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URBAN MIGRATION TRENDS IN EUROPE

Quality and limitations of data

With the increasing importance of migrants and migration in the social, economic, political and cultural dynamics of societies and above all of cities, migration flows and migrant dynamics have come to the forefront of various policy registers, including urban policies. Reliable, accurate and comparable data as well as elaborate statistical indicators about migrants and migration are therefore crucial for any kind of policy development, be it national or local.1 Such information is not only essential for the provision of services and assistance but also for the governance of migrants and cities. Without appropriate knowledge on different forms of movement of people, such as regular, irregular, voluntary or forced, and without evidence on the directionality of these movements, the creation of sound migration policies becomes almost an impossibility.

Many of the weaknesses and limitations of data on migrants and migration to cities overlap with the difficulties and problems regarding the quality of country-based data on cross-border migration in general. Although the generation of reliable records on the latter poses additional challenges to scholarship dealing with the interplay between urban and migration dynamics, it is important to address the problems of the limitations of country-based cross-border migration data before concentrating on these specific challenges.

Significant limitations of data on migration are related to the availability of accurate statistics on cross-border migration movements. Moreover, the biggest challenge of available figures on migration is their comparability and comprehensiveness. These limitations stem from the variations of definitions and criteria used in conceptualizing and registering people as migrants; several sources of data (such as population registers or administrative sources) used to compile migration statistics do not cover an important section of the migrant population, such as undocumented migrants, and are therefore not comprehensive. Different definitions and registration methods employed in compiling statistics defy sound comparable data. Due to the differing “mobility regimes” adopted (Glick Schiller and Salazar, 2013), authorities use varying criteria in registering the mobility of different groups as migration and of the people as migrants.

As a result, the mobility of some groups becomes invisible. Whose mobility is counted as part of migration statistics and whose mobility is excluded is very much related to the way in which the nation, the national community and the nation-state spatiality are construed. The immigration statistics of some countries, for example Ireland, Portugal and Romania, cover only the mobility of foreigners in their statistics (De Beer, J. et al., 2010). They do not register or include the return migration of their nationals into the statistics of immigration flows. There is also variation between countries in terms of “threshold of stay”, that is stays of a specified limited period of time are not counted as migration, while there are countries such as Germany where the duration of stay does not play a role in defining the migrants.

One of the reasons that endanger the quality and the accuracy of migration data is the coverage of immigration and emigration flows in different countries (Melegh, 2014). Many European countries lack reliable statistics on emigration as they are less meticulous in registering emigration and outward mobility. Consequently, people could be registered in several places despite their settlement in one place.2 This is particularly the case when one does not require a residence permit for mobility, like EU citizens’ mobility within the EU.

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1 The processes flowing into statistics and the elaborate technologies of numerical representation are not addressed in this paper. For a critical approach to the generation and use of indicators, see S. E. Merry (2011); R. Rottenburg et al. (forthcoming).
2 Migrants themselves often prefer to be registered in several places as, by remaining connected in this way, they can benefit from cheaper public transport, health services, etc. whenever they are in these places. As ethnographic fieldwork showed, many students, for example from EU countries in Vienna, also remain registered in their original hometowns, or even in the places where they had studied before, to continue receiving such benefits.
Given the fact that in several European countries, as in Austria, migration from EU countries is increasing and outnumbering the immigration flows of Third Country Nationals (OECD, 2014; Biffl, 2014), this creates an important weakness in the accuracy of immigration statistics (on a national and urban scale).

The incompleteness of the immigration data greatly limits its usefulness. Documentation of the flows of different groups like irregular migrants, intra-corporate transfers or students is missing from migration statistics and these categories are becoming increasingly important for urban economies and city positionality. Many countries do not include irregular migrants in their statistics (De Beer et al., 2010: 42). Skilled migrants or intra-corporate mobility, especially where the mobility of people is covered by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), escape the conventional data collection of immigration flows (De Beer et al., 2010).

However, limited information regarding undocumented migrants affects the reliability of data on migration. Despite the increasing numbers of undocumented migrants, estimated at 10–15 per cent of the world’s international migration (PICUM, 2013), reliable and systematically collected data on undocumented migrants is missing (Reeger and Sievers, 2009; De Beer et al., 2010). The missing data on undocumented migrants poses a major obstacle particularly to policy development and provision of services to a segment of the population where such services are most needed.

In the face of incomplete and incompatible data on migration and migrants, there have been efforts, nationally and institutionally, to collaborate and coordinate such data collection. Several agencies involved in the generation of migration statistics and data collection (UNDP, UNSD, UNHCR, IOM, OECD, ILO, Council of Europe, Eurostat) are attempting to harmonize their efforts to improve and develop effective systems of data collection. Although efforts to overcome the incompatibility of migration statistics date back to the early 1950s (with revisions in 1976 and 1997), they remained limited because the collection of statistics was managed by nation states (Fassmann, Reeger and Sievers, 2009). For the harmonization and production of better data collection to overcome the problem of missing data on migration, specific research programmes and agencies were set up, such as NORFACE and PROMINSTAT. Specialized agencies concentrating on different migratory groups have been set up, for instance CLANDESTINO (relating to undocumented migrants), the MIMOSA project within Eurostat or THESIM within PROMINSTAT. In the context of increasing migration flows and their multidirectionality and the importance of coordination of migration management industries (Soresen, 2014), governance structures, and the services to be provided in that regard, the harmonization of definitions, measurement methods and the domains of data collection have all become more important than ever.

**Data on migrants in cities**

Although more than half of the world population lives in cities, the immigration flows into cities are rapidly increasing and these migrants’ contributions are crucial to the city-making and globalization processes. However, there is hardly any standardized, comparable world-wide data on migration to cities and the migrants living in them (Price, Benton-Short and Friedman, 2005). In order to study the interplay between migration, migrants and city-making, researchers and policy makers need data on foreign-born residents in the cities and metropolitan areas rather than figures of country-based immigration flows (Price and Benton-Short, 2007b). Very often this data is not enumerated systematically and scholars have to extract

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3 Student mobility and the proportion of non-EU students within the student body have increased. For example between 2000 and 2005, student mobility in European countries increased by 50 per cent (S. Box, 2008).

4 Those crossing the borders for a temporary stay to provide services between the countries where the movement of people are covered through GATS escape the statistics.

