

My name is Kayly Ober. I'm the senior advocate and program manager of the Climate Displacement Program at Refugees International. I'm also a Steering Group member of the Climate, Migration, and Displacement Platform; a participant in the Civil Society Action Committee, which recently released a paper on "Civil society priorities towards the 2022 International Migration Review Forum." Out of the 12 key priorities, climate change features prominently.

That's no mistake.

As the latest IPCC Working Group II report on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation underscores, we're in the midst of a climate crisis.

Scientists have already observed increases in the frequency and intensity of climate and weather extremes, including hot extremes on land and in the ocean, heavy precipitation events, drought and fire weather. These increasing weather and climate extremes have already exposed millions of people to acute food insecurity.

This report also makes clear: the magnitude of existing and coming climate change impacts is much larger than previously acknowledged and is already contributing to displacement and humanitarian crises around the world.

For those living and working on the frontlines, this assessment is obvious—and it has become more obvious, more existential, with every year, with every day.

That's why civil society has been so vocal about the need to include climate change in relevant migration policy and frameworks, including the Global Compact for Migration.

Civil society is responsible for important touchpoints within the GCM that are related to climate change, including but not limited to objective 2 on minimizing the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin; and objective 5 on enhancing the availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration.

However, the GCM and these objectives, while noteworthy, still require reflection. Civil society is hopeful that the IMRF may serve as an opportunity to lay out these objectives in fuller detail and with renewed commitments, including from the United States. I'm gratified by the presence of Ms. Wedel on this panel. It sends an important signal.

First, States must be clear on what minimizing adverse drivers entails. Logically, "developing adaptation and resilience strategies to sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters, and climate change" means more adaptation planning, more disaster risk reduction, by countries on the frontlines. However, it must be acknowledged that it also means high emissions countries have the responsibility to support such endeavors, financially and technically.

High-income countries have already pledged \$100 billion per year for adaptation financing under the Paris Agreement. Can this approach be reaffirmed within the GCM process? Can States outline what responsibilities they may share related to migration in the context of climate change

if this pledge isn't met? And it's not just about the amount of money earmarked for adaptation. Can States pledge to increase access to long-term, multi-year, flexible funding that responds to locally defined needs and resource gaps? This understanding and framing is aligned with the goals of the Grand Bargain and the Principles for Locally Led Adaptation.

At the same time, Objective 2 cannot be an excuse to focus solely on "root causes". Even with increased investments, there are limits to adaptation. Yesterday's IPCC report made clear that we're already in an era of "loss and damage," or irreversible impacts due to climate change that adaptation will not adequately address.

States must determine what "enhancing" availability and flexibility of pathways means in an era of "loss and damage." This is particularly important in the face of slow-onset events. My friends and colleagues in the Pacific have requested more good faith efforts to offer novel pathways, including resettlement and planned relocation options to other countries. This is important. However, States must also strengthen existing pathways.

The Nansen Protection Agenda has showed us that multiple tools to admit and protect people displaced across borders in the context of climate change **do** exist, such as humanitarian visas, temporary protection, immigration quotas, or free movement agreements. But their implementation is unpredictable. For example, cases of temporary admission post-disaster are at the complete discretion of immigration officials at the border. This has meant that, in the past, admission has been unevenly applied based on the country of origin, race or religion. How can States ensure that the tools that they'll no doubt highlight at the IMRF work in practice for those that need it most? How can they ensure that these pathways are consistent, non-discriminatory, and uphold fundamental human rights?

In sum, the IMRF is an opportunity to ensure that "enhancing" pathways means more than just considering movement in the context of climate change. It's also an opportunity for States to reaffirm that responsibility sharing and collective action is crucial, and connect the dots with other international processes and frameworks.