This chapter reviews the major migration trends of 2010/2011, including developments in policy, legislation, international cooperation and dialogue on migration. It offers a brief global overview and thereafter outlines some of the key regional trends in migration, focusing on six regions of the world (Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Oceania).

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TRENDS

Despite the ongoing effects of the global economic crisis, the total number of migrants worldwide has not fallen in recent years. Migratory flows to developed countries somewhat slowed down during and immediately following the crisis – for example, in the United States of America, the number of foreigners entering the country dropped from 1,130,818 in 2009 to 1,042,625 in 2010; in the United Kingdom, the number dropped from 505,000 in 2008 to 470,000 in 2009; in Spain, it dropped from 692,228 in 2008 to 469,342 in 2009; in Sweden, from 83,763 in 2009 to 79,036 in 2010; and, in New Zealand, from 63,910 in 2008 to 57,618 in 2010 (UNDESA, forthcoming). However, there were no staggering reversals in the patterns of movement, and thus, the global stock of migrants that had built up over the course of several decades was hardly affected: in 2010, the total number of international migrants in the world was estimated at 214 million people – up from 191 million in 2005 (UNDESA, 2009). Given that the estimated number of internal migrants is 740 million (UNDP, 2009), around a billion people (roughly one in seven of the world’s population) are migrants. Additionally, underlying this picture of general stability, were a number of specific developments that were evident during 2010/2011. Some of the key trends are highlighted in the following sections.

I. Political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

The political transitions in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 have had a tremendous impact on migration patterns in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and beyond. Demonstrations against Tunisian President Ben Ali prompted him to resign on 14 January 2011, and the unrest in Tunisia was followed by demonstrations in other Arab countries, including Egypt, where President Mubarak stepped down in February 2011. In Libya, there was a rapid breakdown of law and order following the government’s attempts to repress the mass demonstrations that broke out in a number of provincial cities, as of mid-February 2011. The confrontations between the demonstrators and the security forces rapidly escalated into a major civil conflict that became the source of large outflows towards neighbouring countries in the east, south and west. By the end of June 2011, according to

---

1 Data presented in this chapter include new figures released in 2010 and at the beginning of 2011. Unless otherwise stated, this chapter does not include data made public after June 2011. Given the relative scarcity and still fragmented nature of migration data, newly released data included in this chapter do not always provide 2010 figures and may, instead, offer figures for previous years, which are still useful for the analysis proposed in this chapter.

2 Other countries included Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.
IOM, more than 600,000 migrants (including about 280,000 third-country nationals (TCNs)) had left the country, representing a significant share of the 1.5 million migrants (the largest migrant worker population in North Africa) hosted by Libya before the outbreak of hostilities (UC Davis, 2011a). Major cross-border movements were recorded at the border with Tunisia and Egypt, with 256,000 and 184,000 arrivals, respectively. A significant number of these arrivals were Libyan nationals, with the vast majority going back and forth across the border for economic purposes, while their families stayed in Egypt. Arrivals outside the region were mainly recorded in Malta and Italy; as of the end of June 2011, more than 43,000 migrants had landed on Lampedusa Island since the beginning of the crisis — 19,200 departing from Libya and 24,100 from Tunisia. No significant outflows were reported from other countries in the region, including Egypt.

The media have often promoted the perception that the crisis in North Africa would result in much more irregular migration to Europe. In reality, a very small proportion of those displaced by the conflict took boats to cross the Mediterranean, with the others seeking return to Libya or assistance to move to another country in Africa or Asia. Many of these migrant workers were able to return home with the help of IOM, working in partnership with UNHCR. By the end of June 2011, more than 143,000 third-country nationals from around 50 different countries had been evacuated (see map 1). The largest numbers of assisted returns were to the following seven countries: Bangladesh (31,000), Chad (26,000), Egypt (24,000), Sudan (17,000), Niger (12,000), Ghana (11,000), and Mali (10,000).

These figures for assisted cases do not, however, reveal the full scale of return movements. IOM figures suggest, for example, that up to 200,000 migrants returned to Egypt. In addition, some Asian countries, such as the Philippines, require departing migrants to pay a fee into a fund that can later be used to bring home stranded migrants if they need to be evacuated from a country. Some 26,000–30,000 Filipinos (mostly workers) were in Libya before the uprising began, and approximately 10,000 of them were evacuated from the country and repatriated, according to the Philippine Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

The sudden return of large numbers of migrant workers to developing countries in Africa and Asia may have a serious impact on the economic stability of these States. Many of these countries are already struggling with high unemployment, and now they face the prospect of trying to absorb large numbers of returnees into their labour market. These countries are also likely to be hit financially, as migrant workers returning home will no longer be able to send remittances. Neighbouring Chad and Niger, for instance, saw 70,000 and 80,000 nationals, respectively, return home from Egypt and Tunisia, on their own or with the support of IOM, within the first three months of the Libyan crisis. Such massive return movements have raised concerns about food security in receiving communities and highlighted the need for reintegration options and community stabilization programmes to absorb the high number of

---

3 In the context of the Libyan crisis, a third-country national (TCN) is a migrant who crossed the border from Libya to a country that is not his or her country of origin.
5 Others were recorded at the border with Algeria, Chad, Niger and Sudan.
6 For example, on 10 May, the International Herald Tribune published an op-ed article entitled Look who’s coming to Europe, even though the article pointed out that most of those leaving Libya were migrant workers returning to their countries of origin in Asia and Africa.
Map 1: Number of third-country nationals assisted by IOM/UNHCR to return home from MENA region, June 2011

Source: IOM, 2011.
returnees without destabilizing the subregion and to mitigate the risk of a humanitarian crisis related to livelihood failure.⁹

In some countries, action has already been taken to assist returnees in reintegrating. In Bangladesh, for example, the World Bank has approved a Repatriation and Livelihood Restoration for Migrant Workers project. This project covered the cost of repatriation, along with a one-time cash grant of approximately USD 775 (equivalent to about 30 months of the average wage in Bangladesh)¹⁰ to cover migrants’ immediate needs and enable them to establish livelihoods in Bangladesh. The project has a total budget of USD 74.1 million with a large component (USD 40 million) implemented by IOM on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh. The Nepalese Government is another example of a country that has used its Foreign Employment Welfare Fund to cover repatriation costs.

Some of the people leaving Libya cannot return easily to their home countries. These include Somalis and Eritreans, who may require special assistance to help them re-establish themselves in a third country. However, despite extensive media coverage, suggesting that tens of thousands of migrants from North Africa would seek to enter Europe irregularly, only a few of those leaving Libya have actually moved to Europe. As of end of June 2011, arrivals by sea to Malta and Italy from Libya represented less than 3 per cent of the total outflows from that country, and were largely Eritreans and Somalis. Similarly, the number of Tunisian nationals who have left their home country since mid-February was lower than initially forecast.¹¹ Moreover, according to UNHCR, only a small proportion of these people were refugees. The vast majority of migrants seeking a better life in Europe have been young Tunisians – predominantly single males in their 20s – who have taken advantage of the situation to seek work abroad.

II. Increase in natural disasters and displaced people

In 2010, the estimated global number of displaced persons due to sudden-onset natural disasters was over 42 million, which represents an increase of 6 and 25 million, in comparison with 2008 and 2009, respectively. The large majority (38 million) were displaced by climate change-related disasters (primarily flooding and storms) (IDMC/NRC, 2011). The significant overall rise in 2010 was mainly due to the unusually heavy floods in mid-2010 in China (which displaced over 15 million) and Pakistan (which displaced at least 11 million), as well as the earthquakes in Chile, Japan and Haiti. Bangladesh, India and the Philippines were also severely hit by natural disasters, making Asia the most affected region (ibid.). In 2010, the total number of natural disasters was 321 – slightly more than the 290 recorded in 2009, but close to the average for the last 10 years (EM-DAT/CRED, 2011).¹² The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that the number of natural disasters has doubled over the last two decades (from about 200 to over 400 per year). As a result, displacement figures due to disaster are much higher than those recorded for displaced people due to conflict, which accounted for around 2.9 million additional displacements in 2010 (IDMC/NRC, 2011).

¹² Figure extracted on 25 March 2011 from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT): www.emdat.be
The January 2010 earthquake that devastated Haiti and the severe floods later that year that hit Pakistan are prime examples of displacement-inducing natural disasters. Each of these disasters has been the focus of major international humanitarian intervention, but the livelihood, housing, health and other general service needs have yet to be fully met in both countries, and reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts continue.

The Haiti earthquake killed more than 300,000 people and displaced around 1.5 million. Significant waves of emigration were expected in the aftermath of the earthquake but they did not occur (United Nations Foundation, 2011). This may be largely due to the lack of resources for Haitian nationals to engage in a costly and dangerous journey. On the other hand, the problem of internal displacement remains a concern. A year after the earthquake, IOM found that 810,000 people were still living in informal sites in Port-au-Prince and provinces.13

In late July 2010, “Pakistan was struck by the worst floods in the country’s history, affecting more than 18 million people across Pakistan, making 11 million homeless [and] killing some 1,750 persons ...”14 The entire country was affected, with floods initially starting in the northern mountainous areas and slowly spreading to the southern low-lying regions of Punjab and Sindh. They were compared to a “slow-motion” tsunami as areas of the Sindh region close to the sea were flooded in September and October – more than two months after the rains that triggered the flow of water from the north. A significant part of the more than 11 million people displaced during the floods in Pakistan still need assistance and relocation to their places of origin.15

Between May and August 2010, China was hit by severe flooding and landslides. The Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs reported that more than 3 million people were temporarily displaced in central China in the last two weeks of July 2010 alone (IFRC, 2010). The February 2010 earthquake in Chile affected approximately 2.6 million people, 800,000 of whom were displaced (EM-DAT/CRED, 2011; American Red Cross, 2011).

