

## CHAPTER 4

# MIGRATION DYNAMICS AND DIALOGUE IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN<sup>1</sup>

**WITH A POPULATION** of close to 250 million (UNDP, 2002; 2004), the western Mediterranean<sup>2</sup> is a region that has been exposed to unusually complex migration dynamics because of demographic, economic, geographic, institutional and strategic factors.

The economic situation across the region varies broadly: in 2002, while France enjoyed a per capita income of USD 22,010, Mauritania's barely came to USD 340. However, this gap is not attributable to any North-South divide, since within the European Union (EU) the per capita income in Italy (USD 18,960) is almost double that of Portugal (USD 10,840). A similar pattern exists among the Maghreb countries, where Libya's per capita income (USD 7,570) is far ahead of that of all the other countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (ibid).

There are huge contrasts in population and life expectancy across the region,<sup>3</sup> but also increasing similarities. For example, the general decline in the birth rates in western and southern Europe is now gradually also taking hold in the Maghreb as well. In Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia the drop in fertility in 25 years is equivalent to that in France over the last two centuries (INED, 2000). After three decades of steady decline, the fertility rate in Tunisia of 1.55 children per woman has now reached the same level as in western countries. However, the effects of this trend are unlikely to be felt in the labour market until

2010. Thus the pressure on the labour markets of the Maghreb countries is likely to continue and engender a relatively high emigration potential.

But, apart from economic and demographic considerations, migration in the western Mediterranean also plays a decisive role in the life of the region's states. It is also a major factor affecting bilateral and multilateral relations between them. This chapter looks at the growing and evolving nature of migration within this interdependent grouping of states across the north African and European continents, with a particular focus on the "5+5" dialogue that has emerged and found concrete expression among these states in recent years.

---

### MIGRATION TRENDS

---

#### MIGRATION DYNAMICS IN THE SOUTH: FROM MIGRANT WORKER TO EMIGRANT COMMUNITY

**THE 1960s** saw the start of a significant flow of labour migrants from the Maghreb countries towards Europe (Brand, 2002).<sup>4</sup> These were mainly individuals coming with their families to work in selected sectors of the economy.<sup>5</sup> Between 1966 and 1972, the number of Algerians admitted to France increased by over 40 per cent (Tapinos, 1975).

---

1. The author of this chapter is Redouane Saadi, Liaison Officer for the Western Mediterranean, IOM, Geneva.

2. Including the Maghreb countries, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia; and the European Union countries, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain.

3. The population of Morocco (30 million) is much greater than that of Tunisia (10 million). Similarly, Italy (with 58 million inhabitants) is ahead of Malta (with only 0.4 million) and although life expectancy at birth for Spanish (78.5), Maltese (78.0) and Libyan people (70.5) is roughly comparable, the equivalent figure for Mauritania is only 51.5.

4. According to statistics of the French Ministry of the Interior (General Information Directorate), the net balance of Algerian migration to France from 1962 to 1964 stood at 110,213 (see Tapinos, 1975).

5. The main sectors employing such workers were heavy industry, construction, catering and tourism. Note, however, that the tertiary sector nowadays offers more jobs to migrants than the primary and secondary sectors (Salt, 2000).

In 1973, however, a major economic recession was triggered in western Europe by the first oil price shock. In that year, Algeria stopped labour emigration to Europe and encouraged its expatriates to return.<sup>6</sup> In July 1974, France reacted to the oil price shock and the ensuing economic crisis by freezing labour immigration, a measure also adopted by other European countries.

This European freeze on immigration led to new migration strategies. Since the movement of workers slowed down after 1973, and only immigration for the purpose of family reunion remained legally possible, the two-way traffic of male workers tended to be replaced by a one-way immigration of women and children. After the flow of immigrant workers in the 1960s, family reunion reached a peak in 1975 and 1976, a trend that gave rise to a growing feminization of migration. While in the 1970s migrant women tended to be economically dependent on their spouses, they gradually became economic and social actors in their own right (Khachani, 1999).

