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IOM International Organization for Migration  
OIM Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations  
OIM Organización Internacional para las Migraciones

# **Development and migration**

*Policy memorandum – July 2004*

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## **Summary**

This memorandum examines the links between development and migration, and between development policy and migration policy. Its purpose is to develop a foreign policy that is integrated in this respect too, by indicating where the two policy areas can reinforce one another and where policy changes are needed in the interests of coherence.

One main conclusion of this analysis is that there is no major incoherence between Dutch policy on foreign affairs and security, development cooperation, human rights and migration. All these policies are helping to attain the Government's goals of poverty reduction, reduction of disparities in wealth, conflict management and protection of human rights, while maintaining a balanced emphasis on controlling migration in the light of the absorptive capacity of Dutch society and with a view to preventing abuse of the system and illegal migration.

At the same time, the analysis identifies the areas in which greater efforts and new emphases could make overall policy more effective.

The relationship between development and migration is not a simple one. Economic development is not the only factor that determines whether people emigrate. Another key issue is whether development is accompanied by an increase or decrease in local demand for labour. An increase in local demand for labour often leads to a decrease in migration, and vice versa. In general, economic development in developing countries leads in the long term to a decrease in emigration to industrialised countries. In the least developed countries, however, there is sometimes a temporary increase in emigration in the short and medium term.

Development cooperation is not the only factor that determines whether a country develops. Development takes place when there is a favourable combination of factors such as peace, security and stability, reasonably good governance and policy, foreign direct investment, liberalisation of trade, a manageable debt burden, development aid and remittances by emigrants. By focusing on all these factors at once, Dutch development, foreign, security and human rights policy is contributing to the development of the main countries of origin of migrants in the Netherlands. This is taking place partly through the EU, particularly in the countries along the Union's external frontiers (including Turkey and Morocco), as well as in countries such as China, Iraq, Iran and Serbia and Montenegro, and through development programmes for the least developed countries. In some cases it is taking place through bilateral ties, in countries such as Suriname, Indonesia, Afghanistan and Ghana.

The Netherlands will continue to vigorously pursue this development-oriented policy, which in the long term is expected to lead to a decline in migration from these countries.

South-North migration can help developing countries to develop. Especially in middle-income and higher low-income countries that enjoy peace, security and stability and reasonably good governance and policies, the impact of South-North migration is mainly positive, thanks to favourable conditions for the use of remittances and 'brain gain' that promotes structural development.

The least developed countries, on the other hand, risk losing out through a combination of such factors as emigration of highly skilled people ('brain drain'), high incidence of HIV/AIDS, low levels of technology and so on. A large proportion of emigrants from the least developed countries are highly skilled. The vast majority of them go to the United States, which means that the Netherlands scarcely contributes to the brain drain. In developing countries that do not enjoy peace, security, stability, good governance and good policy, there is little chance that migration will have a positive impact on development through remittances and brain gain.

Except in the case of migrants who are highly skilled by international standards, industrialised countries have the most to gain from selective and temporary migration, attuned to job opportunities and the absorptive capacity of society. Such types of migration encourage economic development and at the same time help maintain an economic base for social services.

Circular migration, in which migrants return temporarily or permanently to their countries of origin, can have a positive impact on the development of countries of origin and countries of destination alike, especially if the migrants are highly educated. Highly educated migrants from developing countries often do not belong to the category known as 'knowledge migrants' (i.e. ones that are highly skilled by international standards). Labour migration to the Netherlands by knowledge migrants is governed by the policy set out in the policy paper *Toelating van kennismigranten* (Admission of knowledge migrants), which was sent to the House of Representatives of the States General on 25 May 2004. The Government wants to encourage labour migration to the Netherlands by knowledge migrants and does not wish to impose time limits on their stay. Any other type of labour migration should be primarily temporary. In the case of migrants who are not knowledge migrants, the Government considers the encouragement of circular migration (within the constraints of national migration policy) an appropriate strategy that will serve the interests of migrants, countries of origin and countries of destination alike. This can be done, for example, by taking advantage of

existing opportunities for temporary labour migration (under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, for example), including the encouragement of return at the end of the temporary period of work, and by encouraging migrants from developing countries to return to their countries of origin either temporarily or permanently.

The aim of the Government's policy is to limit brain drain from the least developed countries, in part by encouraging temporary migration, taking special measures as part of labour migration policy – e.g. covenants – and carrying out development activities to combat brain drain.

The Government favours an integrated foreign policy and, more specifically, an integrated approach to development and migration. Reports by Dutch diplomatic missions, including those in development partner countries, will cover major trends in the field of migration (South-North as well as South-South and North-South). With due respect for the ownership principle, the Netherlands will raise relevant migration and development issues in talks with its development partners on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Migration will be systematically discussed during visits and dialogues, in consultative forums and in negotiations involving the main countries of origin of migrants to the Netherlands. By analogy with existing lists of countries for development cooperation programmes, a list of priority countries of origin will be drawn up. This will be based on the list of countries in the policy document on return, and will be drawn up in consultation among the relevant ministries.

The Government will involve migrant organisations in the Netherlands more closely in drawing up development policy through the National Ethnic Minorities Consultative Committee (LOM). At EU level it will press for greater emphasis on development and migration as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, development cooperation (including emergency aid) and cooperation on justice and police matters.

Dutch human rights policy, as part of integrated foreign policy, also has links with development and migration. On the one hand, international efforts to promote respect for human rights and good governance in countries of origin help to create conditions that may lead in the long term to a decline in emigration. On the other hand, migration policy protects migrants who require international protection, in a way that fulfils obligations under international human rights conventions. Migrants' human rights are also relevant in this context.

Dutch conflict policy is concentrated on areas of international conflict that are selected on the basis of foreign and security policy considerations. In some cases, the actual or potential pressure of migration in the Netherlands and other Western

countries may help generate the necessary political will to focus on certain conflict situations, since conflict policy, to which development and human rights policies also contribute, helps prevent and solve the problem of forced migration.

Providing shelter of refugees is part of conflict policy. More effective protection in regions of origin may help solve the refugee problem, reduce secondary migration and perhaps eventually alleviate the asylum problem in industrialised countries. In international forums, the Government is also pressing for more effective protection in the region.

Once conflict situations are resolved, the best solution is the return of refugees. What is important is a smooth transition from emergency aid to long-term development aid in the area concerned, so that refugees can return for good. The voluntary return of skilled migrants from industrialised countries, either temporarily or permanently, can contribute to reconstruction.

The Government's policy on the return of rejected asylum seekers and illegal aliens is an integral part of its foreign policy, as set out in earlier letters to the House of Representatives. Policy to encourage temporary labour migration and circular migration depends on an effective return policy. It is important to encourage voluntary return using a combination of measures, such as forced return where necessary, agreements with countries of origin, support for or pressure on countries of origin, support for migrants and migrant organisations, support for training and reintegration initiatives by Dutch civil society, support for temporary labour migration (including effective return), and support for temporary or permanent return to support the development or reconstruction of countries of origin. In this connection it is important to make use of EU resources alongside bilateral activities.

Finally, the Government is eager to increase efforts to combat illegal migration and smuggling of/trafficking in human beings. It will try to work with countries of origin and transit on achieving this aim. The repercussion of smuggling of/trafficking in human beings give many of these countries a motivation to engage in dialogue with Western countries on migration issues. Support for or pressure on such countries, in any area of relations, may form part of the negotiations. The EU often provides the best framework for pursuing our aims in this area, especially in the case of countries adjoining the Union. The Government is in favour of tougher EU measures on illegal migration and smuggling of/trafficking in human beings, through regional and development programmes and as part of cooperation on justice and police matters. Tougher bilateral measures will also be taken in this area as part of good governance and human rights policy.



## **1 Introduction**

The policy memorandum *Aan elkaar verplicht: ontwikkelingssamenwerking op weg naar 2015* (House of Representatives 2003-2004, 29234, No. 1) outlines development policy for the years to come. The memorandum is based on the letter of 17 June 2003 entitled *Ontwikkelingssamenwerking in meerjarig perspectief* (House of Representatives 2002-2003, 28600 V, No. 65). When debating it with the House of Representatives on 17 November 2003, the Minister for Development Cooperation promised to send the House a memorandum on development and migration, to be drawn up in collaboration with the Minister for Immigration and Integration. She also promised to involve migrant groups in the Netherlands in drawing up the memorandum.

The promised memorandum on development and migration is now before you. It is a broad-based memorandum that covers more than just development *cooperation* and migration. It focuses on the foreign policy to be pursued by the Netherlands, and examines such issues as the role of migrants in Dutch society largely from that angle. The memorandum mainly deals with international, i.e. cross-border, migration.

There has not yet been sufficient international analysis of the links between development and migration. Partly because of this, the implications of those links for an integrated foreign policy have not been sufficiently clarified. Development cooperation and migration have hitherto been quite separate areas of policy, with different goals and basic principles. Their only points of contact have been in their implementation.

The memorandum therefore begins by taking stock of what *is* known about the various links. It then examines how the two policy areas can reinforce one another and what policy changes are needed in the interests of coherence. It looks closely at developing countries and how migration affects them. This includes both South-South and South-North migration, although such is the nature of the memorandum that the emphasis is on South-North migration. Migration is a phenomenon in which individuals play a particularly important part, but migrants' decisions and interests are only mentioned indirectly, as the memorandum focuses on the various societal processes at work in both countries of origin and countries of destination, and on the government policies to be pursued.

Both Dutch bilateral policy and policy pursued through the European Union (EU) and other multilateral channels are taken into account. The analyses are long-term, whereas the policy recommendations focus on the short and medium term.

When the memorandum was being drawn up, members of civil society (including migrant groups, development organisations and researchers) were consulted at various times, including a working conference on the memorandum on 25 February 2004.

The framework for the memorandum is formed by the goals and principles of Dutch development policy, migration policy and integrated foreign policy. Development policy, as formulated in *Aan elkaar verplicht*, focuses on poverty reduction, reduction of differences in wealth, conflict management and protection of human rights. The interests of developing countries and partnership are key elements. Migration policy focuses on controlling migration and on measures to combat abuse of the system and illegal migration. The absorptive capacity of Dutch and European society is a key factor. Integrated foreign policy brings together these goals and principles and strikes a balance between the interests of developing countries and those of the Netherlands.

The structure of the memorandum is as follows. The general summary is followed by this introduction (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 then describes and, where possible, explains a number of recent migration trends. Chapter 3 examines the impact of these trends on countries of origin and countries of destination. Chapter 4 investigates how migration policy can help in attaining development policy goals and vice versa. Finally, Chapter 5 examines in detail a number of specific links between the two policy areas, addressing the issues of what policies should be changed or stepped up and what the financial implications will be.

## **2 Links between development and migration**

### **2.1 General links between development and migration**

Migration is a complex phenomenon, and one that has always been with us. The scale and direction of migration can to some extent be influenced by targeted policies in the countries concerned, but overall migration seems likely to continue increasing (in absolute terms) in the decades to come. Judging by the percentage of the world's people living outside their country of origin, the scale of international migration has stayed fairly constant over the past few decades and seems likely to remain so (2-3% of the world population).<sup>1</sup> Most of this migration was, and is, from developing countries to other developing countries ('South-South migration').<sup>2</sup> What is new is that in recent decades, and especially since 1995, a relatively larger proportion of overall migration has been from South to North, i.e. from developing to industrialised countries.<sup>3</sup>

Migration affects the development of countries of origin, and vice versa. An important question is whether there is a clear link between greater development in a country and the scale of emigration. There is no international consensus about whether development will lead to (a) a temporary increase in emigration which then declines again as development proceeds (the 'migration hump'),<sup>4</sup> (b) a decline in emigration or (c) in today's globalising economy, a lasting increase in emigration.<sup>5</sup>

What is clear is that economic development in a country of origin is not the only factor affecting pressure to emigrate. Another particularly important factor is whether increasing development in a country is accompanied by an increase or decrease in local demand for labour. If there is an increase in demand for labour, pressure to emigrate often decreases, and vice versa. Increased pressure to

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<sup>1</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> In the European Economic Area minus Germany (i.e. the EU minus Germany, plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), immigration in 1995 was almost 170%, and in 2002 over 375%, of what it had been in 1985 (OECD, Working Party on Migration, 2004).

<sup>4</sup> Lucas, Robert E.B., *International Migration to the High Income Countries*, Boston University, April 2004, pp. 3 *et seq.*

<sup>5</sup> See De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten* (Migration and development: pitfalls, nuances and new insights), paper presented at the Strategic Policy Planning Unit's Policy and Research Lunchtime Lecture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 January 2004.

emigrate at a time when economic development is increasing seems largely limited to the least developed countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>6</sup>

The migration hump theory states that emigration from a developing country generally increases as the country experiences rapid economic and social development, but that this process stops when the benefits of migration become too small in terms of differences in income between sending and receiving countries (although emigration need not cease altogether).<sup>7</sup>

The question then is at what levels of economic development the increase and the subsequent decrease in emigration commence. Statistics gathered over the past few decades provide clues. There is relatively little migration from the least developed countries (those with a per capita income in PPP terms of less than USD 1,500),<sup>8</sup> with the exception of refugee migration. There are high levels of migration from middle-income countries whose per capita income in PPP terms is between USD 3,500 and 8,000. Typical countries of emigration include Mexico, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and the Philippines. There is again little migration from countries with a higher per capita income. Middle-income countries are located in what might be termed a migration band. Countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece and Ireland have recently come to the end of the migration hump, countries such as South Korea and Taiwan are now in the middle of this transition, and in countries such as Turkey and Mexico the transition seems imminent.

However, the migration hump theory is no means undisputed. Although analysis of migration to the OECD countries of Europe plus the United States from some seventy developing and transitional countries points to the existence of a migration hump,<sup>9</sup> analysis of UN figures on net emigration from 164 countries over the period 1995-2000 does not. A possible explanation for this is that people from developing countries do migrate, but not to industrialised countries.

A second important link, though an indirect one, between development and migration can be seen where there is considerable refugee migration as result of serious armed conflict. The causes of such conflict are often associated with development problems. Furthermore, targeted international policy which includes elements of development cooperation can help to resolve and manage conflict and

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<sup>6</sup> See Lucas, Robert E.B., *International Migration to the High Income Countries*, Boston University, April 2004, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Olesen, Henrik, 'Migration, Return and Development: an institutional perspective', 2002, IOM, *International Migration*, Vol. 40 (5), Special Issue 2/2002; De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en inzichten*, 2004.

<sup>8</sup> Purchasing power parity: see World Bank, *World Development Report 2004*, pp. 252, 253, 265.

<sup>9</sup> OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

so prevent, solve or reduce the problem of refugee migration. At the same time, humanitarian policy has an important part to play in alleviating refugees' distress.

A third link between development and migration can be found in situations where political repression leads to the departure of people who perceive no political prospects for themselves or even have to flee for fear of persecution. In many cases, political repression is an aspect of the development problem, and policies to promote good governance, democratisation and respect for human rights may also help prevent this type of migration, although mainly in the long term.

As the foregoing makes clear, it is useful to distinguish between different types of migration when analysing the links between development and migration. A first distinction can be made regarding the extent to which migrants leave of their own free will; here there is a continuum from more voluntary to more forced migration. Where people flee from armed conflict or natural disaster, or out of justified fear of persecution, elements of compulsion predominate, a situation often referred to as forced migration or asylum migration.<sup>10</sup> Where people migrate because of a lack of prospects in a context of rapid economic and social development in low-income and middle-income countries, their choice is a freer one. If such migrants leave to seek work elsewhere, this is termed labour migration, and in the case of internationally scarce highly skilled people it is called knowledge migration. Labour migration, knowledge migration and forced migration are often eventually followed by follow-on migration, i.e. migration for purpose of family formation or reunification. In practice, individual migrants often have more than one reason for migrating – for example, they may want to form a family and also look for work. The nature of migration may also change over time; for example, some refugees who have fled their countries because of war migrate again (this is known as secondary migration), generally as labour migrants. Accordingly, it is not always easy to make clear distinctions between forced migration, labour migration, knowledge migration and follow-on migration. The fact that industrialised countries' admission policies often make it easier for people to enter them as asylum seekers than as labour migrants helps blur the distinction between migrant flows, since many labour migrants register as asylum seekers in the hope of being admitted. Another consequence of restrictions in the admission policies of countries of destination is that there is often illegal migration as well as legal migration.

The remainder of this chapter will review the main migration trends, focusing on continents and countries that are linked with Europe through migration.

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<sup>10</sup> As used in this memorandum, the term 'forced migration' refers to this type of migration.

## **2.2 Migration trends**

### **2.2.1 Global**

Each year five to ten million people migrate worldwide, including illegal migrants.<sup>11</sup> In 2000, some 40% of these moved to industrialised countries; the other 60% went to developing countries. Most migrants stay in their regions of origin, such as the former Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe or the Middle East. Between 1975 and 1994, for example, only 10% of Asian labour migrants (not including Chinese migrants) left Asia.<sup>12</sup> Migration to another continent is often secondary migration. Some 48% of migrants are women, and the number of women migrating independently has greatly increased in recent years. One to two million of the people who migrate each year are women and children who are victims of trafficking in human beings; of these, 120,000-500,000 are brought to EU countries, mainly from the former Soviet Union via the Balkans.<sup>13</sup>

Annual numbers of refugees vary considerably from year to year, depending on the wars and natural disasters that displace them. In 2002, for example, the number of new refugees fell by nearly 70% from 2001, to just under 300,000 (and a vast number of refugees – over two million – returned to their countries of origin, especially Afghanistan, but also Angola, Sierra Leone and Burundi).<sup>14</sup> The number of asylum seekers in industrialised countries is about 500,000 a year.<sup>15</sup> Of these, approximately 100,000 are admitted.<sup>16</sup> These figures make it clear that the vast majority of migrants are labour and follow-on migrants.

Increasingly, migration no longer just involves a single move from country of origin to country of destination. Often it is not certain in advance what the country of destination will be (except in the case of follow-on migration). Migrants move on from country to country, and many return, whether permanently or temporarily. However, there are no firm figures to make the dynamics of migration clear.

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<sup>11</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, p. 6; the number of people migrating in a given year is often referred to as the migration flow, whereas the number of migrants living in a given place at a given moment in time is known as the migration stock.

<sup>12</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, p. 6.

<sup>13</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, p. 61.

<sup>14</sup> UNHCR, *Refugees by numbers 2003*, p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> The average over the period 1990-2001 in 29 OECD countries was 567,500 a year (OECD, *Trends in international migration*, 2003, p. 34).