Data on the impact of gradual, slow-onset environmental events on the movement of people are more difficult to obtain, but there are some indications that more and more people are being affected by droughts (EM-DAT/CRED, 2011) – for example, in Somalia, droughts have displaced over 52,000 people since 1 December 2010, with many moving to the capital, Mogadishu. Though migration in the face of drought is not uncommon, this appears to be the first time a large inflow of pastoralists has migrated to the capital, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (IRIN, 2011). Similarly, the so-called Dzud16 effect in Mongolia led to changes in the usual nomadic movement patterns. Rural populations moved to the outskirts of the capital, as the result of an extremely cold and dry winter that killed cattle – the traditional source of income.

---

III. Overall numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers remain stable

At the end of 2010, it was estimated that there were 15.4 million refugees\(^ {17}\) and 845,800 asylum-seekers globally.\(^ {18}\) While the number of refugees increased slightly (by 153,000, compared to 2009), new asylum claims received by UNHCR or governments decreased by 11 per cent in 2010. The increase in refugees was mainly due to the deterioration of the situation in Somalia, which resulted in an additional 119,000 Somalis fleeing to neighbouring countries during 2010 (UNHCR, 2011a). As a result of conflicts that flared at the beginning of 2011 in North and West Africa, particularly in Libya, but also in Côte d’Ivoire, the number of refugees in 2011 is expected to increase.

In contrast, UNHCR data reveal an important decrease in the number of asylum-seekers in industrialized countries\(^ {19}\) over the last 10 years. “A total of 358,800 asylum applications were lodged in industrialized countries in 2010, which was 5 per cent fewer than in 2009. The latest number was the fourth lowest in the last decade and almost half (42%) of the 620,000 applications filed in 2001” (UNHCR, 2011b).

IV. Migration and the global economic crisis: some signs of recovery

In 2010/2011, there were significant (although mixed) signs of recovery in the global economy. Emerging and developing countries experienced an average GDP growth rate of 7.1 per cent in 2010, compared to 2.6 per cent in 2009, but recovery was more modest in advanced industrialized economies (from -3.4% in 2009, to 3% in 2010) and unemployment is still high, as of mid-2011 (IMF, 2011). Since February 2011, declining trends in unemployment rates have been recorded for the majority of the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for the first time since the beginning of the global economic crisis. At that same point in time, about 45 million persons were unemployed in OECD countries – a decrease of 2.1 million when compared to February 2009, but an increase of 14.3 million when compared to February 2008 (OECD, 2011).

Since the beginning of the global economic crisis in 2007–2008, numerous forecasts have been made about the potential impacts of the crisis and ensuing recovery on migration. Among others, predictions have included the following: a sharp reduction in migration inflows, an abrupt halt in the growth of the foreign population in high-income countries, a radical reduction in remittance inflows for migrant-sending countries, and an increase in return migration due to higher unemployment rates of migrants living abroad. The available evidence now suggests that predictions of the patterns and magnitude of migration flows remain inaccurate.

\(^{17}\) This figure includes refugees (9.95 million at the end of 2010) and people in refugee-like situations (597,000 at the end of 2010), both of which fall within the Office of the UNHCR mandate. It also includes refugees covered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) mandate (estimated at 4.82 million at the end of 2010). “Refugees are individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or those enjoying “temporary protection”. People in “refugee-like situations” represent a category that is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.

\(^{18}\) According to the UNHCR definition, asylum-seekers (pending cases) are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been assessed. The 845,800 people mentioned above refer to claimants whose individual applications were pending at the end of 2010, irrespective of when they may have been lodged.

\(^{19}\) The data refer to the following 44 industrialized countries: the 27 European Union countries, Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
While it is, for instance, difficult to fully assess how the economic recovery will affect job opportunities for migrant workers, the latest figures from a number of countries suggest a mixed picture. In some countries, there are indications of an increase in immigration; in others, the number of migrants is expected to fall. In Canada, for example, the number of foreign workers entering the country is increasing again (from 178,271 in 2009, to 182,322 in 2010), reaching almost the level registered in 2008 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011). In the United States of America, the number of new arrivals in 2010 was higher than that registered in 2009 and 2008 (476,049 vis-à-vis 463,042 and 466,558, respectively) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). In Germany, the foreign population increased by about 58,800 (0.9%), which represented the first rise in five years, after a slight reduction between 2006 and 2009 (Federal Statistical Office – Destatis, 2011).

On the other hand, in the United Kingdom, it is projected that the migrant population will decrease by some 360,000 by 2015, as compared with the pre-recession projection in July 2008, and will reduce the UK labour force by 200,000 (UK Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009, cited in Ghosh, 2011: 73). In Ireland, it was estimated that a net outflow of 60,000 persons occurred in the year ending April 2009; a further net outflow of 40,000 people was anticipated (Ghosh, 2011).

IOM’s World Migration Report 2010 and a new IOM/Hague Process publication entitled The Global Economic Crisis and Migration: Where do we go from here? (Ghosh, 2011), argue that the recent economic crisis has highlighted some of the key challenges for future migration patterns and their management, going far beyond the impact on remittance flows. The global economic crisis seems to have had at least five different types of impact.

First, several thousand migrants lost their jobs or could not get their labour permit renewed due to significant job losses in the labour market of destination countries. For example, more than 7 million jobs had been lost in the United States and 1.6 million had been lost in Spain – mainly in the construction and manufacturing sector – by the end of 2009 (MPI, 2010a). In addition, the levels of unemployment were increasing faster among foreign workers than among natives (particularly in Spain) (IOM, 2010a). This happened partly because migrants were concentrated in sectors of the economy that were most vulnerable to recession, such as the construction sector, and partly because migrants tend to be younger and have less job security than natives.

Second, the overall stock of migrants did not decrease as much as expected because, even after losing their jobs, many migrant workers chose not to return home, despite incentives to do so being introduced in some countries, and because the economic situation was often worse in the country of origin than in the country of destination. For instance, the Plan de Retorno Voluntario – a ‘pay-to-go’ system introduced by the Spanish Government in June 2008 to give unemployment benefits to non-European Union (EU) nationals who agreed to return home – only recorded 11,660 applications as of April 2010 (compared to the anticipated 87,000 applications) and only 8,451 immigrants actually returned home (Lopez, 2011). Similarly, programmes offering return incentives to migrants in the Czech Republic and Japan had only limited impact. On the other hand, the example of Poland highlights how the economic performance of a country of origin can affect migrants’ decisions to return. Since 2008, the number of Polish returnees has increased, probably due to the fact that, “Poland is the only
member of the European Union that has not fallen into a recession and ... has continued to grow economically due to a relatively high domestic demand and because foreign trade makes up a small share of Poland’s GDP” (Kaczmarszyk et al., 2010).

Third, increased joblessness among migrant workers probably made them much more vulnerable on the labour market, although the extent to which the crisis led to more precarious employment for migrants has not been fully documented. There were, however, indications of a hardening of public attitudes towards immigrants, with an accompanying decrease in levels of tolerance of foreigners, making migrants increasingly vulnerable to discrimination and xenophobia.

A fourth effect of the crisis was a reduction in irregular migration flows. In the EU, for example, the number of border apprehensions for attempted illegal entry at EU borders fell by a third between 2008 and 2009 (Frontex, cited in WMR, 2010).

Fifth, although there was some decline in remittance sending, perhaps reflecting the rise in unemployment among migrant workers, remittances remained resilient, in many cases, because return migration was not as high as expected. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2007–2008, remittance flows have shown great resilience compared to other financial flows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) (World Bank, 2010). In 2010, remittance flows seemed to bounce back to levels registered in pre-crisis years. Total amounts of recorded remittances were estimated to have exceeded USD 440 billion in 2010, with the biggest share (USD 325 billion) being sent to developing countries. This represents an increase of almost 6 per cent, compared to remittances recorded in 2009 (USD 416 billion globally, of which USD 307 billion went to developing countries) (ibid.). Growth rates of about 7–8 per cent are expected for the coming three years (2011–2013), which would result in global remittances exceeding the USD 500 billion benchmark in 2012 and reaching USD 536 billion in 2013 (with USD 375 and USD 404 billion, respectively, going to developing countries) (World Bank, 2011a).

Overall, it appears that the changes in the labour markets and patterns of migration caused by the global economic crisis were relatively short-lived. Nevertheless, a key question for the future is how will the slow general economic recovery affect employment prospects for migrant workers? Job recovery often lags behind output recovery, thus creating a need for more emphasis on job-creation measures that specifically include or target migrants. To date, however, migrants have not been targeted in any economic stimulus measures launched by governments.
V. The relevance of human trafficking

The year 2010 marked the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Anti-Trafficking (Palermo) Protocol, yet there have been few indications of a decrease in human trafficking since the protocol was signed.

The global number of trafficked persons – including adults and children in forced labour, bonded labour, and forced prostitution – has remained high and was estimated at 12.3 million in 2010 (U.S. Department of State, 2010). Globally, almost 2 out of 1,000 people are victims of trafficking, while in Asia and the Pacific this ratio is as high as 3 per 1,000 inhabitants.

There are, nonetheless, indications that the international community is taking a more serious view of the problem. For example, the number of signatories to the Palermo Protocol has risen by almost 50 per cent in 10 years – from 80 signatories in 2000 to 117 signatories at the end of 2010. This is an important achievement that has coincided with an increase in the number of ratifications by countries of destination (for example, China and Ireland). However, according to the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) 2010 Report, 62 ratifying countries have yet to convict a trafficker under laws in compliance with the Palermo Protocol, while 104 countries have no laws, policies or regulations to prevent victims’ deportation. There has also been progress at the regional and national level. On 14 December 2010, the European Parliament adopted the text of a new EU Directive on human trafficking, which replaces the Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA. This represents an important step towards tougher action against human traffickers and stronger protection for victims. The Directive provides for criminal law to cover a wider range of activities, including grooming and sex tourism. It also provides for measures to improve the situation of children when dealing with prosecutions.

