The survey on “Engaging Diasporas as Agents for Development” was carried out by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2005, with the objective of taking stock of current policies pursued by governments as regards engaging diasporas for development. This analysis presents the findings extracted from the 49 responses received to the questionnaire entitled “Policies targeting diasporas as agents for development” that was addressed to all IOM Member States and Observers.

The purpose of this document is to contribute to the ongoing debate on diasporas and diaspora policies. It also aims to inform governments willing to engage with diasporas for development about existing policies, obstacles and successes encountered.

The questionnaire provided a definition of “diasporas” as: “people and ethnic populations that left their homelands, individuals and/or members of organized networks and associations, maintaining links with their homelands”. The transnational dimension of diasporas, the link between home and host countries rather than the historical connotation was stressed. The term was purposely used in plural to reflect the diversity of populations that can be acknowledged as diasporas.
“Development” was defined in its broad human, social and economic meaning. Development implies growth, advancement, empowerment and progress. The goal of development is to build human capabilities and enlarge human choices. Equity, sustainability, productivity and empowerment are its essential components.

The main message conveyed by the survey is that respondents pursued dynamic policies targeting diasporas. There is a noticeable expansion in the number and types of programmes over the past five years. A variety of policy objectives and tools are involved; however, these policies are driven by a shared objective: to find ways to encourage expatriate populations, either permanently or temporarily settled abroad, to contribute to the development of their home country. Diaspora policies still face many obstacles, including suspicion on the part of the populations they target.

This analysis proceeds as follows:

1. Background of the survey
2. Main findings
3. Detailed analysis of the responses to the questionnaire
4. Annexes: (a). List of respondents; (b) List of Tables and Charts; (c) Questionnaire.

**Background**

This first part of the analysis presents the background of the survey, the added value of the exercise, the methodology, a presentation of respondents and some acknowledged caveats.

*Why Undertake a Survey on Diaspora Policies?*

The role of diasporas in the development, poverty reduction, reconstruction and growth of countries of origin is attracting considerable policy interest. To maximize their potential contribution to development, and minimize potential negative effects, any policy concerning a country’s relation with the
overseas diasporas requires careful management. Countries experiencing high levels of emigration are not necessarily successful in attracting the attention and support of their diasporas. Moreover, migrants are frequently unable to work legally in host countries, or their qualifications may not be recognized and occupational downgrading occur, all features that limit their potential contributions to their home countries, as well as their countries of residence. Integrating diasporas into local growth projects that represent a real added value for the national economy is a major issue today, as is establishing effective cooperation between home and host countries to facilitate and support diasporas and their contributions to development.

IOM’s experience in implementing programmes targeting human capital shows that members of diasporas are very interested to support the socio-economic development of their home countries, provided that the opportunities offered to do so are credible, and that specific cooperation mechanisms between home and host countries allow them to keep their jobs in the host country. It was therefore felt that a survey would be timely in order to take stock, and assess the governmental policies being put in place to engage diasporas for development.

*What is the Added Value of this Survey?*

Despite increased academic and policy interest in the contributions to be made by diasporas to development, there is a clear knowledge gap at the policy level: what policies are being implemented, what institutions are in charge, which methods are favoured, and what tools are put in place? This gap is partially owing to the novelty and rapid change in this field.

To our knowledge, no other survey has been undertaken at the international level that focuses on policy and assesses government engagements with their diasporas for development purposes. Existing research concentrates to a certain extent on the organization, activities and attitudes of diasporas towards governments.

Of additional interest is the comprehensive scope of this survey. Very often studies focus on one aspect of the contributions
made by diasporas, such as, e.g. migrant remittances, or skills transfers, or on a specific policy concern, for instance, how to gather data on diasporas, or how to identify the appropriate diaspora interlocutors, or on a specific sector, e.g. medical, educational, information and technology, etc. This survey spans a very wide range of aspects identified as of major importance in engaging diasporas for development, and the contributions that diasporas could make, viz. social, financial, business, trade, and human. Moreover, it allows to recognize potential similarities or differences among the various aspects: for instance, are financial contributions related to human capital transfers? The survey deals with the policy and structural environment in which the pro-diaspora measures are set up and explores potential obstacles to policy action.

The survey compares countries at diverse levels of development and reveals the similarities and differences in the respective interest most developed and least developed countries have in their diasporas abroad.

Another valuable feature of the survey is its dual focus: both home and host countries are considered and attention is, therefore, directed at government strategies towards their own diasporas abroad and host countries’ strategies towards foreign diasporas within their borders. Special emphasis has been placed on understanding the collaboration mechanisms between sending and receiving countries.

Finally, this survey, which was addressed to IOM Member and Observer States in December 2004, is part of IOM’s strategy on Migration and Development, and its results inform policy and support project development. The questionnaire was designed to contribute to the Migration and Development Intersessional Workshop, held in February 2005, which is one of the annual events organized by IOM within the framework of International Dialogue on Migration. It allows IOM Member States and Observer States to exchange their respective knowledge and experience concerning diverse migration issues. Forty-nine countries responded to the questionnaire that was addressed to all IOM Member States and Observers, through their permanent representations in Geneva.
Methodology

The questionnaire is based on a literature review on diaspora strategies and policies, as well as on the analysis of IOM programmes dealing with diasporas (Migration for Development MIDA, Return of Qualified Professionals, Research on Remittances and Diasporas).

The questionnaire contains 18 multiple-choice questions, that also give respondents the opportunity for further elaboration. The questions aim to take stock on policies in place or in the pipeline, to assess the interest of governments in working with diasporas with a development perspective, understand how governments actually engage in activities with their diasporas, and to see how governments themselves appraise the measures and policies they pursue. The questions deal with multiple aspects of diaspora policies: identifying the interlocutors inside diasporas, collecting data on diaspora populations, designating institutional bodies to collaborate with diasporas, introducing legislative measures, targeting the human, social, financial and business resources of diasporas, establishing partnerships to better engage diasporas for development, assessing obstacles and defining priorities for further action.

The questions are either intended to obtain information on government strategies towards their own diasporas abroad or host governments’ strategies towards foreign diasporas on their territory. This dual focus was chosen in order to obtain new elements of analysis that can connect the respective policy interest of both.

Only three questions used a different method. Question 13 requested respondents to give a qualitative assessment of the success of the actual implementation of policies and programmes mentioned throughout the questionnaire, by ranking governmental initiatives from 1 to 3 (corresponding to not successful, successful or very successful). Question 17 asked respondents to rank a set of priorities from 1 to 3, i.e. not important, important and very important, and question 18 encouraged respondents to add any other general remarks or documents they considered significant to explain their responses.
This document provides an analysis extracted from the questionnaire, and is not a general overview of current global diaspora policies.

Caveats

While analysing the responses to the questionnaire, some caveats were identified.

- Shortcomings related to the lack of coordination among governmental institutions in charge of diasporas.

The fact that a large variety of governmental institutions deal with diaspora concerns makes it difficult for the questionnaire to be completed by one person alone. Since diaspora issues are relatively new and cover all types of social, financial and individual concerns, the agencies charged with overseeing such issues are also varied. For example, many respondents did not reply to the questions on financial resources because these fall within the competence of other departments. Out of the 49 responding countries 13, or 20 per cent, did not provide any financial responses, often indicating that this was the responsibility of other government departments or agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the results might not fully reflect the diverse aspects of diaspora policies.

- Lack of coherence in responses since diasporas represent a new and poorly defined subject area.