<sup>16</sup> Van Kessel, G., 'Global Migration and Asylum', in *Forced Migration Review*, Issue 10, April 2001, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

In terms of the number of people not living in their countries of origin, there are an estimated 180 million migrants worldwide.<sup>17</sup> However, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates the number of labour migrants at only 60-65 million, or 120 million if relatives and illegal labour migrants are included.<sup>18</sup> UNCHR estimates the number of refugees in the world at 11.5 million, including asylum migrants in Western countries.<sup>19</sup> These figures show that the various estimates differ greatly, probably as a result of imperfect data collection and different definitions.

The following sections describe the main migration trends in the various regions of the world, focusing on regions from which there is substantial migration to Europe.

### **2.2.2 Europe**

The recent history of migration in Europe shows that from 1880 to 1930 Europe was an continent of emigration, with 45 million Europeans moving overseas.<sup>20</sup> However, during the turbulent period from 1930 to 1950, Europe became an continent of immigration. Migration from developing countries to Europe began in the late 1950s, as a result of the growing demand for labour in the fast-growing European economies and the growing supply of labour in the developing countries owing to economic changes there (modernisation of agriculture, migration from rural to urban areas and rapidly improving education). Large numbers of foreign workers were recruited or came to Europe of their own accord. This system operated smoothly until 1973, when the oil crisis drove the European economies into recession. A number of industrial sectors that had attracted immigrant labour were wound down, leading to rapidly increasing unemployment in Europe, especially among immigrants, and higher social expenditure on this group. European countries' labour migration policies thereupon became more restrictive. However, once a system of migration has got going, it is by no means a simple matter for countries that respect international law to halt it once more. Differences in wealth between Europe and developing countries persisted, migrant networks and contacts had been created and large diasporas had established themselves and acted as magnets for new migrants. As labour migration policies became stricter, immigrants looked for new ways of entering Europe, namely asylum migration, follow-on migration and illegal migration. The European countries were unable to

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<sup>17</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, p. 5; number of migrants living in a given place at a given moment in time is known as the 'migration stock'.

<sup>18</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, p. 307.

<sup>19</sup> UNHCR, *Global Appeal 2004*, p. 19.

<sup>20</sup> Based on Olesen, Henrik, 'Migration, Return and Development: an institutional perspective', 2002, IOM, *International Migration*, Vol. 40 (5), Special Issue 2/2002.

limit the scale of migration to Europe to any substantial extent, especially as Europe experienced another economic boom from about 1990 onwards.<sup>21</sup> As a result, immigration began increasing again in the mid-1990s, largely in the form of follow-on migration. The stagnation in economic growth that set in around 2002 and restrictive admission policies now seem to have brought about a slight decrease, at least in legal migration.<sup>22</sup> At present, migrants make up about 8% of the population of Europe on average.<sup>23</sup>

The current situation in Europe is a complex one. On the one hand, keeping immigration under control is still a policy priority and the economy has been stagnating since early 2002, which has discouraged immigration. On the other hand, most industrialised countries are suffering from labour shortages in certain market sectors, partly because of the ageing population, and hence there is a renewed interest in admitting and recruiting labour migrants (mainly on a temporary basis). A number of countries are trying to attract skilled migrants, but low-skilled migrants are also being recruited, for example by Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom.<sup>24</sup> Most active recruitment of labour migrants is taking place in middle-income countries. In 2001, when the economic cycle was at its peak, there was accordingly a large increase in temporary and permanent labour migration, although in many countries follow-on migration remained the most prevalent type of immigration.<sup>25</sup> Asylum migration has started to decrease (by 22% in 2003), mainly as a result of positive developments in former areas of major conflict such as Afghanistan and Serbia and Montenegro.<sup>26</sup> Whether this trend will continue or make way for another increase in asylum migration will largely depend on the future international situation and stability in the world. There are also large differences between countries when it comes to the distribution of immigration over the various categories, with countries such as Austria and the United Kingdom (labour migration about 55%, follow-on migration about 33% and asylum migration about 12%) at one end of the spectrum

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<sup>21</sup> OECD, *Trends in International Migration*, p. 23.

<sup>22</sup> OECD figures concern only legal migration.

<sup>23</sup> IOM, *World Migration Report 2003*, p. 304.

<sup>24</sup> OECD, *Trends in International Migration*, p. 16. In the present memorandum the terms 'highly skilled', 'higher-skilled', 'low-skilled' and 'lower-skilled' are used as equivalents of the terms 'highly educated', 'more highly educated', 'poorly educated' and 'more poorly educated'. In most cases these descriptions are not meant to be absolute, but refer to relative differences in education and work experience which are clear from the context. In this connection it is important to remember, as indicated at relevant points in this memorandum, that someone who has received higher education (university-level or equivalent) in a developing country will not necessarily be considered highly educated by the standards of industrialised countries.

<sup>25</sup> OECD, *Trends in International Migration*, p. 22, 310.

<sup>26</sup> UNHCR, *Asylum Levels and Trends: Europe and Non-European Industrialized Countries, 2003*, 24 February 2004, UNHCR, Geneva (figures do not include Italy).



and a country such as Sweden (labour migration about 2%, follow-on migration about 62% and asylum migration about 36%) at the other.<sup>27</sup>

#### **2.2.2.1 Eastern Europe**

Since 1989 there have been major migration flows within the territory of the former Soviet Union. Large numbers of Russians and Ukrainians have returned from the new states, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and other migrants have returned to new states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus and the Baltic countries. The region has experienced various types of migration: refugee migration as a result of war in Afghanistan and Chechnya, labour migration in the form of chain migration from East to West (from the newly independent states to Western Europe via Russia) and an exodus of highly skilled people, especially from Armenia, Russia and Ukraine.

Since the early 1990s, registered migration flows have decreased. There is no large-scale migration to the West, since most migration takes place within the region and the Central and Eastern European countries act as a buffer. A major problem in the Russian Federation is the growth of trafficking in women for purposes of sexual exploitation, involving some forty countries of destination. In the space of a few years this has become the main source of income for criminal organisations in Russia.<sup>28</sup>

#### **2.2.2.2 Netherlands**

The trend in the Netherlands has largely followed the European pattern outlined above. On the basis of recent migration trends, the Netherlands can be classified as one of the European countries with moderate growth in legal immigration.

During the period 1997-2001, the distribution of legal immigration over the various categories was as follows: follow-on migration 41%, labour migration 20%, study migration 8%,<sup>29</sup> and asylum migration 26%.<sup>30</sup> In 2003 the number of asylum seekers declined by a further 28%, to 13,400. On the other hand, it is

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<sup>27</sup> OECD, *Trends in International Migration*, p. 33.

<sup>28</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, p. 44.

<sup>29</sup> Study migrants are migrants who move elsewhere for purposes of study. These are often not treated as a separate category in international statistics.

<sup>30</sup> Roodenburg, Hans, Rob Euwals and Harry ter Rele, *Immigration and the Dutch Economy*, Statistics Netherlands, 2003, p. 27.

conceivable that the decrease in asylum migration has been at least partly cancelled out by an increase in illegal immigration.<sup>31</sup>

Over the years the number of nationalities among net immigrants to the Netherlands (immigrants from a country minus emigrants to that country) has increased. Since the 1960s, immigration from EU member states and other Western countries has been quite significant. However, unlike immigration from non-Western countries, it has always been more or less cancelled out by emigration. Net immigrants are therefore mainly people from non-Western countries.<sup>32</sup>

In recent years EU residents have accounted for about 14% of net immigration.<sup>33</sup> The equivalent figure for inhabitants of other Western countries has been 24%. Inhabitants of the Netherlands Antilles have accounted for about 12% of net immigration.<sup>34</sup> The share of traditional countries of origin (Turkey, Morocco and Suriname)<sup>35</sup> has remained fairly stable in recent years (Turkey 9%, Morocco 8% and Suriname 5%).<sup>36</sup> Non-Western countries other than those already mentioned have accounted for 58% of net immigration, with a large percentage increase in the period 1999-2001 for 'new ethnic groups' from Iran (2,061 new arrivals in 2001), Poland (2,011), Russia (5,928), China (3,560), Angola (1,822) and Sierra Leone (1,514).

Although there has clearly been more immigration of non-Western migrants to the Netherlands than emigration in the other direction (including return to countries of origin), the level of such emigration has still been substantial (about one-third of the gross number of immigrants).<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> *Illegalennota: aanvullende maatregelen voor het tegengaan van illegaliteit en de aanpak van uitbuiters van illegalen in Nederland* (Memorandum on illegal immigrants: additional measures to combat illegal residence and exploitation of illegal immigrants in the Netherlands), discussed by the Government on 24 April 2004; Zuidam, M. and D. H. Grijpstra, *Over de grens: een onderzoek naar illegale activiteiten op het gebied van uitzendarbeid* (Across the border: a study of illegal activities in the temporary employment sector), Algemene Bond Uitzendondernemingen, Leiden, 2004, p. 20.

<sup>32</sup> Roodenburg, Hans, Rob Euwals and Harry ter Rele, *Immigration and the Dutch Economy*, Statistics Netherlands, 2003, p. 25.

<sup>33</sup> This refers to the unenlarged EU of fifteen Member States, minus the Netherlands.

<sup>34</sup> Roodenburg, Hans, Rob Euwals and Harry ter Rele, *Immigration and the Dutch Economy*, Statistics Netherlands, 2003, p. 26.

<sup>35</sup> For details of which countries of origin belong to the various categories of developing countries, see Annexes II and III.

<sup>36</sup> OECD, *Trends in International Migration*, p. 237.

<sup>37</sup> Roodenburg, Hans, Rob Euwals and Harry ter Rele, *Immigration and the Dutch Economy*, Statistics Netherlands, 2003, p. 26.

Strikingly, there is considerable net emigration of Dutch nationals from the Netherlands. In recent years the number of Dutch nationals who emigrate has been about 30% of the number immigrating. The Netherlands is faced with a brain drain: the cleverest people are leaving the country.<sup>38</sup> In contrast, relatively few highly skilled people are moving to the Netherlands. This is hampering the development of a knowledge-based economy.

For years the vast majority of legal labour immigrants have come from Western countries (85%), with just 5-6% from Africa and 8-11% from Asia.<sup>39</sup> During the period 1993-2002 most asylum migrants came from Angola, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, China, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the former Yugoslavia, Sudan, Guinea, Armenia, the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan.

Only fragmentary information is available about immigrants' level of education on arrival. There are indications that almost three-quarters of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants had received no more than primary schooling or vocational training on arrival, and that only 4% of them had received higher vocational training. The level of education among many of the new ethnic groups (including many successful asylum seekers and their follow-on migrants) appears to be higher. The level of education of almost half of the asylum seekers that came to the Netherlands in the period 1995-2000 was recorded. Of those aged sixteen or older, almost half stated they had received secondary or higher education (for higher education the figure was 18%).<sup>40</sup> The share of African asylum seekers who had received higher education was lower than average, with the exception of Congolese, Nigerian, Rwandan and Sudanese applicants.

The general picture that emerges of the level of education of Africans in the Netherlands (not just asylum seekers) is that on average they are low-skilled (compared with the Dutch population), the exception being Ghanaians. It should be noted here that low-skilled by Dutch standards does not necessarily mean low-skilled by the standards of the country of origin.<sup>41</sup> Owing to differences in the standards of educational establishments, many people who have obtained high

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<sup>38</sup> Among them Minister Brinkhorst (*NRC Handelsblad* newspaper, 24 March 2004).

<sup>39</sup> Report by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs entitled *Regulering en facilitering van arbeidsmigratie* (Regulation and facilitation of labour migration), May 2004, p. 27.

<sup>40</sup> Warmerdam, John and Harry van den Tillaart, *Arbeidspotentieel en arbeidsmarktloopbanen van vluchtelingen en asielgerechtigden* (Labour potential and careers in the workforce of refugees and successful asylum seekers), ITS Nijmegen, OSA publication A 189, July 2002, p. 184.

<sup>41</sup> Tellegen, Nina, 'Afrikanen op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt: een eerste verkenning' ('Africans on the Dutch labour market: an exploratory study'), in Ineke van Kessel and Nina Tellegen (eds), *Afrikanen in Nederland* (Africans in the Netherlands), Royal Tropical Institute/African Studies Centre, 2000, pp. 168-181.

qualifications in their countries of origin will be considered low-skilled in the Netherlands.

When considering the migration stock in the Netherlands, it is important to distinguish clearly between the various terms that are used. In this context, 'migrants' are people who have emigrated to the Netherlands and are staying for a relatively long time (more than a year). In this memorandum, the term refers to inhabitants of the Netherlands who were born elsewhere and at least one of whose parents was born abroad. Statistics Netherlands refers to this category as 'first-generation ethnic minorities'. In some analyses it is also useful to identify as a separate category those people who were born in the Netherlands and at least one of whose parents was born abroad. Such people are not considered migrants. Statistics Netherlands refers to them as 'second-generation ethnic minorities'. Finally, some analyses use the term 'foreigner' or 'foreign' to refer to people who do not have Dutch nationality.

The number of migrants living legally in the Netherlands is 1.6 million, or about 10% of the population.<sup>42</sup> In the last four years the number of people living illegally in the country has probably risen, to between 112,000 and 163,000.<sup>43</sup>

It is difficult to divide migrants living here into labour migrants, follow-on migrants and asylum migrants. What is clear is that the vast majority of the 1.6 million migrants legally resident in this country came here as follow-on migrants. One indication of the level of labour migration is that only 3-4% of the total working population does not have Dutch nationality,<sup>44</sup> which is somewhat below average for Western countries. In the period 1995-2002 about 125,000 labour migrants came to the Netherlands legally,<sup>45</sup> though it should be noted that most labour migration is only temporary.<sup>46</sup> At the same time it should be remembered that non-labour migrants often end up working here. In 1998 there were 235,000

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<sup>42</sup> Statistics Netherlands Statline ([www.cbs.nl](http://www.cbs.nl)); 'eerste generatie allochtonen' (first-generation ethnic minorities).

<sup>43</sup> Zuidam, M. and D. H. Grijpstra, *Over de grens: een onderzoek naar illegale activiteiten op het gebied van uitzendarbeid*, Algemene Bond Uitzendondernemingen, Leiden, 2004, p. 20.

<sup>44</sup> OECD, *Trends in International Migration*, p. 311.

<sup>45</sup> Statistics Netherlands Statline, in the report by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs entitled *Regulering en facilitering van arbeidsmigratie*, 2004, p. 26. This usually means people who stay in the Netherlands for more than four months in order to work and who register with the local authority in which they are living during this period.

<sup>46</sup> See also Alders, M. and H. Nicolaas, 'Een op drie immigranten vertrekt binnen zes jaar' ('One in three immigrants leaves within six years'), Statistics Netherlands Web Magazine, 20 January 2003, in report by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs entitled *Regulering en facilitering van arbeidsmigratie*, May 2004, p. 26.

foreigners working in the Netherlands.<sup>47</sup> The estimated number of asylum seekers admitted to the Netherlands in the past five years is 30,000-50,000.<sup>48</sup>

Of legal migrants, 63% come from non-Western countries.<sup>49</sup> The number of non-Western migrants has risen by nearly 32% since 1996.<sup>50</sup> The main countries of origin of migrants living in the Netherlands are Suriname (188,000 in 2003), Turkey (182,000), Indonesia (133,000) and Morocco (165,000).<sup>51</sup> Other non-Western countries of origin are the countries of the former Yugoslavia,<sup>52</sup> Iraq (36,000), Afghanistan (31,000), the former Soviet republics, China (27,000), Iran (24,000) and Somalia (20,000).<sup>53</sup>

Of the 235,000 foreigners working in the Netherlands in 1998, half were from the EU, 11% from Morocco and 11% from Turkey.

If second-generation ethnic minorities are taken into account as well as migrants, the percentage of economically active people among first and second-generation non-Western ethnic minorities is about a quarter less than among the Dutch population and Western ethnicities. However, this figure disguises the fact that the percentage of economically active people among the Surinamese and Antillean ethnic minorities is much closer to that of the Dutch population than the equivalent figure for the Turkish and Moroccan ethnic minorities (the figure for Moroccans is almost 50% less than for native Dutch people).<sup>54</sup>

The level of education of ethnic minorities is relatively lower than that of the native Dutch population, although about 60% of the population aged 15 to 64 of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin has received education beyond primary level.

The proportion of migrants (first-generation ethnic minorities) in the population of the Netherlands is expected to rise to 15% by 2050. The proportion of non-

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<sup>47</sup> OECD, *Trends in International Migration*, p. 368.

<sup>48</sup> Based on the total number of applications (more than 150,000) over that five-year period and an average international admission rate of 20% (see Van Kessel, G., 'Global Migration and Asylum', in *Forced Migration Review*, Issue 10, April 2001, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford).

<sup>49</sup> Roodenburg, Hans, Rob Euwals and Harry ter Rele, *Immigration and the Dutch Economy*, Statistics Netherlands, 2003, p. 28 (first generation).

<sup>50</sup> I.e. first-generation ethnic minorities (Statistics Netherlands Statline ([www.cbs.nl](http://www.cbs.nl))).

<sup>51</sup> Statistics Netherlands Statline ([www.cbs.nl](http://www.cbs.nl)).

<sup>52</sup> However, there are only small numbers of migrants from the former Yugoslav and Soviet republics.

<sup>53</sup> Statistics Netherlands Statline ([www.cbs.nl](http://www.cbs.nl)).

<sup>54</sup> Roodenburg, Hans, Rob Euwals and Harry ter Rele, *Immigration and the Dutch Economy*, Statistics Netherlands, 2003, p. 29.

Western migrants among total legal migrants is expected to remain fairly stable, at 60%.

### **2.2.3 North America**

The United States and Canada are among the countries that receive the greatest annual numbers of both legal and illegal migrants. They pursue a policy of recruiting labour migrants on the basis of minimum levels of education and experience and annual admission quotas, as well as a refugee resettlement policy.

With 850,000 new legal permanent migrants a year, the United States is the world's leading country of destination in absolute terms. It is also the country that attracts the largest number of highly skilled people from the least developed countries (brain drain). Most immigrants are from Latin America and Asia. In the past few years larger numbers of both highly skilled temporary migrants and unskilled migrants (especially Mexicans) have been admitted, and recently the Bush administration has presented a proposal for the legalisation of illegal immigrants. On the other hand, security measures have been tightened since 11 September 2001, including measures to combat illegal immigration.<sup>55</sup>

### **2.2.4 Africa**

There is considerable migration within the African continent,<sup>56</sup> with an estimated 20 million African labour migrants living in African countries.<sup>57</sup> Four of the five countries in which refugees impose the heaviest burden, in terms of available financial and institutional capacity, are in Africa (Burundi, Guinea, Tanzania and Gambia).<sup>58</sup>

In North Africa, and particularly the Maghreb, there has been considerable official labour migration and follow-on migration to the EU for decades. This is also a transit zone for both legal and illegal migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

In West Africa there has traditionally been large-scale temporary labour migration (both legal and illegal) from the Sahel countries to the more prosperous coastal

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<sup>55</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, pp. 31, 32.

