudanese, Eritrean, Somali, Ethiopian and Yemeni.

A decision was taken to use gender as an independent variable and examine its impact on the well-being of migrants surveyed. There were two main reasons for this choice. First, gender inequality is an important issue across the region (UNDP, 2006). Many of the structural factors that present obstacles for females in the native population also present obstacles for female migrants. Indeed, there are key differences between the native-born and the migrant population, which have the potential to make female migrants more vulnerable than native-born females of similar social backgrounds, facing similar difficulties. One of these differences is that migrants usually do not enjoy the same rights or entitlements as the native-born population. It is difficult for them to acquire permission to work, which makes it harder for migrants to find appropriate employment to support themselves. Sometimes they may not even have legal residence, putting them at risk of detention or deportation if they engage local authorities on a given issue. Another inequality is that migrants are less likely to have access to the same external support structures as the native-born population (including networks of friends and relatives). Lastly, as is the case for most of our sample, migrants may have been pushed to move due to difficult circumstances in their countries of origin. This can make migrants less well prepared, psychologically or materially, for expatriation.

Therefore, where significant gender inequalities are found within the native-born population across the region, it is reasonable to expect that migrant females will face similar, if not more severe, obstacles to their autonomous self-development. This expectation is also borne out by the Cairo case study. The analysis that follows includes a comparison of the migrant sample with the native population. It finds that gender discrepancies with regard to the labour market follow broadly similar trends within the two groups (females find it more difficult to find suitable work than men) and that the situation of migrant females on these indicators is worse than that of native females.

Significant gender inequalities are in fact found within the native-born population across much of the region. Table 4 illustrates the level of gender inequality in the region on certain indicators, relative to the level of development. The Gender Development Index (GDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is essentially its human development index (HDI) discounted downwards for gender inequality. It addresses gender gaps in life expectancy, adult literacy, school enrolment and earned income. It is not designed to be used as an independent indicator of gender inequality, but rather, the key measure here is the difference between HDI and GDI
ranks (see the last column of Table 4). The table shows that most of the region presents quite large discrepancies relative to other countries included in the sample (over -3). This indicates that levels of development are not matched by similar conditions of gender equality.

**Table 4: MENA countries’ HDI versus GDI scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI rank</th>
<th>GDI rank</th>
<th>GDI value</th>
<th>HDI rank minus GDI rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.826</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figures 2 and 3 show that the Arab states have ranked low on two measures of gender inequality in education, even when compared with regions that are much less developed.

**Figure 2: Female literacy rate as a percentage of male literacy rate (age 15+), world regions, 2005–2011 (%)**

*Source: UNESCO, 2013.*
In recent years, better progress has been made as States across the MENA region have been making quite fast progress in improving in key indicators for gender inequality in health and education, as Figures 4 and 5 show.
However, despite some progress on certain indicators, the levels of female participation in economic and political life in the MENA region remain the lowest in the world (World Bank, 2013), as Figures 6 and 7 show.

**Figure 6: Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, world regions, 2012 (%)**

The causes behind this trend of gender inequality are likely to be many, complex, and interrelated. A comprehensive analysis is therefore well beyond the scope of this paper. However, previous research on gender inequality in the region has highlighted, inter alia, that many parts of the region include communities that share similar sociocultural norms, religious-juristic heritage, and the fact that they have traditionally had patriarchal social structures. As argued in previous research, these characteristics contributed to the development of similar structural-institutional features in many parts of the region that continue to contribute to gender inequality (UNDP, 2006; World Bank, 2013).

By choosing to analyse gender discrepancies within the Cairo case study, we hoped that the conclusions and policy recommendations could also be relevant to the wider region. The foregoing is not to say that the causes, components, or women’s experiences of gender inequality are exactly the same across the region. Rather, it is to say that sufficient similarities exist, such that a deep examination of female migrant experiences in Cairo can give us an indication of what female migrant experiences might be like in the wider region.

The second reason for choosing a gender focus is that IOM’s 2013 WMR examines how improvements in migrant well-being can contribute to development objectives. The links between development and the well-being of females are well established. This is reflected in two of the eight UN Millennium Development Goals, namely (1) promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women and (2) improving maternal health.
Methodology

We assembled a survey with indicators specifically designed to track four key dimensions of well-being (financial, career, social and community), as well as some more general well-being indicators. The surveys were also designed to record more detailed elements of information about the migrants’ social backgrounds (see Annex A for full list of indicators).