Internal migration also plays a role in the Maghreb region. Mauritania, in particular, has had an interesting history of rural-urban migration, harking back to the society-building efforts of pre-colonial times.<sup>7</sup> The twin factors of migration and urbanization took a new turn following Mauritania's independence in 1960. Social change, development and the drought-related degradation of the environment led to intensified rural to urban migration and, by 1999 the urban population had increased from 40 per cent of the total population in 1992 to over 55 per cent<sup>8</sup> (80% currently in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou).

The Maghreb countries have set up a number of institutions, both in their own countries and in the

host countries, to maintain close links with emigrant populations. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia established “*Amicales*” (friendly associations), which act as official or associated offices to deal with expatriate affairs and manage relations with host countries, especially in regard to employment and social security. With the shift from labour migration to family reunion, the Maghreb countries were obliged to adapt their links with expatriate communities accordingly. After creating entities responsible for migrant labour quotas and subsequently relations with expatriates, they established institutions to manage the increasingly complex links with the diasporas, ranging from banking and legislative systems to facilitating investment in property in the countries of origin, to cultural instruments that help maintain and strengthen the identity of the home countries among expatriate communities.

Algeria established a National Labour Office to supervise the management of emigrant labour quotas and linkages with the diaspora. In 1996, the government set up a State Secretariat in charge of the National Community Abroad, attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At present, the Algerian government includes a Minister Delegate in charge of that community, who reports to the head of Government.<sup>9</sup>

In Morocco, the management of expatriate links had been shared between the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1990, a ministry dealing specifically with the affairs of Moroccan Communities Living Abroad was established and a Minister Delegate in charge of the communities duly appointed. The Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad<sup>10</sup> was also established that year, to help maintain and strengthen the links between Moroccans

6. Algeria, an oil and gas producer whose energy resources were nationalized in 1971 by the late President Houari Boumediene, aimed to relieve pressure on employment by creating jobs in the country with oil money instead of through emigration. Morocco and Tunisia, on the other hand, which at that time had essentially agriculture-based economies, had a more favourable policy towards emigration, and were more seriously affected by the European freeze on immigrant quotas. See also Collinson, 1996.

7. Traditionally, migration in Mauritania has been closely related to population movements in the region. The Saharan cities (like Chinguitti or Ouadane), whose power of attraction used to extend as far as Andalusia, became crossroads for the flow of people and products from large neighbouring empires, owing to their considerable influence, and supported by the dynamism of distant trade.

8. See Mauritania's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), 2000 (refer footnote 13).

9. For more details, see [www.mdcne.gov.dz](http://www.mdcne.gov.dz).

10. See Act No. 19-89 promulgated by the Dahir of 13 July 1990, establishing the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad. The Foundation is a “non-profit institution, pursuing social ends, under the responsibility of a financially independent legal entity”, which plays an active part in social, cultural and religious affairs. It organizes courses in Arabic, civilization and religion for children of expatriates, and provides financial assistance to indigents.

living abroad and the home country. More recently, the Minister Delegate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in charge of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad has been given the responsibility for developing a general policy on this.<sup>11</sup>

In Tunisia, the Office of Tunisians Abroad was set up in 1988 in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity with the general mandate of “providing the Government with elements and data to enable it to implement a policy for the guidance and assistance of Tunisians abroad”. The Office operates at a national and a transnational level, by providing logistical support for the *Amicales* and associations of Tunisians abroad. It supervises economic, cultural and social aspects of relations with expatriates. In Tunisia, it is represented by regional delegations, which provide socio-cultural guidance to the families of emigrants that have remained behind in Tunisia (Brand, 2002).

The Libyan migration model is one of a kind in the Maghreb: similar to some guest worker-based labour migration systems, it does not expect migrants to become integrated locally. Immigrants play an extremely important role in all of the country’s economic sectors (except in direct government service). The number of migrant workers in the country fell substantially, however, following the decline in oil price in the mid-1980s. The Libyan government manages migration through three bodies: the People’s General Committee for External Relations and International Cooperation (migration diplomacy and consular affairs), the People’s General Committee for Public Security (illegal migration and human trafficking) and the People’s General Committee for Labour, Training and Employment (labour migration).