Some responses were contradictory, which may be due to ambiguous question formulation, or the lack of a national definition of diasporas and of policies targeting diasporas for development. For example, there are various connotations behind “return programmes” that target failed asylum seekers rather than diasporas and do not have a stated development goal. The respondent will in that case say that they do have return programmes, even though these programmes do not target diasporas. There is, therefore, some confusion in the interpretation of the questionnaire as to the actual understanding and identity
of diasporas. Caution, in particular regarding confusion with the migrant population in general and with the concept of “national minority”, is called for.

- Determining the linkages between migration and development.

Some countries responded affirmatively to the question whether migration policies were part of their development strategies, but failed to explain such policies. Though most respondents had a migration policy as such, no details or examples were given in their response when it came to linking the issue of migration to development. The questionnaire might therefore offer an overly positive view on how well migration and development agendas were integrated.

- The dual perspective of their own diasporas abroad and foreign diasporas on their territory.

As many countries are both home and host countries to migrants, the questionnaire purposely targeted their own diasporas abroad, and foreign diasporas within their national borders. Although this dual perspective, offered useful correlations between integration and diaspora issues, some respondents might have found it confusing. This caveat was discussed during the design of the questionnaire, but the importance of this dual perspective outweighed the concerns over a potential confusion.

- The respondent countries represent a self-selected sample.

The questionnaire was sent to all IOM Member and Observer States, each deciding on whether or not to respond. This type of sample leads to a number of caveats: (1) if only the most interested and active countries respond to the questionnaire, it may convey an overly dynamic image of diaspora policies which might have been less so with a different sample. (2) The questionnaire attracted only few responses from developed countries (11), which raises questions about the general interest of developed
countries in diasporas as both migrant sending and receiving countries. However, by formulating the questionnaire differently and focusing more on the aid and support given by developed host countries to developing countries with well-represented communities on their territories, might have triggered more interest on their part. Yet, the relatively low response rate also demonstrated that the resources of their own nationals abroad are, or seem, less vital for developed countries.

**Main Findings**

The second part of this analysis discusses how the objectives initially set out for this survey were achieved, how diaspora policies outlined in the responses might have a real impact on development and how host and home countries collaborate on diaspora issues. This part concludes with a synthesis of the main findings of the questionnaire.

**Respondents: Countries and Institutions**

Forty-nine countries responded to the questionnaire:

Africa and the Middle East (17 countries in total): Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

The Americas (11 countries in total): Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Asia-Pacific region (7 countries in total): Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand.

Europe (14 countries in total): Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine.

Table 1 lists the respondent countries according to income level. Chart 1 illustrates the income levels of the respondent countries.

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<th>Middle income</th>
<th>High income</th>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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Based on the OECD DAC List of Aid Recipients, as of 11 January 2003.
Responses to the questionnaire indicate that countries with a similar level of development also share some similar concerns:

High-income countries:

- Most developed countries are more concerned with the integration of foreign diasporas on their territories and with policies that take into account ethnic diversity and multiculturalism, than with their own diasporas abroad.
- Some high-income respondent countries, such as Australia, Belgium, Italy, Canada are nevertheless interested in encouraging return migration of their own highly qualified professionals.
- High-income countries are interested in promoting their own identity (political, economic and cultural) abroad through their diasporas.

Middle and low-income countries:

- have a higher interest in diasporas as remittance senders;
- encounter specific difficulties with engaging diasporas because of their reluctance to work with the home government;
encounter difficulties in identifying willing development partners and interlocutors;

• face resource limitations and truncated policies because of such obstacles as lack of institutional communication, heavy administration and insufficient services to diasporas.

The questionnaire was received and answered by very diverse governmental institutions and entities. Moreover, it revealed that diasporas were a complex notion, embracing multiple realities. The responses received confirmed that the notion of diasporas can have blurred conceptual borderlines and be confused with other notions such as “labour migrants”, “migrants” or “national minorities”. This conceptual blur might explain the extreme diversity of institutions responding to the questionnaire (for a complete list, please refer to Annex 1). The variety of departments that responded to the questionnaire encompasses such different institutions as: Ministries for Foreign Affairs (Costa Rica, Pakistan, Hungary), Ministries for Interior (Germany, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Lithuania), Departments in charge of Immigration and Citizenship (Australia, Canada), Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs (Bulgaria, Thailand, Pakistan), Authorities dealing with Irregular Migration and Trafficking: Bosnia and Herzegovina; Authorities dealing with Nationalities and Migration: Ukraine, as well as agencies dealing with development, ethnic affairs, migrant workers, refugees and displaced people.

This diversity of stakeholders in charge of diaspora issues illustrates one of the greatest challenges in developing pro-diaspora policies: how to coordinate the work of such a multitude of stakeholders for effective implementation. While ministries of foreign affairs tend to be concerned with diasporas abroad, interior ministries, or migration or border control agencies usually deal with foreign diasporas on their territory. Some respondents returned two questionnaires: one referring to their own diasporas abroad, the other to foreign diasporas within their borders. This variety of stakeholders leads to a lack of exchange and of coordination regarding government strategies towards their own diasporas and those settled on their own territory.
Despite this diversity, it is possible to discern ministerial departments specifically dealing with diasporas abroad, most of which were created after 2000. As illustrated in Chart 2, 74 per cent of respondents stated they had a specialized governmental structure liaising with diasporas, for instance Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, Lithuania, Mali, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Senegal, Tunisia and Uruguay. This highlights the increased awareness, interest and action by governments concerning the involvement of diasporas in development schemes.

Achieving the Objectives of the Questionnaire

The questionnaire was designed to achieve six specific objectives:

- Take stock of existing policies, institutions, laws, tools and instruments targeting diasporas as agents for development.
- Understand and compare the different policies designed to manage relations with diasporas abroad and foreign nationals living on a country’s territory.
- Identify specific policy needs and priorities of IOM members and observers on diaspora issues.
- Identify major obstacles to involving diasporas in development policies or programmes (financial means, political problems, data limitations, etc.).
- Explore the relationship between migration and development agendas.
- Define regional trends.

**Objective 1: Existing policies, institutions, laws, tools and instruments**

Ninety-two per cent of the respondents indicated that they had policies and programmes targeting their own diasporas abroad (Chart 3) and 74 per cent were engaged in activities directed towards foreign nationals on their territory (Chart 4). This shows that developed as well as developing countries have an interest in diasporas abroad and that, in general, this yielded a sample of both migrant home and host countries. Nevertheless, the level of development has a strong impact on the interest for diasporas abroad: low and middle-income countries are clearly more interested in tapping the potential of their diasporas abroad.
Even though the interest of host countries in foreign diasporas on their national territory is less important and their respective activities less structured, 74 per cent have policies regarding their foreign diasporas in place, which is high, especially as our sample is composed of 38 low and middle-income countries and only 11 high-income countries. While the majority of high-income countries confirmed that they had policies intended for foreign diasporas on their territory, only some developing countries responded likewise.

A strong policy commitment towards collaboration with diasporas abroad was displayed by all respondents. Moreover, the responses point to a great diversity of programmes. A few countries have developed comprehensive policy packages, for instance:

- The Republic of Benin developed a National Policy Plan for Beninese abroad, launched in 2001 and supported at the presidential level, which comprises a National Policy Declaration and establishes a new ministry in charge of relations with Beninese abroad, as well as a national agency of Beninese abroad. However, results so far are judged to be minimal.
• Colombia: the new programme “ColombiaNos Une” is monitored at presidential level and has achieved good results despite limited funds. Colombia also works with the countries that are host to Columbian diasporas, especially with the United States. A pilot project for a “Consular Registry Card” is being implemented in Washington.