Five-hundred and sixty-one interviews were conducted over 18 days in around 27 different locations in Cairo (some were visited more than once), in addition to around 50 telephone interviews. Field work adhered to IOM’s ethical and data protection codes. The survey was conducted by five native Arabic speakers (Egyptians) of mixed gender in their early twenties. Access to migrant communities was organized through a wide variety of means. A number of pre-existing access points that IOM has established in the field were used. However, due to the nature of IOM’s work in Cairo (often providing support to vulnerable migrant communities), this method risked oversampling from communities that had already received disproportionate study, reinforcing the bias towards the study of vulnerable communities. Therefore, rather than only talking to migrants who used the facilities at these community support organizations, these organizations were used as points of access to the wider community in the local area, in what is commonly known as snowball sampling. Interviews were conducted at shops, restaurants and cafes in these areas. IOM’s points of contact also allowed researchers to speak with respondents from more varied social backgrounds though staff members’ own social networks.

However, this method still risked some selection bias and a restriction of the sample to communities with some association to IOM. Therefore, efforts were made to find novel access points by recruiting participants at protests, music concerts, cultural events, embassy events, restaurants, shops, cafes and places of worship. In total, around 27 different organizations, establishments and events were visited (some on multiple occasions), giving the sample significant variety. Around 50 interviews were conducted on the phone where participants did not have time to go through a whole survey at these events. Snowball techniques were attempted at all stages to try to vary and broaden the reach of the survey.

A system was developed to give migrants a well-being score on the basis of their answers to the four well-being indicators so as to facilitate easy comparison within the sample (scoring system is also in Annex A). The score was broken down into five categories (financial, career, social, community and an aggregate of more general well-being indicators) and a total overall score was also calculated. The system first calculated a potential total score for each migrant, based on the questions that were relevant to them. By calculating this potential score, we were able to compare well-being between migrants for whom not all the same indicators were applicable and or important. For example, whether or not a migrant’s children are in school will affect their community well-being score. However, a migrant with no school-age children will have no component to the score concerning access to schooling. To avoid these discrepancies, migrants’ total actual score was divided by their total, individually tailored, potential scores in order to calculate a percentage for each category of well-being, as well as an overall well-being score.

Where no answers were provided, it was treated in the same way as if the question had not been relevant to the migrant. While this has the potential to introduce a bias if migrants were not answering sensitive questions, in practice, this was not an issue; during the research validation phase and research debrief sessions, researchers reported that no migrants had registered a refusal to answer any of the questions.

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4 Indicates include residency status, whether respondents feel optimistic about their future, whether they would recommend Egypt to friends/relatives, and whether they would leave Egypt.
5 See previous footnote.
Results and analysis

The 561 respondents came from a broad range of social backgrounds and have a range of different well-being scores. As Annex B shows, the distribution of the overall well-being scores of the sample is approximately normal.\textsuperscript{6} The sample was quite diverse in terms of nationalities represented. The largest majority of respondents, by far, were Sudanese (186/33.2%). This is not unexpected, since in Egypt, Sudan’s neighbour, the Sudanese are one of the largest non-native ethnic groups in the country. These numbers were closely followed by Syrians (107/19.1%), Somalis (88/15.7%), Ethiopians (69/12.3%), Iraqis (58/10.3%) and others (53/9.4%). If we use level of education completed as a proxy for social background, we can see from Figure 8 that the sample includes respondents from a wide variety of social backgrounds. Unfortunately, data do not exist to gauge exactly how representative this sample is of the total migrant population in Cairo. A recent IOM pilot exercise to mainstream migration into development in Egypt (IOM, 2013) found that even basic estimates of the size of Egypt’s stock of immigrants varied wildly (from 250,000 to 7 or 8 million, with estimates towards the lower end being better substantiated). A forthcoming Household International Migration Survey (HIMS) should yield groundbreaking data. However, until that time and in the context of wildly varying estimates of such basic indicators it is probably unhelpful to speculate as to the sample’s representativeness.

Figure 8: Distribution of sample by level of education

The sample includes 205 females (36.5%) and 356 males (63.5%).\textsuperscript{7} An exploration of overall well-being scores finds a statistically significant difference between the mean scores of males and females. The sample presents a difference of 7.2 per cent between the mean scores of men and women, with 95 per cent confidence that the difference is at least 3.6 per cent and at most 10.7 per cent in the population.

\textsuperscript{6} The most common probability distribution. This matches expectations and indicates the appropriateness of using various statistical tools.

\textsuperscript{7} Once again, the paucity of data makes it hard to estimate how representative this gender breakdown is of the migrant population in Cairo. However, the World Bank estimated (2010) that 46% of Egypt’s migrants were female. The potential discrepancy between the sample and the population is probably largely due to the fact that sociocultural norms often make it unacceptable for women to go to public places like coffee shops, especially unaccompanied, thus making them harder to interview. This is an interesting point in itself and may even be a contributing factor to female migrants having lower levels of well-being on average than male migrants.
Table 5: Male and female migrants’ overall well-being scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender of respondents</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Std. error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean, 95% confidence interval for</td>
<td>Lower bound,</td>
<td>.95325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>median, 5% trimmed mean, Median</td>
<td>Upper bound</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variance, Std. deviation, Minimum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maximum, Range, Interquartile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>skewness, Kurtosis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95% confidence interval for mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5% trimmed mean</td>
<td>Variance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>Std. deviation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std. deviation</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>Range</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interquartile range</td>
<td>Interquartile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>skewness</td>
<td>skewness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Male and female migrants’ overall well-being scores
Our sample includes migrants from Afghanistan, Chad, Guinea, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan and the UAE all of whom are male and have higher-than-average levels of well-being. We exclude these groups from all subsequent analyses as outliers due to the fact that they represent only 2.8 per cent of the sample, were reached through the same access point, and either did not come from a place that had experienced a recent period of conflict or came from a different geographic region than the majority of the sample. After excluding these cases, the difference between the mean scores of males and females remains large at 6.3 per cent (95% confidence intervals show difference of at least 2.8% and at most 10%).