<sup>56</sup> Largely based on IOM, *World Migration 2003*, pp. 37-39.

<sup>57</sup> ILO, Report III, 87th session, International Labour Conference, Geneva, 1999, in European Commission Communication *Integrating migration issues in the EU's relations with third countries*, COM (2002) 703 final, p. 10.

<sup>58</sup> The fifth country is Iran. Source: UNHCR survey, in European Commission Communication *Integrating migration issues in the EU's relations with third countries*, COM (2002) 703 final, p. 13.

countries, as well as between the coastal countries. In Côte d'Ivoire this pattern was brutally disrupted in 2000 by waves of xenophobic violence directed at the 30% of the population who were of foreign origin.

Most of the migrants who travel to Europe via the Maghreb countries come from West Africa. Smuggling of/trafficking in human beings takes place along this route, as well as along migration routes within the region. For example, Nigerian women are traded for purposes of prostitution in Europe and Asia, and tens of thousands of children have been sold to work as slaves on plantations in West and Central Africa.

Armed conflict and political unrest, for example in Sierra Leone and Liberia, have led to major refugee movements within the region, with concentrations of refugees in Guinea and (until 2000) Côte d'Ivoire. At the start of 2003 there were 630,000 refugees in the region.<sup>59</sup>

In Central Africa (the Great Lakes region) migration is mainly the result of serious armed conflict. In recent decades, millions of refugees fled armed conflict in Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo created. Most of them went to countries in or near the region (such as Tanzania and Zambia). At the start of 2003 there were more than 1.2 million refugees in Central Africa.<sup>60</sup> With the end of the fighting in Rwanda and progress in the peace processes in Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, a considerable proportion of these refugees have now returned to their countries of origin, and there are good prospects for the return of the remainder.

East Africa and the Horn of Africa have also had to deal with large numbers of refugees in recent decades, as a result of internal and interstate armed conflict both there and in the Great Lakes region, as well as drought. Tanzania is one of the main countries harbouring refugees from the Great Lakes region. Somalia has ceased to exist as a state, and large numbers of migrants have spread across the world from there. There is also a considerable amount of emigration of skilled labour from East Africa, to countries including South Africa.

In southern Africa there has been considerable labour migration for the past century to mining and industrial centres in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana, mainly from the densely populated neighbouring countries (Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland). Since the collapse of the apartheid system there has been a shift in migration patterns. More migrants from the whole of Africa, both skilled and unskilled, have been coming to South Africa, often illegally. At the same time, more people (mainly highly skilled whites) have

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<sup>59</sup> UNHCR, *Global Appeal 2004*, p. 20.

<sup>60</sup> UNHCR, *Global Appeal 2004*, p. 20.

been emigrating. In the last few years, immigration from Africa has been threatened by economic recession in sectors such as mining, as well as increasing xenophobia and crime. The South African Government has tightened up legislation to combat illegal immigration and enforcement measures.

There is also refugee migration in southern Africa, as a result of the conflicts in Angola and the Great Lakes region (more than 300,000 people in total).<sup>61</sup> Zambia, in particular, has given shelter to large numbers of refugees. There too, many refugees have already returned, and most of the remainder are expected to follow shortly.

### **2.2.5 Middle East**

Since 1975 the Middle East, particularly the Gulf area, has been a key destination for labour migrants. After a temporary decline in the period 1986-1990, the annual number of migrants to the Gulf states has risen once more, to higher levels than before. One feature of the Gulf area is that countries there do not have welfare systems and migrants are given little protection. Despite this, some 40% of annual remittances to India (to take just one example) come from the Gulf.<sup>62</sup> Most of the migrants come from South and Southeast Asia and Africa (Sudan, Egypt).<sup>63</sup>

Turkey has traditionally been a country of origin for labour migrants and follow-on migrants to Europe, but in recent years it has also become a country of transit for illegal migrants from many parts of the world (an estimated 200,000 a year) who are heading for Europe.

### **2.2.6 Rest of Asia**

In South, Southeast and East Asia the main features of migration are the diversity and large number of migration flows within the region, partly because Asia contains both industrialised and developing countries.<sup>64</sup>

In recent years Asia has been the scene of a number of serious armed conflicts or situations of internal instability (Afghanistan, Iraq) which have led to large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers. Of the four million Afghan refugees that found shelter in Iran and Pakistan in 2001, 2.5 million have since returned home.

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<sup>61</sup> UNHCR, *Global Appeal 2004*, p. 20.

<sup>62</sup> Lucas, Robert, *International Migration Regimes and Economic Development* (to be published).

<sup>63</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, pp. 34-35.

<sup>64</sup> Largely based on IOM, *World Migration 2003*, pp. 34-36.



In South and East Asia, the largest numbers of refugees are from China (with a diaspora of 30-50 million people), India (20 million) and the Philippines (7 million). Alongside legal migration, an overall increase in illegal migration can be observed, including smuggling of Chinese workers and trafficking in women and children from Southeast Asia.

### **2.2.7 Latin America and Caribbean**

There is a great deal of migration in Latin America and the Caribbean. Various patterns can be identified: migration to the United States and Canada, mainly from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean; migration within Central America; migration within the Andean region; migration within the southern part of South America; and refugee migration as a result of guerrilla warfare (in Mexico, Guatemala and Colombia). In Colombia, the second most densely populated country in the region, there is a great deal of emigration due to economic recession and persistent violence.<sup>65</sup>

## **2.3 Causes of migration**

Causes of migration can be described at various levels. On the one hand there are the fundamental causes – the macro-phenomena that are found to accompany migration. However, the decision to migrate is often an individual or family decision, and for a complete picture one must also look at intermediate factors that influence the decision to migrate at micro level. In practice, the distinction between fundamental and intermediate factors is a gradual one and is not always easy to make. In many cases there are several causes operating at once. A second distinction can be made between factors that mainly affect the decision to migrate and ones that have more influence on the choice of destination. A third common distinction is between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Push factors are circumstances in the country of origin that induce people to emigrate, and pull factors are factors in countries of destination that attract migrants. A fourth useful distinction can be made between causes that are more compelling and ones that leave people more of a free choice; this is simply our familiar distinction between the various types of migration. Finally, one can distinguish between causes that are directly associated with policies pursued by countries of destination and those associated with policies in countries of origin.

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<sup>65</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, pp. 32-34.

The causes of migration will be discussed below with reference to the various types of migration, starting with the more fundamental causes and moving on to the more policy-related, intermediate ones.

The causes of forced migration are mainly to be found in what may be termed political developments:

- violations of human rights, often leading to persecution (within the meaning of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees)<sup>66</sup>
- lack of good governance, including respect for the rule of law (in other words, the government as a whole is malfunctioning)
- internal conflict, violent or otherwise
- violent international conflict

All these cases quite clearly involve push factors: the situation in the country of origin is such that people's personal safety is threatened or they have no prospects of personal development in their own country. Of course, this does not mean that there is never a mixture of push and pull factors in individual cases: even those whose safety is not immediately at stake may avail themselves of the opportunity to leave their country if they know that the likelihood of being admitted to other countries has increased as a result of the overall situation in their country of origin.

A second cause of forced migration is acute natural disaster, which usually forces large groups of people to leave their area of origin. In many cases they can eventually return once the area has been made habitable once more, sometimes with foreign aid.

Causes of other types of migration, particularly labour and follow-on migration, are:

- Differences in social and economic development between countries. These often lead to migration. Differences in demand for labour and in wage levels are particularly influential, and to a lesser extent the security provided by social services in welfare states. That this last is not a decisive factor can be seen from the fact that the Gulf states and the United States continue to attract migrants from many parts of the world. High unemployment in countries of

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<sup>66</sup> The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees defines the term 'refugee' as anyone who 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.'

origin encourages emigration. Labour shortages in certain market sectors in industrialised countries, due to such factors as an ageing population, act as pull factors for immigration. Immigration in industrialised countries is highly responsive to changes in the availability of work.<sup>67</sup>

- Globalisation. A growing number of worldwide connections in all areas (technological, political, economic, etc.) are making the world more accessible. Economic liberalisation has led to increasingly free movement of capital and goods, which in turn has created economic pressure to liberalise the movement of people as well. Transfers within multinational concerns are an example of (often temporary) labour migration as a result of the globalisation of business.
- Rapid population growth in combination with low level of economic development – and particularly of employment – in developing countries. This leads to more emigration.
- Environmental degradation, resulting in falling or unstable income. This leads to more emigration.
- Bad governance, leading at worst to complete failure of the state. This induces people to emigrate. People in poorly governed countries (particularly young people) often feel there is an overall lack of political, economic and social prospects.
- The existence of a culture of migration. This encourages emigration. A culture of migration is said to exist when people direct all their efforts towards emigration and emigration is an increasingly important part of their survival strategy. This focus on migration often undermines efforts to tackle internal problems.
- An unrealistically favourable picture of economic and other opportunities in countries of destination. This picture is often based on media reports and tales told by migrants who are already living elsewhere and pretend to have succeeded even when they have not.
- The existence of communities of fellow countrymen in other parts of the world (diasporas). This acts as a general pull factor. The presence of a group of fellow countrymen in a specific country of destination makes it easier to

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<sup>67</sup> As indicated with reference to the Netherlands in Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), *Bevolkingsvraagstukken in Nederland anno 2000* (Demographic issues in the Netherlands in the year 2000), The Hague, 2000, p. 156.

migrate to that country and settle there, and is a specific pull factor for that country.

- Migration policies pursued by countries of destination. In recent decades, industrialised European countries have pursued increasingly restrictive migration policies. Such policies discourage migration, although they can never halt it altogether.<sup>68</sup> Demand for access to the industrialised countries far exceeds supply (there are only 2.5 to 3 million legal jobs available for migrants each year).<sup>69</sup> This labour-market disequilibrium leads many migrants to try and circumvent the restrictions on admission. Commonly used methods are illegal immigration, failure to leave the country after one's residence permit (e.g. a student or tourist visa) has expired or application for asylum without satisfying the prescribed conditions.

The restrictive policies pursued by European countries may have had another, paradoxical effect, namely a greater tendency for migrants to settle permanently in Europe.<sup>70</sup>

Non-industrialised countries also often pursue restrictive migration policies which may involve deportation of foreigners (Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Southeast Asia).

- Activities of syndicates that smuggle and traffic in human beings. People who want to migrate at all costs often have little option but to enlist the help of smugglers or traffickers in order to circumvent the restrictions on admission. As admission policies in countries of destination have been tightened up over the past few years, organisations that smuggle and traffic in human beings have become firmly established in many countries of origin (Eastern and Southern Europe, Southeast Asia, the Maghreb countries) and now often make greater profits out of this than out of activities such as drug smuggling.

In many cases it is the syndicates that determine what the exact country of destination will be, on the basis of the country's admission policy. Changes in a country's admission policy often lead the syndicates to alter their choice of destination.

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<sup>68</sup> For example, it has been calculated the number of legal immigrants in the period 1994-1997 was 20% lower after the Netherlands' admission regulations were tightened in 1993 and 1994 than it would have been if the rising trend had continued (De Beer, 1998, in NIDI, *Bevolkingsvraagstukken in Nederland anno 2000*, The Hague, 2000).

<sup>69</sup> Van Kessel, G., 'Global Migration and Asylum', in *Forced Migration Review*, Issue 10, April 2001, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

<sup>70</sup> De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, 2004. Further study may be necessary to verify this.

- Employment policies pursued by countries of destination. Despite restrictive migration policies, many countries of destination are endeavouring to liberalise both their labour markets (in whole or part) and the admission of labour migrants. The balance that is struck between these two policy areas by particular countries of destination greatly influences the scale of labour immigration and immigration in general. In times of labour shortage, there are often greater opportunities for admission or even active recruitment of certain categories of labour migrants.
- Migration policies pursued by countries of origin. A number of countries (such as the Philippines) pursue a deliberate policy of exporting labour in order to obtain income from remittances and make use of the knowledge and contacts acquired by the migrants.
- Historical, cultural and linguistic ties still often influence the choice of destination, as do geographical proximity and accessibility.
- Circumstances associated with a potential migrant's community and family may act as intermediate factors that influence the decision to migrate. This influence varies from country to country.<sup>71</sup> Relevant features include age, gender, education, marital status, the potential migrant's employment situation, the role of women and views on this, one's financial situation and 'relative deprivation' (perception of one's financial situation in comparison with nearby households), previous experience of migration and the socioeconomic situation in the area of origin. In Morocco, for example, people who migrate abroad are often lower-skilled than those who migrate within the country.

### **2.3.1 Causes of migration to the Netherlands**

A great deal of migration to the Netherlands can be explained in the light of the general causes discussed above.<sup>72</sup>

The four main countries of origin of migrants to the Netherlands, namely Turkey, Suriname, Morocco and Indonesia, are developing countries that are located in or just below the 'migration band'.

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<sup>71</sup> The NIDI is carrying out research in this area, based in part on fieldwork in five countries of origin (Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Ghana and Senegal) and three countries of destination (Italy, Spain and the Netherlands).

<sup>72</sup> For a more detailed account, see *inter alia* NIDI, *Bevolkingsvraagstukken in Nederland anno 2000*, The Hague, 2000, pp. 148-161.

The decision by Turks and Moroccans to come to the Netherlands is the result of active recruitment by Dutch employers in the 1960s and 1970s. Once here, the group of Turks and Moroccans acted as a magnet for new migrants, mainly in the form of follow-on migration. Social services made continued residence and follow-on migration possible even after the labour migrants had in large part become unemployed.

The fact that many Surinamese and Indonesians decided to come to the Netherlands can be explained by reference to historical ties and developments.

Immigration by 'new ethnic groups' is mainly in the form of asylum migration due to international instability. The nationalities involved are closely linked to countries that are unstable or at war: the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union, Iran and Somalia. Yet this link is more complex than would appear at first sight. The decision to come to the Netherlands appears to be based in part on the economic boom that began in 1990, together with a restrictive labour migration policy from 1994 onwards and a relatively open admission policy for war refugees. Most of the new countries of origin are located in the migration band, and most of the migrants come from the upper classes in those countries.

### **3 Implications of migration trends**

#### **3.1 Implications of migration trends for the development of countries of origin**

There is little consensus about the implications of migration, particularly labour migration, for the development of countries and areas of origin.<sup>73</sup> The debate between ‘migration optimists’ and ‘migration pessimists’ has been raging for decades. In the 1960s the optimists saw migration as a particularly promising means of boosting economic growth. They believed that remittances, investment and consumer expenditure as a result of migration would play a crucial role, together with the spirit of enterprise the migrants would take back with them from the developed countries. The pessimists – who believed that, on the contrary, the departure of ‘young, talented, enterprising’ migrants led to lethargy and economic decline in areas of origin – dominated the debate from the 1970s onwards.

However, the debate became less cut-and-dried in the 1980s and 1990s. Migration is now seen as a multilocal survival strategy by households to spread income risks and overcome local, structural obstacles to development (such as malfunctioning markets and corruption). There is much greater awareness of the coexistence of positive and negative effects, as a result of which migration may have very different implications for different areas and countries. The key question, then, is why migration has a much more positive impact on some countries and regions than on others.<sup>74</sup>

The main issue is the impact of migration on the labour market in the country of origin. There have hardly been any systematic studies of this. It can theoretically be assumed that migration will have little impact if the migrants are unemployed or can easily be replaced from a reserve stock of labour. In some cases those who remain in the country of origin will benefit from the departure of migrants, particularly if they can take over migrants’ old jobs or if the migrants’ departure causes wages to rise. Only if the migrants are irreplaceable, highly skilled workers will the local economy suffer.<sup>75</sup>

For developing countries, emigration entails a loss of potential: potential productivity, tax revenue, human resources and returns on public investment. The main benefits are financial remittances to relatives in the country of origin and the

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<sup>73</sup> De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, 2004.

<sup>74</sup> De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, 2004.

<sup>75</sup> Lucas, Robert, *International Migration Regimes and Economic Development* (to be published).

knowledge, experience, networks and spirit of enterprise that emigrants acquire and can use to help their country of origin develop.

The following sections will examine which situations are likely to have which implications, with reference to two major determinants: remittances and human capacity.

### **3.1.1 Remittances**

Increased migration has been accompanied by a steady increase in the volume of remittances by migrants to developing countries.<sup>76</sup> Remittances are mostly likely to come from labour migrants, but even other types of migrants, including refugees in the region, will normally remit money to relatives back home as soon as they have the wherewithal to do so. The total global volume of official remittances to developing countries is currently about USD 80 billion,<sup>77</sup> which is more than the total volume of official development assistance and about half the volume of foreign direct investment. Moreover, the estimated volume of unofficial remittances (goods, money taken home in cash and money sent through informal channels) is one to three times the official amount. The volume of remittances is likely to continue growing in the years to come as migration increases and the financial infrastructure is improved.

The main countries from which money is remitted are the United States (about 30%), Saudi Arabia (about 20%), Germany and Belgium. The Netherlands is not one of the top ten countries when it comes to remittances.<sup>78</sup> However, annual remittances by migrants living in the Netherlands doubled between 1995 and 2002, from EUR 331 million to EUR 653 million. The main recipient country for remittances from the Netherlands is Suriname.<sup>79</sup>

Only about 10% of the remittances recorded worldwide come from developing countries.<sup>80</sup> Low-income and middle-income countries receive half of global remittances between them. In relation to income, remittances are higher for poorer countries. In absolute terms, most remittances go to higher low-income and low middle-income countries, since this is where most migrants come from. The main

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<sup>76</sup> De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, 2004.

<sup>77</sup> World Bank, *Global Development Finance*, 2003.

<sup>78</sup> Pearce, Douglas, senior financial advisor at the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), *Migrant Remittances*, EU High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 2004.

<sup>79</sup> Kapur, Devesh, *Remittances: the new development mantra?*, Harvard University and Center for Global Development, August 2003, p. 24.

<sup>80</sup> Lucas, Robert, *International Migration Regimes and Economic Development* (to be published), pp. V, 12 and annexes.



recipient countries are India, Mexico, the Philippines, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon and Bangladesh. The whole of sub-Saharan Africa receives only 5% of remittances to developing countries.<sup>81</sup> However, as a percentage of total capital inflow and GNP, remittances are most important to least developed countries. The countries that receive the most remittances as a percentage of GNP are Lesotho (37%), Samoa (21%) and Jordan (21%). Incidentally, Jordan is a low middle-income country.

Research has shown that remittances are more reliable and stable and are less affected by cyclical trends – indeed, they sometimes even run counter to them – than other capital flows to developing countries. In times of economic hardship, more people emigrate from developing countries and migrants remit more money to relatives.

Remittances are thus an important type of private payment to individuals in countries of origin and are potentially a major stimulus for development. There are indications that remittances lead to additional investment in countries with a favourable business climate and to considerably faster growth provided there is sufficient surplus production capacity. There are also strong indications that poor people (although not the very poorest) benefit from remittances.