• The Ethiopian government established the Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs General Directorate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ethiopian Expatriate Support and Coordination Office as part of the country’s capacity-building efforts. Establishing these programmes within existing structures suggests a considerable policy awareness and interest.

• El Salvador adopted a number of legislative decrees that introduced a “Migrant Week”, a “Convention for Migrant Workers”, visits from Salvadorians living abroad, tax-free goods for visiting diaspora populations. Executive decrees have consolidated the foundations for policies and programmes, such as the creation of a Vice-Minister for Salvadorians Abroad, the creation of the General Direction for Salvadorians Abroad, the establishment of an inter-institutional network dealing with Salvadorians abroad and, more generally, made the diaspora issue an integral part of the country’s foreign policy.

• Uruguay has an official governmental programme, “Programa de Vinculacion con los Uruguayos Residentes en el Exterior” along with an internet website (www.vinculacion.gub.uy). Membership is on a voluntary basis and diaspora members are free to sign up to this programme. Another interesting feature of this programme is the Evaluation Committee which operates under executive authority and in collaboration with the Dean of the University of Uruguay. Events for diasporas are also organized under this programme. Although the government does not collect data on the characteristics and qualifications of its diaspora community, it does maintain a
skills/knowledge database of its diasporas through the “Programa de Vinculacion”.

- Tunisia adopted an annual official programme at the presidential level with a special diaspora chapter for 2005-2009.

In addition, the significance of diasporas has led to the introduction of new or revised policy programmes in respondent countries:

- Algeria: A new government programme targeting diasporas is being implemented.
- Bangladesh: The governmental programme being developed aims at identifying its most prominent diasporas.
- Benin: A “Qualification Database” and an “Investment Code” targeting diasporas is being developed.
- Burundi: A “National Forum for Diasporas” has been created.
- Chile: A new migration programme and census have been launched together with the “Document on the Migratory Policies of Chile” (“Documento sobre Politica Migratorias de Chile”).
- Pakistan: A programme including visits of expatriate Pakistani consultants on short-term assignments for the purpose of transferring knowledge and technology has been introduced.
- Rwanda: Policies include the preparation of conventions targeting Rwandan diasporas living in West Africa.
- Sudan: A capacity-building initiative has recently been introduced to raise both awareness and competence within the institutions in charge of populations abroad.
- Ukraine: The “2010 Diaspora Programme” has been launched to raise awareness and improve collaboration with diasporas by 2010.
- Venezuela: Programmes include a census of Venezuelan residents abroad (Censo de los Venezolanos Residentes en el Exterior, 2005) and a consolidated government programme to implement the Electoral Presidential Programme 2004-2005.
Countries which had no policy activities aimed at their own
nor foreign diasporas, nonetheless responded to the questionnaire
and expressed a clear interest in the subject area, a clear indication
that they considered it important to participate, even though for
some the widely dispersed diaspora communities made data
collection difficult, or where collaboration with diasporas existed,
the initiative had been taken by financial, private institutions and
NGOs, rather than by the government.

Objective 2: Manage relations with diasporas abroad and
foreign nationals living inside the country

The questionnaire intended to collect relevant information for
governments, most of which concerned both home and host
countries. Many respondents, though they recognized this dual
role, responded mainly as either host or home to diaspora
communities. The responses received showed that the concerns
specific to home or host country were rarely systematically treated
and linked and that strategies were developed by different
institutions and pursued disconnected objectives.

The definition of diasporas in the questionnaire emphasizes
its transnational character, and this sometimes causes confusion
among the respondents, which may account for their different
approaches regarding their diasporas abroad and foreign
diasporas within their own borders. In addition, some countries
indicated that they paid particular attention to some third-country
diaspora communities regarding which they conducted extensive
research and introduced special policies. For example, Germany
focuses on foreign diasporas from Egypt, Serbia and Montenegro,
and Afghanistan, and has introduced projects specific to these
diaspora groups. The participation by foreign diasporas in host
country development projects is not very common. However, it
is possible that some respondent governments define those who
do participate as migrants and not as diasporas, and therefore
might have considered that information on these populations is
beyond the scope of the questionnaire.
Objective 3: Specific policy needs and priorities

The responses obtained through this questionnaire illustrate policy priorities and needs. When asked to give ratings of importance, governments are mainly concerned with (1) learning about international good practices, (2) improving governmental capacity regarding diaspora programmes, and (3) improving coherence between migration and development agendas. These priorities demonstrate that governments are interested in very concrete examples of policies and good practices, the effective implementation of such policies, along with the improved integration of migration concerns into development strategies. The responses also indicate the need for further policy guidance to fully incorporate diasporas into national development frameworks. Some countries, for example Chile, underlined the fundamental importance of well coordinated inter-institutional policies.

Since the response to the questionnaire came from various government agencies, general trends are somewhat difficult to identify. Most respondents prioritized their policy needs as: (1) accessing a “policy guide” that would offer information and guidance to incorporate diasporas in the development agendas; (2) establish a “good practices” database or catalogue; (3) increase “governmental awareness” of diaspora potential”, and (4) identify the “right partners” within diasporas. The participation in international consultations as well as regional exchanges are highlighted as a useful platform for policy dialogue. All these elements are of key importance for further prioritization of IOM’s work in the field of diaspora policies and programmes.

Objective 4: Major obstacles

Regarding obstacles, the majority of respondents regarded “problems to collect data on diasporas” as the main obstacle in engaging diasporas in development strategies. The responses offer limited information regarding the registration of diasporas and the improvement of data collection that could provide a clear view of existing gaps in data collection. Some examples included
the use of a census abroad (Chile), card schemes for nationals abroad (Pakistan) and data on labour migrants (Philippines). These limited results indicate the need for more research and knowledge exchange on methods to register diasporas and collect data, as a priority area for future work.

“Policies targeting diasporas contradicting integration policies” is quoted as the least-common obstacle, which contradicts the idea that diaspora policies might be at odds with integration policies. It is occasionally assumed that favouring diaspora linkages with their home countries might harm the process of integration in the host country, but our responses do not bear out this assumption.

Additionally, the responses show that “problems to finance governmental work with diasporas” is the second greatest obstacle quoted by respondents. While governments acknowledge the importance of diasporas in development, they lack the financial resources, means and policies to attract diaspora resources. This explains the gap that is often mentioned in the responses to this questionnaire, between planned policy strategies and genuinely implemented policies.

Other significant obstacles include “assessing the diasporas’ development potential”, “overcoming competition among diaspora groups” and “building partnership with home or host countries”. The first point stresses the difficulty for policymakers to clearly identify the professional, financial and social capital of diasporas abroad, and to match this potential with concrete development strategies at home. The second issue underlines a constant in the questionnaire: the difficulty that governments have to identify the right interlocutors among the diasporas, and to offer development strategies able to respond to the diversified social, political and economic interests of diasporas. This stresses the need for a more up-to-date and fitting definition of diasporas that accounts for the diversity of individual interests rather than supporting the establishment of one “Diaspora”, united by a unique national interest which might seem unrealistic or remote from the personal strategies of individual diaspora members. The third point emphasizes the transnational nature of diasporas and
the need for partnerships between home and host countries. Although governments acknowledge the need to cooperate, actual coordination seems still difficult to achieve.

Countries identified other specific obstacles apart from those proposed by the multiple choices, such as the lack of communication among departments, community representatives and corporate actors.

Objective 5: Are migration and development agendas integrated?