Significant gender discrepancies are found across all of our categories of well-being, as the boxplots in Figures 10–14 show.

Figure 10: Male and female migrants’ career well-being scores

Figure 11: Male and female migrants’ financial well-being scores
Figure 12: Male and female migrants’ social well-being scores

Figure 13: Male and female migrants’ community well-being scores
The only case where this is not so clear-cut is within financial well-being scores in which the difference between the mean scores for males and females is only 0.5 per cent, partly due to differences of 6 per cent at the 95th percentile. However, a closer examination reveals significant discrepancies between male and female migrants’ financial situations. The similarity in financial well-being scores is largely because the principal component of a respondent’s score is his/her level of disposable household income, adjusted for dependents. Where relevant, this takes into account a partner’s contribution to household income and/or other transfers. This is so as to avoid incorrectly assigning migrants very low levels of financial well-being when they may in fact be relatively well-off. When we look at total average monthly income by gender for those respondents who are earning, we find that males earn 16.3 per cent more on average than females (key percentiles shown in Table 6). Women were more likely to worry about buying food than men (91.4% versus 78.9%). They were also less likely to receive remittances from abroad (12.3% versus 25.8%). Among female migrants, 83.5 per cent said that they were very unhappy with their economic situation, whereas for males, 76.8 per cent said so.

### Table 6: Male and female total monthly income at key percentiles (USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Total Monthly Income (USD)</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At least part of the reason for these financial differences is explained by the differences between male and female migrants’ career well-being. A far greater proportion of women were in unskilled work (48.1%) compared with men (37.8%). Correspondingly, only 16.5 per cent of females were engaged in professional work, compared with 25.6 per cent of males. This is despite the fact that the proportion of females who were in professional work in their home countries prior to migration equalled that of males (40.8%).

Table 7: Employed migrants’ work skill levels, by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Semi-skilled</th>
<th>Unskilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Chi-squared: 2.705, P< 0.1309; γ = -0.20710.

The unemployment rate was very high at around 60 per cent for both males and females. Of those that were working, women were more likely to be involved in casual/daily work than men (33% versus 15.5%) and less likely to be in full-time work (6.5% versus 12.1%). As shown in Table 8, casual/daily, seasonal and part-time work are grouped under one variable for ease of comparison and for facilitation of a chi-squared test.

Table 8: Migrants’ employment rates, by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Casual/Daily, seasonal, or part-time job</th>
<th>Full-time job</th>
<th>Full-time education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Chi-squared: 35.648, P<0.00111.

These figures indicate a significantly greater propensity for females to find work in the informal sector than men. A slightly higher rate of unemployment for men may represent, in part, an unwillingness to accept these kinds of job. We found that 72.8 per cent of women were engaged in domestic work (an unregulated sector of employment that leaves migrants vulnerable to exploitation) with only a few working in services (4.9%), public services (7.4%) or other sectors (14.9%). In contrast, men were much more evenly spread across different sectors of work. Conversely, before migration, only 8.4 per cent of women were occupied by domestic work.

8 In this case, the null hypothesis is that population proportions for skill level of work are the same for males as they are for females. P = the probability, if the null hypothesis were true in the population, of obtaining as strong or stronger evidence against the null hypothesis as the test statistic provides in the observed data.
9 The probability is less than 13%, moderate evidence that being female impacts skill level of work in Egypt in the population. However, the test effectively treats the dependent variable as nominal. The fact that the dependent variable is ordinal and that differences in its values go in the same direction provides even stronger evidence.
10 Where -1 = perfect negative association, 0 = no association, and 1 = perfect positive association. We would make 20.7% fewer errors if, for every non-tied pair, we predict that males are engaged in higher-skilled work and females are engaged in lower-skilled work, compared with tossing a coin for each pair.
11 Less than 0.1%; strong evidence that population proportions for “rates of employment” are different for men and women in the population at any conventional test of significance. However, one cell (females in full-time education) contains fewer than five cases so a slightly larger sample would have been better for the test.
To investigate whether low educational levels could explain the high portion of females employed in the domestic sector, we conducted an analysis excluding all respondents with no schooling from the analysis; even so, 66.1 per cent of women were still engaged in domestic work. When selecting only those who had at least completed primary schooling, 58.3 per cent were engaged in domestic work. Of those who had completed secondary school, 42 per cent were engaged in domestic work. Of the 13 women who were both in work and had completed university, three were engaged in domestic work and over half were working in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs.