However, the impact of remittances on the macroeconomic development of recipient countries is still a matter of debate.<sup>82</sup> The potential effects are well-known and varied in nature. On the positive side there are increases in savings and investment, plus the multiplier effect of higher consumption. On the negative side the supply of labour may decrease because alternative income is available, and the exchange rate may rise, discouraging domestic production of trade goods.

It is not entirely clear what determines the amount of money remitted. The available data indicate that temporary migrants (who stay for a few years) remit more than permanent ones, but that temporary migrants who stay only for very short periods remit less. There is no clear evidence as to whether highly skilled migrants remit more or less than low-skilled ones.

Nor is it clear whether the policies pursued by countries of origin to encourage remittances are effective. Current international efforts to regulate informal

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<sup>81</sup> The figures for other regions are: Central Asia and Europe 13%, South Asia 20%, East Asia and Pacific 14%, Latin America and Caribbean 30%, Middle East and North Africa 18% (Pearce, 2004).

<sup>82</sup> Lucas, Robert E.B., *International Migration to the High Income Countries*, Boston University, April 2004, pp. 9 *et seq.*

channels for remittances could lead to a decrease in total remittances, especially to poor people.<sup>83</sup>

Remittances directly affect the living standards of tens of millions of households in developing countries and often lead to dramatic improvements. They may account for as much as 40% of household income. Furthermore, there is increasing research evidence that migrant households invest more, especially in the long term. The investments are in housing construction, health care, training and productive activities. Remittances may serve as 'insurance policies' for risk-bearing businesses.<sup>84</sup>

There is less investment in countries of origin with an unfavourable investment climate. Poor infrastructure, inflation, corruption, bureaucracy and above all distrust of government and lack of legal security are factors that explain why many migrants ultimately do not invest in risk-bearing businesses.<sup>85</sup>

In some cases, migrants see pressure from relatives to remit money as a problem. In the Netherlands, paying remittances sometimes hampers migrants' integration into Dutch society. For example, they may need more than one job to earn enough money, and the remittances may be at the expense of their children's education or other investments in building up a life in the Netherlands. However, it has not been demonstrated that remittances to countries of origin necessarily clash with good citizenship and socioeconomic integration into the country of destination.<sup>86</sup> In fact, integration may be associated with greater financial capacity.

Remittances can also be used for other purposes. There is little doubt that they are an important mechanism for financing terrorism, civil wars and wars of liberation.<sup>87</sup> International concern about this has been particularly great since 11 September 2001, following the closure (under US pressure) of a major informal

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<sup>83</sup> Lucas, Robert E.B., *International Migration to the High Income Countries*, Boston University, April 2004, p. 15, based among other things on World Bank, *Global Development Finance Report*, 2003 and Chami, Ralph, Connel Fullenkamp and Samir Jahjah, *Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?*, 2003, IMF Working Paper WP/03/189, Washington DC.

<sup>84</sup> World Bank, *Global Development Finance*, 2003.

<sup>85</sup> De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, May 2004.

<sup>86</sup> De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, 2004.

<sup>87</sup> Examples include support from Sweden for the struggle in Aceh, from Canada for the struggle in Sri Lanka and from the UK for the struggle in Kashmir. In the case of countries such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan, and peoples such as the Palestinians and the Kurds, remittances have been used not only to keep families alive but also to finance activities by military leaders. See Kapur, Devesh, *Remittances: the new development mantra?*, Harvard University and Center for Global Development, August 2003, p. 26.

bank in Somalia. Since then there have been greater international efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.<sup>88</sup>

### **3.1.2 Human capacity (brain drain, brain gain and brain circulation)**

Many industrialised countries go out of their way to admit highly skilled labour migrants, or even actively recruit them. Large numbers of highly skilled people are leaving many developing countries, a phenomenon often referred to as 'brain drain'. The main destination is the United States, which has more than twice as many foreign-born highly skilled residents as twelve EU countries between them.<sup>89</sup> Little of this brain drain is caused by the Netherlands.<sup>90</sup>

It has traditionally been assumed that the loss of skilled migrants is detrimental to those who remain, but recently more attention has been paid to mechanisms that may benefit them (often referred to as 'brain gain'). However, there is little concrete evidence either way.

#### *Brain drain*

The question with regard to how the departure of highly skilled or highly competent people (brain drain) affects development is not whether their departure reduces domestic production, but whether those who remain suffer as a result. It may be that they do suffer in some cases but not in others. For example, it is quite conceivable that the emigration of skilled health workers is very damaging to African countries with a high incidence of HIV/AIDS, assuming that they were doing useful work there. It seems less likely that India has suffered as a result of the emigration of ICT experts. A second potential disadvantage for those who remain is net loss of tax revenue. The cost of higher education per student is much greater than that of lower-level education, the cost of higher education in relation to income is greatest in the least developed countries, and these costs are heavily subsidised. If graduates emigrate, the costs of their education are sunk costs. The state also loses revenue that the emigrants would have paid in taxes if they had found work in their country of origin. However, it is highly questionable whether these losses are greater than the extra expenditure that the state would have incurred if the emigrants had stayed. One policy option for developing countries

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<sup>88</sup> World Bank, *IMF enhance efforts at combating money laundering, terrorist financing*, DevNews Media Center, [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org), 2 April 2004.

<sup>89</sup> Lucas, Robert E.B., *International Migration to the High Income Countries*, Boston University, April 2004, p. 17.

<sup>90</sup> Report by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs entitled *Regulering en facilitering van arbeidsmigratie*, May 2004.

with considerable brain drain is to review funding for higher education and so reduce the amount of sunk costs.<sup>91</sup>

Middle-income countries are generally less sensitive to loss of human capacity through migration than low-income countries, especially the least developed countries. This is because middle-income countries have more skilled people and educational capacity to absorb the impact of migration.

Where migration is due to unemployment in certain professions, it often creates job opportunities for those who remain. This is routinely the case when low-skilled people emigrate (a good deal of South-South emigration falls into this category). In many developing countries, however, the same applies to higher-skilled people, since there are a number of potential reasons – bad governance, the political situation, poor economic policy, lack of resources and infrastructure, etc. – for high unemployment in this category (a phenomenon known as ‘brain waste’). In that case, emigration leads to an improvement in the local employment situation.

The negative impact of brain drain is felt primarily in a few specific sectors, the most important of which is health care. In Zambia, three-quarters of doctors with Zambian nationality have left the country in the space of a few years, and 21,000 doctors have emigrated from Nigeria to industrialised countries. In some least developed countries the ICT and education sectors are also under pressure. One problem that arises in virtually all least developed countries is the departure of policymakers, researchers and university staff, often after being recruited by international organisations.

#### *Brain gain*

There are at least four mechanisms whereby those who remain in their countries of origin may benefit from migration. The first three are associated with the influence of diasporas (particularly skilled diasporas), which may encourage trade links, international capital flows and technology transfer. The fourth is the possibility that migration may encourage those who remain to seek higher education.

There is growing evidence that the existence of large diasporas can play an important part in strengthening trade links between countries of origin and countries of destination. The evidence that they play a part in increasing capital flows is less convincing. The large Chinese diaspora invests massively in China, but the Indian diaspora invests far less in India. Technology transfer occurs in many different ways, both formal and informal, but there is no statistical evidence of its impact on productivity. The economies of many less developed

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<sup>91</sup> Lucas, Robert E.B., *International Migration to the High Income Countries*, Boston University, April 2004, p. 16 *et seq.*

countries may simply not be capable of taking advantage of such advanced technology.

The fourth proposed mechanism is based on the assumption that opportunities to emigrate induce more people to seek higher education. Evidence of this phenomenon can be found in the Philippines. It should also be remembered that many higher-skilled migrants receive their training abroad, so that the cost is not borne by the country of origin.

Highly skilled people (whether or not they have returned home) often use experience gained in the West to play a major innovative, progressive role in the local economy, and often in social and political debate and the development of civil society in their countries of origin.<sup>92</sup>

#### *Brain circulation*

In this context, it is important to recognise that many migrants live in a 'transnational' world, in which it is more and more difficult to make sharp distinctions between countries of 'origin' and 'destination' or between 'temporary' and 'permanent' migration. Increasingly, highly skilled people are circulating from country to country, including their countries of origin (a phenomenon known as 'brain circulation'). Temporary migration and temporary return may be part of this process. Borders are becoming less meaningful, and it is getting easier to maintain lasting ties over long distances and so remain involved in both societies.<sup>93</sup> This is not to say that this is true of all migrants, or even the majority of them. Further research is needed.

Forced migration due to political repression may have either a minor or a major impact, depending on the scale and type of migration. At first there is often fairly small number of emigrants, who are highly educated and politically aware. The departure of such migrants may have a particularly serious impact on the 'political human capacity' of their country of origin; for example, domestic opposition may be weakened and as a result the repressive regime's position may be strengthened, governance may fail to improve, political lethargy may increase and the people's political prospects suffer. Opposition often continues from abroad, and efforts may be made to mobilise international opinion, with a varying impact on the country of origin. The impact of this type of migration on human capacity in other sectors, such as the economy, is often limited owing to the small numbers of migrants involved.

However, much larger numbers of migrants may leave at a later stage, because many industrialised countries have immigration policies which protect asylum

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<sup>92</sup> De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, 2004.

<sup>93</sup> De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, 2004.

seekers from that country from being sent back. Once a channel for migration has been opened up, the migrants need no longer be highly skilled. This is then no longer forced migration, but labour migration in disguise, with follow-on migration in its wake. The implications are therefore the same as the implications of labour and follow-on migration in comparable situations.

Large flows of refugees as a result of armed conflict always have a profound impact on human capacity, at all levels of education and experience, and on the entire development infrastructure in the country of origin. The development process in a country, or part of a country, is often totally disrupted, causing serious damage to institutional and human capacity. Here again, the impact is greater and more lasting the longer the refugee situation persists. Once their situation stabilises, many refugees do eventually manage to remit money to their country of origin.<sup>94</sup>

Some refugees, including those who fear persecution, move on to industrialised countries, especially in prolonged refugee situations. Here again, the resulting diasporas may generate patterns of large-scale follow-on and labour migration. An example is Somalia, which has been riven by civil war since 1991, leading to permanent flows of Somali migrants throughout the industrialised world.

### **3.1.3 Illegal migration, smuggling of/trafficking in human beings, and countries of origin**

In the case of illegal labour migration and forced South-North migration, migrants often have little option but to enlist the help of smugglers or traffickers. The syndicates operate in ways that put the migrants involved at serious risk. There have been countless instances of migrants dying en route or ending up in exploitative situations. Many governments of countries of origin also condemn these practices because of the affront to their citizens' human dignity, for security reasons, due to the need to combat organised crime and terrorism, and out of concern for their countries' international image. West African governments, for instance, are now involved in efforts to combat regional trafficking in children.

Even so, governments of countries of origin are rarely capable of pursuing effective policies against illegal migration, and in some cases they simply turn a blind eye to it, because they see migration as mainly beneficial to their country and they are in any case unable to do much about it.

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<sup>94</sup> International Organisation for Migration, 'The Migration-Development Nexus, Evidence and Policy Options, State-of-the-Art Overview', *International Migration*, Vol. 40 (5), 2002.

### **3.1.4 Implications for migrants**

The extent to which migration can influence migrants' own development largely depends on their personal situation. In the case of legal migration there may certainly be a positive link, although the difficulties that may be encountered by legal immigrants should not be overlooked, especially if they fail to find work. In the case of illegal migration the situation is more complex. Although the scale and persistence of the phenomenon do suggest that many illegal aliens believe the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, they remain highly vulnerable. They have little or no access to social services in industrialised countries, and not infrequently they are at the mercy of smugglers and traffickers and are subject to exploitation.

### **3.1.5 Different implications for middle-income countries and least developed countries?**

There has been few empirical studies of the balance between the positive and negative implications of emigrations for the various categories of developing countries. What, for example, is the net impact on each category of, on the one hand, migrants' remittances and their other contributions to development and, on the other, the loss of human capacity? The following very tentative conclusions can be drawn from the information provided above.

There is substantial emigration from many middle-income countries. In such countries the positive implications are more likely to outweigh the negative ones than in the least developed countries. Migration of low-skilled people often helps to improve job opportunities for those that remain, and the migrants' remittances may contribute to development.

Middle-income countries are less sensitive to the loss of skilled people through migration. Moreover, the economic climate in many of these countries is relatively favourable, so that remittances can be invested in structural development and migrants are more likely to return or contribute to development in other ways. Moreover, industrialised countries mainly recruit the labour force they lack from middle-income countries, in some cases through partnerships which serve the interests of both countries.

In the case of the least developed countries the links are less clear, and it may well be that the balance differs from country to country. Although the overall level of emigration from many such countries is relatively small, the implications may still be considerable if the migrants are highly skilled.

Major factors include the country's development climate (quality of governance, policy and business climate) and the ratio of highly skilled to low-skilled migrants. In general, the emigration of low-skilled people also has a positive net impact on least developed countries. However, there is a greater risk that emigration of highly skilled people will have a negative net impact than in middle-income countries, especially in the case of least developed countries with an unfavourable development climate. The departure of skilled people means the loss of capacity that is essential to development, and a downward spiral may be created. The positive impact of migration on development (through remittances and brain gain) is unlikely to compensate for this loss, for the following reasons. First, these contributions are relatively small, because people who have received higher education in their country of origin by no means always find jobs, and hence earn income, to match their standard of education. Second, opportunities for productive investment and a multiplier effect that can boost development, or for major productivity benefits from brain gain, are limited by the unfavourable development climate. Only if local job prospects for skilled people are nil is their emigration likely to have any alleviating effect on local unemployment, and even then it is questionable whether this will make any long-term contribution to development.

In theory, political action by highly educated emigrants abroad should be able to encourage political change and improved policy in their countries of origin. However, there are no real-life examples of this.

Some of the above considerations also apply to least developed countries with a favourable development climate, although in such cases it is somewhat more likely that remittances and brain gain will have a positive impact. However, it remains questionable whether these will outweigh the primary effect of migration: loss of human capacity.

### **3.2 Implications of migration for countries of destination**

Migrants may migrate to either developing or industrialised countries. Migration has some of the same effects in both types of country, but in other ways the effects differ greatly. This depends on the scale of the migration, whether the increase in migration is sudden or gradual, the type of migration and the characteristics of the migrants, and the economic, social, cultural and political absorptive capacity of the receiving country or the receiving region within a country – in other words, the extent to which the migrants fit (or can be integrated) into the economic, social, cultural and political situation in the country of destination.



### **3.2.1 Implications of migration for developing countries of destination**

The vast majority of labour migrants to developing countries come from other developing countries.<sup>95</sup> Some are higher-skilled, for example in South Africa, but most are low-skilled or unskilled. Owing to the lack of social programmes such as unemployment benefit, such migration is largely determined by job opportunities: people move to where the work is, and move on again when there is none. The economic implications of such labour migration for the economic development of the country of destination are thus mainly positive.

However, there may also be negative implications, namely the spread of HIV/AIDS and social, cultural or political friction between local people and migrants. In the latter case there is usually an identifiable cause, such as a downturn in job opportunities or in the overall situation, or an excessive influx of migrants. Particularly if a migrant community has been living in the country of destination for many years, it takes some time before job scarcity begins to act as a brake on migration from their country of origin. When friction of this kind arises, migrants are usually in a vulnerable position. Often they have little legal security and are low-paid, either because there are no formal systems for migration or jobs for migrants or because the formal sector is circumvented. Much labour migration in the informal sector is illegal, and in some cases it involves slavery. When friction increases, migrants risk becoming scapegoats. Ethnic conflict is often fomented for political ends, as has happened in Côte d'Ivoire in the past few years.

Highly skilled Westerners also migrate to work in developing countries, often for international aid organisations and the like or for multinational companies. An estimated 100,000 non-African experts are living and working in sub-Saharan Africa, including many physicians, often in positions that are not open to African experts under the same favourable terms. For comparison, an estimated 100,000 skilled Africans are working in the EU and North America.<sup>96</sup>

Labour migration between developing countries usually leads to only a limited amount of follow-on migration. Follow-on migration is often only possible if the migrants can support themselves in the country of destination; in such cases it is, strictly speaking, labour migration.

Refugee migration may have an extremely profound impact on developing countries of destination. In the short term a mass influx of refugees, mainly into neighbouring countries, will have a damaging impact owing to pressure on

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<sup>95</sup> IOM, *World Migration 2003*, p. 6.

<sup>96</sup> IOM, *World Migration Report 2000*, cited in the European Commission Communication *Integrating migration issues in the EU's relations with third countries*, COM (2002) 703 final, p. 24.

resources (land, water, shelter and food). In the medium term, however, the impact may be more favourable, thanks to the economic, human and social capital that the newcomers bring with them and also the aid provided by international organisations. There may also be political and security implications, which may be positive but are usually negative, depending on the role of the refugees in the conflict that caused them to flee in the first place. The long-term impact will depend on whether the refugee situation is resolved, and if so how (return, integration into local society or resettlement in a third country).<sup>97</sup>

Experience shows that many developing countries are confronted with the prolonged presence of large numbers of refugees, leading to drastic changes in many areas (in infrastructure, in local markets for labour, goods and services, in the local economy as a result of humanitarian aid, in supply of and demand for medical and educational facilities, and in demographics and the environment). Experience also shows that donor contributions for humanitarian aid often eventually decrease, in part because the situation in time calls for other kinds of aid. If return is not an option in the foreseeable future, there will be pressure to integrate locally. In recent years various developing countries have proved increasingly reluctant to shelter refugees for long periods of time, owing to the decline in humanitarian aid and a similar reluctance on the part of Western countries.<sup>98</sup> However, there are also developing countries which, with support from Western countries and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), are trying to improve refugees' lot, for example by offering them prospects of integration in to local society.<sup>99</sup>

Whether these various processes have a positive or negative impact on the development of the country of destination will vary from country to country.

### **3.2.2 Implications of migration for industrialised countries of destination**

Industrialised countries, including those in the European Union, derive considerable benefits from migration and will continue to have a need for selective immigration of both highly skilled and low-skilled people.<sup>100</sup> To the extent that

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<sup>97</sup> International Organisation for Migration, 'The Migration-Development Nexus, Evidence and Policy Options, State-of-the-Art Overview', *International Migration*, Vol. 40 (5), 2002.

<sup>98</sup> International Organisation for Migration, 'The Migration-Development Nexus, Evidence and Policy Options, State-of-the-Art Overview', *International Migration*, Vol. 40 (5), 2002 and Vas Dev, Sanjuga, 'Asylum in Africa: the emergence of the "reluctant host"', *Development*, September 2003, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 113-118.