In 2010, as South Africa hosted the first Football World Cup on the African continent, renewed attention was given to the link between trafficking and sporting events. With considerable international concern that this event would contribute to a sharp increase in trafficking, primarily for the purpose of sexual exploitation, religious leaders, teachers, government and non-governmental stakeholders, as well as representatives from the private sector, came together to put forth a strong, effective and unified message against trafficking in persons during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The aim of this initiative was to inform communities of the dangers and warning signs of human trafficking, as well as to better inform communities on how to identify victims, to whom to refer cases of trafficking, and how to assist victims.

---

22 The new Directive applies to trafficking of humans for the sex industry as well as for labour exploitation. Reforms include a broader definition of trafficking (e.g. forced begging, forced removal of organs, forced criminal activity), longer penalties for violators (10 years instead of 8), child protection, no prosecution of victims, providing legal services and health services for victims, and establishing or strengthening policies in Member States that aim to prevent trafficking. See: http://www.ungift.org/doc/knowledgubhriem/Doc/Governments/DIRECTIVE_OF_THE_EUROPEAN_PARLIAMENT_AND_OF_THE_COUNCIL.pdf (accessed on 4 July 2011).
Global Forum on Migration and Development becomes more action-oriented

The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) – a voluntary, intergovernmental, non-binding and informal consultative process – was hosted in November 2010 by the Government of Mexico in Puerto Vallarta and attended by 131 governments. This fourth meeting of the GFMD included, for the first time, a round-table discussion on the linkages between climate change, migration and development, gender and family, and a “common space” that allowed for an interface between government and civil society participants. Additionally, the IOM-initiated and Global Migration Group (GMG) endorsed handbook, *Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning*, was presented to States. The publication of this handbook and its subsequent endorsement at the GFMD IV paved the way for its implementation in developing countries that seek to ensure that migration is fully taken into account in their development plans.

In all, discussions between States at GFMD IV produced 47 recommendations, most addressed directly to participating States, which may implement them, at the national, and as applicable, regional and international levels.

In 2011, the GFMD under the Swiss chair, introduced a new format for the process. Instead of organizing a full annual GFMD meeting, the 2011 Chair has organized a series of smaller, focused and action-oriented meetings around the world in support of its flagship theme: Taking Action on Migration and Development – Coherence, Capacity and Cooperation. Under three thematic clusters: labour mobility and development; addressing irregular migration through coherent migration and development strategies; and planning tools for evidence-based migration and development policies, some 14 meetings were held in various locations around the world. The GFMD 2011 concluding debate will present the preliminary results of an assessment of GFMD achievements since its creation.

Also of related interest, on 19 May 2011, the General Assembly of the United Nations held a one-day informal thematic debate on international migration and development. This debate was intended to build on the on-going dialogue on international migration and development within the framework of GFMD, and to contribute to the process leading to the second High Level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development, to be held by the General Assembly in 2013.

Regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs)

Regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs) are privileged information-sharing and discussion platforms for States with an interest in the promotion of cooperation in the field of migration management. Many RCPs made major advancements in 2010 and 2011.

---

23 The GFMD is open to all States Members and Observers of the United Nations, with the goal of advancing understanding and cooperation on the mutually reinforcing relationship between migration and development, and fostering practical and action-oriented outcomes. For more information, see: [http://www.gfmd.org/en/process.html](http://www.gfmd.org/en/process.html) (accessed on 24 June 2011).
The Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) convened for the first time in ten years of existence at the ministerial level in Windhoek, Namibia, in November 2010. The aim was to promote reflection on how best to facilitate improved regional cooperation on migration and the development of migration policy. Recommendations were made on how to improve and harmonize regional migration data, expedite ratification of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons, increase public awareness of the dangers of irregular migration, and reduce the impact of brain drain within the region.24

In April 2011, Bangladesh hosted the fourth Ministerial Consultation of the Colombo Process, with discussions focusing on the promotion and protection of migrants’ rights, welfare and dignity, the improvement of services for migrants, capacity-building activities for governments and national partners, and better information exchanges regarding migrant workers. IOM prepared a study (Labour Migration from Colombo Process Countries: Good Practices, Challenges and Ways Forward) reviewing existing policies and programmes and highlighting a number of good practices in labour migration management.25

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development Regional Consultative Process on Migration (IGAD–RCP) held its first meeting as an RCP to discuss and agree a plan of action. Other advancements were made by the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (see Regional Overviews).

In terms of gaps in the global RCP landscape, interest in the development of new RCPs advanced among the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) group of countries, who continue to pursue the possibility of establishing an RCP in the region. In the Caribbean – the only region that is lacking in RCP coverage – discussions continued among a small group of Caribbean countries with a view of putting in place a platform for regular deliberations on common migration issues.

These developments signal the growing interest among countries across the migration spectrum in coming together to deliberate on migration issues. The role that RCPs and similar interregional forums dealing with migration issues can play in addressing migration policy coherence within and between regions is now widely acknowledged. However, meaningful interaction between such forums is often impeded by the uneven capacities of RCPs. IOM continues to focus on capacity enhancement at the request of RCP-participating States, in order to put them on a firmer footing towards predictability and regularity of meetings – crucial factors in building and sustaining trust and promoting cooperation within and between regions. In line with the growing interest in promoting cooperation across regions and in the cross-fertilization of ideas and practices – as also recommended at the 2009 Global RCP Meeting – the Government of Botswana and IOM hosted the Third Global Meeting of Chairs and Secretariats of RCPs under the broad theme of “Enhancing cooperation on migration through dialogue and capacity building”, in 2011.

The 2011 consultation, like its predecessors, allowed representatives from the various RCPs to exchange information and good practices on migration issues of interest to individual RCPs. In addition, it encouraged a discussion of possible improvements that States could make to

24 The complete list of recommendations and MIDSA goals can be found at: http://www.migrationdialogue.org/midsa/ (accessed on 4 July 2011).
their respective RCPs in terms of organizational and operational arrangements, to enhance the regularity with which they meet and thereby increase their effectiveness. In doing so, this consultation served a capacity-building function in addition to further strengthening the role played by RCPs in international migration. It also examined the potential relationship with other mechanisms in facilitating inter-State dialogue, partnership and cooperation on migration at the regional, interregional and global levels, such as GFMD and HLD.

Environmental and climate change: Policymakers increasingly recognize the implications for migration

Although there has been a recent upsurge of interest in the effects of climate and environmental change and natural disasters on migration, most States have yet to determine what their national response policies will be. Indeed, international cooperation mechanisms as well as regional and national-level policies to manage environmental migration flows are still at an early stage of development. Existing policies for managing such flows tend to be ad hoc, rather than being part of a more coherent system of migration management. Nevertheless, several countries have taken steps to promote consultation and debate on potential solutions to problems of environmental migration or to formulate legislation, thereby placing migration and the environment more firmly on political agendas.

At the national level, the United States enacted its Temporary Protected Status (TPS) legislation as a measure of temporary protection for the Haitian migrants already in country and unable to return as a result of the 2010 earthquake. This was accompanied by a provision to temporarily suspend deportations. Currently, TPS and similar legislation in other countries (such as in Sweden and Finland), enacted on an exceptional basis, are the only legal instruments available specifically designed for this purpose, although they are not intended as measures to facilitate migration in the face of natural disasters or other environmental events (Martin, 2009). In Bangladesh, the national-level Policy Dialogue on Environment, Climate Change and Migration, organized by IOM and the BRAC Development Institute (BDI) in May 2010. The policy dialogue was the first of its kind aimed at fostering debate on the nexus between the environment, climate change and migration in Bangladesh and encouraging dialogue among concerned stakeholders in development, government and civil society (IOM, 2010c). In March 2010, the Kenyan Government presented a draft national policy on internally displaced persons (IDPs), which considers displacement due to conflict, natural disasters and development projects, with three main objectives: 1) to ensure adequate protection for IDPs; 2) to prevent future displacement; and 3) to fulfil the country’s obligations under international law (IDMC/NRC, 2010a).

Kenya’s draft policy is in accord with the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Africa (the Kampala Convention). The Kampala Convention is the first regional legally binding instrument of its kind globally that obliges States to protect and assist IDPs. The Convention applies to displacement due to a wide range of causes, such as conflict and natural or man-made disasters, as well as from development projects, and it provides standards for the protection of people from arbitrary displacement, the protection of IDPs while they are displaced and durable solutions to their displacement. Adopted by the African Union (AU) in October 2009, the Convention must be ratified by 15 countries to enter into force and become legally binding. To date, it has been signed by
31 African Union Member States (11 in 2010)\textsuperscript{26} and only ratified by 6 in total,\textsuperscript{27} with Uganda being the first to ratify the Convention in February 2010.

As mentioned above, for the first time since its inception in 2007, the GFMD held a dedicated round-table discussion on the relevance and impact of climate change on migration and development during its 2010 meeting in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. The inclusion of environmental and climate change-related issues in the discussion is a clear indication not of the increasing global importance of these issues. It also demonstrate that global discussions on migration and development can no longer ignore the integral role of environmental and climate change.

Finally, at the global level, the Cancun Agreements reached at the 2010 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Cancun, Mexico represent perhaps the single most important policy outcome of 2010 on the issue of migration and environment. The objectives defined by the Cancun Agreements included, among others, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and providing assistance to vulnerable groups worldwide in adapting to the impacts of climate change. More specifically, the Cancun Adaptation Framework, included as an element of the Cancun Agreements, explicitly refers to migration and displacement within the context of adaptation:

\emph{The Conference of the Parties}

14. \textit{Invites} all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, by undertaking, inter alia, the following:

\ldots (f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels; (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Decision 1/CP.16)\textsuperscript{28}

Referring to migration in the Agreements is an important step towards a more concerted global effort to address the issue of climate change-induced migration and to promote concrete actions to reduce vulnerability and build resilience, particularly among those most affected in developing countries.