The questionnaire aimed to explore the relationship between the migration and development agendas. The responses offer few satisfying explanations on how this is to be achieved, though a majority of governments stated that migration concerns were integrated into development strategies. This question requires further analysis and exchange with the respondents.

Chart 5 shows that 70 per cent of respondents considered that migration issues are incorporated in their government’s development agenda. Despite the significance of positive answers to this question, closer scrutiny reveals that the link between migration and development policies appears to be weak, recent or only partially implemented. It is also interesting to note that
77 per cent of developing countries answered in the affirmative, compared to only 55 per cent of developed countries (however, it is important to bear in mind that the sample includes only 11 developed countries).

Some respondents detail their governmental efforts of incorporating migration into the developmental agenda. Greece explained how migration and development are integrated into one framework, as “The interaction of immigration and development emerges in several articles of Law 2910/2001 in the frame of implementation of migration policy in Greece”. The Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization of the Hellenic Republic has initiated a new draft law on the reform of the legislative framework of migration policy in Greece, in collaboration with other governments. The reform aims to promote more flexible and simplified procedures of entry and residence of immigrants, as well as special procedures for the growth of economic activities within the Greek territory by third-country nationals in order to attract foreign investments.

Costa Rica and Nicaragua also established an agenda of binational cross-border development that brings together development and migratory concerns. Bangladesh emphasized that migration and development concerns are linked through the official recognition of remittances as an important resource for the economy, while in Cape Verde the national foreign direct investment policy integrates concerns about diaspora investments. Other countries included development objectives in their migration programmes; for instance Benin in its “Governmental Action Plan” and the “National Policy Document on Beninese Abroad”. But this official inclusion does not yet mean that the results are being achieved. The Benin government is now evaluating initial results and designing a follow-up strategy due to limited concrete results.

Objective 6: Regional trends

Given the partial responses received, it is difficult to identify regional trends in diaspora policies. Among the few identifiable regional trends it is possible to identify:
• a stronger link between diaspora policies and interest in labour migration in the Asia region and the countries of the former Soviet Union.
• more comprehensive policy packages and high-level recognition of diaspora role in development, in Central and South America compared to other regions, as well as some concrete examples of collaboration with banks on remittances there.
• a growing interest in diasporas in eastern and central Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union.
• a very significant interest and dynamism towards diasporas in Africa, despite the recognition that results are often limited because of diverse obstacles and rather recent policy initiatives.
• the African and Latin American regions also appear as significant sending and receiving regions that face complex challenges owing to this double dimension.

It seems, however, more appropriate to consider the level of development for each respondent country instead of the geographic location. The division of countries according to income might suggest more accurate views on diasporas and development policies than regional classifications. Without separating the Least Developed Countries (LDC) from the Most Developed Countries (MDC), it is hard to explain how countries are involved in developing policies and programmes for diasporas and how they are related to development initiatives. While MDCs might not need to engage diasporas in national developmental schemes, LDCs are in need of such support from diasporas and their human and financial potential. Many countries positively responded that the remittances coming from their diasporas have made great contributions to economic development. In addition, while European countries largely belong to the MDC category, most respondents from Africa and the Middle East and Asia are categorized as LDCs. Therefore, when this analysis refers to regional differences it concurrently takes into consideration the economic and developmental standards of the respondents.
Are Diaspora Policies Contributing to Development in Place?

A general remark about the results of this survey is that, while the responses we received to the questionnaire offer very useful insights into policies targeting diasporas, the development objective often surfaces in a diffuse way. It is not very clear how diasporas contribute to development, how their contributions are measured, what their assessed contributions are and how they impact on socio-economic development, what difference they make to the development strategy of the country. Two questions directly invited governments to assess the results of their policies: “Overall, how would you rate your government’s measures to engage diasporas as partners for development: unsuccessful, successful, very successful?” (Question 13) and “Do you consider that the means invested in those measures/policies match the results obtained?” (Question 14).

Sixty-three per cent of all respondents consider their government’s measures/policies aimed at engaging diasporas as partners for development are either as “successful”, or “very successful”. This result means that inspite of multiple obstacles, many respondents consider that their policies have positive and effective results.

With respect to Question 14, the responses received do not allow us to assess the effectiveness of many projects, measures and programmes mentioned. This is partly because responses were not very detailed, but also because there is limited evaluation and result assessment. Nevertheless, we can extract some concrete results.

- Some countries have designed comprehensive policy packages enforced by legislative and executive means and supported at the presidential or ministerial levels. This is the case for El Salvador and Colombia. Despite being recently implemented, the policies are rated as very successful.

- The pro-diaspora policies have led to an improvement in investments made by diasporas in Cape Verde.
The facilities created by the Government of Mali to transfer funds and encourage returns have been identified as conducive to diasporas’ increased involvement in development issues.

Though the pro-diaspora policy is considered very successful, the Rwandan government considers that its measures are still very recent and at a mobilization stage. Hence, there are significant expectations concerning future stages.

The Government of Indonesia has introduced preliminary legislation to better respond to the needs of their diasporas abroad. Major challenges still exist to provide better services for diasporas in terms of better legislation and human security issues, as well as the provision of services.

Benin considers that only few concrete impacts are registered because of the obstacles encountered by diaspora organizations abroad.

Pakistan considers that the means invested match the results, but highlights the difficulty of quantifying the results.

These results call for further attention within the policy debate on developing indicators to evaluate policy successes. Countries are not always certain how to define in concrete terms the results obtained. Better assessment of policy results could encompass: measuring investments by diasporas or the numbers of temporary and permanent returns. However, other positive results are of equal importance but difficult to quantify such as, reducing administrative burdens, improving communication with diasporas, facilitating diaspora driven initiatives, etc.

Each programme and policy should define its own parameters of success from the start and measure achievements as well as evaluate the implementation. However, this requires additional resources which are limited for some governments. Therefore,
comparisons of good practices and exchanges of experiences at international level are of major importance.

**Policy Collaboration between Sending and Receiving Countries**

The questionnaire’s results offer useful insights about existing collaboration between host and home countries on diaspora matters. The collaboration between receiving and sending countries is generally acknowledged in existing research and programme evaluations as a significant component for effective diaspora resource management. Respondents provided examples of such partnerships: Greece with Bulgaria, Indonesia with South Korea, Costa Rica with Nicaragua, Thailand with Nigeria, and Mali with France.

However, it appears that, in general, collaboration is limited as well as difficult to establish. Some countries recognized the significance of regional integration mechanisms as key opportunities for exchange at regional level on diasporas (i.e. Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest CEDEAO, Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine UEMOA, African Union).

Numerous respondents though they are both sending and receiving countries do not see foreign diasporas on their territory as a potential driving force for development but they do acknowledge their potential role in the development of their home country.

The lack of collaboration between host and home countries is identified as an important obstacle to developing policies towards diasporas in several respondent countries, such as Mexico and Portugal. Nevertheless, 23 out of 49 respondents stated that they had established partnerships with the countries where their own diasporas are based. Only 14 respondents claimed to have such a partnership with the countries of origin of the foreign diasporas based on their territory.

The responses show a clear correlation between home and host countries partnerships and labour migration dynamics (Ukraine
signed 16 bilateral treaties on mutual employment and/or social insurance). Countries of origin with active labour migration programmes are more likely to seek partnerships with countries of destination. Recruitment agencies are increasingly involved in such partnerships and financial intermediaries also play an important role in this matter.

Summary of Findings

General Points

Strong policy engagement is cited among respondents, although they usually have limited resources dedicated to these policies.