5 For the NORFACE Research Programme on migration and the issue of data collection, see www.norface.net/522. For more information about the PROMINSTAT database, see www.prominstat.eu/.
these figures from the census data for urban and metropolitan areas. Working with census data on foreign-born, however, poses some restrictions to facilitating the analysis of the entanglement of urban and migrant dynamics. First of all, census data provides us with snapshots rather than the means to capture the complex process of migration and settlement. Moreover, the publication of a snapshot comes with a time lag which limits its reliability and accuracy (ibid.). In the face of increasing suburbanization of immigration and migration, urban scholars need statistics on foreign-born at the metropolitan level, in addition to the core city which is also not always available (ibid.). Moreover, some cities tend to under-report foreign-born (Price, Benton-Short and Friedman, 2005).

Most importantly, use of foreign-born data on cities poses comparability problems (as with the country-based data). Scholars and policy makers are confronted with varying definitions of foreign-born in cities (and in metropolitan areas). What constitutes a foreign-born is far from clear. There is no one definition, which will be relevant to all places. While in most cases, foreign-born refers to those born outside of the borders of the territorial residence (Münz, 2014), some countries like the Netherlands include second and third generation migrants in this category although they are born in the country of settlement (Hagendoorn, Veenman and Vollebergh, 2003). Some sources differentiate foreign-born in terms of their legal status like illegal migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and do not include all of them into the foreign-born statistics, while others do not regard such differences. Furthermore, the use of foreign-born data becomes problematic in cities, where the borders, rather than the people, moved as was the case in several East European countries such as Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, etc.

There are likewise definitional problems in terms of what constitutes the rural and the urban, as well as the boundaries of the metropolitan region. Moreover, the quality and detail of data varies considerably between global North and Global South (Price and Benton-Short, 2007b). All these problems of availability and incompatibility of data on foreign-born restricts the quality of statistics and data on migrants in cities.

**Diversified and multidirectional migration patterns**

A focus on immigration to gateway cities, where at least 9.5 per cent of the total population is foreign-born (Price and Benton-Short, 2007a), dominates the scholarship and public debates on migrants and cities (Glick Schiller and Caglar, 2009). It is true that established global gateway cities are the destination for 19 per cent of the world foreign-born population (Münz, 2014) and such gateways are important in shaping the pathways of migrant incorporation. However, there have been new emergent and diversified migration patterns and these cannot be understood solely by focusing on global gateway cities.6 First of all, there are important gateway cities that do not fall into the common understanding of global world cities, which are defined on the basis of a set of mainly economic and financial ranking indexes7. Moreover, urban migration destinations have also proliferated and migrants are increasingly settling in various types of cities that are not gateway cities. For these reasons, migration theories and policies generated from the experiences and dynamics of established gateway cities fail to capture the diversity and complexity of immigration flows and their composition in non-gateway cities.

In Europe, there have been new and emergent migration destinations alongside established gateway cities for at least two decades. Not only is there an increasing suburbanization of immigration and migrant settlement in small-sized towns, but there is also increasing immigration to rural areas. Migration flows...

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6 See A. Caglar (2013) and N. Glick Schiller and A. Caglar (2009) for the methodological nationalism involved in this almost exclusive focus on gateway cities, which establishes the basis of generalization of pathways of migrant incorporation at country level.

7 This does not mean that these gateway cities, which are absent from the Global World Cities Rankings, are not global. For a discussion of the globality of all cities, see M. Samers, 2002 and N. Glick Schiller, 2009. According to this perspective, all cities, not only those which are designated as global cities, are part of the global processes. However they are situated differently in these global fields of power (N. Glick Schiller and A. Caglar, 2009).
to cities have changed since the beginning of the 1990s as immigrants increasingly settle in suburbs. The
dynamics of suburbanization of immigration that US cities have experienced since the 1970s (Dawkins,
2009) can now also be observed in Europe — for example, in Spain and Italy (Bayona and Gil-Alonso,
2011). In Western Europe, the share of population growth in suburbs has been high and a close examination
of population change in several European core cities, suburbs and metropolitan areas through census data
shows that while suburbs attract domestic migrants as well as international migrants, the rate of growth
of the latter is higher. For instance, in Vienna, between 2001 and 2007, the net international migration in the
suburbs has not yet outnumbered net domestic migration (24,432 and 32,103 respectively) but in London,
Milan, Stockholm and Gothenburg the net international migration clearly outnumbered the net domestic
migration in the suburbs. The rate of growth of international migration flows to suburbs as well as the
rate of growth among the international migrants in suburbs was higher than the flows and the population
growth rate of domestic migrants to the suburbs (Cox, 2009).

Another emergent migration pattern is that migrants, rather than heading to large gateway cities, move
to and settle in small-sized towns (Preston, 2013). Today, in the north-eastern and southern regions of
Italy, at least 50 per cent of the migrant population lives in small-sized towns (Jentsch, 2007). In Spain,
according to the 2000 census, 17 per cent of all migrants lived in areas with a population below 10,000
(ibid.). This trend of de-concentration is clearly observable in Latium and in Lombardy in Italy, where
migrants, who used to head to Rome or to Milan respectively, have been increasingly settling in smaller
municipalities of the metropolitan areas (UNESCO SSIIM, n.d.). Veneto, which has a very large number
of foreign residents, is also marked by the prevalence of small and medium-sized cities (ibid.). Many
small towns, which might have been depopulating, have been receiving flows of immigrants (including
irregular migrants and asylum seekers) to work in services (tourism and personal care). These towns
provide different opportunity structures to migrants than the gateway cities. For example in Latiun, one
of the reasons for the increased flow of international migrants was the availability of accommodation
and the opportunity to make use of and revalue the abandoned, unused housing. These towns, however,
do not provide international migrants with greater access to economic, political and cultural capital or
to elaborate migrant networks or organizations for social mobility as the gateway cities do. However,
flows of capital and networks with transnational reach (mediated through migrants) that would have been
otherwise unavailable in these places have a higher value and weight in the economic and cultural life of
these towns (Glick Schiller and Caglar, 2011).