Before looking at the regional migration trends for 2010/2011, there are two other global developments that are worthy of note. First, a non-binding code of practice on the international recruitment of health personnel (with a focus on fair recruitment and employment conditions for migrant health personnel, as well as on refraining from recruiting in countries facing critical health-care shortages) was adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2010. Second, a report by the International Labour Organization (ILO) introducing a rights-based approach provided a comprehensive synthesis of all applicable principles and guidelines for formulating sound migration policies (United Nations, 2010).

\textsuperscript{26} In 2010, these were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, and the United Republic of Tanzania.

\textsuperscript{27} To date, these are: the Central African Republic, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia. See: \url{http://www.internal-displacement.org/kampala-convention} (accessed on 20 June 2011).

\textsuperscript{28} See: \url{http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2} (accessed on 19 April 2011).
AFRICA REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Importance of intraregional migration

Despite a common perception in the media that Europe risks being swamped by a flood of migrants from Africa, the percentage of Africans migrating abroad remains relatively modest. According to official data, some 30 million Africans (about 3% of the population) have migrated internationally (World Bank, 2011b). About two-thirds of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa move to other countries in the region. Only 4 per cent of all migrants living in OECD countries come from sub-Saharan Africa (ibid.). In 2010, 64 per cent of the sub-Saharan migration was intraregional and employment-related, directed mainly towards countries such as Burkina Faso, Kenya and South Africa. Migration flows in West Africa are perhaps the best example of this intraregional inclination, with more than 70 per cent of movements within the subregion; in Southern and East Africa, interregional movements account for 66 and 52 per cent of flows, respectively (World Bank, 2011c; IOM, 2011b). By contrast, the large majority (90%) of migrants from North Africa travel to countries outside the region (World Bank, 2011c). Overall, about half of Africa’s migrants live outside the continent, the majority of them in Europe.

Remittances back to pre-crisis levels

Sub-Saharan Africa has, perhaps, been less affected by the global economic crisis than other developing regions in the world. After a modest reduction in remittance flows (by USD 0.8 billion, to USD 20.6 billion in 2009) flows increased again in 2010 (up to USD 21.5 billion), reaching the level recorded in 2008. A recent continent-wide household survey revealed that, in 2010, an estimated 30 million Africans living abroad sent over USD 40 billion back home, representing 2.6 per cent of Africa’s GDP and four times the total amount recorded in 1990 (World Bank, 2011c). Remittances are the African continent’s largest source of net foreign inflows after foreign direct investment (FDI). The cost of sending remittances to sub-Saharan Africa is high, averaging almost 10 per cent of a typical USD 200 transaction, compared with less than 8 per cent for most other developing regions (ibid.).

Ongoing interest in regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs)

Governments in key regions of Africa renewed their dialogue on migration in 2010, within the framework of informal regional processes on migration. As noted earlier, the year 2010 saw the first ministerial meeting of the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) process in 10 years and, in Eastern Africa, the IGAD-RCP held its first meeting as an RCP to discuss and agree a plan of action. Furthermore, interest in the establishment of new RCPs advanced significantly among Central African countries, which decided to constitute an RCP for the region, involving countries that were already a part of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

East African Common Market entered into force

On 20 November 2009, Heads of State from the East African Community (EAC) signed a Protocol establishing the East African Common Market, which entered into force on 1 July 2010. This protocol “provides for ‘Four Freedoms’ – namely, the free movement of goods,
labour, services and capital\textsuperscript{29} – in the subregion. Such free movement regimes provide a basis for well-managed south–south migration, which, in turn, can contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).\textsuperscript{30} While African countries have created half a dozen free trade areas, designed to facilitate free trade and freedom of movement since the late 1960s, outcomes are still unknown (UC Davis, 2010a).

\textit{Elections and impasse in Côte d’Ivoire}

The November 2010 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire resulted in a violent political standoff as the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refused to hand over power to his political rival Alassane Ouattara, despite the evidence from Ivorian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that the latter had won the election. The election standoff came to an end in April 2011, when troops loyal to internationally recognized President Alassane Ouattara arrested former president Gbagbo, but the four months of intense fighting between forces loyal to the two sides had resulted in hundreds of deaths and extensive displacement within and from the country. As of 25 March 2011, the violence had resulted in over 462 deaths.\textsuperscript{31} On 15 April 2011, OCHA estimated that around 1 million people had been displaced within the country, while UNHCR reported that more than 147,000 people had fled to Liberia (USAID, 2011).

\textit{Referendum in South Sudan}

On 9 January 2011, the referendum on the self-determination of the status of Southern Sudan revealed overwhelming support in favour of secession (effective on 9 July 2011). While the voting process was orderly and peaceful,\textsuperscript{32} in the run-up as well as in the post-referendum period, the movement of massive numbers of Southern Sudanese living in the north (estimated at 1.5–2 million) towards the south has been recorded. The majority of them were previously working in Khartoum and other economic centres in the north and decided to return home, either because of fear of reprisals or in anticipation of better economic prospects. More than 120,000 Southern Sudanese had returned prior to the referendum – at the rate of an average of 2,000 people per day since mid-December 2010. After the referendum, clashes in the provinces along the disputed border between Northern and Southern Sudan (particularly in the oil-rich Abyei Province and in South Kordofan) displaced some 140,000 people and increased the risk of renewed hostilities (UNHCR, 2011c).


\textsuperscript{32} IOM’s Out-of-Country Registration and Voting Programme enabled 60,000 registered voters in eight different countries to participate in the referendum. For more information, see: \url{http://www.southernsudanocv.org/} (accessed on 4 July 2011).
Chapter 2 | International Migration Annual Review 2010/2011

Americas Regional Overview

Over 1 million displaced due to Haiti’s earthquake at the beginning of 2010, marking the start of complex humanitarian responses

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the year 2010 began inauspiciously for the Americas. On 12 January, the magnitude 7.0 earthquake that devastated Haiti killed more than 300,000 people and displaced around 1.5 million. As of May 2011, IOM found that 680,000 people were still living in informal sites in Port-au-Prince and the provinces, facing particular vulnerability as a consequence of the annual rainy/hurricane season and a cholera epidemic (IOM, 2011c). Although this represents a significant decrease (56%) compared to the estimated 1,500,000 internally displaced people in July 2010, it still suggests that much remains to be done in terms of humanitarian assistance and sustainable reconstruction and recovery. Indeed, displacement induced by natural disasters is often temporary. Nonetheless, return movements can take time as the appropriate provisions need to be made, including access to land and property. Since just after the earthquake, IOM has been coordinating and managing displaced persons in camps, and more than 1.3 million people have been registered and referred to services and programmes, including those relating to reconstruction and return.33 As part of the international community’s humanitarian assistance efforts, IOM played a major role in the provision of shelter and acted as the major consignee for non-food items distributed to affected families. The information collected from camps by IOM is also used in the formulation of reconstruction and recovery policies. Furthermore, IOM is involved in land and property issues (one of the main obstacles to reconstruction), community-based infrastructure and violence reduction through the US-funded PREPEP Programme (Programme de Revitalisation et de Promotion de l’Entente et de la Paix), as well as community shelter assistance programmes.

United States still the top country of destination, with Hispanic population nearly doubling over last decade

In 2010, the United States hosted around 43 million foreign nationals, representing 13.5 per cent of the total US population (World Bank, 2011b). Results of the 2010 Census indicate that Hispanics34 made up 16.3 per cent of the total population and that the population increased from 35.3 million in 2000 to 50.5 million in 2010 (Pew Hispanic Center, 2011a). About 11.6 million immigrants came from Mexico, which means that almost one out of three immigrants originated in Mexico (ibid.).

The estimated number of irregular migrants in 2010 remained at about 11.2 million, after a two-year decline from a peak of 12 million in 2007, according to the Pew Hispanic Center (2011b). It is likely that this decline is linked to the overall decline in migration from Mexico since 2007, due to the economic crisis. Although the economy has begun to recover, this has not yet been reflected in terms of employment.

34 Please note that “Hispanics” include both foreign-born and those of Hispanic origin born in the United States.
Remittances sent from the United States remained relatively stable during the economic crisis, compared to the impact on other economic factors in 2010: total remittances sent back to Latin American and Caribbean countries were about USD 58.1 billion, which represented an increase of 1.2 billion when compared to 2009 (World Bank, 2011b). Remittances to Latin America are expected to grow further, given the initial stabilization and revitalized growth of the US economy indicated at the beginning of 2011 – for example, in the first quarter of 2011, the GDP grew by 1.8 per cent; the unemployment rate declined by 0.6 per cent (down to 9%) and is expected to further decrease to 7.8 per cent in 2012. While remittances declined sharply in 2009 and remained almost flat in 2010, the first quarter of 2011 recorded an increase of about 7 per cent compared to previous years (World Bank, 2011a).