The diaspora policy field is dynamic with ongoing programmes and many planned activities in most respondent countries.

A great diversity of programmes dealing with different aspects of diaspora issues is acknowledged, but only few are comprehensive and equally encompass legal, financial, social, professional and symbolic features.

Countries share similar objectives and concerns according to similarities in income levels, rather than regional categorization.

Diasporas and Development

The sectors covered by government activities are not solely aimed at economic development but encompass other social, cultural, artistic, religious or political aspects; therefore the development focus of the programmes is often diluted or unclear.

However, this might express that indirect measures (dual citizenship, property rights, voting rights) i.e. those that are not devised with a development purpose, might have a significant impact by gaining diaspora confidence and trust and therefore favouring their contributions to development.
Concrete results assessing the impact of diaspora contributions in financial, human, social and economic terms are limited (for instance, percentages of diaspora contributions to foreign direct investment FDI, business and job creation, etc.).

**Institutional Arrangements**

A growing number of institutions specializing in diaspora issues within governments is noted, which indicates a clear dynamism and strong political interest in this area.

Consulates remain the main vehicles of communication and interaction with diasporas abroad.

**Data**

The lack of data is a significant problem, especially for measuring diasporas abroad, mainly due to registration and definition issues. The key question is how best to register citizens and nationals abroad, temporary and permanent migrants.

Many countries are actively engaged in data collection of qualified diasporas, the questionnaire offers many examples of diaspora skills data bases, but only limited insights in the effectiveness of these programmes.

**Common Types of Programmes/Tools and Measures**

Organizing events is one of the most common means of reaching out to diasporas. However, there is no indication of the development objective being pursued by such events. Respondents indicated that physical returns are less of a priority, either because they already undertake such programmes, or because they favour other types of programmes targeting virtual returns or exchanges, or, finally, because of the costs of such programmes.

Problems of programme implementation, coordination and collaboration with the diasporas were reported.
What Contributions are Sought?

Policy interest in remittances is directly related to labour migration initiatives and, more broadly, to the interest in diaspora transfers.

Though there seems to be significant awareness of the need to facilitate remittance transfers, there is still limited evidence regarding the channelling of remittances towards development, or identifying local projects for development.

The importance of financial transfers is largely confined to LDCs. Remittances are often the responsibility of finance departments and appear to be unrelated to other diaspora issues. This can prevent governments from having a comprehensive view and, therefore, relevant policies regarding their populations abroad.

Diasporas emerge from this survey as key business partners and there is clearly a growing awareness of their potential contributions in terms of foreign direct investment and trade. There is also a strong interest in the business capacity and potential of foreign diasporas in the host country.

The business potential of diasporas is also recognized by governments in the form of developing partnerships with chambers of commerce to specifically favour relations with representatives from diasporas.

Governments have community and hometown associations as primary contact points among diasporas abroad and at home.

Whom governments identify as partners among the diasporas is an illustration of the country’s development priorities, and different policymakers will prioritize dialogue differently with professionals, student networks and academia, business people, community representatives or cultural associations among their diasporas.

Throughout the responses, professionals in the medical sector and research (education and IT) appear to be the priority diaspora
targets for matching skills abroad with professional needs at home. The most common type of partnership among all respondents is with international organizations to engage diasporas in the economic and social development of both home and host countries.

The questionnaire provides an interesting comparison of government interest in financial and human resources. More countries within our sample facilitate remittance transfers (approximately 50%), whereas fewer develop databases on diaspora skills and competences (roughly 30%).

The responses do not indicate clear regional trends showing more interest in financial rather than human capital. It appears that human and financial capital interests are complementary, which implies the need for more comprehensive diaspora policies. The Americas are an exception to this as evidence shows that interest in remittances is clearly greater than in human capital.

Policy Concerns

The local level (local authorities, local partnerships, local networks) appears as a key feature for channelling diaspora contributions in an efficient and tangible way.

Collaboration between home and host countries is acknowledged as a key feature to develop effective programmes targeting diasporas owing to their transnational dimension. Examples of such collaboration do exist, but there are reported as difficult to achieve and still insufficient.

Our questionnaire could not provide any specific information on the role of social networks contributing to a better communication between governments and diasporas or influencing diasporas’ decisions to become engaged in development initiatives for the home country.

Respondents often cited the difficulty of developing a common agenda with diasporas, identifying the right partners and overcoming the reluctance of diasporas to work with governments.
The development of technology and communications systems has lessened the need for respondent countries to facilitate the return of their diasporas, and has increased the awareness of countries to the potential contributions via the diaspora networks.

A great number of respondents consider that international organizations have played an important role in relating with diasporas and integrating migration concerns into development strategies. Country strategies for Benin, Cape Verde, Madagascar and Mali have been developed in cooperation with the IOM and shared with home governments and donors in order to match their development concerns with diaspora resources. In the questionnaire, however, international organizations appear as merely donor or funding institutions, whose financial assistance is appreciated by many respondents.

**Detailed Analysis**

This third and final part offers a detailed analysis of the main points of interest raised by this survey: data collection, diaspora initiatives and counterparts, policy tools, partnerships, diaspora financial resources and diaspora human capital resources.

*Data Collection: Still Limited but Acknowledged as a Priority for Many Respondent Countries*

Reliable data and information are prerequisites to enable governments to engage diasporas in practical programmes for development. The availability of data often reflects the degree of policy interest and, as reporting methods improve, more detailed data are generated.

Data collection on diasporas involves a number of specific challenges: first, diasporas have to be properly defined and determined to yield accurate quantitative and qualitative data; second, the difficulty of collecting data on diaspora organizations; third, defining and measuring transnational diaspora flows, and
fourth, identifying the institutions responsible for gathering data on diasporas. A major barrier to data collection on diasporas is the reluctance of diaspora populations themselves to respond to surveys and governmental inquiries, which demonstrates the importance of having neutral bodies undertaking such exercises.

Most respondent countries pursue activities geared to their own diasporas abroad. Seventy-two per cent of respondents stated that they collected data on their own diasporas abroad. Chart 6 shows the level of data collection by regions. Though the Asia-Pacific region distinguishes itself from other regions due to its slightly higher degree of data collection on diasporas abroad, other regions have also taken an interest in this issue, in particular in the south and central American countries.
Among the eight countries stating that they did not collect data, some are LDCs, which may point to a lack of financial capacity to collect such information on diasporas.

Furthermore, some respondents explained that their communities abroad were excessively dispersed, preventing them from collecting data, which, in turn, indicates a need for further research on registration systems abroad, currently not included in the questionnaire. Such registration systems would warrant such considerations as whether registration was voluntary or compulsory, which agency maintained the registry for diasporas and how the registry could be used for national elections or citizenship purposes.

A major issue raised by the questionnaire was how the accurate registration of expatriates was to be assured. Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania and Ukraine stated that they collected data on demography, location, country of destination, gender, age, qualifications, occupation and length of stay. Other countries gathered specific data such as students abroad (Peru) and voters abroad (Estonia). Australia has many sources allowing it to track expatriates, such as its Census of Overseas Temporary Workers, the Graduate Destination Survey, the Online Registration Service and exit and entry cards that all together can offer a picture of diaspora populations.

Examples:

- **Chile**: Worldwide census of Chileans abroad in 2003-2005 which gathers demographic, educational and professional data.
- **Colombia**: An ongoing census based on consular registries.
- **El Salvador**: In addition to its population of 6.1 million, 2 million are registered by consulates abroad.
- **Italy**: A database of Italians abroad keeps track of such information. Italians staying abroad for more than 12 months register through consu-
lates abroad. All information is compiled into one single national database.