One of the most important emergent immigration patterns in Europe is the rapidly increasing migration
to rural areas, especially to depopulated rural regions (ESPON, 2011). Strong immigration flows to these areas
are relatively new phenomena in Europe (Kasimis, Apostolos and Zacopoulou, 2003; Jentsch, 2007). This
pattern could be identified as a post-enlargement migration pattern as the EU enlargement in 2004 had an
important impact on these migratory flows. Since the 1990s, there has been a steady flow of migrants to
rural areas in Southern Europe. An increasing number of migrants from the new member states migrating
to rural areas in core EU countries (EU15) gave a strong impetus to this migration trajectory⁸.

In south European countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (which recently became destination
countries), more than 50 per cent of all rural households and two thirds of farm households employed
(international) migrant labor (Kasimis, 2009). It is important to note that these immigration flows to rural
areas occur in conjunction with out-migration from these same localities, which sometimes takes the

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⁸ The EU and its expansion were not only important for the emergence of new migration patterns within Europe, but also for the immigration
flows from outside of Europe to Europe. Although the crisis in Argentina and the 2008 crisis in the US and Europe had an impact on new
migration routes, there has been increasing migration from Latin America particularly to Latin Europe (Spain, Italy, Portugal) (J. Peixoto,
2009). In Italy, the number of Argentinian citizens doubled between 1993 and 2003. Many of those migrating from Argentina to Europe are
of European descent and are entitled to mobility within Europe as EU citizens (M. Jachimowicz, 2006).
character of an exodus from the rural to the urban. These parallel processes give rise to a profound change in the demographic composition of these areas.

These migratory flows from urban to rural have to be considered together with the contemporary reconfiguration of the rural within the context of neoliberal globalization. The withdrawal by the welfare state from the provision of social services, together with decentralization and the restructuring of capital, reconfigure the economies and the sociabilities in rural areas in a profound way. Although, these areas were shrinking in terms of their population and becoming increasingly less agrarian, they began to develop non-agricultural activities, such as manufacturing, tourism, leisure, recreation services and sometimes construction work, thus creating new employment opportunities. These jobs are, however, low wage, non-secure, non-insured, seasonal and mostly part-time and are usually taken up by the incoming migrants (mostly from the new EU member states) rather than by the locals. Facing difficulties in replacing their active population (an important effect of depopulation), such rural areas were able to provide opportunities to migrants. Thus the immigration flows to depopulated rural regions contribute to the sustainability of the public and private services in these areas, counteracting or at least mitigating the effects of depopulation dynamics. Moreover, these migration flows are important in setting in motion a “counter-urbanization” movement from the cities to these rural areas. Counter-urbanization became a common trend in Europe and “together with the parallel process of de-agriculturalisation of rural households and increasing development of non-agricultural activities in rural areas, these processes contributed largely to the formation of ‘a new rurality’” (Kasimis, 2010: 7).

The Aragon region in the northeast of Spain, which went through such restructuring processes and depopulation, illustrates these transformations clearly. Aragon, a depopulated region, was able to attract foreign-born immigrants on the basis of the opportunities opened up by the labour shortage resulting from depopulation following the restructuring of the Spanish economy. Together with an emergent tourist industry, Aragon now has a higher per capita income. The percentage of foreigners was less than 1 per cent in 1999, but by 2004 it had reached up to 8 per cent overall (Pinnila, Ayuda and Sáez, 2008). Although population growth still remained negative, the immigration of foreign-born to Aragon and their contribution to the restructured economy of these regions also attracted internal migration of native Spaniards from nearby provinces. In Aragon, immigration of foreign-born clearly contributed to the local development and the creation of further employment opportunities. The foreign-born in Aragon comprised between 19 to 64 per cent of the new inhabitants between 2001 and 2003 (Pinnila, Ayuda and Sáez 2008:13-14). Thus, although the population of Aragon was still shrinking, its composition was changing. Despite its importance, contemporary immigration to the rural areas is under-researched. The increasing dominance of an urban lens to migration eclipses the need to go beyond rural/urban divisions in analyzing migration dynamics. The Aragon case could be taken to be paradigmatic for the multidirectionality of migration patterns and therefore it underscores the need to look beyond the confines of the city to explore the interplay between migrants and the dynamics active at a particular locality within a multiscale global framing.

The international and internal migration to depopulated rural areas in the European countryside reconfigures the demographic composition of the population in the rural areas and in small-sized towns in a way that the designation of these places as “shrinking” falls short of capturing the social, political and cultural transformations taking place in these cities. Migrants’ location and the impact of their transnational reach in these rural areas and in depopulated small towns, as well as the nature of opportunity structures available in such places for migrants, are different from those that gateway cities provide.

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9 Or it is researched not relationally to the immigration and urban dynamics taking place elsewhere. For the importance of having a global framing to migration and displacement in general, see F. Miraftab (2014).
The diversification of migration destinations, patterns and migrants’ varying pathways of incorporation into these settings should caution us not to generalize migrant experiences, sociabilities and incorporation dynamics from “global” and gateway cities to the national scale. We need to address the differing ways of migrants’ incorporation into diverse kinds of cities. For that, however, we need a theoretical frame to approach the uneven spatial patterning of migration in Europe (Deas and Hincks, 2014:2561) beyond the national scale. This in turn requires a framework to theorize and situate the “subnational” within the state territoriality of nation-states. In the context of globalization, the existing structures and institutions as well as governance structures within the nation state space are dis-assembled and re-assembled in varying ways (Sassen, 2001). Thus we cannot approach state territoriality as if it were even and homogenous within the nation-state in terms of state activity, governance structures (Brenner, 2004) and, consequently, the opportunity structures available to the migrants.