<sup>99</sup> Countries mentioned in Lambo, David (Director, UNHCR Africa Bureau), 'Reintegration of returning refugees in Africa', *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2003 include Sudan and Uganda.

<sup>100</sup> European Commission Communication, *Integrating migration issues in the EU's relations with third countries*, COM (2002) 703 final, p. 7.

low-skilled labour migration is required, the Netherlands believes it should be selective and largely temporary.

However, European countries are increasingly confronted with negative effects of immigration. The first of these is economic. The Netherlands, for example, has calculated that its current residents with a non-Western background are, on average, a drain on government resources.

This has to do with the relatively extensive use that these residents make of social security benefits, which in turn is due to the fact that follow-on and asylum migration between them have accounted for the largest group of immigrants to the Netherlands in recent years. The admission of such migrants is not subject to economic criteria.<sup>101</sup>

Second, many European countries, including the Netherlands, are faced with growing social and cultural problems due to insufficient integration of immigrants, especially in major cities, where immigrants form a large and increasing proportion of the population. In general, immigrants from non-Western countries have more difficulties in integrating than Western ones, and the lower their level of education, the greater the difficulties.

Third, there is increasingly acute awareness of the negative societal effects of illegal immigration, such as displacement from jobs and various forms of crime and social nuisance.

Migration to industrialised countries, most of which is labour migration (sometimes in disguise), is less responsive to the labour market than migration to the Gulf states and developing countries, since welfare state facilities and immigration policies in Western countries enable migrants to stay even if there is no work, or no longer any work, for them to do. It is now increasingly clear that a welfare state can no longer be maintained if movement of people is liberalised to any major extent. The welfare state is in any case already threatened by such factors as the ageing population and the excessively large number of people who are not working. It is now also clear that, for various reasons, the problem of ageing populations cannot be solved by using labour migrants to make up for the reduced labour capacity.<sup>102</sup> For example, the number of labour migrants required would be so large that the Netherlands could not physically accommodate them.

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<sup>101</sup> Roodenburg, Hans, Rob Euwals and Harry ter Rele, *Immigration and the Dutch Economy*, Statistics Netherlands, 2003, p. 12.

<sup>102</sup> See United Nations, *Replacement migration: is it a solution to declining and ageing populations?*, United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2000 ([www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration.htm](http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration.htm)).

Nevertheless, selective labour migration may have an important part to play in compensating for the negative impact of an ageing population.

The positive economic impact of immigration (in all categories) can be seen among migrants who are more successful on the labour market than the average Dutch citizen and hence make less than average use of social services. In particular, immigrants with high economic potential who occupy vacancies that are difficult to fill have a positive impact on the labour market.<sup>103</sup> Migrants have an important part to play in various sectors of the economy – not just highly skilled migrants, but also low-skilled ones in such sectors as building, market gardening and services.

The impact of forced migration is partly determined by the much larger numbers of asylum seekers that most European countries have had to deal with the last ten years, although this trend appears to have reversed since last year. On the one hand this increased influx was the result of armed conflicts which caused large numbers of people to flee from their countries in a short period (especially from the former Yugoslavia, parts of Africa and Afghanistan). At the same time, a growing percentage of asylum seekers turned out to have economic reasons for migrating, and a greater number were rejected. These developments put asylum procedures under increasing pressure. Although the EU Member States reaffirmed (for example in the Treaty on European Union) their commitment to their obligations under the Refugee Convention, it had become clear that the costs of asylum procedures in Europe were disproportionate to the costs of protecting the much larger numbers of refugees in the regions of origin. This led to initiatives to simplify and tighten up legislation on immigration and to devise ways of improving protection in the region.

### **3.2.3 Illegal migration, smuggling of/trafficking in human beings, and countries of destination**

Not only countries of origin but also countries of destination are confronted with the adverse effects of illegal migration and smuggling of/trafficking in human beings. Developing countries of destination (or transit) often lack the resources to combat these problems effectively. However, they are often interested in taking part in the international cooperation that is necessary in order to fight the criminal syndicates involved. Industrialised countries of destination are also increasingly active in this area, not only because of the affront to the migrants' human dignity but also because of the negative impact of illegal migration on their own territories and for security reasons (to fight terrorism and organised crime).

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<sup>103</sup> Roodenburg, Hans, *et al.*, *Immigration and the Dutch Economy*, Statistics Netherlands, 2003, p. 14.

## **4 Integrated foreign policy**

### **4.1 Migration as a road to development?**

As already indicated, under certain conditions migration can contribute to the development of countries of origin. It can also play an important part in migrants' personal development. This raises the question of whether measures to promote migration can form part of a policy to promote development.

A relevant factor here is that countries of origin can only develop if there is a proper blend of elements such as good governance, peace, a favourable business climate, foreign direct investment, liberalisation of trade and development aid. Where all these elements are present, migration can also make a positive contribution, through remittances and migrants' human capacity. Temporary or permanent return can be part of this process. Where these elements are lacking, however, migration cannot make any major contribution to development. At most, then, it can only be one of numerous contributing elements.

From the point of view of the development of countries of origin, unqualified support for migration makes little sense, since migration of highly skilled people may have a serious adverse impact on certain countries, especially the least developed ones. The development of a culture of migration and the departure of their best human resources could seriously hamper their development.

From the migrants' own point of view, greater opportunities for legal migration do offer major opportunities for personal development. Clearly, migrants' personal interests do not always coincide with those of countries of destination or, as in the case of serious brain drain, countries of origin. In general, migrants can only avail themselves of the opportunities for personal development if they integrate to some extent into the receiving society, for example by finding work.

Migration will ultimately only be able to contribute to development if it is sustainable (if necessary, this could entail circular migration).<sup>104</sup> This is only possible if migration also makes a economic contribution to the development of the country of destination. If it puts too much economic, social and cultural strain on the absorptive capacity of the receiving society, that society will respond either by restricting social services (especially for migrants) or by closing its borders.

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<sup>104</sup> 'Circular migration' means migration during which migrants return either temporarily or permanently to their countries of origin.

Under certain conditions, temporary migration may serve the interests of migrants, countries of origin and countries of destination alike. For countries of destination, temporary labour migration may help to eliminate labour-market bottlenecks, while limiting potential future recourse to social services and welfare programmes. In the case of countries of origin, temporary migration encourages circular migration and hence increases the likelihood that the migrants will contribute to development. In the case of migrants, temporary migration will be beneficial if restriction of migration to temporary migration allows admission policies to be relaxed.

Countries of destination can encourage temporary migration by relaxing their admission policies for labour migrants on condition that they eventually return or move elsewhere. In the case of highly skilled migrants, this condition can largely be met by the international labour market. In the case of lower-skilled migrants, it can be met by appropriate admission policies and effective return policies. However, it should be noted here that temporary labour migration schemes have in practice not always succeeded in preventing permanent settlement.<sup>105</sup> The precise implications of this for Dutch labour migration and knowledge migration policy are set out in sections 5.6 and 5.7.

#### **4.2 Development as a means of reducing migration?**

Current South-North migration trends are closely linked to differences in wealth between developing and industrialised countries. It would therefore seem logical that development policy can help to reduce migration, by enabling countries of origin to develop to such a level that migration is no longer necessary.

As indicated above, an effective blend of the enabling conditions for development can cause emigration to cease in the medium term, at least in middle-income countries. The countries that matter most to the Netherlands as far as this is concerned are Turkey and Morocco. Other middle-income countries with significant numbers of migrants in the Netherlands are Iraq, China, Iran, Egypt and Serbia and Montenegro. Of these countries, only Egypt is a Dutch bilateral development partner. There is no reason to make the other countries eligible for bilateral development cooperation on migration grounds, since EU and multilateral policies are considered to be more effective.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Lucas, Robert E.B., *International Migration to the High Income Countries*, Boston University, April 2004, pp. 25 *et seq.*

<sup>106</sup> As discussed in more detail in Section 5.1.1, the EU plans to work more closely with countries including Turkey, Morocco, China, Russia and Serbia and Montenegro, in part to tackle the fundamental causes of migration.

In the case of low-income countries, successful development policy may cause migration to increase temporarily in the short and medium term, and it may only stabilise or decrease in the long term. Some of these countries have been selected as Dutch bilateral development partners on the basis of conditions there (serious poverty and reasonably good governance). Development goals are paramount in making this selection, and there is no reason to change it because of possible implications for migration. Any future increase in migration, temporary or permanent, will have to be kept under control by Dutch migration policy in effective partnership with countries of origin. These development partners include some of the main countries of origin of migrants in the Netherlands: Suriname, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Ghana, Cape Verde, Pakistan and Vietnam. Somalia is the only major low-income country of origin of migrants in the Netherlands that is not a bilateral development partner.

In the case of forced migration, the key factors are not differences in wealth, but internal and international conflict, violations of human rights and natural disasters. Although there are often no quick fixes in such cases, the integrated foreign policy pursued by the Netherlands and the EU can help eliminate or reduce these push factors for migration. Human rights measures and development cooperation form part of this policy, if they are used to promote respect for human rights, to improve the quality of governance and, in conjunction with conflict prevention and management, to promote stability and reconstruction.

## **5 Precise implications of current policy and possible changes**

The previous chapters have examined the links between development and migration, and between development policy and migration policy. This chapter will look more closely at a number of specific points of contact between the two policies, and at possible ways of increasing synergy and coherence between them.

### **5.1 Integrated policy towards main countries of origin**

The Government favours an integrated foreign policy that incorporates development cooperation, human rights policy and immigration policy. More attention will be paid than in the past to the migration issue in all relations with countries of origin that are important to the Netherlands, such as the countries of origin of the largest ethnic minorities in the Netherlands and the countries from which large numbers of illegal migrants or rejected asylum seekers come. These include Turkey, Morocco, Suriname, Indonesia, Ghana and the priority countries for return.<sup>107</sup>

The Government will actively seek dialogue with these countries. Current migration issues will be discussed on appropriate occasions (such as visits by ministers and other important meetings) and in bilateral and multilateral consultative forums. For example, the Africa Memorandum states that the Government will endeavour to ensure that migration is discussed during consultations between the EU and Africa, with a view to developing an international migration policy based on shared interests. Apart from the legitimate interests of the countries involved, the need to protect human dignity is a common thread in many areas, such as asylum and refugee protection, migrants' rights and smuggling of/trafficking in human beings.

Although many aspects of foreign policy have their own specific goals and Dutch efforts in these areas do not depend on whether there is migration from the countries concerned to the Netherlands, these efforts may nevertheless help to eliminate the causes of migration. Examples include policy on poverty reduction, conflicts, humanitarian crises, human rights violations and bad governance. In some cases, the existing or potential pressure of migration in the Netherlands and other Western countries may help generate the necessary political pressure to

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<sup>107</sup> As listed in the letter dated 21 November 2003 on return (House of Representatives 2003-2004, 29344 No. 1): Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Iran, Nigeria, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia and Syria.



focus on violations of human rights, conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, as happened, for example, in the Balkans.

The effectiveness of Dutch foreign policy, particularly human rights policy, may be undermined if the impression is gained abroad that the Netherlands is itself violating human rights. Dutch immigration policy has been the subject of critical reports by international non-governmental organisations and has also been criticised by UN supervisory agencies. If the effectiveness of Dutch foreign policy is to be maintained, Dutch missions abroad must therefore be given enough information to be able to make clear that the Netherlands is fulfilling its international human rights obligations.

In pursuing foreign policy, increasing account will be taken of the presence of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. There is a growing realisation that this has implications for Dutch foreign policy. What these are is not yet entirely clear, but more attention will certainly have to be devoted to this. One specific possibility is to involve migrant organisations in the Netherlands more closely in development policy (see section 5.5).

Policy integration will be pursued at all levels of foreign policy: national, EU and multilateral. The following sections will look more specifically at the EU and multilateral levels.

### **5.1.1 Integrated policy within the EU**

The basis for an integrated EU policy based on partnership with countries of origin was laid at the 1999 Tampere European Council, which adopted the proposals made by the specially established High Level Working Group (HLWG) on Asylum and Migration. The Council declared that the EU needs a comprehensive approach to migration, focusing on issues of politics, human rights and development in countries and regions of origin and transit. As indicated in the conclusions reached at Tampere, this means combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts, consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular the rights of minorities, women and children.<sup>108</sup> The HLWG on Asylum and Migration was asked to give form to this integrated approach to asylum and migration.

One prominent item on the agenda of the Seville European Council in 2002 was whether the amount of development aid should be a negotiating tool in cases where countries of origin do not cooperate sufficiently with efforts to combat

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<sup>108</sup> Tampere European Council, October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, Conclusion 11.

illegal migration. The conclusion was that relations with third countries that do not cooperate sufficiently should be systematically evaluated and that failure by a country to cooperate sufficiently may hamper the establishment of closer relations between it and the EU. In extreme cases the Council may take measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, without, however, jeopardising development cooperation goals.<sup>109</sup>

Under the Danish Presidency it was determined that, before evaluating relations with third countries in this area, the EU should offer relevant third countries the possibility of closer cooperation. In November 2002 the Council therefore decided that such closer cooperation should initially be developed with Albania, China, Libya, Morocco, Ukraine, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Tunisia and Turkey.

The main issues here are:

- Tackling the fundamental causes of migration. The entire range of EU external cooperation and development cooperation programmes are used for this purpose, as an indirect but significant means of reducing pressure to migrate from third countries.
- Partnerships on migration, based on the identification of interests that are shared with third countries. In this connection the European Commission will continue to make migration issues an integral part of its political dialogue with third countries and regions, focusing not only on illegal migration but also on opportunities for legal migration.
- Specific initiatives to help third countries increase their capacity to control migration.

An evaluation mechanism was established in December 2003, and the first evaluation report will be submitted to the Council by the end of 2004.

In May 2003, after extensive discussions within the EU and the Member States on the links between development policy and migration policy, the Council drew up conclusions on development and migration.<sup>110</sup> Among other things, the Commission was asked to make proposals in a number of areas, including remittances, use of migrants' capacities for development purposes, and brain drain. The Commission will submit its proposals by the end of 2004.

Steady progress has been made in EU policy in the past few years. Clauses on the fight against illegal migration have been added to all association and cooperation

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<sup>109</sup> Seville European Council, June 2002, Presidency Conclusions, Conclusions 35 and 36.

<sup>110</sup> Doc. 8927/03.

agreements signed since 1999, including those with the Mediterranean countries, the newly independent states of Central Europe, Central Asia and the Balkans, and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Major cooperation projects have been launched as part of external aid programmes, an example being a MEDA-funded EUR 40 million programme in cooperation with Morocco to combat illegal migration and transit migration by improving border controls.<sup>111</sup> Another example is cooperation with the Western Balkan countries in combating illegal migration and trafficking in human beings. A third example is assisted return, reintegration and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons in Asia and Latin America, including a programme for Afghanistan. Also important is cooperation with the new EU Member States in strengthening their ability to control migration. As part of its European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU is now focusing its efforts on the countries adjoining the enlarged Union.

For the time being, migration-related activities still mostly involve border controls and measures to combat illegal migration. However, there is growing interest in a broader approach that focuses on such aspects as protection in the region, return, and development and migration.

The resources available to the EU to pursue an integrated migration policy are seriously limited by the budgetary framework, which is largely fixed until 2006. However, December 2003 saw the adoption of a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS), with a financial envelope of EUR 250 million for the period 2004-2008, to finance the aforementioned specific initiatives for controlling migration.

The Netherlands strongly supports the further integration of migration issues into all aspects of the EU's foreign relations. For example, the Netherlands feels it will be important, in the years to come, to give asylum and migration a more prominent place both in Regional Strategy Papers and Country Strategy Papers, as well as in action plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The Dutch Presidency will focus on topics emerging from this memorandum, such as protection in the region, return policy, closer cooperation with third countries in controlling migration flows, trafficking in human beings, the link between legal and illegal migration, temporary labour migration, remittances and brain drain.

As regards protection in the region (see section 5.4.1), the Netherlands has pressed from the outset for European cooperation, and EU funding has recently been made available for initial proposals on the subject.<sup>112</sup> There are also opportunities for EU

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<sup>111</sup> MEDA (the Mediterranean European Development Agreement) provides funding for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation between the EU and the countries on the Mediterranean.

<sup>112</sup> From the budget for the 'Cooperation with third countries in the area of migration' (B7-667) programme.

funding in other Dutch priority areas, and the Government plans to examine whether European cooperation and funding are available for priority areas identified in this memorandum.

### **5.1.2 Integrated policy in multilateral forums**

The Netherlands will also make an active contribution to the migration agenda in other relevant multilateral forums, on its own initiative and as a member of the EU. An example is the current Doha Round of WTO negotiations, in which labour mobility of natural persons is one of the items on the agenda (see section 5.8).

In this connection it should also be noted that the Netherlands is a member of the Global Commission for International Migration (GCIM) Core Group, a recent initiative by the UN Secretary-General. Depending on the results of the Commission's work, the Government will examine how to maintain the focus on migration at the highest international level and what form this should take. The Netherlands' own policy concerns regarding migration (including migration and development and the need for integrated policy) will be raised with the Commission.

Various multilateral organisations, such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR, still have a major part to play in the development and implementation of policy in the field of development and migration.<sup>113</sup>

## **5.2 Making migration a key aspect of development policy aimed at partner countries**

Migration has become an increasingly crucial aspect of the development of developing countries. The impact of migration, its causes and its effects on development have been outlined in this memorandum. One important conclusion is that the precise links between development and migration differ from country to country and that it is necessary to obtain a clearer picture of these links in the Netherlands' partner countries. This is a gap that urgently needs filling, and there are a number of ways in which that can be done.

One example is the conference on development and migration that is being organised by the Dutch embassy in Accra, Ghana, for autumn 2004. The purpose of the conference is to enable representatives of the Ghanaian Government and

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<sup>113</sup> For details of the activities of international organisations in the field of migration, see Annexe VI.

other Ghanaian development partners, international researchers and the international donor community to explore the topic.

Dutch missions, including those in development partner countries, will pay more attention in their reports to major trends in the field of migration (South-North, South-South and North-South). With due respect for the ownership principle, the Netherlands will point out relevant aspects of migration and development in talks with its development partners on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

### **5.3 Migrants' human rights**

In principle, everyone is entitled to enjoy the human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the main international human rights conventions, irrespective of residence status. This principle is based on the fact that the conventions do not make such a distinction at any point and do include general non-discrimination provisions. However, the grounds for restricting individual human rights and fundamental freedoms may be interpreted as entailing that certain elements of those rights and freedoms do not apply to illegally resident migrants. While the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or humiliating treatment is applicable irrespective of residence status, but the right to family reunification implicit in the right to family life can be made applicable to legally resident migrants but not to illegally resident ones. In particular, differentiation will be possible in the field of basic social rights. The fact that an illegally resident migrant is not entitled to work in the country of residence can be seen as a restriction of this basic social right, yet it is a restriction that is permissible under Article 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Covenant also allows developing countries to determine, in the light of their economic situation, to what extent the rights set out in the Covenant are applicable to aliens.