Mali
A demographic census and electoral census tracks the socio-professional status of migrants.

Ivory Coast
An estimated 26 per cent of the national population is abroad.

Tunisia
The Tunisian government maintains an annual updated database to collect demographic statistics and data on the evolution of nationals abroad (numbers and professional and educational data).

Uruguay
Data are collected by the National Institute for Statistics based on figures from the National Migration Service which tracks entrance and exit flows.

Colombia
Cross-border data on entrance and exit flows are compared with data from the United States.

Philippines
Different sources of data contribute to give a general view of its diasporas: the Commission on Filipinos Overseas collects statistics and estimates the stock of Filipinos abroad (as of December 2001); the Filipino Overseas Information System offers information about emigrants, the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters and the Census of Overseas Filipinos (www.census.gov.ph). The diversity of sources allows a good estimate of the Filipino population abroad. The Philippines also highlights the relationship between diaspora policies and labour migration. In this case, the focus is on citizens who live abroad as labour migrants. The Overseas Filipinos Workers are specifically classified according to occupation, job categories, destination and gender. Information about overseas workers is more readily available than on diasporas, which encompass
larger populations (families, nationals settled permanently abroad, second generations). A similar situation exists in Pakistan, where the main institution charged with diaspora issues is located in the Ministry of Labour and Overseas Pakistanis.

Many respondents did not specify either figures or the type of data they collect on diasporas. In addition, many respondents had not designated a particular institution in charge of data collection, and consulate offices have carried out most of the relevant work overseas. This suggests that there may be a significant number of diasporas abroad who have not been accounted for through any institutional means. The questionnaire was intended to offer a first glance on the diaspora policy context. Future research should include the methods used to gather data, identify the type of data needed, examine registration issues and encourage international data exchanges.

Only very few countries have gender-specific programmes or interlocutors among their diaspora groups (the Indonesian government identified the State Ministry for Women Empowerment as one of the specific governmental structures to work with diasporas).

Although governments confirmed that they collected data, they also considered the collection of data on diasporas abroad as one of the most significant obstacles to policy development. The responses were not detailed enough to explain why the data collection is such a significant problem (difficulties to define who diasporas are? Problems to register citizens and national abroad? Lack of data collection tools and methodologies?, etc.) This highlights the need for qualitative and quantitative indicators of the realities of diasporas, as well as for improved information exchange between sending and receiving countries which might yield useful statistics of mutual interest.
Diaspora Counterparts

A major result expected from this questionnaire is the identification of diasporas with which governments are in contact. It is evident that governments interact with a diversity of stakeholders. The results have two major interests:

First, those identified by governments as partners among the diasporas illustrate governmental priorities. Some policymakers will prioritize dialogue with professionals, student networks, business people, academia, community representatives or cultural associations in their diaspora communities abroad. The following examples show that countries concerned with labour migration or with brain-drain issues will engage in dialogue with diaspora representatives from:

- Migrant worker associations abroad: Indonesia
- Student associations: Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Madagascar
- Associations of young people: Lithuania
- Community associations: Mexico
- Business and professional associations: Tunisia, Cape Verde (Tunisian entrepreneurs from France investing in Tunisia, and Cape Verdian entrepreneurs from Portugal investing in Cape Verde)
- Scientific associations (academia and researchers): Tunisia
- Academic networks: Chilean networks in Argentina
- Virtual networks: El Salvador Grupo Virtual de noticias

Second, the responses illustrate the level of organization of diasporas (associations, networks, virtual initiatives, etc.), their own agenda and the dynamics of the diaspora world in general:
The Mexican government interacts with a very well-organized forum of the Consultative Council of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad.

Other associations will illustrate a particular issue for the country, such as the Association of Parents with Children abroad (Uruguay).

The State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad keeps contacts with over 600 structures from 90 different countries in all types of activities (cultural, political, professional, etc.).

The questionnaire confirms the transnational dimension of these networks which function as bridges between countries: regarding Romania, for instance, there are references to Franco-Romanian and Australian-Romanian associations.

Nevertheless, two main types of diaspora representations are referred to as the most common partners for governmental action. First, 66 per cent of the respondents referred to community and hometown associations as their primary contact points (Chart 7). This indicates that governments have access to a stock of information relevant to community or hometown associations established abroad through their consulates and embassies.
Second, 61 per cent of the respondents stated professional/business networks as their diaspora contacts (Chart 8). Finally, 57 per cent mentioned individuals as their diaspora contacts.

Virtual forums/networks do not seem to figure very prominently as a contact for the respondent countries because of frequent changes of content, the variety and changes in individuals participating in the forums and time limits.

Some examples of organized databases on diaspora contacts:

- The Bulgarian government (State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad) maintains contact with over 600 cultural, political, professional and student organizations.
- Ethiopia has a very active approach to its diaspora issues. When asked to identify interlocutors within its diasporas, the Ethiopian government provided detailed information as well as links to internet websites of cultural, academic and individual contact points.
- El Salvador maintains a database of networks or associations as its diaspora contacts.
A key finding is that diasporas emerge as privileged business partners. Considering diasporas as business partners goes beyond the issue of remittance transfers and towards other broader areas of financial activities, such as trade exchange and foreign direct investment. A very high number of governments identified business associations, networks and clubs among their diaspora partners.

**Policy Tools and Measures to Engage Diasporas for Development**

There are two types of governmental measures for organizing diasporas: direct financial support and indirect measures, such as organizing events, holding forums, facilitating access to services, etc.

There were very few affirmative responses regarding direct financial support to existing structures. Whether they are for diasporas abroad or for third-country diasporas within their borders, most respondents were reluctant to offer direct financial support, preferring indirect measures. The questionnaire results show that only about 20 per cent of respondents provided any kind of financial assistance to their diasporas abroad. In addition, many countries are hesitant to offer direct financial assistance to or funding of foreign diaspora associations. Mali explained that the Constituent Assembly of the High Council for Malians Abroad (Haut Conseil des Maliens à l’Extérieur) was financed as
a new structure and that it did not financially support already existing diaspora structures.

A significant 70 per cent of respondents stated that they organized events for diasporas abroad. This is an indication that organizing events is one of the most common means to reach out to diasporas (Chart 9). However, this does not indicate whether a development objective is also being pursued thereby.

There are numerous examples of such events for diasporas abroad:

Benin Organizes day for Beninese abroad in France and Belgium for information sharing and communication among diasporas. Benin has also designed a website for their expatriates at www.mcrigate.bj.

Ethiopia The annual Ethiopian Diaspora Day is held in December in Addis Ababa.

Hungary The high-level Hungarian Standing Conference. The Hungarian government has also constructed a website for diasporas abroad at www.htmh.hu.


Philippines Balik-Saya Programmes that bring Filipino culture through the performing arts to its diasporas in the Middle East, Europe and the United States.

Rwanda Events for its diaspora, such as les Conventions globales des Rwandais de la diaspora, and its internet website, www.rewandadiaspora.org, for its diasporas abroad.

Thailand National Day and Thai Food Festivals for diasporas.
Tunisia  Summer school organized by the Office of Tunisians Abroad.

Zimbabwe  Homelink System organizes business events or trips for diaspora members.

Côte d’Ivoire  *Colloque international de valorisation des compétences de la diaspora* (CIVACAD) to better utilize diaspora resources.

By organizing events that encompass such areas as education, business, health, food or culture, the respondent governments expect to involve their diasporas abroad in diverse activities of their home countries even though the development and poverty reduction objectives are not clearly stated.