In short, migrants are increasingly settling in diverse kinds of cities and localities (small-, medium-sized, global and gateway cities as well as rural regions) where they are inserted differently into the urban economies, politics, and into social and cultural life. In this context, there is an urgent need to theorize the relationship between place, migration and globalization to capture the differing ways migrants become part of the city-making processes beyond the national scale. Variation of the opportunities available to migrants within nation-states (not just in global cities) alert us not only to the fault lines of the analysis of migrant dynamics by adopting nation states as units of analysis, but also to the challenges of capturing the “local” in relation to the structural constraints and imperatives resulting from global power fields. Such an understanding avoids approaching every locality or city as if they were unique in terms of its mix of institutions and histories. Country-based analyses (expressed in the idioms of countries of origin and of settlement) fail to capture the variations of the subnational and its opportunity structures. However, an exclusive focus on the “local” detached from the global fields of power and reconfiguration of state territoriality carries the danger of defying any comparative analysis which is crucial for policy formulations.
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES

Locality, migrants and territorial inequalities

One of the main challenges for both scholars and policy makers in exploring the interplay between migrants and cities is to develop a theoretical framework that is able to address the differential workings of the global within the nation-state, at the “localities”. In the context of the increasing importance of cities and metropolises as engines of economy, centers of trade and investment unfettered by national governments (Katz and Bradley, 2013), this kind of unleashing is altering the locus and focus of power and leadership, and is giving rise to new forms of urban governance, institutions and politics. In the context of decentralized governance in these neoliberal times, cities and regions not only become competitive for economic growth and generate their own resources and wealth, but they also become the main facilitators of access to rights, benefits and services (such as housing, education, and health) for its inhabitants, including migrants (Klink, 2008).

However, in the context of uneven spatial dynamics of globalization, though all cities are part of these global processes, they are differentially positioned in fields of economic, political and cultural power (Brenner and Theodore, 2002b; Smith, 1995). These varying positions of cities within global fields of power create differential livelihood possibilities and, most importantly, different opportunity structures for the inhabitants (including the migrants) of these cities. This presents us with the challenge of framing the “local” and approaching the dynamics of the interface between migrants and the places of settlement from within a comparative theory of locality (city or region) beyond the national scale (Glick Schiller and Caglar, 2009). Comparative analysis is important to understand and analyze the varying (converging and diverging) dynamics of opportunity structures in time and space, which are in turn crucial for understanding the agencies, practices, translocal connections, and the sociabilities of migrants.

Urban scaling scholarship may provide us with the conceptual vocabulary to relate the dynamics of local politics and trajectories to the uneven spatial dynamics of globalization (Brenner, 1999; Brenner and Theodore, 2002a; Jessop, 2002; Smith, 2002; Swyngedouw, 1997). It supplies us with a framework to explore the uneven spatialization of globalization and its effects as well as the impact of urban restructuring on the new forms of urban governance, politics, and differential livelihood opportunities in particular localities. Scholars operating with the scalar perspective document how neoliberal globalization alters the relationship not only between localities but also between localities and their states; how neoliberalism shifts the axis of power, how state intervention and activity are differentiated institutionally and geographically so that the homogeneity and the equality of state space of intervention have been disrupted. Most importantly, they examine the processes by which the states themselves contribute to the development of territorial inequalities within the national territory by re-concentrating their socioeconomic resources unevenly. Rather than the state space, state territoriality is central to this analysis (Sassen, 2001). Thus, a scalar perspective may provide migration scholars with the possibility of approaching places of migrant settlement and their translocal reach in interaction with power hierarchies and enable them to incorporate the uneven character of globalization into the analysis. It establishes a theoretical framework for a comparative perspective on the variation of migrant settlement and translocal reach (including translocal ties) in time and space (Glick Schiller and Caglar, 2009; Caglar and Glick Schiller, 2011).

The concept of emplacement may be useful to relate the dynamics of local politics and trajectories to the spatial dynamics of globalization. Emplacement refers to the relationship between the continuing restructuring of a city within networks of power and a person’s efforts to settle within the barriers and opportunities of a specific locality (Glick Schiller and Caglar, 2013). The concept of emplacement allows us to situate all of a city’s residents within the dimensions of both time and space and to hint at the relationship between displacement and the processes of capital and urban restructuring.
This way of approaching the local conditions and the unfolding of unique histories and institutions of cities is – rather than seeing these as being anchored in the intrinsic and unique logic of these cities (Löw, 2008) – to argue that these conditions and their impact are in turn related to the broader processes being closely shaped by global forces of capital restructuring and acted out at that specific locality. This approach does not try to comprehend the dynamics at hand in a particular city as “internal” dynamics to be studied in their own right without reference to the mutual constitution of global and local as part of the reconstitution of capital. The specific discursive, symbolic and institutional legacies of particular cities are important but they become assets for the urban regeneration, and thus acquire effectivity in conjunction with the repositioning efforts of cities, which are closely related to the way the restructuring of capital is acted out in that place at a particular historical conjuncture. Migrants are emplaced differently in city-making processes in disempowered cities (small-sized or not) and in gateway cities.

**Urban governance, migrants, and development: Tools and strategies**

In the context of an “urban” turn in scholarship, policies and governance of migrants, migration and development, it becomes particularly important to scrutinize the local (or the city for that matter) and frame it beyond its “uniqueness”. Local takes central stage in the emerging paradigms and policies of the migration-development mantra and migration governance structures (Thouez, 2014; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011). As the title of a joint European Commission (EC) and United Nations (UN) programme on migration and development clearly indicates, “M4D goes local” (Migration for Development goes local) (EC-UN JMDI, n.d.).

During the heyday of decentralization of policies and the increasing withdrawal of states from providing social services, many European cities, faced with the lack of financial and human resources to carry out their tasks, increasingly shifted from a rather technical management of cities to urban governance (Bontenbal, 2012: 1–16). This shift has reconfigured the role and place of civil society and non-state actors, organizations, public and private institutions, the responsibilities of the local authorities, as well as the role and place of migrants, communities and urban institutions within the new semantics of urban and local development. Cities and municipalities became increasingly entrepreneurial in generating their wealth and resources in order to position themselves competitively in relation to economic, political and cultural fields of power and to achieve economic growth (Hall and Hubbard, 1998).

While the rapid urbanization and increasing migration flows posed challenges to the scale and scope of urban and migration governance in general (UNESCOCAT, 2010), there was also an increasing awareness of the fault lines of national scale based migration and development programmes and policies, which contributed to the rise of an urban lens to migration and development. Scholars urged an urban approach to migration and development so that international migration, development and urban areas could be linked together and brought into an urban/metropolitan framework, especially for generating sound policies (Klink, 2008: 245). Meanwhile organizations and institutions recorded that, as mentioned in the former section, migrants were increasingly settling in small-sized towns and that these processes posed additional challenges to local authorities in terms of the effective management of a “society of diversity” in these towns (UNESCO SSIIM, n.d.).10 Questions about how to mobilize social capital as well as the capabilities in the small-sized cities, which did not have the economic power or the organizational infrastructure of large and gateway cities, occupied the agendas of institutions dealing with migration (ibid.). The challenges of migrants moving to these cities and of their governance is being examined in one of the Horizon 2020 work programmes and aims to identify migration trends, impacts and policy responses in small-sized cities (ibid.).