Although the international debate on migration will necessarily focus on efforts to control migration flows, the Government favours a balanced approach in which sufficient attention is also paid to migrants' rights. In this connection the debate within the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), in which migrants' rights are a separate agenda item, may be of relevance.

A policy that focuses on migrants' human rights will also focus on preventing affronts to human dignity through exploitation or total lack of prospects. Human rights policy can also be used to help combat illegal migration and smuggling of/trafficking in human beings (see section 5.9).

#### **5.4 Policy on forced migration**

There are two main issues with regard to forced migration: ways of preventing or at least reducing forced migration, and protection and reception of victims of persecution and war. Foreign and security policy, development policy, human rights policy and asylum policy can complement one another here.

A first form of forced migration is flight abroad because of persecution as defined in refugee law. This can only be prevented if there is greater respect for human rights in the country of origin. The Netherlands is pursuing an active human rights policy, bilaterally and through the EU and UN organisations, aimed at protecting human rights worldwide. However, human rights policies usually only produce results in the long term. Accordingly, a decrease in persecution of individuals and the resulting asylum migration to the Netherlands can in general only be expected in the long term. Victims of persecution as defined in refugee law who apply for asylum in the Netherlands are entitled to protection under Dutch asylum policy.

A second form of forced migration is flight from armed conflict that leads to an overall situation of insecurity. Prevention, control and elimination of this type of migration are part of a broader conflict management policy in which foreign and security policy has a leading part to play, in support of development cooperation. Much of this policy is pursued through the EU and other multilateral organisations. Dutch development cooperation is largely focused on the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa and the Western Balkans (see the policy memorandum *Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities*). Dutch support also includes the reception and return of refugees in conflict-torn regions.

In cases where there is primary or secondary migration of war refugees to the Netherlands, asylum policy allows categorial protection (usually temporary) to be offered to refugees from countries where the overall security situation justifies such protection. When the conflict ceases and the situation allows refugees to return, this temporary categorial protection also ceases (unless the refugee has been granted a permanent residence permit after being legally resident for three years) and the refugee must return. Voluntary return (whether temporary or permanent) of skilled migrants from industrialised countries may assist reconstruction (see also section 5.4.1). Former refugees who return from elsewhere in the region can also be of great value during reconstruction. It is important to ensure an effective transition from emergency aid to structural development aid in the area so that refugees who return do so on a lasting basis.

#### **5.4.1 Protection in the region**

Internationally there is a growing awareness that improved reception and protection in the region of origin is of great importance in refugee situations, and that there is a discrepancy between the large amounts spent on the reception of asylum seekers in Europe and the amounts currently available for refugees in their regions of origin. The Government subscribes to this view and is making efforts at international level to improve the protection of refugees and asylum seekers in the region. The House of Representatives has been kept informed of progress in this area; in 2003 the Government sent the House two policy letters on protection in the region, and the topic has again been raised a number of times this year during oral consultations with the House.<sup>114</sup>

The Government is now focusing its attention on the forthcoming Dutch Presidency of the European Union and on developments under the UNHCR Convention Plus initiative. On 8 June 2004 the European Commission submitted to the JHA Council a Communication which emphasised the importance of protection in the region. The Commission has repeatedly stressed the value of improved protection in the region. In a resolution adopted on 1 April 2004, the European Parliament also called for appropriate responses to the need for protection in refugees' regions of origin, given the shortcomings of the current international arrangements for asylum.

Protection in the region has also been the subject of much discussion between UNHCR and the countries that are party to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Under Convention Plus, UNHCR is trying to induce states to reach practical agreements that will give more refugees access to protection and provide lasting solutions. In this context, High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers has acknowledged the advantages of protection in the region.

In cooperation with the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark, UNHCR has submitted funding proposals to the European Commission. The main subjects of the proposals are Somali refugees and dialogue between various African countries and Western countries of destination. Funding has now been approved, with cofinancing by various member states, including the Netherlands.<sup>115</sup> This year, in consultation with UNHCR and other countries, the Netherlands will once again examine whether new proposals can be submitted for EU funding to improve protection in the region.

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<sup>114</sup> Letters dated 28 May 2003 (House of Representatives 2002-2003, 19637, No. 739) and 20 October 2003 (House of Representatives 2003-2004, 19637, No. 785).

<sup>115</sup> From the budget for the 'Cooperation with third countries in the area of migration' (B7-667) programme.

As well as through the EU, the Government is prepared to offer UNHCR additional support of its own for protection in the region. The House of Representatives supports this position, as is apparent from the last debate on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget, in which an amendment sponsored by MP Camiel Eurlings was adopted by the House. The amendment called on the Government to increase this year's contribution to UNHCR by €5 million, to be spent on reception in the region. The Government has accepted the amendment, and talks are now taking place between UNHCR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the use of these additional funds.

### **5.5 Contributions to development policy by migrant organisations**

There are several hundred migrant groups in the Netherlands, most of them organised according to country of origin. Their activities and degree of organisation vary considerably. However, practically all of them are some way involved with the country of origin, for example through remittances, investment, development of trade links, deployment of human capacity and/or political lobbying.

Migrant organisations have a wealth of commitment, knowledge and experience regarding their countries of origin. They can also contribute to those countries' development, for example by supporting community projects. It therefore makes sense to examine the extent to which migrant organisations can be more closely involved in shaping Dutch development policy and be given more specific support for their development activities.

For migrant organisations to be more closely involved in shaping Dutch development policy, the Government needs contacts among the many migrant and umbrella organisations. To consult with ethnic minorities living in the Netherlands, the Government has set up the National Ethnic Minorities Consultative Committee (LOM). The following seven ethnic minority associations are currently affiliated to the LOM:

- the Association of Moroccans and Tunisians (SMT)
- the Southern European Communities National Government Consultative Group (LIZE)
- the National Consultative Committee on Moluccan Welfare (LOWM)
- the Surinamese Community Advisory Association (SIO)
- the Dutch Association of Refugee Organisations (VON)
- the Consultative Association for Caribbean Dutch Citizens (OCAN)
- the Turkish Community Advisory Association (IOT)



The LOM, which meets at least three times a year and is chaired by the Minister for Immigration and Integration, discusses policy proposals relating to integration and ethnic minorities. Both the Government and the ethnic minority associations can submit agenda items.

In future the Government will also discuss the main lines of major relevant draft memoranda on development policy with the LOM. In this way the migrant organisations will become more closely involved in shaping development policy. Like other Dutch organisations, migrant organisations can obtain financial and other support for development activities through various channels. Details are provided in annexe V.

The relationship between migrant organisations and development organisations in the Netherlands is a new one and has so far not been easy. There are a number of obstacles to close cooperation between the two types of organisation. For example, migrant organisations are often essentially interest groups that mainly support the members' own families or districts, which is not always compatible with the development organisations' broader approach. Nor do the political analyses made by migrant organisations always match those made by development organisations. At the same time, there is a great deal of rivalry between the various migrant organisations. Many of them are ambivalent about public authorities in general and the Dutch authorities in particular. They do not always have expertise in development cooperation, and as a result their proposals often fail to qualify for support under existing programmes. Finally, development organisations are sometimes confronted with rivalry between migrant and partner organisations in countries of origin and migrant organisations.

Despite all this, migrant and development organisations are starting to get to know each other and are working together more closely. The Government is encouraging both migrant and development organisations to continue seeking closer cooperation, so that migrant organisations can realise their full potential for contributing to development. The Government believes that the existing range of agencies (see annexe V) can provide sufficient support for migrant organisations in this field.

## **5.6 Increased use of remittances for development purposes**

Given the vast amount of money remitted by migrants and its potentially favourable impact on development, it makes sense to ask whether government policy can help increase that impact. The main thing to be remembered is that the money remitted by migrants is their own private wealth. All governments can

therefore do is create conditions in which remittances can be optimised and put to the best possible use in countries of origin.

A first issue here is the transaction fees charged on remittances. Financial institutions charge fees of 10-20% on remittances to countries of origin. These costs may be much lower if informal channels are used, but these entail risks for the customer and for the international community (no records, no transparency and no supervision). There is therefore growing international interest in attempts to set up a financial structure that will reduce fees charged on remittances and at the same time increase transparency.<sup>116</sup> In the Netherlands the conditions under which businesses facilitate financial transfers abroad are laid down by law. Within the limits of the law, any business is free to determine the conditions under which such transfers take place. Since no banking licence is required for this activity, it is fairly easy for new businesses to enter the sector. Consumers can minimise the fees charged on transfers within this structure by acting strategically, for example by sending larger sums but less frequently.

A second issue is the extent to which migrants (or migrant organisations) desire support in using remittances for development purposes. In general, migrants and migrant organisations are very reluctant to channel their own money through governmental or non-governmental development organisations. Their main objections concern bureaucracy and loss of control over what happens to the money. However, if migrants and migrant organisations approach the Government for support in this area, the Government will advise them and refer them to relevant organisations and programmes (see annexe V). The initiative will mainly lie with the migrants and migrant organisations themselves, as will the decision as to how the remittances are to be used.

## **5.7 Return of migrants**

An important and insufficiently researched link between development and migration is the role that return migration can play in a country's development. Little is known about the scale and impact of migrant return. What *is* known is that migration is seldom in one direction only. Most migrants dream of eventually returning home with the money they have earned. Of migrants that came to the United States between 1908 and 1957, 30% returned home.<sup>117</sup> Over the period 1997-2001, departure of legal non-Western immigrants from the Netherlands was

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<sup>116</sup> Kapur, Devesh, *Remittances: the new development mantra?*, Harvard University and Center for Global Development, August 2003, p. 27; World Bank, *Global Development Finance 2003*, p. 165.

<sup>117</sup> Olesen, Henrik, 'Migration, Return and Development: an institutional perspective', 2002, IOM, *International Migration*, Vol. 40 (5), Special Issue 2/2002.

equivalent to about 30% of gross immigration, although it is not known where the emigrants went.

In general, the longer migrants remain abroad, the more difficult it is for them to return, especially if follow-on migration has taken place. Their focus of their family lives (and their lives in general) has by then largely shifted to the country of destination, and they have built up entitlements and often acquired property there.

Apart from this, the scale of migrant return depends on many factors: the type of migration, the migrants' status, whether they are migrating within the region or to the West, whether migration is meant to be temporary or permanent, and whether the migrants are low-skilled or highly skilled. In the case of forced migration, migrants often return (or have to return) when the circumstances that caused them to migrate in the first place have ceased to exist, for example because the security or human rights situation in their country of origin has improved. The large numbers of refugees that returned to Afghanistan, Angola, Sierra Leone and Burundi in 2002 are mentioned above. There has also been large-scale return of migrants to countries where the quality of governance has improved, e.g. Spain after General Franco's death in 1975, Chile after General Pinochet stepped down in 1990, Eritrea after independence in 1991 and Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In the case of labour migration, large-scale return usually only occurs if the country of origin reaches the end of the migration hump or economic opportunities in that country improve considerably in other ways. In other cases only a minority of migrants return. If they do, it is generally because (a) they cannot find work and remit money, (b) they cannot obtain or keep the required residence permit, (c) they do not feel at home in the country of destination, (d) they want to retire to their country of origin at the end of their working life or (e) they want to start up a business in their country of origin. Return of labour and follow-on migrants from developing countries is to a large extent determined by job opportunities in the country of destination, although when unemployment increases some migrants move on to a third country instead.

Return from industrialised countries and migration on from there to third countries are also largely driven by job opportunities, especially in the case of illegal migration and temporary legal migration of highly skilled people. In other cases, however, migrants are discouraged from returning by the fact that they would lose their claim to social security benefits if they left the country of destination. There are also indications that they are discouraged to do so by the fact that they would

lose their residence permit or are not certain whether they could obtain a new one.<sup>118</sup>

Returning migrants may have a highly positive impact on the development of their countries of origin. If there is in fact an increase in circular migration (in which migrants return to their countries of origin for longer or shorter periods), positive effects may be expected. Encouragement of circular migration, for instance by encouraging temporary labour migration, appears to be an appropriate strategy that will serve the interests of migrants, countries of origin and countries of destination alike. It is important to make sure that such migrants do indeed return after their contracts expire.<sup>119</sup>

In many cases return and reintegration are less attractive options to migrants and are no easy matter, with a risk of failure. Moreover, governments of countries of origin are eager to maintain the flows of remittances. On the other hand, return of legal but unemployed migrants relieves the pressure on social services in Western countries. Finally, return of illegal immigrants and rejected asylum seekers is a necessary final component of those countries' immigration policies, which would otherwise lack sufficient public support. In the light of all this, various Western governments have set up various types of programme to support the return and reintegration of certain categories of migrants. Experience with such programmes has been varied. What is clear that return of migrants is a thorny problem.

In 2002 the European Commission reviewed the lessons of a large number of return projects which it had cofinanced since 1997 (projects for the voluntary return of refugees, rejected asylum seekers and other migrants).<sup>120</sup> Experience showed that it was particularly important to provide follow-up projects in countries of origin, since otherwise, when confronted with adverse physical conditions, lack of work or other problems, migrants would tend to return to the former country of destination.

The focus of the projects was on job training, preparation for return through exploratory visits, information and advice on the situation in the country of origin,

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<sup>118</sup> European Commission, *Green paper on a Community return policy on illegal residents*, COM(2002) 175, Brussels, 2002; De Haas, Hein, *Migratie en ontwikkeling: valkuilen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, 2004, p. 5: 'The increasingly restrictive migration policies pursued by EU countries have [...] resulted in a greater tendency on the part of migrants to settle permanently in Europe.'

<sup>119</sup> It is not easy to formulate a coherent policy that will guarantee such return. As regards the situation in the Netherlands, see Recommendations 14-20 in the report by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs entitled *Regulering en facilitering van arbeidsmigratie* and the Government's response to them (May 2004).

<sup>120</sup> European Commission, *Green paper on a Community return policy on illegal residents*, COM(2002) 175, Brussels, 2002.

help in setting up small businesses there, and general assistance after the migrants' return. There were numerous difficulties – political problems in the country of origin, unwillingness of migrants to return (not infrequently accompanied by attempts to misuse the system), problems in issuing travel documents and insufficient coordination with reconstruction efforts – but solutions were often found.

The main features of the more successful projects were:

- a comprehensive approach that included counselling, job training and assistance both before and after the migrants' return;
- assistance to the communities to which the migrants were returning;
- coordination with other aid initiatives in the country of origin (construction of schools, employment projects, etc.).

A study commissioned by the IOM points to the importance of securing cooperation from countries of origin and of support for migrants after they return there, the serious risk that illegal immigrants and rejected asylum seekers who do not choose to return voluntarily will be forced to do so, the need for coordination between relevant ministries in the country of destination, support from migrant organisations in both countries, and measures to make continued illegal residence less attractive.<sup>121</sup> The study also points to the risk that excessively attractive return packages may actually draw migrants to the country in question. Another important finding is that attempts to combine development and migration goals in a single project (local development, return on a lasting basis and measures to discourage further migration) were often only partly successful because the goals proved incompatible.

The Netherlands also has experience with a number of voluntary return projects. The Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower and Local Opportunities for Development (REMPLOD) project was carried out in Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey from 1973 to 1978. An evaluation conducted in 1980 found that the return projects component of REMPLOD was not a useful development cooperation instrument, among other things because it was impossible to find enough viable initiatives. In all three countries of origin, emigration was in fact viewed as a way of dealing with unemployment.

In 1985 the Netherlands introduced the Repatriation Subsidy Scheme, under which immigrants who were unemployed or ill could return to their countries of origin

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<sup>121</sup> Koser, Khalid, *The Return and Reintegration of Rejected Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants: an analysis of government-assisted return programmes in selected European countries*, IOM, 2001.

with social security benefits. Migrants aged over 45 who have been living in the Netherlands for at least two years qualify for the scheme. Their return allows the Netherlands to save money on social services (approximately EUR 30,000 per migrant over ten years). About 4,000 people – mainly from Turkey (1,751), Morocco (1,451) and the former Yugoslavia (566) – have made use of this scheme. In 2003, a total of 509 migrants were repatriated with social security benefits.<sup>122</sup> The Government has now submitted a bill to end the scheme.<sup>123</sup>

The Assisted Return of Rejected Asylum Seekers (GTAA) project, which was carried out during the period 1997-2000, was for rejected asylum seekers from Ethiopia and Angola who had come to the Netherlands before a given date. Although the project was a failure, important lessons were drawn from it: (a) the cooperation of the authorities in countries of origin is necessary, but not always forthcoming, (b) migrant organisations in countries of origin have an interest in discouraging return and have considerable influence on potential candidates for return as well as on governments in countries of origin, (c) the alternative for rejected asylum seekers – staying on in the Netherlands – was too attractive, (d) there was no serious risk of expulsion and (e) the responsible government bodies were unable to estimate the numbers of candidates for return with any accuracy.<sup>124</sup>

The Return and Emigration of Aliens from the Netherlands (REAN) project was launched in 1992 and is still running. Under the project, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants who return voluntarily have their travel and transportation costs paid, receive assistance in obtaining documents and are given enough money to live on for several days.

REAN+ programmes, which provide all of the above plus a reintegration bonus, is only available for certain groups of migrants (in principle, for large groups of temporarily admitted asylum seekers who no longer have a reason to stay here). A successful REAN+ programme has been carried out for migrants from Kosovo.<sup>125</sup> Similar programmes are now being carried out for Afghanistan, Angola and Iraq. As of 1 May 2004, a total of 123 people had returned to Afghanistan and 353 to Angola through this programme.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> *NRC Handelsblad*, 'Remigratie met uitkering wordt gestopt' ('Return migration with benefits to be stopped'), 2 July 2003.

<sup>123</sup> Repatriation Act (Repeal) Bill (29020).

<sup>124</sup> Van de Bunt Adviesbureau, *Midterm review of the pilot project Assisted Return of Rejected Asylum Seekers*, 1999.

<sup>125</sup> For further details, see the letter to the House of Representatives dated 1 October 2001 (House of Representatives 2001-2002, 19637/26646, No. 609) on return programmes for specific groups.

<sup>126</sup> IOM Dutch office.

The REAN+ programmes are fairly successful, as a number of lessons have been learned from previous programmes. Active efforts have been made to secure the cooperation of the authorities in countries of origin (which issue travel documents, for instance) and formal agreements have been reached with such authorities (in the case of Afghanistan, for instance, there is a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the Afghan and Dutch Governments and UNHCR). The alternative to return – staying on illegally in the Netherlands – has now been made much less attractive. Migrants who refuse to return voluntarily are likely to be forced to do so.