A number of governments have endeavoured to support development by attracting diasporas to work systematically with their countries of origin. Institutional and legislative measures are intended to help to organize diasporas abroad and enhance their long-term contributions. Regarding such measures, 76 per cent of respondents stated that they had consular services directed towards diasporas abroad. Consulates appear to be the most important interlocutors and actors to interact with diasporas (Chart 10).
Peru, for instance, defined a new key role for its consulates as the interface between the government and its diasporas. Consulates are considered as playing a key role both for countries with well-established diaspora policies, where consulates are given special recognition and resources, as well as those with frail policies, where consulates seem the sole link to diaspora populations.

A number of indirect measures facilitate the engagement of diasporas for development by granting them particular rights. A case in point is dual citizenship (Chart 11).

Dual citizenship is less common in Africa and is often identified by respondents as a field of ongoing restructuring and reflection. However, the importance of dual citizenship is recognized as facilitating diaspora contributions by many African respondents.

Granting special rights to diasporas is acknowledged by numerous countries as a noteworthy measure to attract diasporas. Voting rights granted to diasporas from Tunisia allow citizens
abroad to vote in presidential elections, and Algeria ensures the same rights to its diasporas as to residents in presidential and legislative elections. Property rights (Chart 12) are also significant, especially for post-communist countries where the right to property was often not recognized or lost when emigrating from their country of origin.

Respondents appear to connect such measures, which are not specifically targeted at a development objective, to indirectly favouring diaspora contributions to development.

There are also specific residence and visa arrangements to facilitate diaspora access to their home countries, such as Algeria’s Customs Article (2002), which encourages returns to the country of origin.

Lastly, a number of respondents stressed the use of special registration and identification cards as a key institutional measure aimed at diasporas abroad.

While these cards enhance data registration, they also contribute to shaping the national definition of diasporas (citizens or nationals abroad, second and first generations, non-resident nationals, etc.). Such examples include:
Establishing Partnerships: A Road to Development?

A main result of the questionnaire is that diasporas are considered as genuine business partners. Some countries, e.g. Tunisia, have professional/business networks as significant diaspora interlocutors. Others employ their chambers of commerce to better include diaspora contributions in business and trade. Chart 13 shows that 27 per cent of the respondents, including, for instance, Madagascar and Costa Rica, have built a formal partnership with their chambers of commerce. The respondents identified a few formal transnational chambers of commerce, such as the Americano-Salvadorian Chambers of Commerce (professional networks, private companies and investors) or the American-Bangladeshi Joint Chambers of Commerce.
Commerce. With respect to incorporating chambers of commerce with foreign diaspora representatives, the Greek Commercial and Industrial Chamber consults new enterprises owned by third-country nationals to facilitate their economic establishment in Greece and also organizes conferences for foreign business people.

The most often referred to partnership by respondents is with international organizations to engage diasporas in the economic and social development of both home and host countries. In particular, middle-income and low-income countries consider international organizations as important partners. More than 50 per cent of the respondents stated that they established a partnership with international organizations, including IOM, UNDP, ILO, OECD, UNHCR, USAID and the Council of Europe. African countries most often referred to various IOM and UNDP projects, such as MIDA and TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriates Nationals).

Ethiopia organizes temporary and permanent returns of their skilled nationals through the IOM-MIDA programme.

Mali organizes temporary and permanent returns of their skilled nationals through the TOKTEN programme.
Rwanda works with IOM through the MIDA programme and with UNDP through the TOKTEN programme.

Establishing a partnership with international organizations can produce positive results by helping governments pursue a development agenda through good international practices as well as financial assistance. Still, governments need to establish and implement their own policies and programmes to effectively reap the best rewards from diasporas.

Other innovative partnerships with development, growth and poverty reduction objectives include the following:

**Financial intermediaries:**
- Sierra Leone (Forex) and Peru (Interbank);

**Commercial Banks:**
- La Banque de l’Habitat and la Banque de Développement du Mali;

**Investment agencies:**
- The Rwandan Investment and Export Promotion Agency (RIEPA) supports economic exchanges with the diasporas;

**Non Governmental Organizations (NGO):**
- French NGO in the Kayes region of west Mali within the framework of French decentralized cooperation;

**Public services (schools, hospitals):**
- Madagascar and Tunisia;

**Recruitment agencies:**
- Bangladesh;

**Institutions specialized in employment and business creation:**
- The Portuguese Institute for Employment collaborates with Cape Verde to recruit Cape Verdian diaspora professionals.

**Attracting Financial Resources**

Respondents recognize diasporas both as business partners and as important sources of remittances. The importance of financial transfers is largely confined to the LDCs.

Chart 15 shows the high interest of respondents in remittances. Approximately 57 per cent of the respondent countries stated
that they had facilitated remittance transfers from their diasporas abroad. Latin American countries, in particular, responded in concrete terms. Colombia, Honduras and Chile presented their specific agreements with banks and consulates designed to facilitate transfers. In addition, a number of African countries recognize the significance of remittances for their economies and some respondents, such as Madagascar, focus on diminishing the transaction costs.

Very few respondents offer financial packages to attract remittances from diasporas, for instance through special bonds (less than 10%) or tax exemptions (less than 35%). Some, for instance Mali, grant tax exonerations to investors from diasporas for the creation of enterprises.

The responses received regarding financial capital differed according to whether they were from less and more developed countries (LDCs and MDCs). As already referred to, many of the European countries responding to the questionnaire belong to
the MDC category, while African, Asian and American participants were in the low and middle-income categories. Most European respondents stated that they had not taken any significant measures targeting diasporas’ financial and business resources, while the countries from the Asia-Pacific and African regions showed great interest. In general, the European respondents are not enthusiastic about remittance transfers since remittances do not account for a significant portion of their national income. Also, those in charge of remittance issues are not necessarily engaged in diaspora issues. For instance, several European respondents referred to investment agencies or the Ministry of Finance as responsible to seek and encourage investments from outside the country.

Chart 16 indicates that Asia-Pacific countries, such as the Philippines and Bangladesh, are most actively facilitating remittance transfers. The respondent from Bangladesh specifically mentioned that the country endeavoured to encourage its own diasporas abroad to make remittances transfers and investments to their homeland. The Government of Pakistan offers custom benefits for those who transfer remittances to Pakistan.
Nevertheless, numerous respondents from Africa, the Middle East and the Americas also emphasized the importance of remittances. For instance:

Ethiopia
Ethiopia recently established guidelines regarding the transfer of remittances from diasporas.

Benin
The National Agency of the Beninese Abroad in Benin facilitates remittance transfers from Beninese diasporas abroad.

Sierra Leone
The country has engaged in a new scheme to use remittances for poverty alleviation projects.

Colombia
Work has been undertaken to reduce transfer costs and there is a gradual tax exemption on remittances.

Governments were also asked about their policies to inform diasporas about existing transfer mechanisms. Chart 17 shows that countries in Africa and the Middle East undertake more efforts to inform their diasporas of existing remittance transfer mechanisms.
With concrete plans and schemes from the government, financial resources of diasporas can result in a wide range of partnerships with agencies or organizations targeting remittances from diasporas for developmental initiatives. For example, in coordination with the Department of Trade and Industry, the Government of the Philippines works with the Chambers of Commerce to provide foreign investors, including diasporas abroad, with business enterprise programmes and business assistance services. The “Classroom Galing sa Mamamayang Pilipino Abroad” (CGMA) project was launched in 2003 and envisions to build classrooms through the direct involvement of Overseas Filipinos. It is a joint project between the Department of Labour and Employment, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, channels remittances towards development projects and helps in identifying local projects for investment by diasporas. The Department of Labour and Employment, the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration have also licensed recruitment agencies and industry associations as partners in development.
Though awareness of the importance of facilitating remittance transfers appears significant, evidence on countries channelling remittances towards development, or identifying local projects for development is still limited, as shown in Chart 18.