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10 These were the main developments that broke the hegemony of country-based migration policies especially in the migration development mantra. The dominance of gateway cities in the generation of migration policies and scholarship was also partly weakened, at least in the programmes of international organizations dealing with cross-border migration.
Given the constant positioning struggle of cities, all assets of the cities are re-evaluated and revalued and the potentials of civil society (including migrant organizations) are exploited for economic growth (City of Vienna, 2011). Within these processes, cultural diversity becomes an important resource to be managed for urban regeneration and migrants, as well as citizens with a migration background, find themselves at centre stage as economic and cultural mediators and as important human capital for local development, both in their places of origin and in their places of settlement (Bontenbal, 2012: 1–26; Hadj-Abdou, 2014: 1875–1894). Within the neoliberal urban governance, migrants’ linguistic and cultural competencies, local knowledge and transnational networks become valuable assets to reach out for markets to improve the service delivery in their places of origin and settlement. Migrants and migrant organizations often become agents of development within these decentralized cooperation projects and programmes (Manço, Daffe and Charhon, n.d.).

Migrants and their agencies are conceptualized through the semantic field of neoliberal urban governance, which is shaped by concepts like community building, capacity building and development, participatory democracy, localism, local capabilities and grassroots empowerment (ibid.). Like those of local institutions and local authorities, within this approach, migrants’ “capabilities” become important assets that have to be strengthened through cooperation schemes and projects especially in areas such as health and education.

Local authorities, non-state actors and above all civil society, together with migrant associations (including Home Town Associations) and NGOs, came to the fore as the main agencies of neoliberal urban governance and as active partners of development and urban policies. Municipalities and mayors became crucial in urban and migration politics (ibid.; Saunders, 2013; Bontenbal, 2012: 1–26). Local and/or city authorities acquired a greater role in migration governance and integration policies came to be closely connected to urban policies. In an important number of city regions, international migration has become a strategic element within the overall urban policy agenda (Klink, 2008).

Localism is seen as a key to successful integration of migrants and municipalities become crucial for diversity management. Nations are hailed to be “dysfunctional in providing services and governing” whereas cities and their mayors are seen to “offer the best new forces of good governance regardless of size” (Barber, 2013). The Call of Barcelona, following the First Mayoral Forum on Mobility, Migration and Development held in Barcelona in June 2014, clearly acknowledges the positive role of migration for urban development as well as the central role played by local governments in governing migration and development (EC-UN JMDI, 2014). Municipalities play a leadership role in promoting “civic energy for migrants” by providing space and infrastructure, facilitating intercultural mediation and mapping health needs of migrants. The organization of business advice centers to encourage entrepreneurship, often with a transnational reach to markets, was done for example in Aachen (Maytree Foundation and Cities of Migration, 2012a). Even organizing film festivals becomes a strategy to support intercultural exchange and boost small cities (Maytree Foundation and Cities of Migration, 2012b).

Local authorities come to the fore in urban governance because “capacity building and institutional strengthening of local authorities became major strategies to increase urban productivity, raise local revenues and improve social and economic conditions” (Bontenbal, 2012: 3). International partnerships and cooperation networks are the main tools through which strategic alliances between cities are built to achieve these goals. City-to-City (C2C) cooperation, numerous partnerships and city twinning, United Cities and Local Governments initiative (UCLG), the Council of Europe’s latest funded project on Diversity in the Economy and Local Integration (DELI) as well as the Joint Migration Development Initiative (EC-UN JMDI) are only a sample of a thriving landscape of such networks in which European cities actively participate. Between 1983 and 2004, the number of such international city networks grew from 8 to 49 (ibid.: 1–26). These networks of city programmes are part of urban governance tools and an important
means to generate and circulate knowledge on the role of cities and cross-border migrants in development; to share and disseminate information about the urban competitiveness of cities (OECD, 2006), to create a database for local authorities; to exchange experience and expertise and to provide guidance to local authorities. These networks become venues for the circulation of experts, expert knowledge and policies.

While some of these city networks bring an urban lens to integration and promote city-to-city learning and exchange in relation to migrant incorporation, such as the Cities of Migration Network, some support the development of local partnership platforms together with local public-private actors to encourage migrant entrepreneurship at the local level like DELI, or scale up the local programmes by facilitating ties to supranational institutions as is the case with JMDI. Some of these networks and partnerships are supported by the European Integration Fund led by the Council of Europe (DELI) and others by the UN and the World Bank (United Cities and Local Governments - UCLG) and by UNESCO (Better Cities for Migrants). These city cooperation and twinning programmes based on a peer-to-peer approach become important arenas for knowledge production, policy development and dissemination for the location of migrants within urban governance and development registers. In short, these networks, co-operations and partnerships provide important venues for portable, globally circulating projects and models that cities make use of in their competitive struggle to position themselves to accumulate power.

However, despite its strong focus on the local, the urban optic used for the analysis of the interplay of migrant and (urban and/or local) development dynamics in the context of neoliberal globalization fails to provide us with a theoretical basis for a comparative analysis of locality. There is no framework within which to situate migrants’ practices and the effectivity of the numerous networks and partnerships in a particular locality at a given time. A global framing of the locality is missing (Glick Schiller, 2009; Glick Schiller and Caglar, 2011, 2013; Caglar, 2013). It is true that the “territorial approach” to development cherished by some scholars, policy makers and international organizations\(^\text{11}\) highlights the concrete territorial forces of urban economies (Klink, 2008). However these territorial forces are not situated in relation to the socio-spatial qualities of the locality which are shaped by the global dynamics. It is these global dynamics, which configure the territorial inequalities within nation states at “subnational” settings, like cities. Once such a global perspective is adopted, cities of differing power (not necessarily size) as well as rural areas could be approached from within a common analytical framework. It is necessary to situate migrants’ everyday practices, agencies, the concrete opportunities and the narratives available in different cities and/or localities within the positioning of these places in the global power fields. It is this positioning which constitutes the differential political, economic and cultural power of these cities, which in turn shapes the varying ways migrants are emplaced and become agents and subjects of city-making processes.