These results indicate that female migrants have a hard time breaking into the formal labour market and finding work suitable to their skill levels. Higher-skilled females are overrepresented in the service and public service sectors, and much less likely to work in business or commercial activity.

Working in the informal sector with less job security and fewer rights is likely to negatively impact job satisfaction, as is undertaking work for which one is significantly overqualified. These conditions, particularly those characteristics of domestic work which tend to be solitary, are also likely to impact the more social aspects of work. We found that 54.1 per cent of women respondents were very unhappy with their jobs, which is 10 per cent more than men. Correspondingly, only 12.2 per cent of women were happy with their jobs, compared with 21.6 per cent of men. Female migrants were less likely to feel that their employers were happy with their work than men (29.7% versus 37.6%). They were also much less likely to feel that their colleagues were happy to have them as their colleagues, as Table 9 shows.

**Table 9: Migrants’ feelings of approval from colleagues, by gender**

*Survey question: Do you feel your co-workers are happy to have you as their colleague?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very unhappy</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th>Extremely happy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Chi-squared: 7.074, P<0.03513; γ = 0.34614.*

In addition to the negative responses that female migrants gave about the more social elements of their work life, their responses indicate that other aspects of their social well-being were also lower than those of male migrants. When asked about their social life, 36 per cent of women described themselves as “alone” compared with just 21 per cent of men. Only 19 per cent of women said that they had many friends, compared with 29 per cent of men. A smaller proportion of female migrants maintained contact with close friends and relatives outside Egypt (48.8%) compared with males (62.2%). Those females that did maintain contact with close friends and relatives outside the country were in contact with them less often than males; nearly 20 per cent of male migrants reported daily contact with close friends and relatives outside the country, compared with 5 per cent of females. For both males and females, the data reveal high levels of social isolation, which can negatively impact well-being.

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12 This question was not relevant to all migrants in employment as not all have co-workers.
13 Less than 3.5%; strong evidence that the trend exists in the population at most conventional tests of significance.
14 We would make 34.6% fewer errors if, for every non-tied pair, we predict that males are engaged in higher-skilled work and females are engaged in lower-skilled work, compared with tossing a coin for each pair.
Table 10: Migrants’ social life, by gender

Survey question: What is your social life like in Egypt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I am alone</th>
<th>I have a few friends</th>
<th>I have many friends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Chi-squared: 17.559, P<0.001; γ = 0.300.

This general trend of relatively poor well-being among females continues when we examine levels of community well-being among migrants. Nearly half of females (47.5%) indicated that they were very unhappy with the way that Egyptian society had received them, compared with 27 per cent of males. Only 8 per cent of females were extremely happy with how they had been received, compared with 21 per cent of males. Survey responses also indicate that it is more difficult for female migrants to integrate into Egyptian society. Only 15.3 per cent of women reported that they socialized mostly with Egyptians, compared with 20.6 per cent of men.

Table 11: Migrants’ feelings of reception in Egyptian society, by gender

Survey question: Are you happy with the way Egyptian society has received you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very unhappy</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th>Extremely happy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Chi-squared: 29.004, P<0.001; γ = 0.330.

Female migrants did not feel as safe and secure as male migrants. They were 5 per cent more likely to report feeling very insecure at work, and only 17 per cent felt very safe compared with 33 per cent of men. In public places, 29 per cent of females felt reported feeling very insecure compared to 21 per cent of males, and only 14 per cent felt very safe compared with 23 per cent of males. Indeed, 27 per cent of female respondents said that they would consider leaving Egypt because they did not feel safe, compared with just 19 per cent of men. During our debriefing and discussion of findings with the researchers, they reported that a significant issue that had come up with female migrants was sexual harassment and even rape. Researchers observed that this had an impact on migrants’ answers (this has also been confirmed by other research and media reports, as is discussed in the conclusion to the paper). Given the nominal variable structure of the survey, researchers said that when women had spoken about this issue with regard to reasons why they would leave Egypt, this was recorded in the data as “I do not feel safe”. Thus, although it is hard to say exactly what proportion of women would be pushed to leave Egypt because of gender-based violence or harassment, it clearly arose as a problem that female respondents mentioned on a considerable number of occasions.

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15 Less than 0.1%; strong evidence that the trend exists in the population at any conventional test of significance.
16 We would make 30% fewer errors if, for every non-tied pair, we predict that males are engaged in higher-skilled work and females are engaged in lower-skilled work, compared with tossing a coin for each pair.
17 As in note 15 but 33% fewer errors.
Table 12: Employed migrants’ feelings of safety at work, by gender

Survey question: How safe do you feel at work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very insecure</th>
<th>Insecure</th>
<th>Safe</th>
<th>Very safe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Chi-squared: 5.544, P<0.06818; γ = 0.25719.