Nevertheless, the questionnaire provides some examples of innovative programmes linking remittances and investments from the diasporas to development:

Mexico  Programa Iniciativa Ciudadina, Three Plus One.
Peru  Solidarity with my people.
Bosnia and Herzegovina  A foreign direct investment agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina specializes in diasporas.
Sierra Leone  Remittances are channelled into poverty alleviation projects.
Bangladesh  The government identifies special areas for diaspora investments.
Tunisia  The government works to sensitize investment institutions and regional development institutions, and encourages them to develop a database of potential economic projects at the disposal of Tunisian business people abroad.
El Salvador  The Programa Unidos por la Solidaridad provides additional funds to the community for social and productive infrastructure investments in collaboration with local authorities.

Governments increasingly recognize diasporas as a source of remittances and other potential financial contribution as real business partners able to make long-term contributions. To enhance the potential of remittances, governments need to formulate more policies and programmes to channel such financial and economic contributions towards local development.
Attracting Diasporas’ Available Human Capital is of Growing Interest Worldwide

The previous section on data collection illustrated that many countries collect general data on diasporas. A growing area of government action is the collection of data on the qualifications and characteristics of diasporas. Chart 19 below shows that 41 per cent of the respondents collect data on diaspora qualifications.

Countries actively engaged in data collection of qualified diasporas include:

- Azerbaijan: Maintains a resources and intellectual pool of its diasporas.
- Bangladesh: Has built a Job Specification Database.
- Benin: Has a Database of Health Professional Nationals Residing in France and a Competence Database.
- Bulgaria: Keeps track of the qualifications of its nationals abroad.
Colombia Has established the Red Caldas researcher network.

El Salvador Collects data on its skilled diasporas abroad, such as a database of 150 outstanding Salvadorians, a database of 400 associations of Salvadorians abroad, a database of companies run by Salvadorians abroad, and others. The Salvadorian government also collects data on diaspora qualifications and educational degrees through its overseas consulates, and has created a Virtual Database of Talents Abroad. By means of a virtual magazine, *Comunidad en Accion*, El Salvador supports exchanges with skilled diaspora members and organizes temporary returns of skilled nationals.

Kenya Keeps track of educators and medical practitioners abroad.

Mali Collects data through the TOKTEN programme.

Mexico Keeps track of the qualifications of its diaspora.

Nigeria Has a database of professional human resources.

Pakistan Has established a National Talent Pool, a liaison agency between Pakistani diasporas and Pakistani organizations seeking expertise in various fields. This agency also identifies qualified nationals among the country’s diaspora and matches them against areas or organizations in need of certain expertise.

Philippines Has instituted the Brain Gain Network coordinated with the e-commerce Council, the highest ICT body in the government.

Portugal Keeps track of its professionals abroad.

Tunisia Has created a Database of Competences Abroad.
Uruguay Maintains a database of Uruguayans abroad within the Programa de Vinculacion.
Zimbabwe Conducts research on brain drain issues.

Though the respondents indicated the existence of such programmes, the effectiveness of these programmes is not known and an evaluation of such programmes is necessary.

Over one-third of respondents have a database on the skills and knowledge profile of their diasporas as presented in Chart 20.

Chart 20 indicates that it is overwhelmingly the Asia-Pacific respondents who collect most information on skills and knowledge of their diasporas, followed by Africa and the Middle East region. The Philippines has become involved with its diasporas through the Filipino Resource Centre, which is used to train and upgrade the skills of its diasporas. Ethiopia indicated that it had conducted virtual training sessions for engineering
students with the help of Ethiopian professors from American universities and had also organized video conference training sessions for nurses working with HIV/AIDS.

Chart 21 shows that 33 per cent of the respondents have a specific objective to match such qualifications with a job offer in the country of origin.

Professionals in the medical sector and research (education and IT) appear to be the priority throughout the responses. Many countries work with diaspora professional associations (Chart 22). Ethiopia works with its health professionals in Sweden; Zambia and Cape Verde work with their medical professionals in the EU; Australia has two fellowship initiatives for its expatriates funded by the National Health and Medical Research Council, and Germany attracts its academic and scientific diasporas in the USA. The need for employing the human capital of diasporas is more significant for Africa and the Middle Eastern countries, where the impact of brain drain has been heavily felt, although the responses show that the issue of brain drain is of growing concern to all countries.
As far as government policies with an obvious return objective are concerned, such policies appear to be in place in countries from Africa, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific, while interest in such policies remains low in the Americas and Europe (Chart 23).
Charts 24 and 25 show that 22 per cent of the respondents pursue policies and programmes targeting the permanent return of their skilled diasporas, while 27 per cent have organized such policies and programmes for temporary returns. Virtual exchanges, mainly through the web, are more numerous (Chart 26) and increasing.
Respondents stated that permanent returns occurred either spontaneously or with assistance from international organizations and programmes such as MIDA or TOKTEN. They also indicated that physical returns are not a priority, either because they favour other types of programmes, targeted at virtual returns, or because of the costs of such permanent return programmes. This lack of interest for return programmes may also be explained by the fact that they already have implemented such programmes and are interested in new areas. The questionnaire provides a few examples of return programmes conducted worldwide and considered successful.

In the Americas, Mexico responded that the government organized permanent returns of its skilled nationals through Repatriacion de Ex Becarios del CONACYT (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología). Such programmes promote brain gain to Mexico by encouraging CONACYT scholarship recipients to return and contribute to Mexican development. Lithuania also organizes permanent returns of its skilled nationals, and promotes brain gain by encouraging temporary and permanent returns of skilled Lithuanians. Skilled Lithuanian researchers are attracted back from Europe and America to work in the education and science institutions in Lithuania. The Ministry of Education and
Science awards scholarships for persons of Lithuanian descent to study in their country of origin, and encourages children of Lithuanian descent to learn their native language through secondary schools.

The Bulgarian government supports virtual exchanges with skilled people and organizes temporary returns of skilled people with the Bulgarian Velikden Movement Activity and the activities of the State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad. The Rojen 2000 Movement also encourages temporary return migration of skilled Bulgarian nationals, but the government does not seem to actively encourage its skilled diasporas to return permanently to Bulgaria. The Filipino government organizes both temporary and permanent returns of its skilled nationals through livelihood programmes and projects for returning Filipino migrant workers in coordination with the private sector. Sierra Leone organizes permanent returns of teachers, nurses, doctors and engineers, for the purpose of engaging them as agents for national development. The Programme of Settlement of Foreign Ukrainians Returning to Ukraine is funded by the government and should be completed by 2010.

The Kenyan government has “Political Leadership Pronouncements” and the “Come Home Campaign”, which encourages the return of Kenyans abroad to contribute to the development of their country.

The issue of brain drain is more significant for less developed countries. However, the responses from more developed countries regarding their diasporas abroad show that brain drain has become an issue for more developed countries as well. Such specific examples include Germany, which attracts academic and scientific experts from its diasporas in the United States, and Australia, which has established the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) awards and the Burnet Award and Howard Florey Centenary Fellowships, designed to encourage Australian researchers to come back from overseas.