**Religious and cultural diversity and emplacement of migrants in a disempowered city**

This section focuses on a disempowered city, Mardin, in Turkey to situate the translocal ties of Syriac emigrants from this city with municipal authorities’ efforts to reach out to these emigrants in European cities and reconnect them to Mardin as part of their efforts of local development. The Mardin case and these emigrants’ emplacement dynamics vis-à-vis the local authorities’ efforts to reposition the city draw attention to the importance of situating the local opportunity structures and the effectivity of urban and migration policies within the workings of global dynamics at a particular historical conjuncture. Thus, this case is useful to underline the importance of socio-spatial and temporal dimension of opportunity structures for the emplacement of migrants in city-making processes.

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\(^{11}\) See the territorial reviews OECD has developed to make a participatory diagnose of urban competitiveness, metropolitan governance and social cohesion (OECD, 2006).
Mardin is a disempowered peripheral border city in Southeast Turkey, separated by state borders from its historical commercial, cultural, and religious ties to neighbouring Syria, Iraq and the Middle East in general. It was home to a diverse ethnic and religious population, including Christian Syriacs, for centuries. The city lost segments of its population (mainly the Armenians, but also the Christian Syriacs) through different streams of displacements, and the out-migration of its Christian populations (particularly of Syriacs) has been going on for several decades. However, out-migration of Kurds\(^\text{12}\) and Syriacs grew dramatically in the 1980s and the 1990s, during the years of armed conflict between the Turkish state forces and Kurds.\(^\text{13}\) Mardin’s local economy had been decimated; the city (metropolitan region) was depopulated and it was disempowered in terms of access to national and political power, capital investments, adequate global talent and its positioning within the regional and the global economy. In emigration, Syriac emigrants have continually maintained translocal ties spanning several places in Europe and worldwide, but their hometown of Mardin was not part of these translocal ties.

In the 1990s, several efforts by the local and national authorities to regenerate Mardin’s economy and development had failed. In 1995, although Mardin acquired a free (trade) zone status, the city failed to attract the expected mobile capital and labour despite offering favourable conditions for business. There were also attempts again by the local (and national) authorities to facilitate Syriac emigrants’ return or forge connections to their place of origin by introducing an array of incentives. In 1998, the government initiated a return and rehabilitation project with incentives for investment particularly addressing Christian emigrants from this region. Again all these efforts failed. Thus, at the beginning of the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century, despite a series of national development projects to revitalize its economy, Mardin continued to be a city with limited access to different fields of power and with high rates of unemployment, poverty, armed conflict and out-migration. It was in this structural conjuncture that city officials embarked on efforts to reposition and empower their city by reaching out to the city’s emigrants in 2001 with a renewed incentive and a promise that religious and property rights would be secured.

The (Europe-based) Syriac emigrants’ connections to Mardin changed drastically in the 2000s with the establishment of a Mutual Aid Association in Kafro by emigrant Syriacs several decades after their emigration.\(^\text{14}\) The Christian Syriac emigrant population of Mardin in different cities of Europe started reaching back to the city and partially resettling there within a web of transnational ties and increasingly becoming part of several development projects.

This Home Town Association (followed by several other HTAs) played an important role in mediating Syriac emigrants’ emplacement in Mardin like many HTAs in different parts of the world. However, the succession of initial failures by the local authorities to reach out to Syriac emigrants for development purposes, followed afterwards by their relative success in attracting these migrants, poses a challenge to policy makers in terms of the dynamics of migrants’ translocal ties. What made the initial failure of these incentives become opportunity structures for the emplacement of Syriac emigrants into Mardin?

Mardin’s case is a story of city leaders’ efforts to rebuild and reposition their city, the narratives that they crafted about religious/cultural diversity and of emigrants’ efforts to re-establish relationships with the city only at a particular conjuncture of opportunity structures.

Turkey’s EU candidacy and the EU’s regime of supervision opened spaces, which enabled the Syriac emigrants and the Syriacs in Mardin to become valuable assets in this city’s rescaling efforts. They became ‘scale makers’ (Caglar and Glick Schiller, 2011) in Mardin’s efforts to reposition itself within and across

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\(^{12}\) For the internal displacement of Kurds, see A. Bilgin and D. Yukseker, 2005.

\(^{13}\) For an elaborate analysis of the inter-community relations in Mardin and abroad, see Z.Ö. Biner (2007, 2011).

\(^{14}\) Kafro was one of the villages within Mardin province, where the inhabitants were subject to massive displacement when the village was evacuated by military order in 1994. Its inhabitants emigrated from Mardin to different places in Europe.
state borders. The emergence of several Syriac HTAs in European cities at the beginning of the 2000s and the Syriac migrants’ increasing homeland ties are closely related to the repositioning strategies and struggle of Mardin.

Ironically, the strengthening of hometown ties of migrants from Mardin, for example in Vienna, Zurich or in Stockholm, simultaneously incorporated them further into the institutions in Europe and in their places of settlement. They increasingly became active in Christian organizations in Europe.\textsuperscript{15}

Mardin’s situation demonstrates how the migrants from Mardin became part of the process of capital restructuring and how they were the agents of reshaping this particular locality. Their position within the social, political and cultural dynamics in Mardin, together with the impact of their HTAs, was closely related to these dynamics. They became part of the restructuring of the social fabric of Mardin as well as of the places to which they were connected through their transnational social field. They, as a religious minority, were revalued within the context of efforts to change the parameters of Mardin’s global, regional and national connectedness and the lines of power to govern the territory.\textsuperscript{16} However, the Syriacs in Mardin and the emigrants re-connecting with the city became an asset of cultural and religious diversity in the city’s struggle to reposition itself due to the Turkish state’s rather problematic record of its politics regarding minorities. Religious and cultural diversity acquired a particular importance in this context arising from Turkey’s candidacy to join the EU. The protection of minority rights and, most importantly, religious rights are among the crucial conditions for EU membership in which the Turkish state has been found wanting (Caglar, 2013). The Syriac population’s presence, well-being and above all religious freedom in Turkey became an acid test of the Turkish state’s claimed tolerance of religious and cultural differences.