Tailor-made return policies are also being carried out, and constantly adapted, for the other main countries of origin (see letters to the House of Representatives).<sup>127</sup> These policies are mainly aimed at the return of rejected asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. The basic principle here is that migrants should preferably return of their own free will but may be forced to do so if necessary.

As indicated in the two letters, return policy must be integrated into overall foreign policy if it is to be successful. As part of this integrated policy, consideration can be given to offering priority countries a limited amount of support (which may include development cooperation) if they are willing to facilitate the return of migrants. Possibilities include support for migration authorities in the country of origin, as well as support for non-governmental organisations, for example in providing reception for minors on return to their country of origin. Before specific details of these programmes can be worked out, it is important to have a fairly clear picture of the expected numbers of candidates for return.

Now that the importance of circular migration to migrants, countries of origin and countries of destination alike is gaining recognition, the Government is examining to what extent voluntary (temporary or permanent) return programmes can have a positive impact as part of cooperation with countries of origin on the return of migrants. The Government acknowledges the importance of supporting temporary or permanent return programmes in which skilled immigrants can put their knowledge and expertise to use in their countries of origin, especially in least developed countries and sectors suffering from brain drain. Consideration can be given to supporting such programmes in priority countries for return, using the aforementioned special budget for repatriation support. A case in point is the Return of Qualified Afghans project (which enables qualified immigrants to return temporarily from the Netherlands to Afghanistan so that they can help rebuild their home country). Under this project, which is being carried out by IOM and is

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<sup>127</sup> Letters dated 1 February 2002 (House of Representatives 2001-2002, 19637, No. 648) and 21 November 2003 (House of Representatives 2003-2004, 29344, No. 1) on return policy.

cofinanced by the European Commission, fifteen Afghans have now returned temporarily from the Netherlands and twenty-seven from other EU countries.<sup>128</sup>

Since November 2003 various civil-society organisations in the Netherlands, including development organisations, have placed growing emphasis on the importance of assisting migrants after they return to their countries of origin, in the interests of effective reintegration. This mainly concerns the return of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers who are still being processed or have been rejected, but also applies to legal immigrants who wish to return. Some organisations have been carrying out activities in this area. The Government is prepared to consider financing or cofinancing such activities from the aforementioned special budget for repatriation support. The Government believes that the activities should wherever possible also benefit the local population, among other things to prevent a 'suck-in' effect. They should also be coordinated with Dutch civil-society initiatives to train migrants in preparation for return, as this may make the approach more effective.<sup>129</sup> It is likewise important to involve migrant organisations (through the LOM) in discussions on return, in order to do away with feelings of distrust and make use of opportunities for a positive approach to return. The various Dutch organisations have a great need for specific information on job opportunities in countries of origin. The Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the development cooperation programme can all play a part here.

Efforts should be made to coordinate the various civil-society initiatives and ensure exchange of information between them. The relevant ministries (the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the development cooperation programme) will work on this in consultation with the organisations concerned.

## **5.8 Policy on labour migration**

Among the key factors when it comes to legal migration is international legislation on labour migration. Important negotiations are taking place and positions are being adopted on this subject, particularly under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Developing countries are generally in favour of further liberalisation of labour migration, in view of the great benefits labour migration can bring them and despite the disadvantages of

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<sup>128</sup> Response by the Government to the report by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs entitled *Reguleren en faciliteren van arbeidsmigratie*, May 2004, p. 43.

<sup>129</sup> Examples include the six projects for asylum seekers that are funded in part by the European Social Fund EQUAL programme, and similar projects cofinanced by the European Refugee Fund.



brain drain, which – especially in some of the least developed countries – can be considerable.

In general, industrialised countries pursue restrictive policies in which levels of labour migration are determined by their own labour requirements and the absorptive capacity of their own societies. Many of these countries mainly want highly skilled workers and selective labour migration, among other things to help counter the effects of the ageing population.

The link between illegal and legal labour migration is of relevance. Some believe that increasing opportunities for legal labour migration will reduce the scale of illegal migration. In most cases, however, this effect is likely to be limited, as analysis of the migration of low-skilled workers to the Netherlands has shown.<sup>130</sup> The great financial benefits that employers derive from illegal employment will almost always make it an attractive option. If illegal workers were legalised they would largely be priced out of the market, with possible displacement of local labour by those finding work in the formal sector.

One of the topics in the current Doha Round of GATS negotiations, which is focused on development issues, is increasing the scope for the temporary presence of natural persons on the territory of another country for purposes of service provision (known in GATS terminology as Mode 4 of service provision). Developing countries feel they have a comparative advantage in this area, since they have large numbers of both higher-skilled and lower-skilled people who are willing to provide services abroad. They therefore want increased market access for medium-skilled and low-skilled people as well as those that are highly skilled. Other topics of the negotiations are duration of stay and conditions for admission.

In the Doha negotiations, developing countries are invoking the declared principle that the round should be of specific benefit to them. Various studies have pointed out the great benefits that further liberalisation of service traffic under Mode 4 can bring to developing countries. One advantage for wealthy and developing countries alike is the temporary nature of such labour. At the moment the negotiations on services are making little progress, but a recent letter from European Commissioners Lamy and Fischler to all the WTO trade ministers may change this. The letter explicitly states that developed countries must acknowledge the interests of developing countries, which are mainly in the area of Mode 4, and that the negotiations on services must be speeded up.

In connection with Mode 4, a large number of developing countries have not yet developed negotiating positions. The EU will further determine its own position

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<sup>130</sup> Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs, *Regulering en facilitering van arbeidsmigratie*, p. 5.

on the basis of theirs. If the possibility of a more generous EU position is discussed, this may be a reason for the Netherlands to look at ways of creating greater opportunities for the temporary presence of service providers. In determining its position, the Netherlands will have to strike a balance between the aforementioned benefits of temporary labour migration and the possibility of job displacement, particularly by low-skilled labour migrants, as well as the risk that ostensibly temporary migrants will continue residing and working in the country illegally after their visas have expired. A proposal to change Dutch national policy on labour and knowledge migration was recently submitted to the House of Representatives, in the form of the Government's response to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs in its report entitled *Regulering en facilitering van arbeidsmigratie* (Regulation and facilitation of labour migration). The proposal was accompanied by a government statement on the admission of knowledge migrants, indicating that conditions for the admission of internationally scarce highly skilled labour migrants (knowledge migrants), irrespective of country of origin, should be relaxed and simplified, but that admission of all other categories of labour migrants should remain restricted.<sup>131</sup> Only if no applicants for jobs can be found within the European Economic Area should applicants from other countries be admitted, on a temporary basis.

A more relaxed admission policy for highly skilled people may be harmful to least developed countries (see section 3.1.4). Although not in favour of excluding migrants from such countries from the new arrangements, the Government is aware of the negative impact that the departure of highly skilled people may have there, and recommends that measures be taken to encourage 'brain circulation' (circular migration of highly skilled people). Account has also been taken of the fact that hardly any brain drain is caused by the Netherlands: there are few highly skilled people from the least developed countries working in this country, besides which not all highly skilled people from such countries are highly skilled by international standards. Where there *may* be a risk of brain drain, namely in the health care sector, it has been agreed in a covenant drawn up under the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act not to recruit nurses from developing countries. At the same time, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport will make it its policy to ensure that labour migrants are employed only on a temporary basis in the Dutch health care sector.

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<sup>131</sup> Knowledge migrants are defined for legislative purposes as follows: 'Knowledge migrants are migrants who come to the Netherlands to take up paid employment and have a gross income of at least 45,000 euros. In the case of migrants under the age of thirty, the income threshold shall be the same as the upper threshold for national health insurance coverage (approximately 32,600 euros). The income criterion shall not apply to PhD candidates, postgraduate researchers or university lecturers. Footballers and ministers or teachers of religion shall not be regarded as knowledge migrants.'

Nevertheless, the Government believes that even more attention should be paid to the problem of brain drain from the least developed countries. No clear international policy has yet emerged on this issue, but in recent years there has been a vigorous debate on the subject among all those involved, at all levels.

The governments of countries of origin that are among the least developed countries are also coming to realise just how much capacity they are losing. Internationally, the favoured proposal is (a) building and maintaining capacity in countries of origin and (b) using migrants' capacity to assist development in those countries. Consultations between sending countries and receiving countries are now getting under way (for instance between the Maghreb countries and the EU). Given the divergent interests of national governments and individual migrants, it is vital for migrant organisations (through the LOM) to become more closely involved in analysis and policymaking. The Netherlands will continue to take an active part in this debate.

The departure of highly skilled people is a problem that affects all the Netherlands' development partner countries. The question of capacity should therefore always be considered as a matter of course when analysing migration. The main priority is to create the conditions for building capacity in countries of origin by every available means, so that highly skilled people have an incentive to stay. Research shows that, while higher rates of pay are certainly important, working conditions (equipment, the opportunity to do research, etc.), meaningful employment and career prospects are just as crucial.

As part of their national human resource policies, developing countries should therefore tackle the problem of brain drain by taking action to improve working conditions, rates of pay and career prospects. Long-term partnerships between agencies in industrialised countries and sending countries which focus on both institutional and human resource capacity building in the sending countries may be useful here. Such partnerships should give highly skilled people from sending countries an opportunity to gain international experience and join international professional networks. This can be coordinated with initiatives that various countries of origin have already taken in this area (new legislation in South Africa, the health sector Human Resources Strategy in Ghana, etc.) and with efforts by least developed countries to make use of the new knowledge and skills acquired by highly skilled emigrants. Measures for this purpose include encouraging temporary or permanent return, virtual education, and support for national networking organisations for the highly skilled. Another possibility is concluding agreements with receiving countries on active recruitment, in which sending countries' interests are also taken into account. These are often bilateral

agreements, for example between the United Kingdom and South Africa, the Netherlands and Suriname and the United States and Mexico.

Governments of least developed countries are also trying to contact skilled emigrants and encourage them to use their newly acquired knowledge to help their countries of origin develop. In 2001, for example, Ghana held a summit meeting designed to interest migrants in the development of their own country. South Africa maintains contact with the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA), and India is making efforts to facilitate the return of migrants in the area of information and communications technology.

At the same time, skilled emigrants from developing countries are increasingly aware that they could help build essential capacity in their countries of origin. Organisations and networks – some of them global – are springing up everywhere.

In addition, in order to build capacity and make use of migrants' skills, efforts can be made to convince international businesses of the benefits of employing migrants from countries where they operate (companies known to have done so include Heineken and British American Tobacco). More can also be done to recruit migrants for development cooperation work in their countries of origin.

The Netherlands is supporting efforts by various development partner countries to combat brain drain and its adverse effects. These efforts include:

- Investigation of opportunities for organised migration under bilateral agreements. Talks on this are under way with South Africa with regard to the health sector. Under these agreements, South African doctors, nurses and ancillary staff could be given a chance to work abroad for brief periods. Another pilot project, in collaboration with the Ghanaian Government, is designed to encourage Ghanaian doctors in the Netherlands to go and work temporarily in Ghana. This Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) project is thus helping to encourage brain circulation. MIDA programmes with a significant brain circulation component are also being supported by the United Kingdom (in Ghana and Sierra Leone), Italy, Spain and Belgium (in Burundi).
- Inclusion of conditions designed to encourage return in the development cooperation policy for higher education, of which the Netherlands Fellowship Programme (NFP) is a part.
- Measures to increase health sector capacity, including support for efforts to ensure that health sector workers in developing countries remain there

(topping-up of salaries in Zambia, support for the health sector Human Resources Strategy in Ghana).

However, efforts to tackle loss of human capacity in the least developed countries require an international approach. For the Netherlands, the most useful channel is the EU. International organisations such as the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the World Bank are also working to prevent brain drain and encourage brain circulation, especially in Africa, where capacity is already being seriously eroded by the AIDS epidemic.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is carrying out a great deal of research, developing policy options and helping countries regulate labour migration and build migration-related capacity. Finally, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is carrying out various programmes, including not only the MIDA projects for Africa but also the global Return of Qualified Nationals programme and activities for Afghanistan's benefit.

## **5.9 The fight against illegal migration and smuggling of/trafficking in human beings**

The fight against illegal migration and smuggling of/trafficking in human beings requires effective coordination of domestic and foreign policies in these areas.<sup>132</sup> The Government has recently adopted measures (mainly domestic in nature) to reduce illegal immigration and exploitation of illegal migrants.<sup>133</sup> These measures are designed to prevent misuse of official admission procedures, occupation of housing by (or letting of housing to) illegal immigrants, illegal employment and trafficking in human beings. As part of the policy of encouraging temporary labour migration, efforts are also being made to combat illegal immigration by encouraging temporary labour migrants to leave when their employment ends, rather than stay on illegally.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> 'Smuggling of human beings' means helping people (for financial or other gain) to enter or remain in a country illegally, both parties being involved on a voluntary basis. 'Trafficking in human beings' means forcing people (in the broadest sense of the term 'forcing') to make themselves available for the performance of sexual or other services or to surrender their own organs.

<sup>133</sup> *Illegalennota. Aanvullende maatregelen voor het tegengaan van illegaliteit en de aanpak van uitbuiters van illegalen in Nederland* (Policy document on illegal immigrants: supplementary measures for countering illegal residence and taking on exploiters of illegal immigrants in the Netherlands), April 2004 (House of Representatives 2003-2004, 29537, No. 2).

<sup>134</sup> Response by the Government to the report by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs entitled *Regulering en facilitering van arbeidsmigratie*, May 2004.

Policy to combat illegal migration and smuggling of/trafficking in human beings contributes to an integrated foreign policy in a number of ways:

1. Since many countries of origin share Western countries' concerns about trafficking in human beings, this issue could form the starting point for a wider-ranging dialogue about cooperation on migration.
2. The fight against trafficking in human beings is a key component of human rights policy.
3. Policy on good governance (as part of development cooperation policy) can play a role in the fight against illegal immigration by helping to combat corruption and consolidate the rule of law. Corruption may lead government authorities to issue false identity papers or fail to participate in preventing illegal immigration from their countries.
4. The fight against illegal immigration and smuggling of human beings is an important basis for an integrated return policy, as indicated in section 5.7.

The Government wants to see the fight against illegal migration and smuggling of/trafficking in human beings become an integral part of overall foreign policy. Effective implementation of policy will depend on cooperation by the governments of countries of origin and transit. Giving countries direct or indirect support or exerting pressure on them may be an effective way to secure cooperation, without the need for any formal link. Where appropriate, the Government will consider whether the Netherlands can comply with the wishes of a major country of origin or transit regarding any aspect of bilateral relations: political, development-related, economic or cultural. Likewise, it may consider whether pressure is required in any area. When doing so it will strike a careful balance among the Netherlands' various short-term and long-term interests.

Human rights policy has a major role to play in the fight against trafficking in human beings, the emphasis being on the victim's position. Projects that help to prevent such trafficking, for example by giving potential victims in the country of origin information tailored to their situation, are important, as are projects that promote the reintegration of victims who return to their countries of origin.

Trafficking in human beings is now a criminal offence in the Netherlands, and the police and the judicial authorities have given efforts to curb it nationwide priority. Since April 2000 the Netherlands has had a National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings, the only post of its kind in the world. The Rapporteur reports annually to the Government on the nature and scale of trafficking in human beings and the mechanisms involved.

International cooperation, particularly through the EU, is crucial to the fight against trafficking in human beings, as well as against illegal migration and smuggling of human beings. An integrated approach to these issues, for example making the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration the main forum for negotiations within the EU, is to be preferred.

There are also multilateral efforts to combat trafficking in human beings. The Netherlands will shortly ratify the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the protocols to it (including the Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children). Relevant Dutch legislation will be amended, among other things by extending the definition of trafficking in human beings to sectors other than just prostitution.

## **5.10 Summary of new policy proposals**

A general summary can be found at the beginning of this memorandum. This section (5.10) briefly discusses the specific new features which either were not yet part of Dutch policy or will be emphasised in the coming period.

More attention will be paid than in the past to the issue of development and migration in all relations with development partner countries and countries of origin of importance to the Netherlands. The links between development and migration will be examined in respect of all these countries. Migration will be on the agenda in all relations with the main countries of origin of migrants to the Netherlands. These include Turkey, Morocco, Suriname, Indonesia, Ghana and the priority countries for return.<sup>135</sup> Current migration issues will be discussed on appropriate occasions (such as visits by ministers and other important meetings) and in bilateral and multilateral consultative forums. The Government will endeavour to ensure that migration is discussed during consultations between the EU and Africa.

In some cases, the actual or potential pressure of migration in the Netherlands and other Western countries may help generate the necessary political support for focusing on violations of human rights, conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, as happened, for example, in the Balkans.

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<sup>135</sup> Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Iran, Nigeria, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia and Syria.

The Government will consider what implications the presence of large groups of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands should have for foreign policy. Dutch missions abroad will be kept well informed about the relationship between Dutch immigration policy and international human rights obligations, so that the effectiveness of Dutch foreign policy – especially human rights policy – is not undermined by any false impression that the Netherlands is failing to fulfil its international obligations (see section 5.1).

Dutch missions, including those in development partner countries, will devote more attention in their reports to major trends in the field of migration (south-north, south-south and north-south). With due respect for the ownership principle, the Netherlands will bring up relevant migration and development issues in talks on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) with its development partner countries (see section 5.2).

The Dutch EU Presidency will focus especially on protection in the region, return policy, closer cooperation with third countries in controlling migration flows, trafficking in human beings, the link between legal and illegal migration and the impact of remittances, brain drain and temporary labour migration on development. The Government will investigate whether European cooperation and funding are available for activities in these areas. It is important that in the years to come asylum and migration be given a more prominent place in Regional Strategy Papers and Country Strategy Papers, as well as in action plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy (see section 5.1.1).

The Government will also raise these issues in other multilateral forums, for instance as a member of the Global Commission for International Migration (GCIM) Core Group. Depending on the results of the Commission's work, the Government will examine how to keep migration in the spotlight at the highest international level and what form international efforts should take. The Netherlands' own policy concerns regarding migration (including migration and development and the need for integrated policy) will be raised with the Commission. The issue of migrants' human rights will also be raised in international forums (see sections 5.1.2 and 5.3).

Furthermore, the Government is pressing for more effective international protection in the region. The main focus is now on the Dutch EU Presidency and cooperation with UNHCR. Together with UNHCR and other countries, the Netherlands plans to seek EU funding for a number of new proposals in this area (see section 5.4.1).

The Government will henceforth involve migrant organisations in the Netherlands more closely in drawing up development policy, by discussing the main lines of



major relevant draft memoranda on development policy with the National Ethnic Minorities Consultative Committee (LOM). It encourages migrant organisations and development organisations to continue seeking closer cooperation, so that migrant organisations can realise their full potential for contributing to development in countries of origin (see section 5.5).

If migrants and migrant organisations approach the Government for support in using remittances for development purposes, the Government will advise them and refer them to relevant organisations and programmes, which are listed in annexe V (see section 5.6).