Immigration reform stalled in United States, while controversy ensued over state-level immigration laws

Highly politicized immigration debates led to further stalling of comprehensive immigration reform in the United States. Although anti-immigrant sentiments are not a new phenomenon, particularly with regard to irregular migration, they seem to be amplified during economic slowdowns, particularly when unemployment rates are high among the native population. The DREAM Act,35 put forth on the US Congress agenda in September 2010, which would have legalized certain categories of young migrants. This Act, however, lacked bipartisan support and had not passed the Senate by the end of the year. However, the urgent need for immigration reform and the US Government’s determination to advocate for the passage of the DREAM Act was reaffirmed by President Obama in May 2011 in El Paso, Texas, who stressing that, the large flows of immigrants into the United States throughout history have made the country “stronger and more prosperous”. He also pointed out that periods of economic decline are often met with fear and resentment towards newcomers, but underlined his conviction that immigration remains good for the US economy and that there is a need to attract skilled workers.36

At the state level, controversial legislation in Arizona made headlines in April 2010 with the passage of Senate Bill 1070. Several provisions – such as those authorizing law enforcement authorities to question a person’s immigration status if there is reasonable suspicion of irregularity, and requiring immigrants to carry proof of status – were strongly criticized and challenged in court. They were temporarily suspended by the US District Court in July. In the meantime, however, 23 other American states introduced similar restrictive provisions on immigration, which is a reflection of local populations’ perceptions of immigration (MPI, 2010b).37

At federal and provincial levels, Canadian immigration reforms focused primarily on students and the highly skilled

As a consequence of the global economic crisis, the Canadian Government initially reduced the size of its skilled-migrant programme. However, in 2010, with the situation on the labour market improving, labour visa arrangements were fine-tuned to ensure that the country would

---

35 The purpose of the Development, Relief and Education of Alien Minors Act, also called the DREAM Act, is to provide qualifying individuals with an opportunity to enlist in the military or to go to college as a pathway to citizenship, which they would not otherwise have without this legislation. Supporters of the DREAM Act believe it is vital for the people who would benefit from it and also for the United States as a whole. It would give undocumented immigrant students a chance to contribute back to the country and a chance to utilize their hard-earned education and talents. See: http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/dream/index.htm#facts (accessed on 19 June 2011).


37 For more details, see: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=809 (accessed on 19 June 2011).
have access to the precise mix of skills needed to contribute to economic recovery. Changes to immigration laws throughout the country in 2010 resulted in a combination of restrictions in certain foreign labour programmes and other measures to increase highly skilled immigration levels. At the federal level, reforms were made to the Federal Skilled Worker Program in order to reduce application backlogs and place greater emphasis on economic recovery. The biggest change was the creation of a cap system, which established a processing limit of 20,000 applications, with a maximum of 1,000 per occupation. This affected mainly those who fulfilled the requirements but lacked a formal job offer from a Canadian employer (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010). Occupations listed under this programme were also reduced from 38 to 29. In four provinces (British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec), under Canada’s Provincial Nominee Programs, restriction levels were eased for students who have completed their studies in Canada, thereby facilitating access to residency (ibid.).

**New policy responses needed as migration patterns shift within Latin America**

Intraregional mobility in Latin America is not a new phenomenon, although it is becoming increasingly important. New migration patterns are emerging in Latin America, with new migrants coming from outside the region – particularly from other Southern countries. Notably, flows include sub-Saharan Africans travelling to Brazil by boat and then moving to other South American countries, with some migrants managing to travel by sea directly to Argentina, Chile or Uruguay (*The Miami Herald*, 2010; Reuters, 2009; United Nations Multimedia, 2009). These migrants mainly come from Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia and Zimbabwe, and their presence has become more visible (although their numbers are significantly smaller) in Argentina and neighbouring countries (such as Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay) in the last few years (ibid.). Migrants also come from South Asia as, for example, in Ecuador, where the numbers of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Nepali and Sri Lankan migrants have increased over the last three years by 300 per cent (BBC, 2010). Although there have been some policy responses to facilitate migrants’ access to legal residence and to provide protection of their social and human rights (including the right to access health care and education), discrimination and exclusion are often reported. In a few cases, the increased presence of migrants created social tensions, which, in turn, sparked anti-immigrant sentiments. In Argentina in 2010, for instance, a group of migrants (mainly from Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru) were attacked by groups of native Argentines after homeless migrants occupied a local park in Buenos Aires protesting poor housing conditions. Irregular migration is also an inevitable aspect of increased immigration flows. In 2010, in an effort to respond to high irregular migration levels, Panama decided to grant an amnesty to any irregular immigrant who had resided in Panama for more than two years. It is estimated that around 20,000 irregular migrants benefited from this regularization programme.

**Intraregional migration, migration and development, and economic recovery: Key topics in regional processes and forums in Latin America**

Regional mechanisms such as MERCOSUR, CAN (Mercado Común del Sur), CAN (Comunidad Andina de Naciones) and UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas) recognize the

---

40 Further information on MERCOSUR is available at: [www.mercosur.int](http://www.mercosur.int)
importance of free movements of persons, as well as trade and economic cooperation, within South America. MERCOSUR even promotes the regularization of irregular migrants, considering enhanced mobility to be a positive factor in increased regional integration. On 11 March 2011, the Constituency Treaty of UNASUR entered into force, making free movement within South America region a closer reality (UNASUR, 2011).

In other major forums, such as the Ibero-American Forum on Migration and Development, government officials from the 22 Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries that are members of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), met in San Salvador in 2010 to discuss the financial crisis and its continued impact on migrants and their families in 2010 (IOM, 2010d). Other key topics included strategies to harness the development potential of migration and to promote and uphold the human rights of migrants, regardless of their immigration status. In 2011, the annual ministerial meeting was held in the Dominican Republic under the theme Migration and Labour: Co-responsibility among the States. Similar thematic areas were also reflected in the convening of the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) (also known as the Puebla Process) in May 2010 in Mexico. The meeting marked the fifteenth anniversary of the Puebla Process, at which ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the process and strengthened regional cooperation on migration. In addition, the meeting focused specifically on migration’s impact on the family, and recognizing the challenges posed by extraregional immigration (RCM, 2010).
ASIA REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Millions of people displaced by several natural disasters that hit the Asian region in 2010

Asia was hit in 2010 by several natural disasters that affected millions of people and displaced many of them internally. Asian countries dominated the Natural Risk Index 2010, with Bangladesh and Indonesia as the top two at “extreme risk” of natural disasters. Meanwhile, other Asian countries such as Afghanistan, China, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka were among the top 15 countries affected (IRIN, 2010). In terms of numbers affected by extreme weather events, 249.2 million were affected in 2010, with the overwhelming majority affected by floods (176.6 million), followed by droughts (66.5 million) and storms (6.1 million) (EM-DAT/CRED, 2011). Between July and August 2010, Pakistan was faced with severe floods that displaced over 11 million people. Further east, flooding in China displaced several million people. Storms primarily impacted Bangladesh, China and the Philippines (ibid.).

Asia still a region of high emigration and among the top remittance receivers globally

At the beginning of the global economic crisis, several forecasts predicted significant reductions in migration and remittance flows from and within Asia. However, available evidence indicates similarities with what happened following the previous Asian financial crisis – relatively short-term effects with uneven, but overall moderate, impacts on countries across the region (IOM, 2009). This was partly due to increasing oil prices (which more than doubled between early 2009 and the first quarter in 2011) and the recovering economies in oil-exporting countries (destination countries of a significant share of Asian migrants), which maintained remittance flows to South-East Asian countries (World Bank, 2011a).

In 2010, 5 out of the top 10 emigration countries were in the Asian region – notably, Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan and the Philippines (World Bank, 2011b). In 2010, migration within the region to countries or regions such as Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong SAR and the Republic of Korea represented an important migration stream. A significant number of migrant workers from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines migrated to Malaysia and Singapore, while Thailand was a major destination for migrants from neighbouring Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar (IOM, forthcoming). However, temporary labour migration towards the Middle East and, in particular, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries represented the dominant flow. The latest data from 2009 suggest that approximately 97 per cent of migrants from India and Pakistan and 87 per cent of migrants from Sri Lanka migrated to GCC countries (ibid.).

---

41 The Natural Risk Index was created by Maplecroft – a global risk analysis agency, based in the United Kingdom, specializing in social, political and environmental risk assessment. See www.maplecroft.com
42 Please note that affected includes displacement but also homeless and evacuated. The countries/regions considered are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Macau – China, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam. The events considered are complex disasters, drought, earthquakes, floods and storms. See: http://www.emdat.be
Growing population rates and high rates of unemployment in several countries can be a source of pressure on the local economy, and emigration is often seen as part of a viable solution. In the case of Viet Nam, for example, the largest share of the population is aged 15–19 years and its integration into the national labour market represents a serious challenge for the Vietnamese Government. Providing education and training to this young workforce could facilitate employment opportunities abroad, thereby alleviating pressure on the local economy. Similarly, countries such as Bangladesh, with its capital Dhaka (one of the fastest growing cities in the world) expected to host over 20 million people by 2025, are likely to remain among the top emigration countries of the world (UN-Habitat, 2009).

Despite a temporary slowdown in some countries, as a result of the economic crisis in 2008–2009, remittances continued to play an important role in fostering development in the region, with total remittances estimated to have reached USD 170 billion in 2010. In the first quarter of 2011, Bangladesh and Pakistan recorded an increase of 11.4 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively, although nationals of both countries were highly affected by the crisis in the MENA region. Not surprisingly, the top emigration countries were also among the top remittance-receiving countries (with China and India, for example, receiving USD 53.1 billion and USD 51.3 billion, respectively) (World Bank, 2011a). However, in terms of percentage of GDP, remittance flows to Bangladesh and the Philippines represented a higher share at 12 per cent each, while the percentages for China and India was significantly smaller (World Bank, 2011b).

Measures have also been taken by governments to facilitate the sending of remittances. In the case of Bangladesh, which received USD 11.1 billion in remittances in 2010, the government approved the creation of an Expatriate Welfare Bank in May 2010 to facilitate low-cost remittance-sending to Bangladesh. The bank also provides loans at a maximum interest rate of 10 per cent to Bangladeshis after they obtain an employment contract abroad (UC Davis, 2010c).

**Governments across Asia take steps to increase migrant welfare, support and protection**

Protection of migrant workers and increased support to migrant workers abroad were clearly on the political agenda in 2010 as governments continued to take steps to improve migrant protection and support services. This has been done through new labour migration policies, signing of agreements or memoranda of understanding with key destination countries, and other measures to improve transparency in recruitment and increased awareness-raising among migrant workers.