In Mauritania, the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, the Fight against Poverty and Integration has been dealing with the question of

migration and development through special programmes since it was set up in 1998. Its actions are spelled out in the Mauritanian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).<sup>12</sup>

### MIGRATION DYNAMICS IN THE NORTH: FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION

As amply discussed in other chapters,<sup>13</sup> most European countries have not traditionally been countries of immigration. France is an exception: in 1851, when the first general population census made a distinction between nationals and foreigners, it registered some 400,000 immigrants. Thirty years later, this number had grown to over a million. In the 19th century, the media in France included 19 newspapers in Arabic and dozens of others in Turkish, Armenian and Russian. Between the two world wars, in some years France took in more immigrants than the US (El Yazami and Schwartz, 2001).

Spain, Italy and Portugal, traditionally countries of emigration, have also recently become sizeable countries of immigration. Spanish migration, which since the 16th century was directed mainly at Latin America, has gradually turned towards western Europe. The new wave took on large-scale proportions after 1959, the year of the Economic Stabilization Plan.<sup>14</sup> Between 1960 and 1979, almost 2 million Spanish nationals migrated to what is now the EU (Rubio, 1974). The same pattern may be observed in the case of Italy, from where some 26 million nationals departed for America, Australia, and other European countries between 1876 and 1976. This peaked in 1913, when more than 800,000 Italians, or 2.4 per cent of the total population, left the country (Pastore, 2001).

Since becoming countries of immigration, these European countries have admitted a growing number

11. See in particular the Strategy Paper proposed by Ms. Nouzha Chekraoui, Minister Delegate attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in charge of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad, approved by the Council of Ministers on 13 March 2003 ([www.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma](http://www.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma)).

12. The PRSP is linked to the initiative for reducing the debt of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), for which Mauritania was declared eligible in 1999. The Mauritanian government prepared a poverty reduction strategy, which also involves local communities, employers and trade unions, civil society, Universities and others. The PRSP has given rise to a Steering Act on poverty reduction, which was passed by Parliament in July 2001.

13. See the chapters “Migrants in an Enlarged Europe” and “International Migration Trends”.

14. Labour agreements were subsequently signed with the Federal Republic of Germany (1960), France, Switzerland, the Netherlands (1961) and Austria (1962).

of migrants, also from the Maghreb region. In Spain, from 1991 to 1996, the average annual intake was 35,000 (EUROSTAT, 2000). Since then, the growth has been spectacular. For 1997 and 1998, the number of arrivals was estimated at, respectively, 64,000 and 123,000, and for 2000 and 2001, the figures are estimated to have risen to 360,000 and 250,000.<sup>15</sup> The proportion of foreigners living in Spain has increased substantially from about 0.5 per cent of the total population in 1980 to 1.1 per cent by the end of 1990, and 2.7 per cent by the end of 2001 (Fargues, 2002). One of the largest migrant communities in parts of Europe originates in the Maghreb countries. In Spain, there were 118,345 such immigrants in 1998 (EUROSTAT, 1998) and, having grown to 174,209 by 2002, they are at present the largest foreign community in the country (*ibid*).

Faced with growing immigration, many of the European states, particularly in the south, have tended to react along similar lines by trying to ward off the arrival of more foreigners through stricter border controls, more returns and new regulations affecting migrants already in the country. However, the restrictions imposed on legal admission channels have to some extent merely increased the incidence of illegal immigration into Europe.

#### TRANSIT MIGRATION: A NEW TREND

According to the highest estimates, there were just under 2 million irregular migrants in Europe in 1991, compared with 3 million in 1998. More than half of these appear to be living in France, Italy and Spain (IOM, 2000; 2004). These “Latin” European countries are the preferred gateway for irregular migrants from the Maghreb, as well as from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia – and this is a growing trend.