Except in the case of knowledge migrants, the Government considers the encouragement of circular migration (within the constraints of national migration policy) an appropriate strategy which will serve the interests of migrants, countries of origin and countries of destination alike. The Government is prepared to consider support for the temporary or permanent return of skilled immigrants to help with reconstruction in priority countries for return. Support for Dutch civil-society initiatives to assist the reintegration of migrants returning to their countries of origin can be considered on the same terms. Activities should wherever possible benefit not only migrants but also the local population, in part so that they do not encourage migration. They should also be coordinated with Dutch civil-society initiatives offering migrants occupational or other training in preparation for return, as this may make the approach more effective. It is likewise important to involve migrant organisations (through the LOM) in discussions on return.

On request, the relevant ministries will gather economic information on priority countries for return that can be used by civil-society organisations operating in this field. In consultation with the organisations, the ministries will set up a structure for coordination and exchange of information (see section 5.7).

At the WTO GATS negotiations, the Government will look into the possibility of a more generous EU negotiating position on temporary migration of service providers, provided this does not conflict with national migration policy. The Government will continue to take an active part in the international debate on brain drain from the least developed countries. Migrant organisations in the Netherlands will be involved in the debate, through the LOM. In addition, in order to build capacity and make use of migrants' skills, efforts can be made to convince international businesses of the benefits of using migrants from countries where they are operating. More can also be done to recruit migrants for development cooperation work in their countries of origin (see section 5.8).

The Government is in favour of integrated efforts to combat illegal migration and smuggling of/trafficking in human beings at bilateral, EU and multilateral level.

Giving countries of origin and transit direct or indirect support or exerting pressure on them may be an effective way to secure their cooperation, without any need for a formal link. Where appropriate, the Government will consider whether the Netherlands can comply with the wishes of a main country of origin or transit, or whether pressure is required, in any area of bilateral relations: political, development-related, economic or cultural. When doing so it will strike a careful balance among the Netherlands' various short-term and long-term interests. Within the EU, the Government believes this issue should be handled by the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration. The Netherlands will ratify the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the protocols to it (see section 5.9).

#### **5.11 Financial implications of the new policy proposals**

The new policy proposals will place demands on the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including the development cooperation programme) and the Ministry of Justice (including the immigration and integration programme). However, it seems likely that the additional effort can be achieved with the existing staff.

In accordance with established practice, the proposed activities in support of return will be funded from ODA resources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget. The estimated cost will be approximately EUR 5 million a year. EU funding will be sought in addition to national funds. EU funding will also initially be sought for new activities relating to protection in the region.

## **I Annexe Definitions**

**International migrant:** Any person who leaves his country of residence and goes to live in another country. Journeys that are not associated with a change in country of residence, such as holidays, business trips, journeys for purposes of medical treatment or pilgrimages, are not deemed to be migration.

**Country of residence:** The country in which a person lives, that is to say, the country in which he or she has a place to live where he or she normally spends the daily period of rest.<sup>136</sup>

A distinction is made between long-term migrants and short-term migrants:

A **long-term migrant** is a person who moves to another country for a period of at least a year.

A **short-term migrant** is a person who moves to another country for a period of less than a year.<sup>137</sup>

The definition of **refugee** according to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and hence also in Dutch legal terminology is:<sup>138</sup> ‘Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’

In practice, the term ‘refugee’ is often used more broadly to mean any person who leaves his country in order to escape from an emergency (such as war or natural disaster). Often, however, a person is only termed a refugee if he crosses the border of his country. If a person leaves his place of residence but not his country, he is referred to as a ‘displaced person’ or ‘internally displaced person’.

The African Union (formerly the Organisation of African Unity) has adopted this usage in its definition of the term ‘refugee’, which it declares applicable not only

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<sup>136</sup> OECD, *Trends in International Migration*, 2002 – based on United Nations recommendations for the harmonisation of definitions (UN, 1998).

<sup>137</sup> OECD, *Trends in International Migration*, 2002 – based on United Nations recommendations for the harmonisation of definitions (UN, 1998).

<sup>138</sup> Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, *Dutch Treaty Series* 1951, 131, which entered into force on 22 April 1954 (1 August 1956 in respect of the Netherlands); Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, New York, 31 January 1967, *Dutch Treaty Series* 1967, 76, which entered into force on 4 October 1967 (29 November 1968 in respect of the Netherlands).

to refugees within the meaning of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, but also to ‘every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.’

*To avoid confusion over the term ‘refugee’, the terms **voluntary migration** and **forced migration** are also used.<sup>139</sup>*

*The term **forced migrant** includes both refugees within the meaning of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and persons who flee from their country because of other emergencies (as described, for example, in the African Union’s convention on refugee matters).*

*The term **voluntary migrant** applies to people who migrate of their own free will, and is often treated as equivalent to the term ‘economic migrant’.*

*In practice, voluntary and forced migration are often two ends of a continuum.*

*The European Union defines **voluntary migration** to mean all types of migration by third-country nationals (people who are not residents of an EU Member State) to countries of the European Union, with the exception of asylum. This includes short-term residence for purposes of holiday, visiting relatives, study, training or short-term employment, and long-term residence for purposes of family reunification or employment.*

Another potentially relevant distinction is that between **legal migration** and **illegal migration**:

In the case of **legal migration**, the migrant uses legal procedures to enter the country of destination, such as an application for asylum, family formation, family reunification or official labour or knowledge migration.

In the case of **illegal migration**, the migrant uses illegal channels to enter the country of destination. In the case of **illegal residence**, the migrant remains in the country of destination without a valid residence permit (in some cases his residence permit is no longer valid, e.g. an expired visa or a rejected application for asylum).

The following terms may also be of relevance to analyses of immigrants in the Netherlands:

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<sup>139</sup> International Organisation for Migration, ‘The Migration-Development Nexus, Evidence and Policy Options, State-of-the-Art Overview’, *International Migration*, Vol. 40 (5), 2002.

**Foreigners or aliens:** People with a nationality different from that of the country where they are living. In the Netherlands this therefore means people who do not have Dutch nationality. After naturalisation (which is normally only possible after living in the country for five years), immigrants are no longer treated as foreigners/aliens.

As defined by Statistics Netherlands, members of **ethnic minorities** are people at least one of whose parents was born abroad. Many analyses also distinguish between Western ethnic minorities (from Europe minus Turkey, North America, Indonesia/the former Dutch East Indies, Japan or Oceania) and non-Western ethnic minorities (including people from the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, Suriname, Turkey, Morocco, etc.).<sup>140</sup>

If both their parents were born in the Netherlands, the grandchildren of migrants are often no longer officially treated as ethnic minorities.

Another relevant factor concerning analyses of immigrants in the Netherlands is that they are often based on municipal databases (rather than a central database), in which ethnic minorities are normally recorded as immigrants only after they have been granted a residence permit or have been in the Netherlands for one year.<sup>141</sup> It should also be remembered that many immigrants do not have their names removed from the municipal database when they move away.

In other analyses the type of **residence permit** may be relevant (persons staying in the Netherlands for less than three months will be disregarded here).

The Aliens Act distinguishes between four types of residence permit:

- **temporary asylum residence permits** (usually for three years)
- **permanent asylum residence permits**
- **temporary normal residence permits**
- **permanent normal residence permits**

In general, asylum residence permits are issued when applications for asylum are granted, and normal residence permits are issued when requests to stay for reasons other than asylum (family formation/reunification, labour and knowledge migration) are granted.

**Brain drain** means loss of human capacity through the emigration of highly skilled or highly competent people.

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<sup>140</sup> NIDI, *Bevolkingsvraagstukken in Nederland anno 2000*, The Hague, 2000, p. 89.

<sup>141</sup> NIDI, *Bevolkingsvraagstukken in Nederland anno 2000*, The Hague, 2000, p. 115.

**Brain gain** refers to the benefits for those who remain, despite the emigration of highly skilled or highly competent people, because of the contribution the latter make from their countries of residence.

**Circular migration** means migration in which the migrant successively spends a relatively long time in various countries, including his country of origin.

## **II      Annexe:    Development partner countries of the Netherlands**

### Country

1. Afghanistan
2. Albania
3. Armenia
4. Bangladesh
5. Benin
6. Bolivia
7. Bosnia and Herzegovina
8. Burkina Faso
9. Cape Verde
10. Colombia
11. Egypt
12. Eritrea
13. Ethiopia
14. Georgia
15. Ghana
16. Guatemala
17. Indonesia
18. Kenya
19. Macedonia (FYROM)
20. Mali
21. Moldova
22. Mongolia
23. Mozambique
24. Nicaragua
25. Pakistan
26. Palestinian Authority
27. Rwanda
28. Senegal
29. South Africa
30. Sri Lanka
31. Suriname
32. Tanzania
33. Uganda
34. Vietnam
35. Yemen
36. Zambia

III Annexe: OECD DAC list

DAC List of Aid Recipients - As at 1 January 2003

Part I: Developing Countries and Territories (Official Development Assistance)					Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition (Official Aid)		
Least Developed Countries (LDCs)	Other Low-Income Countries (Other LICs) (per capita GNI < \$745 in 2001)	Lower Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) (per capita GNI \$746-\$2975 in 2001)		Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs) (per capita GNI \$2976-\$9205 in 2001)	High-Income Countries (HICs) (per capita GNI > \$9206 in 2001)	Central and Eastern European Countries and New Independent States of the former Soviet Union (CEECs/NIS)	More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories
Afghanistan Angola Bangladesh Benin Bhutan Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo, Dem. Rep. Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Haiti Kiribati Laos Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Maldives Mali Mauritania Mozambique Myanmar Nepal Niger Rwanda Samoa Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Somalia Sudan Tanzania Timor-Leste Togo Tuvalu Uganda Vanuatu Yemen Zambia	*Armenia *Azerbaijan Cameroon Congo, Rep. Côte d'Ivoire *Georgia Ghana India Indonesia Kenya Korea Democratic Republic *Kyrgyz Rep. *Moldova Mongolia Nicaragua Nigeria Pakistan Papua New Guinea *Tajikistan *Uzbekistan Viet Nam Zimbabwe	*Albania Algeria Belize Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina China Colombia Cuba Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Fiji Guatemala Guyana Honduras Iran Iraq Jamaica Jordan *Kazakhstan Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic) Marshall Islands Micronesia, Federated States Morocco Namibia Niue	Palestinian Administered Areas Paraguay Peru Philippines Serbia & Montenegro South Africa Sri Lanka St Vincent & Grenadines Suriname Swaziland Syria Thailand Tokelau Tonga Tunisia Turkey *Turkmenistan Wallis and Futuna	Botswana Brazil Chile Cook Islands Costa Rica Croatia Dominica Gabon Grenada Lebanon Malaysia Mauritius Mayotte Nauru Panama St Helena St Lucia Venezuela  ----- Threshold for World Bank Loan Eligibility (\$5185 in 2001) ----- ▪ Anguilla Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Barbados Mexico Montserrat Oman Palau Islands Saudi Arabia Seychelles St Kitts and Nevis Trinidad and Tobago ▪ Turks and Caicos Islands Uruguay	Bahrain	*Belarus *Bulgaria *Czech Republic *Estonia *Hungary *Latvia *Lithuania *Poland *Romania *Russia *Slovak Republic *Ukraine	▪ Aruba Bahamas ▪ Bermuda Brunei ▪ Cayman Islands Chinese Taipei Cyprus ▪ Falkland Islands ▪ French Polynesia ▪ Gibraltar ▪ Hong Kong, China Israel Korea Kuwait Libya ▪ Macao Malta ▪ Netherlands Antilles ▪ New Caledonia Qatar Singapore Slovenia United Arab Emirates ▪ Virgin Islands (UK)

\* Central and Eastern European countries and New Independent States of the former Soviet Union (CEECs/NIS).  
▪ Territory.



**IV      Annexe:    Non-Western ethnic minorities in the Netherlands**

*[Let op: cijfers in het Engels worden met komma's i.p.v. punten geschreven, bijv. 1,004,566]*

**Non-Western ethnic minorities by country of origin (first generation)**

ethnic minorities by region, country of origin and sex (1 January)

Topics

First-generation ethnic minorities

Total, first-generation ethnic minorities

Country of origin

Region

Age

Periods

Absolute number

<i>Total non-Western</i>	<i>1,004,566</i>
Afghanistan	30,936
Brazil	6,685
Cape Verde	11,335
China	27,144
Colombia	6,033
Dominican Republic	6,737
Egypt	10,280
Ethiopia	7,286
Ghana	11,597
Hong Kong	10,169
India	8,695
Iraq	35,732
Iran	23,908
Morocco	163,280
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	84,395
Pakistan	10,921
Philippines	7,621
Somalia	19,546
South Africa	8,129
Suriname	187,279
Turkey	190,219
Vietnam	11,551

Rest of Africa	60,869
Rest of Asia	43,775
Rest of America	20,444

Netherlands

Total, all ages

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**Non-western ethnic minorities by country of origin (second generation)**

ethnic minorities by region, country of origin and sex (1 January)

Topics:

- Second-generation ethnic minorities
- Total, second-generation ethnic minorities

<b>Country of origin</b>	<b>Absolute numbers</b>
Total non-Western	618,036
Afghanistan	3,313
Brazil	4,215
Cape Verde	8,018
China	11,671
Colombia	2,765
Dominican Republic	2,463
Egypt	6,746
Ethiopia	2,834
Ghana	6,377
Hong Kong	7,754
India	4,276
Iraq	6,227
Iran	4,135
Morocco	132,052
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	44,917
Pakistan	6,828
Philippines	4,134
Somalia	8,021
South Africa	6,785
Suriname	133,379
Turkey	151,181
Vietnam	5,314
Rest of Africa	23,534
Rest of Asia	18,675
Rest of America	12,422

Netherlands

Total, all ages

Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg/Heerlen, 16 June 2004

**Non-Western ethnic minorities by country of origin (first and second generations)**

ethnic minorities by region, country of origin and sex (1 January)

Topics:

- First and second-generation ethnic minorities
- Total first and second-generation ethnic minorities

<b>Country of origin</b>	<b>Absolute figures</b>
Total non-Western	1,622,602
Afghanistan	34,249
Brazil	10,900
Cape Verde	19,353
China	38,815
Colombia	8,798
Dominican Republic	9,200
Egypt	17,026
Ethiopia	10,120
Ghana	17,974
Hong Kong	17,923
India	12,971
Iraq	41,959
Iran	28,043
Morocco	295,332
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	129,312
Pakistan	17,749
Philippines	11,755
Somalia	27,567
South Africa	14,914
Suriname	320,658
Turkey	341,400
Vietnam	16,865
Rest of Africa	84,403
Rest of Asia	62,450
Rest of America	32,866

Netherlands

Total, all ages

Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg/Heerlen, 16 June 2004

## V **Annexe: Support channels for migrant organisations**

There are various channels through which migrant organisations in the Netherlands can obtain advice and financial support for development-related activities on behalf of their countries of origin:

- The Front Office provides funding for small-scale Dutch initiatives (up to €100,000) by private individuals and organisations.<sup>142</sup> Five co-financing organisations – Oxfam Netherlands (NOVIB), the Humanistic Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (HIVOS), the Inter-Church Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO), the Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development (Cordaid) and Plan Netherlands – and the National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO) are jointly responsible for the Front Office. There are no standard criteria for making applications to the Front Office. Each of the six organisations involved has its own policy and criteria for funding low-threshold private initiatives. Experience so far shows that migrant organisations have had difficulty in gaining access to the Front Office. The situation will be evaluated in the second half of 2004.
- The Small-Scale Local Activities (KPA) programme, which is also carried out by NCDO, awards grants of up to €100,000 to top up the proceeds of fund-raising activities in the Netherlands for projects in developing countries. Grants of up to 50% of the proceeds of fund-raising can be awarded. One important criterion for obtaining a grant is that the fund-raising must be accompanied by public information in the Netherlands concerning the project. At the moment few migrant organisations make use of this programme, so NCDO has launched a campaign entitled *Wanted: more colourful development cooperation* to encourage them to do so.
- LINKIS (Low-Threshold Initiatives & Contact and Information Centre for International Cooperation) is a partnership involving co-financing organisations, thematic cofinancing organisations, the NCDO and the Netherlands Local Development Cooperation Centre (COS Nederland). It is an advisory service for groups of citizens (for example, migrants and migrant organisations) who need help drawing up specific project proposals. Since this needs to be a low-threshold, broadly accessible programme, the regional centres have taken responsibility for it. They receive funding from the NCDO.

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<sup>142</sup> This emphatically covers all kinds of private initiatives, including (but not only) ones by migrant organisations.

- Various departments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are in touch with migrant organisations. For example, the Sub-Saharan Africa Department and various West African migrant groups are involved in the MIDA pilot project in Ghana.
- InTent is a government-funded initiative to help migrants set up small private businesses in countries of origin.

## **VI Annexe: International organisations and migration**

The *International Organisation for Migration* (IOM), an intergovernmental organisation, plays a key role in migration research and debate, despite limited funding and staff. Over the years the journal *International Migration* has become one of the leading forums for discussion about migration. IOM supports studies and consultation between sending and receiving countries, carries out migration-related projects and facilitates the voluntary return of migrants.

The *World Trade Organisation* (WTO) is involved in the issue of labour migration through negotiations on liberalisation of trade in services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

The *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development* (OECD) has accumulated a great deal of knowledge about migration since 1991. However, this knowledge has hardly ever been translated into specific development cooperation proposals.

The *World Bank* report *Globalisation, Growth and Poverty* (2002) was a decisive step in identifying migration as a key factor in globalisation. According to the World Bank, countries that are more fully integrated into the global market and have high rates of emigration have higher rates of per capita economic growth than other countries. However, it is not clear to what extent this understanding has influenced decisions on programmes and loans. Among the topics discussed in the World Bank report *Global Development Finance* (2003) is that of remittances.

The *International Monetary Fund* (IMF) seems less concerned with the link between development and migration. It has published a critical study of remittances indicating that they have an adverse impact on countries of origin.<sup>143</sup>

Of the *United Nations* (UN) organisations, the Secretariat publishes sound demographic statistics and narrowly focused migration studies, but very little on migration and development. The UN Committee on Population and Development, set up in the wake of the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, would appear to be the most appropriate organisation to tackle the theme of migration and development. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has long been a catalyst in the migration debate within the UN, although somewhat half-heartedly for lack of a mandate in this area. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) pays little attention to the subject. The United Nations High

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<sup>143</sup> Chami, Ralph, Connel Fullenkamp and Samir Jahjah, *Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?*, 2003, IMF Working Paper WP/03/189, Washington DC.

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is, of course, closely involved in discussions and policy relating to refugees and forced migration.

The *International Labour Organisation* (ILO) deals with migration and development in articles and seminars, but does not play a very prominent role in this area.



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