Table 13: Migrants’ feelings of safety in the streets and public places, by gender

Survey question: How safe do you feel in the street and public places?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very insecure</th>
<th>Insecure</th>
<th>Safe</th>
<th>Very safe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Chi-squared: 12.161, P<0.00420; γ = 0.12621.

The exception to this general trend of poorer well-being among females was that female migrants tended to enjoy greater access to health and education services than men did. When sick, females reported being more able to access the full range of medical services (pharmacy, doctor and hospital) (20.5% of females compared with 17.5% males). Similarly, 42.5 per cent of males who were sick reported that they did not have access to any health services, whereas among females, only 25.2 per cent reported so. Regarding the number of school-age dependents that were in school, 44.4 per cent of females reported that all of their dependents were in school, compared with 40.4 per cent of men. More importantly, 47.8 per cent of men reported that none of their dependents were in school, compared with just 33.8 per cent of women. This could indicate the presence of more external support structures to ensure that women’s children have access to these services. Women were marginally more likely to receive support from at least one organization (governmental, non-governmental, civil society–based, religious or community) at 41.3 per cent as opposed 37.1% per cent of men. A more certain explanation of this anomaly in the general trend of relatively poor female well-being would require further investigation, which is beyond the scope of this paper; nonetheless, this is an interesting and significant finding.

Finally, we examine our more general indicators of well-being. When asked whether migrants would recommend Egypt to their friends or relatives, 63.5 per cent of women said no, versus 46.3 per cent of men. When respondents were asked whether they would consider leaving Egypt, the results were more similar between genders, with

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18 Less than 6.8%; moderate evidence that the trend exists in the population. However, again, the fact that the dependent variable is ordinal and that differences in its values go in the same direction, provides stronger evidence.

19 We would make 25.7% fewer errors if, for every non-tied pair, we predict that males are engaged in higher-skilled work and females are engaged in lower-skilled work, compared with tossing a coin for each pair.

20 Less than 0.4%; strong evidence that the trend exists in the population at any conventional test of significance.

21 We would make 12.6% fewer errors if, for every non-tied pair, we predict that males are engaged in higher-skilled work and females are engaged in lower-skilled work, compared with tossing a coin for each pair.
75 per cent of women saying yes, compared with 71 per cent of men. However, as has already been discussed, a far larger proportion of women stated that this is because they did not feel safe (partly due to sexual harassment). Men were very marginally more likely to cite economic reasons a motivation to leave the country. Finally, women were less likely to feel optimistic about their future than men (71% versus 80%).

Comparison with the native population

Finding directly comparable data for the native population for all of these indicators is not possible. However, we can examine some key indicators, such as unemployment. Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) recorded an unemployment rate of 24.1 per cent for women and 9.2 per cent for men in the second quarter of 2012. Women therefore find it more difficult to find work. Our sample’s rate (third quarter 2012) is around 60 per cent for both sexes. This indicates that it is much more difficult for migrants to find work than the native population. However, as previously detailed, only a tiny proportion of female migrants were employed full-time. A much higher proportion are in casual/daily, seasonal or part-time work relative to men. This does not appear to be linked to any decision on the part of females to play a greater role in looking after dependents as the proportion of women who were in full-time work versus casual/daily, part-time or seasonal work was greater for those with dependents (20.7% versus 79.3%) than those without (16.7% versus 83.3%). This indicates that it is relatively more difficult for female migrants to break into the formal sector than for male migrants. Thus, while our results show that unemployment rates are incredibly high for both male and female migrants, the difference in the type of work women are able to obtain means that our migrant population follows a similar trend to that of the native population; women are at a relative disadvantage in the labour market.

CAPMAS records an unemployment rate of 41.4 per cent for 20- to 24-year-olds among the native population. Unfortunately, this is not broken down by gender. However, Figure 15 from the World Bank clearly shows that, at least before the revolution, there was a large discrepancy between male and female youth (15–24 years old) within the native Egyptian population (indeed, this is a general trend in the MENA countries covered).

Figure 15: Gender gaps in youth unemployment rates, age 15–24, MENA region, 2011 (%)

Our sample records an unemployment rate of 71.4 per cent and 60.5 per cent for female and male migrants in this age range, respectively. However, we must also note that none of the female migrants who were working were engaged in full-time work, whereas 7 per cent of male migrants were. Females were more likely to be involved in casual/daily, seasonal or part-time work, whereas men were more likely to be involved in full-time education. Once again, our sample follows the national trend of unequal labour outcomes for males and females.

Table 14: Employment status of migrants, age 16–24, by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Casual/Daily, seasonal or part-time job</th>
<th>Full-time job</th>
<th>Full-time education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within this gender category</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Chi-squared: 14.382; P<0.001.