Irregular migrants use several routes to enter Europe: some travel by air, the great majority by sea (Council of the European Union, 2003), which is less expensive. The extensive coastlines of Spain, France, Italy and Malta are the preferred options for entering Europe in an irregular manner, since they remain permeable despite stricter controls.<sup>16</sup> Italy, especially Sicily and the islands of Lampedusa and Pantelleria, has seen an increase in the arrival of irregular migrants from Libya (only 275 km from Italy) and Tunisia (a mere 113 km from Lampedusa). From Morocco, the Straits of Gibraltar are still the route most used by smugglers.<sup>17</sup> Owing to the closer watch on this route by Spain and Morocco, however, boats are now heading either farther east to the coast between Malaga and Almería, even as far as Murcia, or farther west, between Cadiz and Huelva. A route regularly followed by the *pateras*<sup>18</sup> runs from southwest Morocco to the Canary Islands.

At present, the Maghreb countries are both emigration and transit or destination points for migrants coming from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Substantial population flows from Africa stretch between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb and, to a more limited extent, western Europe. They come mainly from West Africa, but also from the Sudan, the Horn of Africa and southern Africa.<sup>19</sup> Most migrants leave West Africa by a variety of means, including boats, buses, taxis, trucks and even on foot. They try to reach Tamanrasset either through the Niger or through Mali (Lahlou et al., 2002). Many then try to enter Morocco before attempting to cross to Europe. These journeys can last several years and are pursued by migrants in several stages, which give them a chance to take informal jobs *en route* to pay for the next stages of their journey. The number of irregular migrants in Libya, counting only those from Niger, the Sudan and

15. See [www.dgei.mir.es/fr/general/ObservatorioPermanente\\_index.html](http://www.dgei.mir.es/fr/general/ObservatorioPermanente_index.html).

16. In 2003, the Spanish Guardia Civil intercepted more than 18,000 illegal migrants on the Spanish coasts, that is, 8 per cent more than in 2002.

17. Between 1996 and 2000, the number of immigrants arrested by the Spanish authorities in the Straits of Gibraltar rose from 7,741 to 16,885, according to Spanish Guardia Civil sources. See Pumares, 2002, p. 88.

18. Small boats (often fishing boats) equipped with 40-60 hp outboard motors, which can carry up to 30 passengers.

19. Several factors account for the rapid rise of irregular migration out of sub-Saharan Africa: population pressure, increasing poverty, reduced access to natural resources such as water, and lack of security. The tendency is further exacerbated by the strong attraction of the lifestyle and economic standards of western Europe.

Mali, increased dramatically by 381 per cent between 2000 and 2003.<sup>20</sup>

The Maghreb countries have responded to this situation by introducing new measures to regulate migration. In June 2003, Morocco adopted a set of laws regulating the rights and conditions of admission and residence of foreigners in Morocco. The King of Morocco has undertaken to set up two new institutions, attached to the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for halting illegal migration. The first of these, the Migration and Border Control Directorate, will, inter alia, implement the national strategy to combat human traffic networks, as well as border controls. It will be run by a national research and investigation brigade responsible for combating illegal migration and dealing with all cases of human trafficking. The second body, the Moroccan Migration Observatory, will undertake research, gather information on migration, maintain a database of national statistics and submit proposals, including a national migration strategy, to the government for concrete measures to manage migration.

Recently, Tunisia has also made greater efforts to reduce the growing number of irregular migrants on its territory by imposing stricter conditions of admission.<sup>21</sup> A force of over 13,000 men, supported by 12,000 paramilitary guards, has been assigned to control the borders. Further backing for these forces is provided by joint Italian-Tunisian naval patrols. As a result of these harsher measures, Tunisia tends to be seen more as a transit than a residence option by irregular migrants (Commission of the European Communities, 2004).

Libya, on the other hand, has strengthened its institutional capacity to deal with irregular migration and human trafficking. In June 2004, the General

Committee of the People for Security and IOM organized courses at the Police Academy in Tripoli to provide training for and strengthen the institutional awareness of 100 senior officials and officers of the Libyan police force. During the courses, participants studied issues such as border control, document fraud and assisted voluntary return of irregular migrants transiting Libya *en route* to southern Europe.