In 2010, both Pakistan and the Philippines either put forth new labour migration policies or amended existing ones. Pakistan’s National Labour Policy 2010 (awaiting Cabinet approval) includes a comprehensive social insurance scheme for Pakistanis abroad, raises the minimum wage for migrants and establishes a labour market information system (IOM, forthcoming). The Philippines 1995 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act was amended in 2010 to include stricter penalties related to illegal recruitment, as well as the extension of welfare services among other provisions (ibid.). In terms of new memoranda of understanding, Indonesia signed several in 2010 with a number of destination countries, such as Australia,
Kuwait, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. In particular, the amended MoU with Malaysia called for increased protection of domestic workers (UC Davis, 2010a and 2010b).

In addition to policies and agreements, other protection measures were put in place in 2010, such as Sri Lanka’s new system that requires all new migrant employment contracts to be signed in front of a Ministry of the Board of Foreign Employment representative, prior to a migrant’s departure, so that the representative can explain the terms and conditions of the contract. Similarly, in Indonesia, the new Ministerial Regulation 14/2010 also requires migrants to sign contracts before an official of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, during pre-departure briefings (IOM, forthcoming). In an effort to raise awareness about migration and overseas employment and to facilitate access to related information, Nepal established a Migrant Resource Centre (MRC), which serves to counsel prospective and current migrants (ibid.).

Efforts made to curtail irregular migration from and within the region

Irregular migration within and from Asia remains a primary issue. In an effort to regularize the situation of migrants in Thailand, the Thai Government introduced a registration programme that would grant a two-year work renewal permit to those who completed a nationality and biographical verification process by the end of February 2010. This process applied to certain categories and primarily targeted the 60,000 migrant workers (mainly Burmese) whose permits were due to expire in January 2010. Meanwhile, the Korean Government granted amnesty to 178,200 irregular migrants, authorizing their departure (without payment of the usual fines) between May and September 2010 (UC Davis, 2010c).

At a regional level, the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime organized different workshops throughout the year 2010 – for example, on regional cooperation regarding refugees and irregular movements and on repatriation and reintegration assistance. In March 2011, it held its fourth ministerial meeting, discussing possible strategies for revitalizing cooperation on trafficking in persons (including, for the first time, a proposal for a regional cooperation framework to address the irregular movement of people and to combat people smuggling) and reaffirming the commitment of participating States to effective cooperation on border control and law enforcement initiatives to combat people smuggling.46

46 For more information, see: [http://www.baliprocess.net/](http://www.baliprocess.net/) (accessed on 20 June 2011).
EUROPE REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Slow recovery from crisis but unemployment challenges continue

In 2010, Europe’s recovery from the global economic and financial crisis seemed to be on the right track, albeit incomplete. The European Union (EU) estimated a GDP average growth rate of 1.8 per cent for 2010 (a significant improvement over the -4.2% in 2009) but at the same time, the average unemployment rate increased from 8.9 per cent in 2009 to 9.6 per cent in December 2010. The foreign labour force, in particular, continued to be more likely to be jobless than their native-born counterparts (IOM, 2010a; MPI, 2010a). For instance, in Spain, at the end of 2007, 12.4 per cent of immigrants were jobless, compared with 7.9 per cent of native-born Spaniards. By mid-2010, those figures had gone up to 30.2 per cent and 18.1 per cent, respectively (ibid.). In Germany, “the unemployment rate among migrants in summer 2010 was almost twice that of Germans – 12.4 compared to 6.5 per cent” (UC Davis, 2010a). In the United Kingdom, the situation affected various groups of immigrants in different ways: Eastern and Central European nationals were relatively unscathed by the rise in joblessness, unlike migrants from Africa, Bangladesh and Pakistan (ibid.). In Southern Italy, the unemployment of seasonal workers led to unprecedented social tensions and anti-migrant riots (The Economist, 2010). However, unemployment also hit nationals – in some cases generating new emigration flows from and within Europe. Ireland, for instance, has experienced significant waves of nationals leaving the country to look for better work opportunities, due to its recent economic crisis. At the end of 2010, net emigration from Ireland reached about 60,000 people (compared to 7,800 in 2009), making it the highest level since 1989. It is estimated that the cumulative net emigration may total 160,000 people, over the period 2009 to 2013, if the labour market situation does not improve (ESRI, 2010).

The Stockholm Programme and tighter control of external EU borders

From a policy perspective, issues related to migration and asylum remained a priority for the EU throughout 2010. In line with the objectives of the Global Approach to Migration, adopted by the European Council in 2005 and confirmed in 2006, several efforts were made to foster partnerships with third countries to promote comprehensive and coherent migration policies – including, for instance, the facilitation of labour migration and the improvement of border management.

On 22 November 2010, the European Commission adopted a Communication called EU Internal Security Strategy in Action, recommending several actions targeting the most urgent security threats facing Europe. In this regard, the Commission was planning to “strengthen security through border management” and decided to establish a European external border surveillance system (EUROSUR); identify “hot spots” at the external borders; issue joint reports

---

47 Some countries, such as Bulgaria, Ireland and Spain, had a GDP growth rate of only 0.1–0.2 per cent, according to Eurostat. See: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database) (accessed on 20 June 2011).

48 The EU Global Approach to Migration originated from a need for a common, global immigration policy, widely recognized and encouraged by the European Commission and EU Member States. Partnership with third countries, solidarity and shared responsibility are at the core of the approach, with the aim of promoting comprehensive and coherent policies that address migration-related issues, bringing together different policy areas (development, social affairs and employment, external relations and justice, and home affairs) and taking both short-term actions and a longer-term vision to address the root causes of migration and forced migration. See: [http://www.europa.eu-en.org/articles/es/article_7589_es.htm](http://www.europa.eu-en.org/articles/es/article_7589_es.htm) (accessed on 20 June 2011).

on human trafficking, human smuggling and the smuggling of illicit goods, as a basis for joint
operations.

Also in 2010, the European Council presented the Stockholm Programme – “An open
and secure Europe, serving and protecting the citizen”. This multi-annual programme
(2010–2014) defines strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the
areas of freedom, security and justice. “The EU strategy has two major components: more
effective control over external borders to preserve internal freedom of movement, and
cooperation with sending countries to accept the return of their citizens and to cooperate
to reduce illegal out-migration” (UC Davis, 2010a). To this end, “the Stockholm Programme
expanded the role of the European Union (EU) Border Agency Frontex50 and provided the
agency with a budget of 83 million Euros in 2010 (compared to 6 million in 2005) (UC Davis,
2010c)”. Bilateral readmission agreements between the European Union Member States
(EU MS) and countries of origin or transit are an integral part of the programme. One such
agreement was concluded with Pakistan in October 2010: “The main objective of this
agreement being to establish rapid and effective procedure for the identification and safe and
orderly return of Pakistanis staying illegally in the EU territories.”51 Tighter EU border control
not only contributed to more apprehensions (during the third quarter of 2010, 34,000 irregular
border-crossings were detected, representing an increase of about 4,000, compared to the
third quarter in 2009), but also deterred potential migrants from moving towards EU borders
(during the first quarter of 2010, only 150 immigrants reached Italy and Malta, compared to
the 5,200 for the first quarter of 2009 (Frontex, 2010).

However, the Stockholm Programme also includes several measures aimed at facilitating
labour migration, highlighting the fact that migration remains a priority issue within the EU. In
particular, it places the Global Approach to Migration and the external dimension of the EU’s
migration policy (based on partnership with third countries) at the centre of the policy debate.
The Stockholm Programme also emphasizes equal rights between third-country nationals
and EU nationals, as well as the importance of integration programmes. Furthermore,
the preparation of the Action Plan for the implementation of the Stockholm Programme
between 2010 and 2014 promoted discussions within the European Commission on the
development of community legislation in the field of seasonal employment and admission
of third-country nationals in the context of intra-corporate transfers. The introduction of the
European Blue Card system for skilled migration (adopted in 2009; implementation expected
in 2011) represents one step towards such a common labour migration strategy (IOM, 2010a;
Collett, 2010).

**The Europe 2020 Strategy and the creation of the Directorate-General for Home Affairs**

On 17 June 2010, the European Council adopted the Europe 2020 Strategy (replacing the
Lisbon Strategy (2000–2010), with the aim of promoting job growth and competitiveness in
the EU. It also includes raising employment levels to 75 per cent and better integration of
legal migrants.52 Although the demand for foreign workers decreased in certain economic

50 Frontex is a specialized and independent body tasked with coordinating the operational cooperation between Member States
in the field of border security.
(accessed on 20 June 2011).
(accessed on 20 June 2011).
sectors during the crisis, the European Commission recognizes that “a long-term, well-organised legal immigration policy will continue to play an important role in filling labour shortages and meeting the EU’s demographic challenges”.53 The aim is to promote Europe’s sustainable economic development through free interregional movement, responding to the skill needs demanded by the labour market. In this regard, the Commission will focus on labour-matching mechanisms, skills recognition, the protection of seasonal workers and the effective implementation of integration policies, among other initiatives.54 The subsequent month, the Directorate-General (DG) for Home Affairs was created as a result of splitting the division of DG Justice, Freedom and Security into two Directorates-General. The new DG for Home Affairs aims at “ensuring European security and putting solidarity at the heart of the European migration policy. The Stockholm Action Plan constitutes the roadmap to implement these priorities” and should promote the creation of an “area without internal borders where EU citizens and third-country nationals may enter, move, live and work, bringing with them new ideas, capital and knowledge or filling gaps in the labour market, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy”.55