Once an urban rescaling perspective is adopted, the varying location of migrants in different cities can be better differentiated and understood by relating them to the cities’ repositioning processes, which include the restructuring of the social relations of capital. The place and role of migrants in this competition might differ depending on the scalar positioning of these cities (Caglar and Glick Schiller, 2011). This approach to city scale allows us to examine the intersections of hierarchies of different forms of power and migrants as social actors. Migrants became actors whose agencies are both shaped by and are contributors to these fields of power. They can be seen as scale makers who, in their multiple insertions into urban life, contribute actively to facilitating, legitimizing and contesting neoliberal restructuring of the cities (ibid.). Urban rescaling literature is important for migration scholarship as it provides us with analytical tools to analyse the state territory as an \textit{uneven} entity vis-à-vis state policies (including those targeting (e)migrants). Consequently, state activity towards migrants abroad and in the country of origin could be analysed in relation to the socio-spatial characteristics of the localities migrants settle into and depart from.

Since the 2000s, city officials in Mardin turned their attention to the city’s cultural and religious past as a means to attract domestic and foreign capital and initiate growth and urban regeneration through tourist industries (which in fact grew substantially in the last decade), including heritage and religious tourism highlighting the cultural and religious diverse past of the city. The city’s Christian Syriac emigrants residing in different parts of Europe became a valuable and crucial asset for reclaiming its multireligious and multietnic past in the city-making process. Within the rebranding of Mardin as “a city searching its future in its past”, the city’s religiously diverse emigrants acquired crucial value in reaching out to

\textsuperscript{15} On the basis of their homeland oriented activities, the migrants from Mardin in Zurich increasingly became involved in some church organizations there. The outcome of this new set of ties in Switzerland was a five-year project, which also aimed to secure the return to Tur Abdin of Christian migrants who were originally from Mardin Province, and which involved several institutions based in Europe.

\textsuperscript{16} Such efforts to change the parameters of a place’s connectedness is referred as “jumping scale” (E. Swyngedouw, 1997).
supranational institutions, such as UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP and the EU, making Mardin an emblem for a culture of religious and ethnic diversity and for cosmopolitanism, as well as a showcase for the protection of minority rights in Turkey.

This regeneration attempt in Mardin illustrates the utility of the concept of migrant emplacement through transnational connections and supranational institutions to the city-making processes. It also shows how the complex history of religious diversity and displacement of a city like Mardin played an important part in the emplacement of Christian Syriac emigrants in the city-making process at a particular historical conjuncture. The Home Town Associations of Syriac emigrants from Mardin had a crucial role in these emigrants’ insertion in their places of origin as historical subjects of the city’s diverse past. However, several efforts to facilitate the Syriac emigrants’ return were not effective until the Home Town Associations were able to draw these supranational institutions into the emplacement process of returnees in Mardin on the basis of their cultural and religious diversity. The supranational institutions were receptive because of the importance they afforded to secure the rights of minorities in Turkey vis-à-vis the state’s EU candidacy. As a result, the Syriac emigrants’ location in the repositioning struggle of this disempowered city acquired greater weight. Through their ability to reach out the supranational institutions, Syriac returnees scaled up their position vis-à-vis the regional and city authorities.

The hometown ties forged by the migrants from Mardin and the efforts and policies of local authorities became effective when they were able to reconfigure the power relations in Mardin, particularly in conjunction with supranational institutions such as UNESCO and the EU. Larger conjunctures of institutional power and transnational networks of urban regeneration contributed to the process of turning displaced populations into active agents of urban regeneration, revitalization of tourism and city branding. Tourism, especially religious and heritage tourism, has been one of the main areas of the growing economy in Mardin. With the emplacement of the once displaced Syriacs into the branding of their city and its cultural industries (as the emblem of and link to Mardin’s cosmopolitan past and future), the presence of emigrants helped to boost the tourist industry, attract investments and create cultural and art festivals. Since 2010, Mardin hosts a successful Biennial aiming to bring contemporary art to the city and establish a new platform of dialogue.

The case of Mardin and the emplacement of Syriac emigrants there show that, though the specific discursive, symbolic and institutional legacies of each city are important, they become only effective in conjunction with the positioning of the city within multiple hierarchies of power. Emigrants and return migrants have a role to play within this conjunction. The process of Syriac emigrants’ emplacement draws attention to the fact that the ability of cities to convert their “culture” and cultural diversity into assets for empowerment is closely related to their capacity to use them as a medium to change the parameters of their regional and global connectedness and power rather than to their actual “cultural” and diverse composition. In the case of Mardin, the Syriac emigrants in Europe and their presence in the city (as the legacy of its historical, cultural and religious diversity) acquired importance in Mardin’s desires and efforts to attract supranational actors like UNESCO and the EU for the empowerment and repositioning of the city. These supranational institutions in turn facilitated and shaped the emplacement of Syriac emigrants into the narratives of the city’s past and future and in its urban renewal/rehabilitation projects.

The example of Mardin provides a critique to the dominant migration and development mantra that assumes migrants act as development agents mainly through their economic and social forms of remittances and become agents of local/urban development once they are part of translocal development networks, which

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17 It has to be noted that this analysis of the location of Syriac emigrants in Mardin does not take into account the recent developments of war in the region.  
18 For the Mardin Biennial, see www.mardinbienali.org/2014/eng/bienal.asp.
are mediated through several cross-city partnerships and networks. The example of the Syriac emigrants from Mardin highlights that the establishment of homeland ties very much depends on the conditions present in particular localities and at particular periods of time, and that migrants can become not only part of the city-making process but also be regarded as pillars of historical, cultural and religious diversity.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Urban governance: Beyond a template

City-to-city networks, partnerships and programmes provide increasingly effective venues for sharing and disseminating experience, knowledge and good practice in migration and urban governance among local authorities, non-state organizations as well as supranational actors. However, there is also a possible downside to these networks and partnerships. These city networks do not only function as sites of learning from each other and of knowledge production about cities and migrants, they could also become arenas through which a particular model and semantics of sustainable urban development are produced as an urban governance template. These networks, therefore, face the danger of becoming not only the medium for the production of portable, globally circulating but also canonized policy models that operate with a very similar apparatus, which diverse city authorities then make use of in their urban governance and competitive urban development agendas.