Actions taken by the countries of southern Europe have generally followed the policies of the European Union (EU). Since the introduction of the Schengen agreements, the EU has unified its immigration policy, by allowing free movement of persons within Europe, on the one hand, and stiffening controls around the Schengen borders, on the other.<sup>22</sup> EU governments have focused their efforts on strengthening border controls, maritime patrols and bilateral agreements, and on parallel diplomatic and operational dialogue with emigration countries. EU states have equipped themselves with a sophisticated computer network to share information on movements of persons within the common European space. They are also working on preventive measures to alleviate the causes of emigration in the countries of origin. Despite all these efforts, however, irregular immigration continues to grow.

---

## REGIONAL COOPERATION ON MIGRATION ISSUES

---

### THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

The main objective of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was launched in Barcelona in 1995 by the governments of 27 countries,<sup>23</sup> is to turn the Euro-Mediterranean basin into an area of peace, stability and prosperity. This partnership, which

20. In three years, the total number of illegal immigrants from Niger, the Sudan and Mali arrested by the Libyan authorities rose from 895 to 4,308. For more details see Al Amn-Alam, 2004.

21. Act No. 2004-6 of 3 February 2004 amending Act No. 75-40 of 1975.

22. In 2002, Spain adopted an "Integrated External Surveillance System" (SIVE). Equipped with video and infrared cameras, it is already operational along some of the coastline of the Province of Cadiz and the Canary Islands, and is expected to be fully operational by 2005, when it should cover the whole of the country's southern border.

23. The signatory countries are: Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the UK and the Palestinian. National Authority.

remains the most ambitious cooperation structure in the region to date, covers three main sectors: political and security; economic and financial and, lastly, socio-cultural. The latter sector has given rise to specific measures that recognize the important role played by migration in relations between host countries, countries of origin and transit countries, and the need for effective intergovernmental cooperation programmes. Continuity of the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue is assured by the regular meetings of foreign affairs ministers of the Barcelona Process.

At the Malta meeting in 1997, it was agreed to intensify the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and cooperation in the areas of migration and human exchanges, in particular, illegal immigration. At the fourth meeting in Marseilles in November 2000, the ministers stressed the need to extend this dialogue through a comprehensive, balanced approach. In 2002 in Valencia, a framework document was approved to implement a regional cooperation programme in the areas of justice, drug control, organized crime and terrorism, and to initiate cooperation on the social integration of immigrants, migration and the movement of people.

The ministerial conference in Naples in December 2003 concluded that, if correctly handled, migration can be a positive factor for socio-economic growth in the region. The ministers confirmed that there should be a balance between security concerns and the management of migration flows, on the one hand, and the need to facilitate legal movements and social integration of legal migrants, on the other. At the tenth and most recent ministerial meeting in Dublin in May 2004, on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, the emphasis was on how to manage irregular migration and trafficking of persons.

## THE MIGRATION DIALOGUE IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN (“5+5”)<sup>24</sup>

One of the most effective ways for western Mediterranean governments to jointly address the above-described complexities of migration in this broader region is through the “5+5” dialogue. This is an important new migration forum between the Maghreb grouping (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and the European grouping (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) that has been steadily consolidating itself in the past three years. The impetus was given at a meeting of the respective foreign ministers in Lisbon on 25 and 26 January 2001,<sup>25</sup> where the path was laid for closer regional cooperation on migration and more regular dialogue among the 5+5 countries. Annual meetings were programmed between foreign ministers, alternating between the northern and southern shores of the western Mediterranean.