**Restrictive national policy measures and bilateral return agreements**

At a national level, some governments decided to introduce stricter regulations for the entry of migrants – for instance, by reducing visa quotas, setting up points systems, limiting the acquisition of citizenship or conducting integration examinations. While often perceived by the media and general public as anti-migrant policies, these limitations were introduced essentially with the intention of mitigating the impact of the global economic crisis on domestic unemployment rates, which were increasing, particularly for foreign workers. On 4 December 2009, Switzerland decided to reduce the quota for workers outside the European Economic Area (EEA) by half – to a maximum of 2,000 for long stays and to 3,500 for temporary/short stays. Similarly, on 6 April, the United Kingdom introduced its first immigration cap on economic migration for non-EU migrants for the period 2011–12. Only 20,700 non-EU nationals will be permitted to work in skilled professions in the United Kingdom from April 2011, under Tier 2 of the Points Based System (PBS) system.56 Furthermore, “skilled and highly skilled migrants must now pass the Life in the UK Test if they want to demonstrate that they have met the knowledge of language and life (KOL) requirement for settlement in the UK”.57 Likewise, the Danish Government introduced a new points system, making family reunification more difficult. It also established new prerequisite conditions for foreigners intending to marry a Danish citizen: they must be at least 24 years of age and able to provide proof of financial independence and an active commitment to Danish society.58 Southern European countries such as Spain and Italy also started stipulating cooperation agreements with migrant-sending or transit countries, “offering aid and guest worker slots in exchange for cooperation to reduce illegal migration” (UC Davis, 2010c). These agreements led to an important drop in arrivals in the EU by sea, mainly in Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta.59 However, tighter controls and

54 Ibid.
57 For details of the requirement, see: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/newsfragments/44-kol-skilled (accessed on 27 June 2011).
cooperation regarding returns seemed to have only shifted the problem. Indeed, a sharp increase in overland arrivals in the north-eastern region of Greece via Turkey was noticed in 2010.60

In addition to returns on the basis of bilateral agreements, there were also deportations of foreigners irregularly present on national soil. The mass deportation of Roma populations by the French Government led to prolonged protests by human rights activists and civil society organizations when a circular (dated 5 August 2010) from the Ministry of Interior that specifically targeted Roma populations was made public. Between 28 July and 17 August 2010, France sent back 979 Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, 828 of whom were accompanied to the border voluntarily, while 151 were expelled.

60 Ibid.
MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Recovery from the crisis in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region: growth in GDP, remittances and salaries

In 2010, the MENA region overall experienced a significant recovery from the global economic crisis, mainly due to rising oil prices and production levels, as well as supportive fiscal policies. According to estimates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the GDP of the region grew by 4.2 per cent in 2010 (almost double the 2.3% increase experienced in 2009), while growth for 2011 was projected at a even higher level (4.8%) (IMF, 2010). The humanitarian crisis in Libya and the unsettled conditions in some neighbouring countries are likely to have the greatest impact on remittance-receiving countries in South Asia, which have an estimated 11 million expatriate workers living in the region (World Bank, 2011a).

A rise in average salaries (estimated at 6.6% for the years 2011, compared to 6.1% in 2010) made GCC countries popular for contractual workers within and outside the region. Indeed, the composition of the foreign labour force in the region appears to be increasingly mixed, with foreign workers originating from Africa, South America and the Far East, while difficulties in hiring from traditional source countries, such as India and the Philippines, seem to be promoting a rapidly growing Chinese presence. In 2010, 8 of the top 10 countries with the highest share of international migrants, relative to their native population, were located in the Middle East region – notably, Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, international migrants account for 87 per cent, 70 per cent and 69 per cent, respectively, of their total population.

Similar to GDP growth rates, remittance inflows to the MENA countries increased significantly in 2010, compared to 2009 (USD 35.4 billion and USD 33.7 billion, respectively) almost reaching the pre-crisis level recorded in 2008 (USD 39.5 billion). Remittances sent back home every year by temporary workers filling the labour shortages in low-skilled sectors represent a crucial source of income for many households and, in some cases, a significant share of the GDP of the country of origin. For example, remittances sent to Lebanon and Jordan in 2009 represented 22.4 per cent and 15.6 per cent of GDP respectively (World Bank, 2011b).

Fast-growing populations and widespread youth unemployment

The Middle East has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, and the vast majority of the population is under the age of 25. Consequently, the demand for employment opportunities will continue to remain high, with nationals looking more and more for highly skilled jobs as a result of increased spending on education in most GCC countries in recent years.
years. However, with GCC economies relying on the growth of labour-intensive sectors (such as construction), the majority of the work opportunities may, for some time, continue to be for low-skilled workers with moderate salary expectations, thereby creating a mismatch between the expectations of the national labour force and the available jobs in the domestic labour market (EIU, 2009). In Saudi Arabia in 2010, for instance, the government faced increasing unemployment rates and difficulties in providing employment to its citizens. The fact that 4.7 million foreign workers outnumbered the 4.3 million Saudi nationals in the labour market (ILO, 2011) created additional pressure for policymakers, although foreign workers are mainly employed in low-skilled sectors of less interest to Saudi nationals. High unemployment rates among their citizens were also recorded in other GCC countries and in the Arab Mediterranean Region where the average unemployment rate in 2008 was almost 15 per cent of the total force and the official labour participation rate was below 46 per cent of the working-age population (compared to the world average of 61.2%). Moreover, unemployment mainly affected young, first-time job-seekers; indeed, the unemployment rate for nationals aged 14–24 was 21.6 per cent – well over the world average of 14 per cent. It was estimated that more than 1.5 million additional jobs would be needed annually in the coming 10 years in order to keep the number of unemployed stable (European Commission, 2010).

This situation has led to alternative policy measures in many Middle East countries, such as in the United Arab Emirates, where the government tried to encourage employers to hire citizens rather than foreigners (UC Davis, 2010a).

**Improvements in the protection of migrants’ rights**

Another policy trend that emerged in 2010 relates to the protection of migrant workers’ rights. The impact of the global economic crisis (although overall it was less pronounced in the Middle East) was mainly felt by migrant workers (ILO, 2011). Their vulnerable situation is generally linked to a lack of legislation protecting foreign workers or a lack of enforcement of labour laws. In the United Arab Emirates, in 2010, several companies had to close. Some of these companies abandoned their foreign workers, leaving them without passports or pay. This was the case, for example, for over 300 Indians workers on a monthly salary of 800 dirhams (USD 217), who reported not having been paid for at least six months (UC Davis, 2010a). However, some governments in the region took some positive steps towards improving the working conditions and increasing respect of migrant rights. In August 2009, Bahrain modified the *kafeel* (sponsorship system) to make “the government rather than the employer the official sponsor of migrants, enabling them to change employers more easily” (UC Davis, 2010c). In Kuwait, after several reported abuses and pressure from civil society, the government finally decided to set minimum wages for expatriate workers in the private sector to ensure decent living conditions for them. In September 2010, the government also announced its intention to abolish the *kafeel* system in 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2010), which would represent an important step towards greater respect of international migrants’ rights. However, not all countries in the region are committed to such changes. For example, although the Labour Minister of the United Arab Emirates acknowledged the need to “examine” the *kafeel* system,

---

65 Includes Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia, as well as the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
68 See Kuwait Times – Kuwait to enforce minimum wage. 1 April 2010. Available at: http://www.kuwaittimes.net/ (accessed on 27 June 2011).
he made it clear that the system was “here to stay” (UC Davis, 2011b). On the other hand, some of the main migrant-sending countries started stipulating bilateral labour migration agreements with main destination countries, with the aim of guaranteeing the rights of their nationals working abroad. In 2010, for instance, Lebanon and Nepal agreed to sign a bilateral agreement regularizing the process of labour migration between the two countries in order to reinforce the protection of Nepalese migrants in Lebanon and to reduce the problems caused by irregular channels of migration.69

**Ongoing displacement of Iraqi nationals**

The high number of displaced Iraqi nationals constitutes a major issue in this region. At the end of 2010, “one in ten Iraqis was still internally displaced, totalling 2.8 million people” (IDMC/NRC, 2010b) and the total number of displaced Iraqi nationals was estimated at 15 per cent of the total population (an estimated 30.2 million in 2010) (IDMC/NRC, 2010c). The majority of these people were displaced either because of the repression of Saddam Hussein’s government, as a result of the 2003 invasion, or following the 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, which triggered a wave of sectarian violence. However, since 2009, few new displacements have been recorded outside the disputed northern areas of Kirkuk and Ninawa, although there were several attacks and threats against Christian communities in Iraq in 2010, which led to internal and international displacement mainly from Mosul and Baghdad (IOM, 2011d). In 2010, the overall number of displacements had been decreasing, up until September of that year; following the attacks on Baghdad’s Saidat al-Najat church, however, the last two months of 2010 saw an increase in the number of families displaced (ibid.). Issues of growing concern for displaced Iraqi nationals include the significant shortage of housing, the high number of displaced minors (often with no access to education), and the impact of prolonged-migration-induced demographic changes on social cohesion, religious coexistence and access to resources such as land, water and oil (ibid.).

OCEANIA REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Shifts in migration patterns and an increase in asylum-seekers in Australia intensified the already highly politicized migration debate

In 2010, Oceania hosted 6 million international migrants. Although accounting for less than 3 per cent of the total global migrant stock, this number represented 16.8 per cent of Oceania’s total population of about 35 million people. This proportion is even higher for the main destination countries – Australia and New Zealand – where international migrants accounted for 21.9 per cent and 22.4 per cent, respectively, of the total national population (UNDESA, 2009).

Although significant migration flows are nothing new to the region, awareness of recent shifts in migration patterns led to fervent public debates and discussions in Australia in 2010, notably during the pre-election campaigns. The increasing arrivals of migrants by boat (2,849 in 2009 and 6,879 in 2010) was the subject of much political controversy (Phillips and Spinks, 2011).

Australia, which is traditionally a main destination for migrants from Europe and the United Kingdom, now receives large migrant contingents from Asia as well as from neighbouring countries within Oceania.