The “European Capitals of Culture” (ECoC) programmes in Europe connect inter alia selected European cities to each other and contribute to their culture-led urban development. There is not only circulating expert knowledge but often these same experts are being consulted and shaping the ECoC programmes of different cities (as in the case of Linz ECoC 2009 and Marseille ECoC in 2013). Cities with very different historical, cultural and political trajectories flag the same projects within their ECoC programmes (as Linz and Marseille did and the city of Pilsen is planning to do).

It is true that once these projects and policies are transplanted into new contexts and carried out in concrete settings, they become transformed often incurring unintended consequences. Nevertheless these networks facilitate the portability of a canon of projects and policies. These globally circulating policies contribute to the canonization of particular semantics and contribute to the establishment of an apparatus for framing the cities, migrants, development and their challenges in terms of governance. Such circulating policies might empower and appeal to similar groups of people, flagging only particular aspects of their lives and relations in settings with very different historical, institutional and discursive trajectories. However these relations might not be the most significant ones for these groups’ connections to each other or to their places of settlement and departure.

Such cross-city networks of policy learning and exchange and the expert knowledge disseminated through them played a role, for example, in the city of Vienna’s shift to diversity policies in urban and migrant governance, which is based on the recognition of ethno-cultural diversity as a resource to be promoted in order to improve the socio-economic performance of the city (Hadj-Abdou, 2014). After gaining experience in the field of immigrant integration, first in bilateral cooperation with cities and then in international city and partnership networks, “the city, together with the city’s administrative unit in charge of urban planning, had commissioned a study on urban immigrant integration policies in Europe, the USA and Canada” (ibid: 1883). On the basis of the recommendation of this study, the administration was reorganized in 2001 to adopt diversity policies and, in 2004, an administrative city authority for matters of diversity and integration (Municipal Department 17) was created: “The adoption of the new policy was the result of strong influence exerted by circulating experts and the outcome of cross-city learning” (ibid.: 1883-1884).

In line with a shift to diversity policies in urban governance, the city of Vienna took specific actions to support entrepreneurs with a migrant background and created new opportunities for them through a plethora of newly established agencies, funds, and awards. These entrepreneurs acquired a particular

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19 See C. Bullen, 2013.
value in relation to the city’s vision of economic growth and competitiveness. In the context of Vienna’s efforts to position itself as a gateway to the EU market, strong emphasis was put on their multilingual and cultural competencies and on their transnational reach that facilitate access to other markets. Their (ethno)cultural diversity becomes a crucial aspect of these entrepreneurs’ emplacement in the repositioning struggle of Vienna. This in turn has an important impact on shaping their sociabilities in the city.

However, such a diversity policy that fosters the emplacement of “migrant background” business people, highlighting their ethno-cultural diversity in the urban economy and social life, might not be relevant in the context of a disempowered city with very little institutional support or resources for migrants including ethnic entrepreneurship. In a disempowered city in which all residents face limited institutional support and social or economic opportunities, diversity might not be the constituting factor for the development of urban economies and sociabilities. Migrant entrepreneurs are not emplaced through their ethno-cultural differences in the city-making processes of such disempowered cities (Glick Schiller and Caglar, forthcoming).

Migrants become scale makers in various ways, not simply as a skilled or unskilled labour force. They become scale makers not only as historical agents and facilitators of alternative social visions but also as facilitators of privatization and neoliberal governance (Caglar and Glick Schiller, 2011). However, in the context of portable and canonized policies of migration and urban governance disseminated through city-based policy networks, think-tanks and groups of experts, migrants’ multiple ways of being part of the city-making process in cities of different power easily get overlooked in policy agendas.

As the Mardin case shows, the effectivity and the workings of urban and migration policies very much depend on the broader dynamics of networked institutional power shaping the particular locality at a particular time. In the context of the differential embedding of neoliberalism in cities, it is important to address the varying re-workings of neoliberal urbanism in concrete cities at a particular time.

Moreover, as already illustrated, the migration trends in Europe clearly indicate that migrants are settling in diverse kinds of cities and not only in gateway cities. There is a strong migration to small-sized cities as well as to rural areas. In the face of these diversified migration patterns, there is even greater need for varying local governance policies for cities of different power rather than an urban governance mantra.

**Beyond city- and size-centric local policies**

At first sight, the city-based migration and local development policies, which flag city networks and partnerships as tools of urban governance, succeed in avoiding the fault lines of country-based migration policies. The nation-state is not the unit of analysis informing these policies. The different opportunity structures available in diverse kinds of localities are recognized and these policies rightly shifted their attention from the gateway cities to the challenges that small-sized cities pose in terms of urban and migration governance. Such policies can therefore suitably accommodate the challenges of emerging migration patterns, namely migration to small-sized cities. However, these governance models and structures still remain city-centric in addressing the location of migrants in local development. Within such a framework, it becomes difficult to address migrants’ increasing tendency to settle in rural areas.

Most of the urban governance policies concentrate on size as the main criteria in framing the variation of capabilities and opportunities available in different types of cities. However, size may be a misleading criterion in situating the power as well as in predicting the challenges posed by the composition of the city. Size is not an accurate measure of the power of cities. The size of the population or the geographical area is not always a good indicator of the power and the relative positioning of a city. There are cities which are small in size but are the site of several headquarters and are centres of economic, political or cultural power (Glick Schiller and Caglar, 2009). It is also possible that cities are large in terms of their population size but are less significant in terms of their potential for economic development.
and geographical area, but are relatively less powerful than cities which are more favourably positioned within hierarchies of power despite their size. Rather than size, using a relative measure operating on a field of power, like scalar positioning, is more useful in framing the varying opportunity structures and the governance capacities of different localities, including rural areas.

Moreover, as illustrated in the first part of this paper, the size of the depopulated cities in which migrants are settling might continue to fall or might not change, but with the settlement of an increasing number of foreign-born migrants, the composition of the city population will drastically change. Thus, rather than concentrating on the size of cities, focusing on the differential political, economic and cultural power of the cities shaped by their positioning in global power fields may be a better ground for policies regarding local (including urban) development and migrants. It is the differential power of cities at a given time which shapes the varying emplacements of migrants in city-making processes.

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