This led to a first Summit of Heads of State and Government of countries of the western Mediterranean in Tunis in December 2003, at which delegates reiterated their wish to further strengthen trust, consultation and dialogue in all fields between their countries. The 5+5 partners continued their discussions on three main aspects of their partnership: i) security and stability, ii) regional integration and economic cooperation, and iii) cooperation in social and human affairs.<sup>26</sup> The Tunis summit marked the successful outcome of a long political process, involving similar attempts by a number of Mediterranean countries since 1983, and the 5+5 process was seen as a catalyst in this success.<sup>27</sup>

24. See also Textbox 13.2, “Migration Dynamics in the Western Mediterranean”, World Migration 2003 (IOM, 2003).

25. See the conclusions of the Portuguese President (item 4) of the Summit of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 5+5 Dialogue of the Western Mediterranean Forum, Lisbon, 26 January 2001, and the speech by Dr. Joe Borg, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malta, entitled “Political, Cultural and Civilization Dialogue in the Western Mediterranean Area”.

26. The Tunis Summit – particularly in the words of President of France, Jacques Chirac – recalled the promising results of the first ministerial conference on migration of the 5+5, in Tunis in 2002. The heads of state and government all agreed on the need for better cooperation, partly to combat illegal immigration and partly to improve the integration of legally established migrants by affording them better protection of their rights.

27. On a visit to Morocco in 1983, the late French President, François Mitterand, proposed a dialogue on the western Mediterranean involving Algeria, France, Italy, Morocco, Spain and Tunisia. This gradually took shape, with several pre-diplomatic meetings in Marseilles, Tangiers and Rome. From 1990 onwards, the meetings became more formal and were attended by the foreign affairs ministers of the countries concerned.

### FOUNDING CONFERENCE, TUNIS 2002

Following the recommendations of the Lisbon conference, Tunisia and IOM<sup>28</sup> organized the first 5+5 Ministerial Conference on Migration in Tunis in 2002. The meeting mostly confirmed the importance of regional dialogue on migration by the ten participating countries. Most importantly, however, it adopted by consensus the Tunis Declaration on the 5+5 Migration Dialogue (October 2002),<sup>29</sup> which reflects the willingness of partner states to consider multilateral approaches on common migration issues. Priority issues identified in the Tunis Declaration include: strengthening of regional consultation processes; exchange of information and analysis of migration trends; illegal migration and trafficking in persons; migration and development; migrant rights and obligations; management of legal migration flows; labour migration and vocational training; migration and health, and gender equality.

### CONSOLIDATING CONFERENCE, RABAT 2003

While the Tunis Declaration established a framework for migration cooperation between the 5+5 partners, the Rabat Conference, held one year later in October 2003, consolidated that initial approach by focusing on several key areas of policy interest. The first of these included joint management of the movement of people, strengthening of human exchanges and the fight against migrant trafficking by combating networks of smugglers, and illegal immigration in general. The second concerned the rights and obligations of migrants and their integration in host societies. The third aspect was migration and joint approaches to development, involving the exchange of information about multilateral actions to combat poverty and local development measures in regions with a high migration potential, especially in cooperation with migrant associations.

### OPERATIONALIZING CONFERENCE, ALGIERS 2004

Two achievements mark the third 5+5 conference in Algiers: first, the Migration Dialogue has now been accepted as part of the tradition of multilateral diplomacy between the countries concerned. Second, practical measures have been identified for follow-up, including the exchange of information and networking of national focal points on migration; training and seminars for experts of the region; awareness campaigns on migration and the risks and dangers of illegal immigration, and encouragement for the introduction of structures dedicated to research and analysis of data on migration flows. A dialogue with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa on issues of illegal migration was also recommended.

### CONCLUSION

THE 5+5 process reflects the extent to which governments across the western Mediterranean spectrum today embrace the need to work together on common migration challenges and strategies. Its forward-looking agenda for information exchange, joint management of international borders, agreed forms of labour migration, migration for development and protection of the rights of migrants is one of the best predictors of where this broad region is heading in regard to migration management over the coming years.

28. Throughout the process, IOM has continued to act as a neutral facilitator of dialogue among the partner governments. For more information concerning these activities, see: [www.iom.int/en/know/dialogue5-5/index.shtml](http://www.iom.int/en/know/dialogue5-5/index.shtml).

29. For text see: [www.iom.int/en/know/dialogue5-5/index.shtml](http://www.iom.int/en/know/dialogue5-5/index.shtml).