Among the native population with university degrees, CAPMAS records an unemployment rate of 46.5 per cent for males and 53.5 per cent for females. Within our sample the rate of unemployment for those with university degrees was 64.3 per cent for males and 65.8 per cent for females. However, once again, those females who were employed were much less likely to be engaged in full-time work (15.8% versus 27.4% of the total employed migrant population). Again, an examination of the above indicators shows that discrepancies between male and female migrants in the labour market follow a broadly similar trend to those of the native population.

Unfortunately, other directly comparable data for the native population are hard to come by. This makes it difficult to compare directly between the current samples of migrants and native population. However, analyses within the native population show that there is a significant level of gender inequality. As shown in the rationale for our focus, Egypt does not perform well on either of the UNDP’s most recently used indices of gender inequality. Egypt’s 2005 Gender Inequality Index (GII) score (0.599) places it closer to the average of the group of countries with the lowest human development scores, whereas its own human development score places it in the medium category. Egypt’s low GII score reflects that, at the time of ranking, only 0.674 females had completed secondary education for every male, females made up only 30 per cent of the workforce, and females had only 3.8 per cent of the share of parliamentary seats. The score also took into account maternal mortality and adolescent fertility.

These indicators are of course only tiny snapshots of a much broader, more complex social context which includes aspects of institutions, beliefs, legal systems, norms, and family and social structures that impact gender inequality (UNDP, 2005). This complexity is partly reflected in our sample, where gender gaps on a broad range of well-being indicators are picked up. However, as discussed at the beginning of this section, there are key differences between the native and the migrant populations, which have the potential to make female migrants more vulnerable than native females of similar social backgrounds, facing similar difficulties. Given the contextual factors of Egyptian society and the additional difficulties that migrants can face, female migrants have the potential to become extremely vulnerable.
Conclusion and recommendations

This almost across-the-board inequality between the well-being of male and female migrants is as tragic as it is impressive. On average, females fare worse in each of the categories of well-being that were examined in this study. At the level of the individual, this indicates that female migrants are relatively less able to pursue autonomous self-development compared with male migrants. This can only have a negative developmental impact at national and regional levels. These results are indicative of a waste of human capital and demonstrate that there are key components missing from the full set of social forces that have the potential to drive development forward.

This paper has argued that we might expect a similar trend of inequality with regard to migrant well-being between genders, to a lesser or larger extent, across other parts of the MENA region. Measurements of the native population of other countries in the region indicate social forces leading to levels of gender inequality that would likely have a similar impact on the migrant population, especially given the additional difficulties that migrant women often face, as discussed in Section II of this paper.

As this paper focuses on migrants likely to have been displaced and on those who spoke Arabic or English, an initial recommendation is to conduct similar research on other migrant groups in Cairo. Research on migrant well-being should also be expanded to other key cities in the region. Such research could verify the nature and extent of gender gaps among migrant communities across the region and provide a more comprehensive picture of migrant well-being. It would also present more opportunities for comparative analysis to explore the causes of gender inequality among migrants, the dynamics of this inequality and the particular challenges that female migrants face. Ultimately, the results would inform policymakers. In addition, there remains scope for additional analysis of the breadth of data collection for this research.

A further recommendation is that efforts to mainstream gender considerations into IOM programmes in the region (and those of other humanitarian actors) be renewed with the development of a comprehensive gender strategy specific to the MENA region. The strategy should aim to incorporate gender components into programmatic activities at the upstream and downstream parts of the migration progress both into and out of the region. Projects aimed at improving females’ access to the regulated labour market could pay dividends, both in terms of improving the well-being of female migrants and mitigating the push factors for native females. More livelihood activities among females could help not only vulnerable female returnees and females left behind by the outward migration process but also more vulnerable immigrant females. IOM already includes a gender focus within many of its projects in the region, including projects specifically tailored for particularly vulnerable female groups, such as female heads of household. However, there is room for a more coordinated, regional approach.

A more comprehensive, regional gender strategy could also include efforts to streamline migration-related and migrant well-being issues into the wider gender-related dialogue and policymaking process in the region. In this respect, perhaps the greatest opportunities for development lie with identifying synergies and working together with civil society–based organizations and movements. Women’s organizations and protest movements have become a prominent part of the landscape during the sociopolitical transformations associated with the Arab Spring (FIDH, 2012). These groups have generally called for women’s rights to be properly upheld, greater gender parity in, for example, the labour market, and for an end to forms of abuse against women, such as sexual harassment. Demands and aspirations such as these represent calls for extensive shifts with regard to the female social context. They also present opportunities for cooperation and coordination to further intergovernmental, governmental and civil society programmatic objectives at the national and regional levels. By engaging with and supporting broad, gender-based coalitions, humanitarian development actors can help to raise awareness and combat complex cross-cutting issues, such as the abuse, exploitation and trafficking of (female) migrants.