Changes to migration policy in Australia and New Zealand even more focused on the highly skilled

In 2010, the Government of Australia maintained its preference for attracting the highly skilled and carried out reforms to its General Skilled Migration (GSM) programme. The reforms, which redefine and sharpen selection criteria for this category of migrants, are aimed at better facilitating the matching of supply and demand in particular sectors. The reformed policy gives preference to applicants who already have a job offer (Employer Nomination Scheme) or who qualify under the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS). The new Skilled Occupation List (SOL) has replaced the previous Migration Occupations in Demand List (MODL) and the Critical Skills List (CSL), and applicants must have a nominated occupation on the SOL at the time of application.70

The Australian Permanent Skilled Migration Program was already cut in January 2009 by almost 15 per cent, due to the impact of the global economic crisis, and it was further reduced by more than 108,000 places in 2009–2010 (OECD, 2010). In New Zealand, the situation was no different in 2010: the number of permanent and long-term arrivals declined (down by about 6,000, compared to 2009), creating additional labour force shortages (Statistics New Zealand, 2011).

Recognizing the need to attract more highly skilled migrants, particularly among young people, New Zealand initiated a new Silver Fern Work Policy in early 2010, which consists of the Silver Fern Job Search visa/permit and the Silver Fern Practical Experience visa/permit (Immigration New Zealand, 2010). The Silver Fern Job Search Policy allows up to 300 young people with

recognized qualifications to enter New Zealand each year in search of skilled employment for up to nine months. In order to qualify, applicants must be between 20 and 35 years old, reside outside of New Zealand, hold a qualification that meets the needs under the programme or in general under New Zealand’s Skilled Migrant Policy, meet language requirements and have a minimum amount of maintenance funds for the period of stay in New Zealand. The Silver Fern Practical Experience Policy offers a work permit that is valid for a maximum of two years for applicants who hold a Silver Fern Job Search permit or a Silver Fern Practical Experience permit, hold an offer of skilled employment for at least 12 months, and meet certain health and character requirements, as with the Silver Fern Job Search permit. Under both of these programmes, partners and dependants are not eligible for visas or work permits.71

**Australia and New Zealand still main destinations within the region for migrants from Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia, with future climate change impacts a major concern**

Migrants from Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia continue to migrate to Australia and New Zealand. Both countries have special entry visas that facilitate migration for nationals of several of the island states, such as Australia’s Pacific Seasonal Worker Scheme and New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category (PAC). The Pacific Seasonal Worker Scheme is only for citizens of Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Vanuatu who have been invited by an approved employer. Under the scheme, seasonal workers are able to work in Australia for four to six months, are permitted multiple entries into Australia during this period and may return to work in future years. However, they are limited to working with approved employers and are not eligible to apply for other visas during their stay or to bring any dependents with them (Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2010).

In New Zealand, the PAC (a residence scheme) was established in July 2002 for Pacific countries with which New Zealand has close cultural and historical ties. The current PAC allows for up to 250 citizens of Tonga, 75 citizens of Tuvalu, and 75 citizens of Kiribati (including their partners and dependent children) to be granted residence in New Zealand each year. In 2009–2010, 357 people were approved for residence through the PAC, compared with 360 in 2008–2009 (New Zealand Department of Labour, 2010). Although it is not intended as a migration scheme to facilitate movement in the face of anticipated climate change impacts on the Pacific Islands, it may serve as a bridge head for future migration flows as migrants build social ties and networks (McAdam, 2011).

The impact of climate change (particularly sea-level rise) on Pacific Islands was high on the agenda, especially before and during the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Cancun in 2010. In preparation for the convention, the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) coordinated a meeting in November 2010 of the Pacific Island countries, to assist them in preparing for the Cancun discussions, where a strong representation from the Pacific region, including Heads of State, environment ministers and ambassadors of the Pacific, was expected (SPREP, 2010).

---

CONCLUSION

2010/2011 was a time of transition for the world – a time when the international community began its slow and sometimes hesitant march towards economic recovery from the worst global recession in decades. GDP growth rates swung positive for most high-income countries, while many emerging and developing countries posted healthy indicators of growth. For observers of international migration, it was a time to look back at the impact of the crisis on migration, in light of the forecasts made.

A wide range of predictions had been offered as the crisis unfolded – some clearly defined, others rather tentative and more than a few contradictory. For example, given the probability of job losses in countries of destination, especially in migrant-intensive sectors such as health care, construction, manufacturing and tourism, it was thought that labour migration flows would slow down. The adoption of tighter immigration policies and/or cutbacks to migration programmes were also thought to be very likely. A number of analysts believed that there would be increases in both the level of irregular migration (to circumvent the expected cutbacks in labour migration programmes) and the number of returns to countries of origin. Finally, there was also a widely held expectation that the level of migrant remittance transfers would be significantly reduced, to the detriment of the economies of developing countries.

While it will take some time for all the relevant data to be gathered, and even more time for them to be properly analysed, it is possible to draw some initial conclusions. What happened at the global level following the 2008/2009 economic crisis mirrors, in many ways, what happened at the regional level in the following the Asian economic crisis a decade earlier, and can be summarized up as follows:

- While a number of global trends emerged, there was considerable variation at the regional and local levels.
- Migrant stocks built up over several decades remained largely unchanged.
- There were indeed many indications of reduced migratory flows to destination countries.
- Many major countries of destination adjusted their migration programme targets downwards, either in anticipation of a reduced demand for migrant workers or simply to protect their domestic labour markets.\(^{72}\)
- Fears of greatly reduced remittances proved to be unfounded. Following relatively small falls, they rebounded healthily in 2010 and are set to continue to increase in the coming years.

All in all, the events of the last two years demonstrate, if nothing else, the resilience of migration in the face of social, political and economic upheavals.

On a different front, the exceptionally disruptive natural disasters during 2010 highlighted the impact of environmental factors on migration patterns and the necessity for governments of achieving and maintaining readiness to manage population movements triggered by such

\(^{72}\) At this point in time, however, the cause/effect pattern is unclear and it is not possible to say whether these decisions were, in fact, responsible for the decrease in movements or whether the latter anticipated the widely expected cuts.
catastrophes. While there has been an increasing interest in issues related to climate and environmental change, many governments still lack the necessary knowledge and capacities to address the resulting challenges in a comprehensive and coherent manner. The Cancun Agreements, the Kampala Convention and national initiatives such as the Policy Dialogue among Bangladeshi stakeholders are meaningful initial steps forward, but more consultation and coordination is needed to identify and implement effective solutions to environmental migration.

More recently, social and political upheavals (most notably in the Middle East and North Africa) have given rise to a type of population movement rarely seen on such a scale in the past: flows of migrant workers caught up in conflict situations in their destination country and requiring assistance in returning home. Each of these situations is a reminder of the vulnerability of migrant workers who may see their jobs (and employers) disappear overnight, and then have to make the difficult choice between weathering the hostilities, at the risk of their lives, or fleeing to a neighbouring country in the hope of obtaining a passage home. The international community has supported the response to this migration crisis – with 33 countries of origin requesting IOM’s assistance in the return of their respective nationals – but more needs to be done to address this emerging form of forced mass displacement in order to provide protection to those affected and to offer appropriate solutions.

The challenge of international cooperation in the field of migration remains considerable. The Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) is thus the best hope for improved dialogue and collaboration at the international level. In 2010, the Mexican GFMD Chair tried to reduce the polarization between migrant-sending and -receiving countries by introducing the concept of shared responsibility, collective benefits and partnerships. The more action-oriented approach adopted by the Swiss GFMD Chair in 2011 intended to build upon the key outcomes of previous GFMD meetings and move towards its practical application through different planning tools. These tools included the development of Migration Profiles73 which, in 2010, received increased attention at national level and within the GFMD and GMG, and the roll-out of the GMG Handbook on Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning. At a regional level, some major advancements made by regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs) (for instance, as a result of the ministerial meetings held by MIDSA and the Colombo Process) could further stimulate governments to increase inter-State dialogue and to deliberate on migration issues of common concern. Possible synergies and opportunities for cooperation between the GFMD and RCPs in the field of migration management need to be explored, especially in view of the forthcoming second United Nations High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, to be held in New York in 2013.

73 Migration Profiles are country-owned tools prepared in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders, and designed to enhance policy coherence, evidence-based policymaking and the mainstreaming of migration into development plans.
# REFERENCES

Adcorp  

Asian Development Bank (ADB)  
2011  *Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific* (forthcoming). ADB, Manila.

American Red Cross  

Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship  
2010  *Changes to the General Skilled Migration Program*. Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra.

BBC  

Citizenship and Immigration Canada  

Collett, E.  

Council of the European Union  

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)  
2011  *Climate Change and Migration: Study of the climate adaptation nexus and the role for development cooperation*. Prepared by C. Tacoli, GIZ, Eschborn.
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI)

*Economist, The*

Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)

EM-DAT/CRED

European Commission

Federal Statistical Office (Destatis)

Feng, S. et al.

Frontex

Ghosh, B.
Human Rights Watch

Immigration New Zealand

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre/Norwegian Refugee Council (IDMC/NRC)


International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

International Herald Tribune

International Labour Organization (ILO)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Forthcoming Labour Migration from Colombo Process Countries: Good Practices, Challenges and Ways Forward. IOM.
2010c Assessing the Evidence: Environment, Climate Change and Migration in Bangladesh. IOM, Dhaka.
2011a Key Figures on Migration, Climate Change and the Environment. IOM. Geneva.

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)

Kaczmarczyk, P. et al.


Miami Herald, The 2010 As European countries tighten up border controls, a rising number of Africans fleeing trouble in their homelands are arriving at ports in Latin America. The Miami Herald, 25 January 2010, re-printed at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/more-african-immigrants-finding-home-latin-america (accessed on 19 June 2011)


Pew Hispanic Center


Phillips, J. and H. Spinks

Regional Conference on Migration (RCM)

Reuters

Reyneri, E.

Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)

Statistics New Zealand

UC Davis
2010a  Migration News, Vol. 17(4)
2010b  Migration News, Vol. 17(2)
2010c  Migration News, Vol. 17(3)
2011a  Migration News, Vol. 18(2)
2011b  Migration News, Vol. 18(1)
UN-Habitat

Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR)

United Nations

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations Foundation

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

United Nations Multimedia
USAID

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

U.S. Department of State

World Bank