Efforts could take the form of focusing on specific issues. Sexual harassment, for example, has been established as a particular problem in Egypt. A survey of 2,000 Egyptian men and women and 109 foreign women conducted by
the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights in four Egyptian governorates found that 83 per cent of Egyptian women and 98 per cent of foreign visitors had experienced sexual harassment. Two thirds of men (62%) admitted harassing women, with 53 per cent blaming women for bringing it upon themselves (Shoukry and Hassan, 2008). Our study finds that female migrants also suffer from sexual harassment and have been victims of rape, and that this is a factor that would push migrants to leave Egypt. Also, the set of social factors that encourage sexual harassment overlap with those involved in the abuse, exploitation and trafficking of female migrants more generally. Thus, there are clear synergies between IOM’s objectives and the increasing number of movements and organizations in Egypt that are gaining traction and momentum in opposition to sexual harassment of women. Although the issue of sexual harassment is a particular problem in Egypt, Egypt is by no means the only country where it is relevant in the region. For instance, reports indicate that Yemeni women experience similar problems (MEPI and ATHAR Foundation for Development, 2009; IOM case data). Another issue which presents obvious synergies between development and humanitarian aims is that of domestic work. Campaigning for better conditions for domestic workers may ultimately result in higher levels of well-being for female migrants, given their high concentration in this sector. The first NGO for domestic workers in Egypt, Helpers, was recently set up with support from UN Women (UNited in Egypt, 2012). Moves are also under way to remove restrictions on domestic worker unionisation in Egypt (Egypt Independent, 2012).

In the current period of great political, legal and economic upheaval, civil society groups have an incredibly important role to play in pushing for greater gender equality. International organizations should not waste this opportunity to be more vocal in their support of these organizations’ objectives or to provide them with organizational support to better promote and augment migrant well-being.
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Zaman, T.
Annex A: Survey questions and scoring system

Personal Details
- Gender
- Marital status – Married/living together (unmarried)/divorced/living apart (not divorced)/widowed/not married
- Household status in Egypt – Living alone/living with friends or relatives/living with Egyptian host family/living with non-Egyptian host family/living in host family/other
- Age
- Place of birth
- Address in Egypt
- Address in home country
- Number of dependents in Egypt – by age range and sex

Life in Country of Origin
- Primary source of income in home country – unemployed/farming, fishing, forestry/construction, trade workers, extraction/production occupations/handicrafts or cottage industry/petty trading/public services (including healthcare and education)/seller, commercial activity/business and finance/services (including tourism)/domestic work/military/student/other
- Skill level of work – professional/semi-skilled/unskilled
- Type of work – unemployed/casual or daily/seasonal/part-time/full-time
- Average monthly income
- Household status in home country – living alone/living with spouse, no children/living with spouse and children/living with children, no spouse/living with immediate family/living with extended family/other
- How many people were in household?
- Level of education completed – no schooling/some primary/primary/some secondary/secondary/vocational/some university/university/post-graduate/other
- Date of leaving home country
- Reasons for leaving home country – “I wanted a job in...”/“Somebody asked me to go to work in...”/“Heard about jobs from neighbours, friends, relatives or agents...”/“Already have friends or family in...”/“I was forced to come to Egypt by family or friends”/“I was escaping conflict or insecurity”/“I was forced to come to Egypt by my agent”/other

Life in Egypt
- Date of arrival in Egypt
- Residency status in Egypt – asylum-seeker/refugee/rejected asylum-seeker/labour migrant/stranded/students/tourist/illegal/other
  - General well-being score (0–4): asylum-seeker (2)/refugee (3)/rejected asylum-seeker (1)/labour migrant (4)/stranded (0)/student (4)/tourist (3)/illegal (1)
- What ID did you arrive with? – ID/passport/no documents/passport with visa
  - General well-being score (0–3), conditional upon whether migrant still has documents: ID (1)/passport (2)/no documents (0)/passport with visa (3)
- Do you still have the documents? – yes/no
- If no, when did you lose them? – upon arrival/during stay
- Who took the documents? – employer/agent/police, detention, border official/co-workers/other
- Primary source of income in Egypt – unemployed/farming, fishing, forestry/construction, trade workers, extraction/production occupations/handicrafts or cottage industry/petty trading/public services (including healthcare and education)/seller, commercial activity/business and finance/services (including tourism)/domestic work/military/student/other
• Skill level of work (Egypt) – professional/semi-skilled/unskilled
  - **Career score (1–3):** professional (3)/semi-skilled (2)/unskilled (1)
• Type of work (Egypt) – unemployed/casual or daily/seasonal/part-time/full-time
  - **Career score (0–9):** unemployed (0)/casual or daily (3)/seasonal (3)/part-time (6)/full-time (9)
• Average total monthly income (USD)
  - **Financial well-being score** – used for household disposable income calculation
• Does anyone else in your household earn? How much?
  - **Financial well-being score** – used for household disposable income calculation
• Do you receive money from friends/relatives abroad?
  - How often? – Once per month/once per three months/once per six months/once per year/other
  - How much? (USD)
  - **Financial well-being score** – used for household disposable income calculation
• How – Money Gram/Western Union/Hawala/other
• Do you send money abroad?
  - **Financial well-being score (0–1):** yes (1)/no (0)
  - How often? – Once per month/once per three months/once per six months/once per year/other
  - How much? (USD)
  - **Financial well-being score** – used for household disposable income calculation
• Are you happy with your job? – very unhappy/satisfied/happy/extremely happy
  - **Career well-being score (0–3):** 0/1/2/3
• Are you happy with your economic situation – very unhappy/satisfied/happy/extremely happy
  - **Financial well-being score (0–3):** 0/1/2/3
• Do you feel your employer is happy with your work? – very unhappy/satisfied/happy/extremely happy
  - **Career well-being score (0–3):** 0/1/2/3
• Do you feel you co-workers are happy to have you as their colleague? – very unhappy/satisfied/happy/extremely happy
  - **Social well-being score (0–3):** 0/1/2/3
• Type of housing in Egypt: stay with family or friends (rent free)/own house or apartment/housing provided by employer/stay on site of work/guest house/other
• Do you pay rent?
• How much rent does your household pay per month?
  - **Financial well-being score** – used for household disposable income calculation
• How much money do you spend per week on food?
  - **Financial well-being score** – used for household disposable income calculation
• Do you worry about buying food?
  - **Financial well-being (0–1):** yes (0)/no (1)
• How many of your dependents are enrolled in school in Egypt? – none/some/all
  - **Community well-being score (0–4):** 0/2/4
• What type of school are they enrolled in? – public/private/faith-based/international/civil society–based/other
• If not enrolled, what is the reason? – migrant children cannot enrol/children required to work/schools too expensive/no school nearby/other
• Since being in Egypt, have you been sick or injured?
• Which were you able to access? – hospital/pharmacy/doctor
  - **Community well-being score (0–3):** 1 for each of the above
• Reasons for not being able to access – cannot afford medicines/treatment/afraid to go to health centres/health care services too far/will not be treated if I go there/other
• What is your social life like in Egypt? – I have many friends/I am alone/I have a few friends/I am involved in sports/I spend time with family/I hang out with work colleagues/other
  ▪ Social well-being score (0–6): I am alone (0)/I have a few friends (3)/I have many friends (6)
  ▪ Social well-being score (0–4): I am involved in sports (1)/I spend time with family (1)/I hang out with work colleagues (1)/other (1)

• Do you maintain contact with close friends/relatives in another country?
• Which country?
• How often? – daily/once per month/weekly/once per three months/every now and then
  ▪ Social well-being score (0–2): Daily (2)/once per month (1)/weekly (2)/once per three months (1)/every now and then (1)

• Do you socialize mainly with Egyptians?
  ▪ Community well-being score (0–1): yes (1)/no (0)

• Are you happy with the way the Egyptian community has received you? – very unhappy/satisfied/happy/extremely happy
  ▪ Community well-being score (0–3): 0/1/2/3

• Do you receive support from any of the following in Egypt? – government/faith-based organizations/civil society organization/international organization/my own community/other
• Did you receive support from any of the following in your home country? – government/faith-based organizations/civil society organization/international organization/my own community/other
• How safe do you feel in Egypt? (at work/at home/in the streets and public places) – very insecure/insecure-safe/very safe
  ▪ Community well-being score (0–9): at work (0/1/2/3)/at home (0/1/2/3)/in the streets or public places (0/1/2/3)

• Would you recommend family/friends to come to Egypt?
  ▪ General well-being score (0–10): no (0)/yes (10)

• Would you consider leaving Egypt?
  ▪ General well-being score (0–2): no (0)/yes (2)

• Why?: – I don’t feel safe in Egypt/I couldn’t find work or longer have a job/I want to see my family/my family needs me/I saved enough money to settle down at home/I have been abandoned by my employer/I want to go back to school or university/I want to get more training to get a better job/I have a better job offer at home/other

• Do you feel optimistic about your future?
  ▪ General well-being score (0–10): no (0)/yes (10)

• Household disposable income (USD) calculation:
  ▪ Financial well-being Score:
    - (<0) = 1
    - (=0) = 2
    - (0–2) = 3
    - (2–10) = 4
    - (10–25) = 5
    - (25–50) = 6
    - (50–100) = 7
    - (100–200) = 8
    - (200–400) = 9
    - (400–800) = 10
    - (800–1,600) = 11
    - (>1,600) = 12
Annex B: Distribution of the sample for overall well-being score

Statistics
Overall Well-being Score (%)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>N Valid</th>
<th>561</th>
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<tr>
<td>Median</td>
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<td>Kurtosis</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
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Note: $^a$ Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown.